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This study is premised on the assumption that cooperative partnerships or strategic 
alliances will become the dominant structure for business in future decades (Drucker, 
1989). This is evident in the phenomenal growth in the establishment of alliances the 
world over despite high failure rates. The high failure rate not withstanding, both 
domestic and international alliances are critically important to firm success (Glaister and 
Buckley, 1999). Currently, the top 500 global business firms average 60 major strategic 
alliances each (Dyer et al., 2001). Results also indicate that more than 80% of surveyed 
top level managers view strategic alliances as a primary growth vehicle and expect 
alliances to account for 25% of their company’s market value by 2005 (Schifrin, 2001).  
 
The simultaneous developments that go under the name of globalization make alliances 
or entente necessary. Entente, the striking of an alliance, is a responsible part of every 
good strategist’s repertoire (Ohmae, 2001). In a world of imperfect options, they are often 
the fastest, least risky and most profitable way to go global; and properly managed 
alliances are among the best mechanisms that companies have found to bring strategy to 
bear on these challenges. Although the use of alliances reduces entry risks, managing 
these alliances entails difficulties. Moreover, this entry strategy has some peculiarities of 
its own, especially when there are significant cultural differences between the partners. 
Under these circumstances, partner selection and initial steps toward managing the new 
relationship become critical factors for successful entry. At the partnership creation stage, 
the balance between the contributions each company will bring to the partnership and the 
difficulties they will face in managing their relationship need to be considered. As the 
  vii 
relationship unfolds, social processes gain importance. The level of inter partner trust or 
“perceived likelihood of the other not behaving in a self interested manner” (Madhok, 
1995, p.120) influences the performance of the partnership (Gill and Butler, 1996). 
 
Whilst research in the West has attempted to focus on such failings, few researchers have 
attempted to understand the state of alliances in developing country contexts and alliance 
partner selection. Malaysia is a successful developing economy with a distinct 
institutional environment. This thesis explores (1) the criteria used by Malaysian firms to 
select their partner, both task related and partner related criteria; (2) the contributions that 
Malaysian firms and their foreign counterparts bring to the partnership; and (3) 
management of the inter partner relationship, including the difficulties encountered, how 
the relationship management varies with the characteristics of the Malaysian partner, and 
the resulting effects on the process of trust building. The study’s results suggest that 
Malaysia’s stable and supportive institutional environment has helped Malaysian firms 
take a longer term view of alliance partner selection, focusing more on the potential 
partner’s intangible assets along with technological and managerial capabilities rather 
than merely transaction cost concerns. The study also finds that Malaysian firms, when 
entering into strategic alliances, do not consider every option, that is, they use filters to 
reduce the potential choice. Thus the range of possible alliance partners is restricted in 
many ways, some of these being unconsciously employed. Furthermore, it is clear that, 
while Malaysian firms consider margins, ratios and percentages, relationships have a pre-
eminent role in strategic alliances and that relationships are poised between ends and 
means to ends. It can therefore be surmised that the overall selection process in Malaysia 
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is fundamentally shaped by the manner in which potential alliance partners are initially 
identified. Case study evidence from a sample of Malaysian firms seems to bear this out. 
This study therefore contributes to knowledge about the influence of the institutional 
environment on alliance partner selection decisions for firms domiciled in developing 
countries.  
 
The study utilized phenomenology as its research paradigm, along with the case study 
method. These methods were found to be highly relevant for conducting exploratory 
research into strategic alliances because of the need to generate holistic data and for such 
data to be interpreted within context. Finally, Malaysia’s economic performance to date 
has been impressive and the outlook for continued high growth rates is good. As 
Malaysia embarks on the next stage of development, the complementarities between the 
Malaysian firms and foreign economies will provide even greater opportunities for 
greater economic integration. The managerial implications for business managers are 
highlighted. Thus, the formation of strategic alliances to achieve or maintain a 
competitive advantage and enhance the firm’s performance is an important issue 













CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Background to the thesis 
 
The Malaysian government pursues a combined multilateral, regional and bilateral 
approach to trade policy. As part of this policy, Malaysia is open to concluding regional 
or bilateral agreements that deliver substantial gains to Malaysia and which cannot be 
achieved in a similar timeframe elsewhere. Malaysia is a member of regional economic 
arrangements, including the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). Malaysia sees economic agreements as complementing 
their main approach to pursuing trade liberalization which is through an equitable, rule 
based multilateral system. It pursues bilateral and regional arrangements in order to 
maximize every opportunity available to enhance its economic growth and complement 
its pursuit of market access via the World Trade Organization.   
 
Malaysia’s specific objectives in concluding economic and cooperative agreements are to 
ensure its exporters are not disadvantaged through the proliferation of free trade 
agreements and other preferential trading agreements, to seek better access by addressing 
tariffs and non tariffs measures, to facilitate and promote trade, investment and industrial 
development and to build capacity in specific targeted areas through technical 
cooperation and collaboration. According to Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib 
Tun Razak, the Malaysian government will not simply tear down the protective barriers 
and immediately throw the local industry to the ‘wolves’ of unbridled competition; 
support will continue to be given but it will be targeted, finite and transitional, not open 
ended and unconditional (Najib, 2006).   
  1 
Economic Partnership Agreements currently being pursued by Malaysia with Japan, 
China, India, Australia, New Zealand and Middle Eastern countries are not confined to 
liberalization and market opening. They also include strategic alliances and cooperation 
in various areas including education, transport, science and technology, information and 
communication technology and agriculture. Concomitant with the spread of market 
liberalization, strategic alliances have become increasingly important for promoting 
international business.  Malaysia’s economic liberalization has brought with it increased 
competitive pressure on domestic firms from newly entering competitors from abroad. 
Many of these formerly protected firms have been unable to face this challenge; others 
have engaged in strategic alliances to better position themselves in the newly opened 
economies. More recently, the Malaysian press has been inundated with news about the 
emergence of many more such alliances. In negotiating strategic alliances, Malaysia 
seeks arrangements that provide balanced and equivalent benefits among signatories; are 
consistent with World Trade Organization rules and allow sufficient flexibility to address 
specific concerns and sensitive areas (MITI, 2004).  
 
Now that the mandate for Malaysian companies is becoming more complex, it is not 
surprising that they are reaching out to other organizations for help in the form of 
strategic alliances. Malaysian manufacturers must engage in joint economies of scale 
with the outside world through a process of specialization and interchange to open doors 
to bigger markets (Najib, 2006). So, while the mandate may still be to increase 
shareholder value, there may be a more attractive way to adapt to change, attract talent 
and diversity. That option may be to find the right partner to grow with because it has the 
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technological complement or market entry Malaysian companies need to succeed. 
Leading Malaysian companies are forming newer and more flexible forms of alliances 
with a wider array of potential partners, to increase revenues and shareholder value, adapt 
to technology driven change, increase market share in their areas of traditional strength, 
and diversify to take advantage of new market opportunities. Several prominent examples 
demonstrate that inter firm alliances can no longer be viewed as second best solutions but 
must be recognized as efficient forms of internationalization (Holtbrugge, 2004). With 
strategic alliances, Malaysian companies can grow the economic pie and increase their 
share of it through relationships that are deeper and much more strategic than traditional 
customer vendor arrangements. The partners bring solutions of equal value to the table, 
each contributing its knowledge, customer base and infrastructure (Doz and Hamel, 
1998).  
 
Perhaps the most startling development on the corporate landscape is that natural 
competitors realize it can be in their best interest to cooperate. In fact, alliances between 
competitors are no longer unusual. More than 20,000 alliances have been formed 
worldwide and they are growing at around twenty five per cent a year (Harbison & Pekar, 
1999), causing them to be viewed as a ubiquitous phenomenon (Gulati, 1998). Research 
also indicates that forty eight per cent of all alliances are between competitors (Hickins, 
2000).  For Dunning (1997), the implications of international strategic cooperation go 
beyond the firm level. According to him, a transition of the entire economic system from 
market capitalism to “alliance capitalism” can be observed, wherein large multinational 
corporations are interconnected with small and medium sized firms in a dense network of 
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joint ventures, licensing agreements and other forms of equity and non-equity 
cooperation. Consequently, the definition of strategic alliances is not coherent in the wide 
body of literature that considers the issue of what really constitutes a strategic alliance. 
For the purpose of this research, however, strategic alliances are defined as a durable 
relationship established between two or more independent firms, involving the sharing or 
pooling of resources to create a mechanism (corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a 
business activity or activities of strategic importance to one or more of the partners for 
their mutual economic advantage (Hamilton et al. 1995; 1996). Not only are strategic 
alliances typically proactive, they are also selective. There is a choice of partners, usually 
involving some consideration of at least some of the possible candidates for the role of 
alliance partner. Despite this union of equals, the casualty rate is high (Hennart, Kim and 
Zeng, 1998). Half fall apart after three years, with the clash of objectives, wrong partner 
selection, managerial culture and differing levels of priority cited as the main problems.  
 
Many executives still find alliances disconcerting - a sort of dangerous liaison of the 
business world (Harbison, 1999). Indeed, a strong and workable alliance is complex to 
negotiate and more difficult than an acquisition. What is driving these once unlikely 
unions is the reaction to a decade of re-engineering and restructuring. Managers realize 
that they cannot cost cut their way into growth and prosperity, because there is a limit to 
how much you can grow earnings by improving margins. The key to growth is in better 
overall performance. As such, alliances are now seen as one of the solutions for accessing 
those capabilities. Like all business processes, the better you manage it, the better the 
return. Unfortunately, until recently most companies were relatively inexperienced in 
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forming and managing alliances. There is however, a dearth of analysis on the causes of 
failure and, more importantly, on such crucial factors as how to successfully select 
alliance partners (Hitt, Tyler, Hardee & Park, 1995). This neglect is particularly acute in 
several developing countries, including Malaysia. This study therefore seeks to fill the 
research gap in the extant literature by developing a strategic alliance partner selection 
model for alliance managers and address the lack of research into strategic alliance 
partner selection in developing countries such as Malaysia. 
This chapter will: 
1.  define the main research problem upon which this study is based 
2.  lay out a conceptual framework for studying strategic alliance management 
3.  justify the purpose of this research 
4.  justify the research methodology adopted in this study 
5.  outline the chapters of the thesis 
6.  define key constructs used in the thesis 
7.  identify the limitations of scope and key assumptions   
 
 
1.2  The main research problem 
 
An early identification of the main research problem is essential as it focuses research 
activity and literature searches (Zuber-Skerritt and Knight 1986, Punch 1998). Further, 
asking the familiar questions of ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ leads the 
researcher to derive a research problem with appropriate parameters (Yin 1989:17, Punch 
1998). This approach has helped to identify the main research problems addressed in this 
study: What are the criteria used by Malaysian companies with differing institutional 
frameworks to select their partner; the contribution both parties bring to the partnership; 
the management of the inter partner relationship including the difficulties encountered; 
  5 
how the relationship management varies with the characteristics of the Malaysian partner; 
and the resulting effects on the process of trust building. The assumption is that strategic 
partnering is pursued by many Malaysian companies because they expect a positive 
economic result through such formation. Variation from developed markets is likely to 
occur as a function of differences in norms, resources and infrastructures. Hence, 
important differences are expected in the partner preferences of firms from each of these 
Malaysian companies. A glance at the literature invariably reveals that a major cause of 
strategic alliance failure is related to partner selection (Hitt, Tyler, Hardee & Park, 1995) 
and alliance management (Niederkofler 1991). Moreover, the partnership is subject to 
rules and regulations of regional and global agreements and institutions to which host and 
home countries of the partners and their venture subscribe. 
 
A number of key questions have been derived from the literature review (Chapter three), 
the answers to which lead directly to solving the research problem: 
1. What  key  characteristics did Malaysian companies search for in a partner 
candidate? 
2.  What initial conditions were critical for the future success of the partnership and 
what were the main differences between the two organizational cultures? 
3.  What did each partner bring to the partnership to add value? 
4.  What initial obstacles in the partnership were most difficult to overcome? 
5.  Were the legal contracts effective to protect the interest of Malaysian firms? 
6.  What kind of things did companies identify in their partner that made them trust it 
and what kind of actions or initiatives did the companies take to accelerate the 
process of trust building? 
7.  How important were the interpersonal relationships and how did the relationships 
change as time went on? 
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The purpose of this research is to examine strategic alliance partner selection preferences 
in one emerging economy and to develop a systematic understanding of the factors that 
influence the behavior of participants at the alliance level which affect alliance 
performance. A holistic strategic alliance partner selection model will facilitate 
successful leveraging of the above factors to ensure alliance goal attainment. 
 
1.3  Conceptual framework 
A conceptual framework is employed to disentangle the research problem. The 
framework was developed for the thesis based on theoretical insights drawn from the 
extant literature on strategic alliances. The framework enables us to evaluate how the 
variables noted in Chapter three (literature review) affect the role of strategic alliance 
managers. This evaluation results in the preliminary conceptualization of strategic 
alliance partner selection model presented in Chapter three. The model’s tenets will be 
field tested using the case study method with the findings presented in Chapter five. 
Insights gained will benefit alliance managers and contribute to the current corpus of 
knowledge in strategic alliances.  
Figure 1.1  Conceptual framework of strategic alliance partner selection model 
Strategic Attributes 
Financial Attributes 







Extend knowledge in 
alliance management 
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1.4  Justification for undertaking the research 
This study can be justified on a number of grounds: (a) the formation of partnerships 
between firms is an increasingly common way for firms to find and maintain competitive 
advantage; (b) high alliance failure rates; (c) the lack of research on alliance strategy in 
developing countries; (d) the use these results may be put to; and (e) the addition to the 
corpus of knowledge on strategic alliance.  
 
First, there is a need to further the research on the trend towards strategic alliances so that 
more can be learnt about the broader paradigm shift in corporate strategy of the 1990s. 
Although the trend was first noticed as early as the 1970s and 1980s (Drucker 1969, 
Porter 1980, Toffler 1981), its relevance in the 21
st century cannot be understated. The 
formation of strategic alliances is motivated primarily to gain competitive advantage in 
the marketplace (Porter, 1980, Powell, 1990, Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). However, 
prescriptions for the formation of such partnerships often overlook the drawbacks or 
hazards of such relationships. For example, increasing complexity, loss of autonomy and 
information asymmetry (Provan, 1984; Williamson, 1975) may accompany partnering 
relationships. Although the number of attempted partnerships has grown almost 
geometrically in recent years, the rates of success are rather low (Harrigan, 1988; Kanter, 
1988). In fact, while the formation of partnering relationships is often viewed as a 
panacea for an individual firm’s competitive woes, the prescription to form an alliance to 
gain competitive advantage overlooks the fact that many strategic partnerships do not 
succeed. Unfortunately, the academic literature has been slow to embrace this important 
managerial concern (Day and Klein, 1987) and little guidance has emerged on how to 
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better ensure partnership success.  Research on strategic alliances has posited theories 
addressing the reasons why firms enter into closer business relationships. For example, 
transactions costs analysis (Williamson, 1975, 1985), competitive strategy (Porter, 1980), 
resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967), political economy 
(Benson, 1975; Stern and Reve, 1980), social exchange theory (Anderson and Narus, 
1984) each make predictions about when partnerships will be formed. Implicit in this 
research is the assumption that when used under the appropriate circumstances and 
environmental conditions, partnerships will be successful. Yet, as mentioned earlier, a 
large percentage of these strategic partnerships do not succeed. Given this inconsistency, 
one must question what factors are associated with partnership success. Knowledge of 
factors that are associated with partnership success could aid in the selection of partners 
as well as in the on going management of the partnership. 
 
Secondly, much prior work on alliance partner selection examined the selection decisions 
made by foreign entrants, commonly from developed nations (Geringer, 1988). With the 
exception of Shenkar and Li (1999), little work has been done on how firms domiciled in 
emerging economies approach alliance partner selection. Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle 
and Borza (2000) employed a resourced based framework to examine different alliance 
partner selection decisions made by firms in developed and emerging markets. However, 
Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright (2000) argued that research should be extended to 
increase the understanding of institutional forces present in developing economies. 
Institutions are defined as shared, collective understandings of rules of conduct reflected 
in laws, rules, governance mechanisms and capital markets (North, 1990; Scott, 2001), 
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which help to define observed patterns of market exchange (Fligstein, 1996). Institutional 
arrangements can produce entry barriers or create opportunities for action. As a result, 
variation in strategic actions across contexts may be a function of differences in the 
existence, saliency and intensity of particular institutional arrangements. For example, 
Kogut, Walker and Anand (2002) found that inter industry firm diversification patterns 
varied across countries because of differences in institutional arrangements. Park and 
Ungson (1997) argued that the values and norms embedded in the institutions could also 
affect the development and management of strategic alliances. Bianci (2002) showed that 
a firm’s success with an international strategy was a function of its conformity to 
institutional norms most salient in the local country contexts. Thus, institutional 
arrangements influence the evolution of national economies, organizational forms and 
managerial actions.  
 
In this response, this research will extend the work of Hitt et al (2000) by comparing the 
characteristics of international strategic alliance partners preferred by managers in firms 
based in Malaysia.  Further, in the context of Malaysia, the study is significant because it 
will benefit the expansion of the Malaysian economy as well as the country’s current 
strategic intent of an export driven economic growth strategy.  Hence, more empirical 
studies on Malaysian firms are required to provide more data on the applicability of 
extant theories on the formation of strategic alliances from developing countries.  Hoesel 
(1999:35) stated that what is seriously lacking at present are new empirical findings that 
will enable us to make theoretical statements and hypotheses more concrete.  
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Third, partner selection does not occur in a vacuum. Much firm behavior is nested or 
embedded in a broader political, economic and social context that shapes action (Dacin, 
Ventresca & Beal, 1999). Emerging markets have become a critically important global 
phenomenon and there is need for more research on them. In particular, there has been 
little research on strategic alliances with partners in emerging markets (Lee & Beamish, 
1995). Beamish (1994) argued that joint ventures, the most common form of strategic 
alliances, were the dominant strategy used in emerging markets by multinational firms. 
Emerging markets provide a particularly rich setting to examine the firm characteristics 
used in partner selection. The economic and sometimes social instability in emerging 
markets produces ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the rules of exchange; in this 
context, the rules are still evolving (North, 1990: Pederson & Thomsen, 1997). In 
emerging markets, the strategic alliance is a relatively new form of organizing (Lewin, 
Long & Carroll, 1998). Also, important differences in the underlying institutional 
infrastructures of emerging markets affect managers’ strategic orientations (Garten, 
1996). Patrick and Luthans (1995) suggested that even countries that are geographically 
proximal could be economically, politically and culturally distant in significant ways.  
 
Child and Faulkner stated that when one of the partners comes from an emerging country 
and the other from a highly developed economy, their configuration of objectives would 
almost certainly differ from that in the case of partners from two developed countries 
(1998:297). This is especially important in an international setting where differences in 
culture, infrastructure, economic development and government policies increase the 
complexity of the context in which the alliance is embedded (Slocum & Lei, 1993). 
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Enterprise strategies in emerging economies are therefore facing strong environmental 
pressures for change, yet this change is neither smooth nor automatic nor uniform across 
different markets. Thus, it is imperative to consider the different contexts in which 
strategic alliance partner selection decisions are embedded. 
 
Fourth, in comparing and contrasting alliance partner selection from another globally 
important region, this study makes three contributions. First, this research will contrast 
the institutional environments in Malaysia and postulate how its differences affect the 
types of alliance partners preferred by local firms in this country. Second, this research 
adds to the understanding of strategic alliances in the international business literature by 
examining the preferences of firms indigenous to developing economies as opposed to 
those of foreign entrants. Third, this research represents one of the few case studies to 
examine one developing economy on important strategic actions. Thus, this case study 
adds to knowledge of international strategic alliance partner selection decisions by 
extending the resource based framework used by Hitt et al (2000) to highlight the effects 
of institutional arrangements on alliance partner selection. The findings suggest that the 
types of partners and the resources desired vary according to the environment in which 
the firms must operate. The results may also provide support for other more specific 
effects of the institutional environment such as regulatory regimes (Scott, 2001). They are 
also lessons for managers and policy makers who are constantly seeking to promote or 
enhance alliance management. The findings of the research will also be of theoretical 
value to the corpus of knowledge in strategic alliance which is the immediate discipline 
  12 
of the research problem. They also contribute to indigenous research (Tsui & Lau 2002) 
by studying firms based in emerging economies. 
 
Fifth, although the characteristics and structure of the Malaysian economy may not be 
homogeneous, it shares several characteristics with many developing economies. As 
indicated by Snodgrass (1980, p.5), “Malaysia is a good case to study because it has 
much in common with a significant group of developing economies yet in some 
important respects is a polar case, in which widespread problems and possibilities appear 
with particular vividness and urgency”. Malaysia is also a nation in which the state has 
played an active part in its economic development, particularly in the stabilization of 
initial conditions (political and social) and random shocks (especially terms of trade) 
during the initial stages of development. Despite the fact that the Malaysian economy is 
based on a “free market system”, the state has dominated the economy through its 
interventionist approach since independence in 1957. Policies were implemented by the 
government over a wide range of activities, from distributing the nation’s wealth to 
industrial development. This is unlike the western context where the role of the state is 
benign and indirect. Thus, by using Malaysia as a case study, an alternative perspective is 
provided for understanding the significance of the role of the state in achieving more 
rapid economic development. This will also provide data for more extensive subsequent 
research and testing of propositions and hypotheses as part of an ongoing research on 
Malaysian firms. 
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Finally, Malaysia’s former Prime Minister (1981 to 2003), Dr Mahathir Mohamad is well 
known for his campaign for the preservation of ‘Asian Values’ and they have permeated 
the relations between state and market in Malaysia. The initial approach of both Western 
and Asian companies doing business in Asian countries was to adopt the ‘colonialist 
model’ (Davies, 1996). Asian companies adopted Western models uncritically and 
Western companies transplanted their own business and management cultures into their 
Asian subsidiaries, joint ventures or regional offices. Very little attention was given to 
differences in organizational and management cultures, working practices and social 
cultures (Davies, 1996). However, evidence suggests that Western management practices 
do not always adequately translate over to organizations operating outside of Anglo-
spheres of influence (Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Newman and Nollen, 1996), resulting in 
many management disasters among the first joint ventures and market forays to the East 
(Davies, 1996). To the extent that a considerable proportion of the discourse of strategic 
alliance is characterized by developed country and universalistic, ‘one size fits all policy 
approach’, a different approach is called for. Thus, this study of international strategic 
alliances also casts light on the path of economic change in a non western society.    
 
1.5      Methodology 
This thesis adopts the case study approach, as propounded by Yin (1989, 1994), to 
explore the variables that lead to the formation of strategic alliances in Malaysia. An 
early appreciation of the determining variables was derived from the extant literature on 
international strategic alliances reviewed in Chapter three. A strategic alliance in effect 
involves strategic partners in coevolving relationships with a web of internal and external 
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ties of networks. The role of the alliance manager (someone representing the company, 
General Managers or Directors) is necessarily about relationship management. Thus, the 
unit of analysis, the alliance manager, has to constantly contend with dynamic rather than 
mere dyadic, or company level relationships (De Burca and McLoughlin 1998). Research 
on Malaysia has not focused on partner selection and the management of the first steps in 
the relationship. Thus, given the state of knowledge in this area, theory building goals, 
research design and data collection methods were selected accordingly in an exploratory 
manner. The methodology used was qualitative analysis of data collected mainly from 
semi structured interviews. Analysis was done using the tools and techniques for 
qualitative data analysis suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). The procedures these 
authors suggest involve the use of descriptive and analytical matrices designed ad hoc by 
the researchers to facilitate data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and 
verification.  
 
There is general consensus amongst researchers that the case study approach entailing 
interviews is the most appropriate methodology that can fully capture the strategic value 
and dynamic nature of networks that involve human interactions over time and space and 
as a corporate strategy (Stainback 1988, Hamel and Doz 1991, Niederkofler 1991, Stiles 
1995, Easton 1998, Prahalad 2004, Ghoshal 2005). Moreover, it has the advantage of 
employing an embedded design, that is, multiple levels of analysis within a single study 
(Yin 1994) such as at the industry and company level.   
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In a nutshell, the case study method has the potential to capture a complex phenomenon 
such as relationships at multiple levels. In particular, Smith, Carroll and Ashford (1995) 
call for “more case studies that are capable of capturing the complexities and dynamics of 
cooperation.” In his critical appraisal of international joint venture research (IJV), Parkhe 
(1993) argued that certain core questions at the heart of the IJV relationship have been 
overlooked by studies which are methodologically impeccable but theoretically weak. In 
particular, he reasoned that prevailing norms emphasizing sophisticated analyses of data 
drawn from mail surveys and secondary sources are fundamentally ill suited for dealing 
with the inherent “messiness” of cross border cooperative alliances. Such studies boast 
large sample sizes but offer little in-depth analysis into important partner selection issues. 
Parkhe proposed instead a research program geared towards a deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms of inter firm cooperation and motivated by goals of theory development. 
He further added that the “maximally efficient procedure” for advancing IJV theory 
begins with the iterative dialogue of ideas and evidence that is characteristic of the 
multiple case study research method.   
 
In the same vein, Steven White (2002) in his assessment of the state of management 
research in Asian contexts drawn from 840 articles, asserted that too much of the research 
effort has been limited to simplistic comparisons, correlational analyses providing no 
insight into underlying processes and skewed, idiosyncratic sampling. The result has been 
a lack of theory development and contribution to conceptual discourse beyond an 
audience specifically interested in Asia, with little relevance for management practice.  
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Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, the methodological approach here follows that 
taken by Parkhe (1993) and Steven White (2002). 
 
The thesis has two basic key assumptions. One is that a major cause of alliance failures is 
partner selection and therefore relates to the task performed by alliance managers. The 
second assumption is that the current phenomenal growth in the number of strategic 
alliances the world over will continue into the 21
st century, as the trend towards 
globalization is here to stay (Ohmae, 2001). With increased globalization, many firms 
feel that an effective way to serve overseas markets and remain competitive edge is 
through establishing alliances with overseas partners.   
 
1.6      Thesis outline  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one provides a brief outline of the nature 
of the thesis, a justification for a case study approach and the choice of Malaysia as the 
case study. Chapter two outlines the basic Malaysian economic framework and 
specifically looks at the structural transformations that have taken place in the overall 
economy over the last three decades. Emphasis on capital intensive and information 
technology industries in support of the establishment of the Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC) and the realization of Vision 2020 indicates the preparation for an international 
economic environment and the changing comparative advantage. A key component of the 
success of the Malaysian economy has been the management and adequate policy 
response to the various economic crises. These policies and strategies have been 
instrumental in the dramatic economic growth of the last thirty years. Chapter three sets 
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out to derive a definition of strategic alliance, lays out a classification of theories to 
analyzing strategic alliance, reviews strategic alliance literature against the theoretical 
approaches and derives an initial conceptualization of a holistic strategic alliance partner 
selection model. The main contribution of Chapter three is its derivation of seven 
research questions that guided the actual research. Chapter three forms an important part 
of the thesis because it is through the process of critical evaluation of adding 
incrementally to a body of knowledge that progress is made (Naude and Turnbull 1998). 
The literature may be used in sharpening the focus of the study and to give structure to its 
questions and designs. In all cases the researcher needs to connect the proposed study to 
the literature (Punch, 1998).  
 
Following on from the research questions derived in Chapter three, Chapter four justifies 
the research paradigm and method used in this thesis and lays out the research procedures 
that guided the actual research. The research paradigm used in this thesis is 
phenomenology, one that fits well with the case study method because of the exploratory 
nature of the research. Chapter five undertakes a cross case analysis of the rich individual 
data found in the case summaries with a view to deriving common themes. These themes 
are in turn, linked to the theoretical findings of strategic alliance and their experiences in 
developed and developing countries. The cross case analysis fulfills the requirements of 
data and theoretical triangulation, being important requirements of the case study 
approach. Chapter six draws on the accumulated evidence presented in Chapters two, 
four and five to derive answers to the seven research questions. It also presents 
implications for policy and practice and contributes to strategic alliance partner selection 
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a holistic conceptual model, modified from that presented in Chapter three. Finally, the 
study’s limitations are discussed and potential areas for future research identified. 
 
1.7       Limitations of scope and key assumptions. 
At the outset, the main research problem investigated in this thesis automatically limits it 
to exploring the management environment within which a strategic alliance manager, the 
primary unit of analysis of this study has to operate. Further, the main research problem 
focuses on the alliance institutional and external environment contexts in Malaysian 
firms. Thus, the focus of the research centres on strategic alliances formation and on 
seeking to understand the emergent problems and issues rather than on managing 
strategic alliance or termination strategies. These issues have been well documented in 
the literature.  Because the thesis uses the case study approach, the generalizations of 
findings are theoretical rather than statistical (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Theories can be 
compelling and useful despite being primarily explanatory (De Rond, 2002). Yin 
(1994:10) explains this succinctly by noting that case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes.  
 
In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a sample, and the 
investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytical/theoretical 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization). 
Generalisation should not necessarily be the objective of all research projects, whether 
case studies or not (Denzin, 1983; De Rond, 2002). Generalizations are highly superficial 
at best and grossly inadequate at worst (Bertagnogli, 2001). While on this lack of 
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generalizability criticism of case study research, which is often a ‘knee jerk’ reaction to 
the case study, we should note the central role given to the case method of teaching in 
professional schools of business, medicine and law, as well as nursing, public 
administration, social work and psychoanalysis (Reinharz, 1992). In these training 
situations, historical cases are studied in great detail, and are used to train managers, 
doctors, lawyers and so on, to deal with situations they will encounter in the future. This 
clearly underlines the potential generalisability of knowledge built from case studies. If 
every case were totally unique, there would be no transferability of knowledge from one 
case to another and little point in the case method of training (Punch, 1998). Following 
this line of argument, it may be that too much research has tried to go straight to 
measurement and quantitative mapping, without the fuller understanding of the 
phenomena and processes involved that is best achieved by case studies (Punch, 1998). In 
case studies, random selection is neither necessary nor even preferable (Eisenhardt 
1989:537). Case studies use theoretical sampling which may involve the selection of 
cases such as extreme situations and polar types (Pettigrew 1988, cited in Eisenhardt 
1989).  
 
1.8         Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundation for this thesis. It showed major gaps specifically in 
the area of strategic alliance partner selection despite the hitherto voluminous literature 
on alliances and networking. Following this, the main research problem and research 
questions were introduced. A conceptual framework of the thesis was outlined and the 
case study methodology was presented, based mainly on the dynamic nature of alliance 
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management involving human interactions over time where reality changes with changes 
in people’s perception, where reality is what people perceive it to be and where values 
will impact on the understanding of the phenomena. The thesis was then outlined with 
brief descriptions of each chapter, key constructs defined and finally an overview of the 
limitations. On these foundations, the thesis is set to proceed with a detailed description 
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In the early 1980s, the term newly industrializing countries was applied to a few fast 
growing and liberalizing Asian and Latin American countries. Because of the widespread 
adoption of market based policies by most developing countries, the term `newly 
industrializing countries’ has now been replaced by the broader term `emerging market 
economies’. An emerging economy can be defined as a country that satisfies two criteria: 
a rapid pace of economic development and government policies favouring economic 
liberalization and the adoption of a free market system (Arnold & Quelch, 1998). In 
1999, The International Finance Corporation (IFC, 1999) identified 51 rapid growth 
developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East as emerging 
economies, including Malaysia. In addition to these fast followers, following the 
classification of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD, 1998) 
13 transition economies were added to the list, including China and Russia. The pace of 
political change and the size of economic gains have not been uniform across the 64 
emerging market economies. The rapid and widespread adoption of market based policies 
by emerging economy governments raises important issues for the strategies adopted by 
private enterprises, both domestic and foreign. In fact, the 21
st century has been referred 
to as the century of Pacific Asia (Tung, 1994).  
 
In spite of this evidence, the literature of international business regarding developing 
markets tends to be very limited, although lately a few countries and regions such as 
China and Mexico have been attracting the attention of academic researchers (Yadong, 
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1999; Kotabe et al., 2000). What is even more striking is that, according to Govindarajan 
and Gupta (2000), in the next 20 years the economic centre of gravity of the world will 
shift toward these countries. During this period of time these Big Emerging Markets 
(BEMs) are expected to be the homes of a number of large players in the world’s 500 
largest companies. These changes in the international economic environment are 
expected to accelerate in the coming years due to the fast growth of BEMs relative to 
developed countries, as well as the strategies of multinational firms benefiting from 
economies of scale and locational advantages. 
 
At the same time as domestic policies are becoming more market oriented, emerging 
economy governments are opening their countries to foreign markets and joining regional 
trading associations such as AFTA (Asean Free Trade Area). New relationships between 
foreign and domestic enterprises are emerging as strategic alliances replacing export 
processing zones and subcontracting arrangements. Alliances with Malaysian firms can 
be seen a gateway into other Asian markets allowing foreign firms to leverage their 
existing alliances into avenues for future collaboration. Given these factors, Malaysian 
firms are likely candidates for cross border alliances. Malaysian firms seeking to find 
new markets for their products will search for partnerships in the western hemisphere and 
Europe and firms from these regions will seek ways to tap into Malaysia’s growing 
economy. Enterprise strategies in emerging economies are therefore facing strong 
environmental pressures for change, yet this change is neither smooth nor automatic nor 
uniform across different markets. 
 
  23 
Malaysia is an Asian country that has emerged as a major participant in the world 
economy during the last two decades. As a result, competition between Malaysian and 
foreign firms in global markets is increasing. Malaysia is a country that relies heavily on 
exports for economic expansion. Its economic expansion is related to its evolution from 
an agricultural based country in the early 1960s to an industrialized one in the 1980s and 
is vigorously supported by government policies through its interventionist approach since 
independence from Britain in 1957 (Economic Analytical Unit, 2005).  
 
Policies were implemented by the government over a wide range of activities from 
distributing the nation’s wealth to industrial development. Government support in the 
form of national and industrial policies can motivate certain forms of industrial 
development. Except for a few dogmatic conservative market economists, there is now 
widespread acknowledgement of the crucial, pro-active role of the state in East Asian late 
industrialization. It is increasingly clear that there has been considerable variation in the 
role, nature and extent of government intervention, and that these have changed over time 
(Jomo; Deyo, 1987). The focus of macroeconomic management through the 2001 to 2005 
planning period was on low and stable inflation, an adequate level of national savings, a 
balance of payments surplus, a stable exchange rate, debt sustainability, fiscal prudence 
and strong and unencumbered external reserves (Economic Planning Unit, 2003).  
 
From 1980 to 1995, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand more than doubled their real 
income per person while the US’s increased by only 20 per cent (Sarel, 1997). This led 
Rowan (1998, p.1) to comment that their record of development is exceptional, not only 
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in comparison to other developing regions but in world history. Although the 1997 
financial crisis may to some extent have discredited the Asian miracle, the East Asian 
countries’ leap from poverty and economic and technological backwardness over a period 
of less than 40 years has been something of a “miracle” (World Bank, 1993; Stiglitz, 
1996, 1998; Sachs, 1997; Nelson and Pack, 1999; Booth, 1999). The facts on the high 
growth performance of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), including Malaysia, 
are not in dispute. They are acknowledged by proponents and critics alike. What is in 
dispute is the interpretation of these facts and their significance for development theory 
and policy.  
 
The main objectives of this chapter are: (1) to highlight economic growth in Malaysia 
paying particular attention to productivity growth; (2) to analyze the main factors and 
policies that are responsible for growth as well as several issues that are considered 
restrictive on business activities in Malaysia; (3) to explain the changing phases of the 
Malaysian economy and the various achievements and conundrums since independence. 
Emphasis is given on the historical account of the changing economic environment, 
comparative advantage and the shift from an agriculture based economy to a manufacture 
based economy. More importantly, the economic framework and industrialization 
strategies that have guided the Malaysian economy into success are clearly outlined. An 
account of the management of the various economic cycles, crises that have hit the 
economy and the impact of these crises on the economy are also dealt with. To give a 
more comprehensive understanding of the Malaysian economy, discussions on issues of 
manpower, privatization, financial, multimedia development and Vision 2020 are also 
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included. The thrust of the argument centre around the assumption that an economy is a 
complex dynamic system and there are strong interactions among selected variables. 
 
 2.1  An Overview of Malaysia’s Economic Performance 
 
Figure 2.1 

































Source: World Bank, 2003 
 
Malaysia is currently experiencing a transitional process towards the production structure 
of the developed economies. This transitional process has led to rapid output growth after 
political independence in 1957. Prior to establishing the New Economic Policy in 1970, 
Malaysia was predominantly a commodity based economy, relying on rubber and tin. 
There was also a program of import substitution, manufacturing consumer goods for the 
domestic market. The New Economy policy saw a policy switch by the Malaysian 
government, pursuing a two pronged policy approach of export promotion and import 
substitution. By the mid 1970s, electronics, electrical products, textiles, clothing and food 
manufacturers were all making export gains (Ariff, 1991). They increased from 11 
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percent of total exports in 1970 to 60 percent in 1990. In part, the New Economic Policy 
provided a blueprint for an active policy to raise Malay participation in business (details 
to be discussed later on). The Malaysian Government was aided in its development plans 
by an increase in oil revenue; between 1973 and 1977, total government revenue more 
than doubled, and the share of oil in the revenue take increased from 1.5 per cent to 11.4 
per cent. Within 10 years, per capita income had more than quadrupled, albeit from a low 
base (Figure 2.1). Concomitantly, the Malaysian middle class has grown both in size and 
affluence. Thus, by the 1990s Malaysia was approaching the status of a newly 
industrializing economy (Islam and Chowdhury, 2000). Figure 2.1 indicates how far 
Malaysia has come since 1970 but more importantly, how far it still has to go. Economic 
growth over the past three decades has been substantial enough to ensure per capita 
income is larger than Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand (World Bank 2003). 
However, per capita income remains much lower than Singapore, illustrating the scope of 
the task ahead for Malaysia to achieve its development goals. 
 
In the early stages, Malaysia’s GDP grew at an average rate of 5.1% in the 1960s and 
7.8% in the 1970s making it one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. In the 1980s, 
the Malaysian economy continued to grow, albeit at a lower average rate of 5.9% due to 
the global recession in 1985-1986. With the recovery of the world economy, the 
Malaysian economy grew rapidly from 1991-1995 at an average rate of 8.7% per annum. 
The growth momentum over the next five years from 1996-2000 was disrupted by the 
severe contraction in 1998 arising from the East Asian financial crisis.  Malaysia’s GDP 
had expanded at an average rate of 8.7% per annum during the period from 1996-1997 
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before registering a negative growth rate of 7.4% in 1998.  Efforts by the government to 
resuscitate the economy starting from mid-1998 succeeded in generating an average 
growth rate of 7.2% during the period from 1999-2000.  Since then, output has recovered, 
with the exception of 2001 where the international dotcom contraction adversely affected 
growth. Overall, the economy grew better than expected at an average of 4.7 per cent per 
annum during the period (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2    GDP growth in Malaysia 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2005 
 
From 2002 to 2004, the Malaysian economy recorded a creditable performance despite 
the unprecedented volatility in the global economy as well as uncertainties arising from 
international terrorism, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the outbreak of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome.  Through fiscal stimulus and accommodative monetary 
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policies, the government was able to sustain growth due to the expansion in domestic 
demand and promotion of domestic sources of growth.  From a GDP growth rate of only 
0.4% in 2001, the Malaysian economy recovered strongly to register growth rates of 
4.2% and 5.2% in 2002 and 2003 respectively.   
 
2.2          Malaysia’s Economic Strength and Overall Competitiveness 
The mid-1997 economic and financial crisis which hit many countries in the Asia Pacific 
Region and caused a currency crisis and stock market crash in Malaysia, provided further 
proof of the strength and resilience of the Malaysian economy. Within less than two 
years, helped by selective exchange controls and the pegging of the ringgit, Malaysia 
bounced back towards economic recovery. Malaysia is competitive relative to other 
economies in the region, has a skilled work force and has a well developed infrastructure 
and banking system. Some barriers remain, including positive discrimination for 
bumiputeras, copyright protection and transparency in the privatization process. All these 
will be discussed at length later in this chapter. The World Economic Forum Business 
Competitiveness Index ranked Malaysia 23 out of 103 economies in 2004 (Table 2.1). 
Areas of particular strength included overall infrastructure quality and low regulatory 
burdens. Malaysian ports, for example, are the eighth busiest in the world measured by 
twenty foot equivalent unit container traffic behind China (including Hong Kong), the 
United States, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Germany and Italy (World Bank, 2004). Of the 
Eighth Malaysia Plan allocation for infrastructure development, transport was a priority 
with USD1.34 billion to be used for the development of new roads to increase 
accessibility to rural areas. An additional USD2.34 billion was budgeted to upgrade 
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existing roads (Economic Planning Unit, 2001). Total expenditure on roads was increased 
in the Mid-term Review of the Eighth Malaysia Plan to USD4.89 billion (Economic 
Planning Unit, 2003). Overall telecommunications access also is better than in other 
South East Asian nations but still lags Singapore, Korea and Taiwan (Economic 
Analytical Unit, 2002). The Government has identified several key areas to develop 
further the information and communications technology (ICT) sector throughout 2001 to 
2005 and the Mid term Review of the Eighth Malaysia Plan allocated around USD2.02 
billion to the ICT sector, of which USD0.39 billion was allocated to Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) flagship applications (Economic Planning Unit, 2003). 
Table 2.1 
Business and Growth Competitiveness Index rank, selected countries, 2004 
 
  Business competitiveness index 
Rank out of 103 
Growth competitiveness index 
Rank out of 104 
Singapore 10  7 
Australia 13  14 
Malaysia 23  31 
India 30  55 
Thailand 37  34 
Indonesia 44  69 
China 47  46 
Philippines 70  76 
Vietnam 79  77 
 
Note: The growth competitiveness index measures the capacity of the national economy to achieve 
sustained economic growth over the medium term, controlling for the current level of development.  
Source: World Economic Forum, 2004 
 
 
2.2.1 Continuous  Economic  Growth 
The Malaysian economy has performed remarkably well over the years due to the 
country’s political stability, the sound financial and economic policies adopted by the 
government, and the efficient management of its natural resources which include oil and 
gas.  Even more impressive is the fact that economic growth in Malaysia was achieved 
within an environment of relatively low inflation. Malaysian inflation since the 1970s 
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compares favorably to other economies in the region (Figure 2.3). Inflation is well under 
control in Malaysia, having been below two per cent in each of the last four years to 2003 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004). Prudent macro economic policies, low imported inflation, 
stability of the exchange rate peg and excess capacity in some sectors of the economy 
helped achieve low and stable inflation (International Monetary Fund, 2004). 
































Note: ASEAN3 includes Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
 
2.2.2  High Level of Global Integration 
During the last decade, Malaysia’s trade expanded by 2.3 times to reach USD188.57 
billion, with exports increasing by 2.6 times to USD104.97 billion and imports doubling 
to USD83.6 billion.  Currently, Malaysia is the world’s 18th leading exporter and 20th 
leading importer. The relatively small size of the Malaysian economy, which has a 
population of 24 million and GDP per capita of US$3880, means exports played a crucial 
role in sustaining rapid economic growth (Figure 2.4). In 2002, Malaysia was the fourth 
most open economy in the world, as measured by the export share of GDP, behind 
Source: World Bank 2003 
 
  31 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Luxembourg, arising from a strong focus on products that 
service the export market as well as large import content in export production 
(International Monetary Fund, 2003). The World Bank considers Malaysia a 
“moderately” indebted nation and debt as a share of exports of goods and services is 
considerably lower than that for upper middle income economies as a whole at 45 per 
cent compared to 100 per cent (World Bank, 2004). Net foreign reserves are increasing, 
covering nearly seven months of imports (Economic Planning Unit, 2004). 
Figure 2.4: Exports of goods and services as a share of GDP, Malaysia, ASEAN3, 

































Note: ASEAN3 includes Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
The manufacturing sector now accounts for 30.8% of Malaysia’s GDP (Figure 2.5) while 
exports of manufactured goods make up 82% of the country’s total exports.  From being 
the world’s largest producer of rubber and tin, Malaysia is today one of the world’s 
leading exporters of semiconductor devices, computer hard disks, audio and video 
products and air-conditioners. Within manufacturing, the Malaysian economy is moving 
Source: CEIC, 2004 
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towards high technology and knowledge intensive manufacturing. Since 1987, the 
electronics sector has grown more than eightfold in real terms, increasing its share of 
manufacturing output from 14 per cent in 1987 to 27 per cent in 2003. The service sector 
in Malaysia, as a share of GDP, has remained relatively flat over the past 30 years, at 
around 40 to 45 per cent of GDP (Figure 2.5). The largest sub sector is wholesale and 
retail trade, restaurants and hotels. Retail and tourism industries were particularly 
vulnerable to the 2002 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak but are 
starting to recover from this setback (Asian Development Bank, 2004). 

















Source: CEIC 2004; UNCTAD 2003 
alaysia’s rapid industrialization was the result of the country opening itself relatively 
 
M
early in the 1960s to foreign direct investment (FDI). Today, its market-oriented 
economy, combined with an educated multilingual workforce and a well-developed 
infrastructure, has made Malaysia one of the largest recipients of FDI among developing 
countries. Foreign direct investment inflows averaged over six per cent over the last two 
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decades. The Institute for Management Development (IMD) in its 2004 World 
Competitiveness Yearbook ranked Malaysia as the fifth most competitive country in the 
world (for countries with a population of greater than 20 million), ahead of countries such 
as Germany, United Kingdom, Japan and Mainland China.  The conditions for attracting 
foreign investment to Malaysia are good. Malaysia ranked seventh in the world in terms 
of top foreign direct investment locations for investment being considered in 2004-2005 
(UNCTAD, 2004).  To quote the former president of the American-Malaysian Chamber 
of Commerce, Nicholas Zefferys: "This was not an economic miracle. It required hard 
work and was built up, brick by brick. It required a visionary and determined leadership 
and the support and will of the people” (MIDA 2005). 
 
Despite intense international competition for foreign direct investments (FDI), Malaysia 
managed to attract USD8.18 billion in investments in 2004 (MIDA 2005).  This is a 
strong indication that Malaysia continues to be an attractive destination for new investors.  
Most of the investments were in manufacturing, and information and communication 
technology services. In the manufacturing sector, 603 new projects with investments 
totalling USD4.89 billion were approved (MIDA, 2005). Existing companies have 
continued to expand and diversify their operations in Malaysia and this is reflected in the 
higher level of reinvestments in 2004 compared to 2003. Foreign investment 
commitments in new projects amounted to USD2.39 billion in 516 projects, compared 
with USD2.94 billion in 514 projects in 2003. USD4.1 billion or 54% of the total 
investment approved in 2004 was secured from domestic sources. The level of domestic 
investment commitments in 2004 was the highest since 1997, reflecting the increasing 
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confidence of the Malaysian private sector.  During the nine years from 1996 to 2004, 
approved investments amounted to USD62.76 billion, averaging USD6.97 billion 
annually (MIDA, 2005). Foreign direct investment played a large part in Malaysia’s 
development and averaged over six per cent of GDP during the 1990s. The rapid 
development of the electronics sector ensured strong inflows of foreign direct investment 
in the decade before the Asian economic crisis, enhancing Malaysia’s industralisation 















































































































Source: UNCTAD, 2004. 
 
According to the FDI Confidence Index 2004, compiled by A.T. Kearney, Malaysia’s 
FDI outlook in the eyes of global investors in 2004 has improved significantly, gaining 8 
places from 23rd position in 2003 to 15th position in 2004, out of 60 countries.  
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Malaysia is ranked the 5th most attractive destination in Asia in 2004 after China (1st), 
India (3rd), Australia (7th) and Hong Kong (8th). Malaysia is ahead of Singapore (18th), 
Thailand (20th), South Korea (21st), Indonesia (23rd) and Taiwan (25th). 
 
According to the report, five of the six largest jumps in the index were registered by 
Asian markets, with Malaysia being among the countries enjoying the strongest 
improvement in investor confidence. Their robust performances were in part driven by 
North American and European investors seeking to diversify their operations across Asia 
and anticipating growth opportunities in these markets. Malaysia was also one of three 
Asian-Pacific countries which received higher confidence nods from Asian investors. The 
latest FDI Confidence Index, which surveyed 1,000 executive world-wide, found that 
69% were optimistic about the global economic outlook. This is a sharp turnaround from 
the last two years. Following the September 11 event and a global economic slowdown, 
just 28% were optimistic in 2002, while in 2003 only 22% were optimistic. In the 2004 
survey, 52% of the respondents said they plan to increase investments while only 8% said 
they intend to divest (A. T. Kearney 2004). 
   
In its report, A.T. Kearney also considers Malaysia a “natural choice” for offshore 
services in view of its low costs, particularly for infrastructure, the most attractive 
business environment among emerging markets, strong global exposure of the workforce, 
and government support for the information and communications technology (ICT) 
sector.  Other significant initiatives cited by A.T. Kearney include the government’s 
investments in infrastructure and developing the intelligent cities of Cyberjaya and 
  36 
Putrajaya as part of the Multimedia Super Corridor project.  Thus, numerous companies 
namely Motorola, Ericsson, IBM, Shell, DHL, HSBC and BMW, have located their 
regional offshore service centers in Cyberjaya. 
 
The report further highlights that although Malaysia, with a population of only 25 million 
people, will be unable to match India’s and China’s scale advantages, effective 
government promotion of the IT and services sector will likely make Malaysia one of the 
strongest competitors to India’s dominance in business process outsourcing (BPO) in the 
next five years. The main weakness for Malaysia was in people skills and availability. 
Acute shortages of appropriately qualified labor occur in the sciences in particular and 
more generally, with the Malaysian labor market at close to full employment. There also 
is not the depth of experience in business process outsourcing as, for example, in India 
(A.T. Kearney, 2004). 
 
The A.T. Kearney 2004 Offshore Location Attractiveness Index evaluated all countries 
based on corporate surveys, current offshore IT and BPO activities, local and national 
government initiatives to promote off-shoring, and the availability of skilled manpower.  
The top 25 off-shoring destinations were then analyzed through survey findings and 
client engagements against 39 measurements across three major categories: financial 
structure, people skills and availability, and business environment (Communications and 
Media Division, MIDA, 2005). 
 
 
  37 
Table 2.2  Malaysia Key Economic Indicators 
Malaysia Key Economic Indicators 
 2003  2004 
Population   25.0 million   25.6 million 
GDP RM229.3  billion 
(US$60.3 billion)  
RM241.8 billion 
(US$63.6 billion) 
GDP Growth   5.2%   5.5%-6.0% 
Per capita income   RM14,343  
(US$3,774) 
 RM14,954  
(US$3,935) 
Inflation rate   1.5%   1.5 - 1.9% 
Labour force   10.5 million   10.8 million 
 Unemployment  3.5%   3.4% 
Total export   RM368.9 billion 
(US$97.1 billion) 
 RM392.5 billion 
(US$103.3 billion) 




Major exports  Manufactured  goods  (electronic products, chemicals and plastic 
products, wood products, iron and steel products, metal products, and 
petroleum products).   
Major  imports  Intermediate goods (thermionic valves and tubes, primary and 
processed industrial supplies, parts and accessories of capital goods, 
primary and processed fuel lubricants, and parts and accessories for 
transport equipment).      
Source: "Economic Report 2003/2004" published by the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia 
(Bank Negara Malaysia 2003 Annual Report) 
 
 
Another study conducted by TNS Global Reputation Survey 2005 (global market 
information provider) indicated that Malaysia has been ranked among the world's top 10 
countries as a choice business location. The study found that in terms of reputation as a 
base to do business, Malaysia was ranked seventh out of 41 countries surveyed 
worldwide; "the stated reputation of the country as a business location by its citizens is a 
good description of the internal perception of the country's current economic situation 
and the people's expectations about their own future economic development" (MIDA, 
2005). 
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For example, many of the highly developed countries such as France, Germany and Japan 
find themselves in a situation of decreasing growth rates and increasing unemployment 
figures, resulting in a high degree of pessimism and low reputation level for business 
location. On the other hand, countries like Singapore (ranked fourth), South Africa 
(sixth), India (10th) and Malaysia, had developed strongly within the last five years, 
therefore enjoying public confidence and high reputation ratings. The TNS Global 
Reputation Study 2005 surveyed almost 37,000 people in 40 countries to gauge 
perception of their country's top corporations and institutions. Conducted during the 
fourth quarter of 2004, the survey involved residents across countries in North America, 
South America, Europe, Asia and Africa. The study detailed how residents rate the 
reputations of their nations' institutions such as healthcare, telecommunications, political 
parties, mail service, business location, financial/banking outlets and supermarkets. 
Malaysia was also ranked favorably in other categories, including fourth best in the world 
for Reputation of Telephone Providers and 10th for the Reputation of Primary Banks.  
Malaysia was also ranked second for both Reputation of Health Service and Reputation 
of Political Parties.  
 
2.2.3         A Knowledge-based Economy 
The last decade has seen a deepening and widening of Malaysia's industrial base as well 
as the further development of its services sector. As such, a strong foundation has been 
laid for the economy to move forward into the new globalized environment.  
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In the early 1980s, the Malaysian economy spiraled into a recession as a direct 
consequence of a massive fall in commodity prices. This drove the government to 
evaluate other development options. As a result of the commitment of the then Prime 
Minister, Dr. Mahathir, heavy industrialization was pursued as the engine of economic 
growth (Jomo, 1993). However, the unsustainability of mounting public expenditure 
being channeled into heavy industry projects and the lack of linkages between heavy 
industries and other sectors of the economy resulted in a shift towards an emphasis on the 
development of human capital (Malaysia, 1991; 1996).  
 
The subsequent release of the Sixth and Seventh Malaysia Plans meant that Malaysia’s 
economic growth would be derived from gains in productivity rather than through 
accumulation of capital and labor. In the coming decade, an important policy component 
in Malaysia's development plans will be to enhance the knowledge content of the 
economy. There will be intensive research and technology development with support 
from venture capitalists, with ICT as the enabling technology. Research and development 
spending also will have to improve throughout the rest of the economy. Although the 
Government approved nearly RM1 billion in research and developments grants between 
2001 to 2003, total research and development expenditure was only 0.4 per cent of GDP 
between 1996 and 2002, compared with 1.5 per cent for Australia, 2.1 per cent for 
Singapore and 3.0 per cent for the Republic of Korea (Table 2.3). To encourage the 
commercialization of research and development, the 2005 Budget Speech proposed 
locally owned companies which invest and own at least 70 per cent equity in a company 
that undertakes commercialization projects be granted tax deductions equivalent to actual 
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investment and a company that undertakes commercialization projects be granted Pioneer 
Status of 100 per cent for ten years. 
Table 2.3  Expenditure and researchers in R&D, selected countries, 2002 
    Expenditure  on  R&D    Researchers  in  R&D 
                 % of GDP        per million people 
                      1996-2002     1990-2001    
Republic of Korea      3.0                       2880 
 
Singapore        2.1                      4052 
 
Australia        1.5                      3439 
 
Malaysia        0.4                        160 
 
Thailand          0.1                          74 
 
Philippines        -                        156 




The next 10 years will see a greater emphasis on human resource enhancement as 
availability of skilled and knowledge workers are a major pre-requisite to transform 
Malaysia from a production-based into a knowledge-based economy. To this end 
Malaysia has created the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) to accelerate Malaysia’s 
entry into a knowledge based economy and also to help realize Vision 2020 (MDC, 
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Free Trade Zone 
 
New Economic Policy 
 
Industrial Coordination Act 
Export Led Growth 
 
Heavy Industries Programme 
 
Industrial Master Plan 1986-95 
 
Promotion of Investment Act 1986 
 
Action Plan for Industrial 
Technology Development 
PHASE 1V  Diversification of Manufacturing 
Base 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Increase the Role of the Private 
Sector 
 
Human Capital Development 
 
Research & Development 
 
Adapted from Ali, 1992 
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At the same time, globalization, liberalization and the technological revolution have 
changed the rules and nature of international trade, investment and competition. A 
country’s competitive advantage is often dependent on its potential to generate, 
disseminate and utilize knowledge. The role of such developments in inducing new forms 
of growth was recognized in Malaysia’s Third Outline Perspective Plan, 2001-2020. This 
plan focuses on building a resilient and competitive nation while developing Malaysia 
increasingly into a knowledge-based economy. This recognition represents a self 
conscious pursuit of paradigm shift for Malaysia.  
 
Of all the East Asian economies, the contribution of total factor productivity to growth 
has been lowest in Malaysia for much of the post war period. Total factor productivity is 
a measure of the efficiency of the production process considering several inputs or 
factors. It is expressed as a ratio of outputs to a combined measure of two or more factor 
inputs such as capital and labour (Noble, 1995). Malaysia’s average GDP growth of six 
per cent over 40 years was driven mostly by labour and capital growth, much more than 
most other countries in the region (Table 2.4). Total factor productivity has risen more 
substantially in recent years, representing about one quarter of GDP growth between 
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Table 2.4 
Total factor productivity and Malaysian growth. Postwar sources of growth in East Asia 
from 1950 to 1990 
 
   
        T o t a l   f a c t o r    
  Output   Capital   Labor   Total factor  productivity   
Country growth   contribution  contribution productivity share 
 
 
Japan   6.8   3.7   0.8   2.3   33.8 
China   5.5   2.9   2.2   0.4   7.3 
Hong  Kong 9.0   2.8   3.1   3.1   34.4 
Korea   7.4   2.9   2.4   2.1   28.4 
Taiwan   8.6   2.6   3.1   2.9   33.7 
Singapore  7.7   3.9   3.0   0.8   10.4 
Indonesia  6.7   2.6   2.0   2.1   31.3 
Malaysia 6.0   3.6   2.9   -0.5   -7.5 
Philippines  4.9   2.4   2.3   0.2   4.1 
Thailand   5.8   1.7   2.4   1.7   29.3 
Source: Drysdale, et al, 2004 
 
Although the World Economic Forum and the International Institute of Management 
Development (IMD) find that Malaysia rates well in terms of a range of criteria such as 
openness, infrastructure, finance and government policy, in the areas of management, 
labor skill and technology much lower rankings are obtained, certainly well below 
Malaysia’s average competitiveness ratings. For example, compared with an overall 
competitiveness country rank of 16 in the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2004, 
in key knowledge economy areas Malaysia ranked much lower. By contrast, in the 
“Production Economy” areas of working hours, wage costs, employment growth, taxes, 
labor legislation and regulation, Malaysia ranks in the top 15 countries (IMD 
International, 2004). The Malaysian government acknowledged that Malaysia’s future 
competitiveness would depend increasingly upon knowledge rather than increases in 
labor and capital. The availability of knowledgeable and highly skilled personnel with 
thinking skills was identified as the ‘missing link’ in allowing Malaysia to develop into a 
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successful knowledge based economy and to sustain its position in the international 
market place against other rapidly industrializing economies (Economic Planning Unit, 
2001). To bridge the ‘missing link’, the Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005 highlighted the 
importance of creating a strong resource base to support the development of the 
knowledge based economy so as to raise productivity and competitiveness. Strategies and 
programs were defined which were to increase the accessibility of education and training 
at all levels, strengthen the delivery system and improve the quality of education and 
training. To achieve these goals the Eighth Malaysia Plan set aside 20.6 per cent of the 
total Plan allocation for education and training and USD4.92 billion for education at pre- 
school through to tertiary levels, with USD2.42 billion for tertiary and teacher education. 
A further USD1.05 billion was allocated to vocational and skills training (Economic 
Planning Unit, 2003). As Table 2.5 shows, Malaysian Government spending on education 
accounted for 20 per cent of all public expenditure in 2001, nearly double the OECD 
country average (OECD, 2004).   
Table 2.5 
Malaysian and OECD public spending on education  
 
  Malaysia (%)  OECD average (%) 
Public spending on education, 
share of all public spending 
20.0 12.7 
Public spending on education 
(payments to institutions only) 
share of GDP 
7.2 5.0 
Public spending on tertiary 
education (payments to 
institutions only) share of GDP 
2.1 1.0 
Public spending on tertiary 
education (subsidies to 
households only) share of GDP 
0.6 0.3 
Public spending on tertiary 
education (education institutions 
plus subsidies to households) 
share of GDP 
2.7 1.3 
 
 Source: OECD, 2004 
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2.2.4        Supportive Government Policies 
Government policies that maintain a business environment with opportunities for growth 
and profits have made Malaysia an attractive manufacturing and export base in the 
region. The private sector in Malaysia has become partners with the public sector in 
achieving the nation's development objectives.   
 
A major factor that has attracted investors to Malaysia is the government's commitment 
to maintain a business environment that provides companies with the opportunities for 
growth and profits. This commitment is seen in the government's constant efforts to 
obtain feedback from the business community through channels of consultation such as 
regular government-private sector dialogues. These allow the various business 
communities to air their views and to contribute towards the formulation of government 
policies which concern them.  
  
Planning constituted the institutional centerpiece of the Malaysian economic 
development effort. Although Malaysia maintains a market economy, planning has 
served as a significant and increasingly comprehensive instrument of economic 
management and development, particularly in minimizing both internal and external 
shocks. Figure 2.8 provides a summary of strategies initiated by the state to minimize 
both internal and external shocks in Malaysia’s economic system. Figure 2.8 shows two 
prominent features. First, the Malaysian economic transformation is shaped by two major 
shocks (political and terms of trade). Second, the state has played an important role in 
minimizing the impact of these shocks. The 1985-1986 recessions was often cited as an 
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example of Malaysia’s vulnerability to external shocks. Malaysia’s rapid recovery from 
that recession was due to not only its favorable external conditions but largely its shift in 
government action. Fluctuation and reduction in export earnings had been cushioned by 
policies initiated to either minimize these shocks or develop a new strategy that 
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Figure 2.8:  Strategies Used by the Malaysian Government to Minimise Shocks in 




Fluctuations in commodity prices 
Internal 
Political and social pressures 
Economic policies to minimize shock  Economic policies to minimize shock 
First Malaysia Plan (1966-70) 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75) 
Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) 
Main Objectives: 
Economic diversification, restructuring 
and modernization of the agricultural 
sector. 
New Economic Policy * 
Main Objectives: 
Poverty reduction and redistribution of 
economic wealth achieved by higher level 
of growth 
Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85) 
Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) 
Main Objectives: 
Encouragement of growth in the 
manufacturing sector with emphasis on 
heavy industry 
Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-95) 
Main objectives: 
Redistribution of economic wealth through 
the diversification of the manufacturing 
sector and technological upgrading. 
 
Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) 
Eight Malaysia Plan (2001-2005) 
Main objectives: 
Redistribution of economic wealth, 
achieved by development of human capital 
 
 
*Operationalised in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Malaysia Plans 
Sources: Malaysia, 1971; 1976; 1981; 1986; 1991; 1996; 2001 
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During the New Economic Policy (NEP) 1971-1990 plan period, the Treasury 
bureaucracy, and other bureaucratic organizations under the administrative guidance of 
the Prime Minister’s office became progressively involved in the planning process. The 
NEP became the foundation of and the yardstick for all economic and social policies. The 
NEP has two main objectives. The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate 
poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all 
Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second prong aims at accelerating the process of 
restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function (Second Malaysia 
Plan, 1971, p.5). These changes were planned to occur over a twenty year Perspective 
Plan period (1971-1990) and the initiatives and strategies were carried out in the Second 
Malaysia Plan, Third Malaysia Plan, Fourth Malaysia Plan, and Fifth Malaysia Plan. 
When NEP expired in 1990, it was widely viewed as a success in that it had achieved its 
two major objectives: reduction of poverty and a more equitable distribution of wealth 
among the ethnic groups.  
 
The incidence of poverty in Malaysia was determined using a poverty line income. The 
poverty line income is an income sufficient to purchase a minimum basket of food to 
maintain household members in good nutritional health and have access to other basic 
needs such as clothing and footwear, house rental, fuel and power, transport and 
communications, health care, education and recreation (EPU, 2002). Table 2.6 indicates 
that the poverty rate dropped from 49 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 1990, a reduction 
of more than 50 per cent. The figure continued to decline to 8.7 per cent in 1995 and 6.1 
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per cent in 1997. However, in 1999, the poverty rate increased to 7.5 per cent as a result 
of the 1997 economic crisis. The incidence of hardcore poverty defined as half the 
poverty line income fell sharply from 6.9 per cent in 1985 to 1.0 per cent in 2002 
(Economic Planning Unit, 1999; 2004). Although differences in poverty between States 
in Malaysia remain, poverty has declined across the board in Malaysia. Considerably 
fewer Malaysians live in poverty relative to Indonesians, Philippinos and Thais (ADB, 
2004). 
Table 2.6: Incidence of Poverty (per cent), Malaysia, 1970-1999  
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1999 
Rural  58.7 54.1 43.1 24.7 19.3 14.9 10.9 12.4 
Urban  21.3  19.0  15.8 8.2 17.3 3.6  2.1  3.4 
Total 49.3 43.9 33.8 18.4 15.0  8.7  6.1  7.5 
Sources: Malaysia 1971; 1981; 1986; 2001 
 
Despite the success of NEP (under the various Malaysia plans) in achieving political 
stability through poverty eradication and inter ethnic redistribution, there have been many 
criticisms of the large amount of public expenditure allocated to achieve NEP’s main 
objectives. Jomo (1990, 1994) argued that the reduction in poverty had been primarily 
attributed to economic growth brought about by an increase in productivity rather than by 
distributional policies. The government itself acknowledged that only 40 percent of the 
USD7.89 billion that was spent on poverty eradication from 1971 to 1988 reached the 
targeted poverty groups, with the balance going to administration and infrastructure costs 
(Jomo, 1991). There is also the issue that the key policy instrument used by the 
Malaysian government to reduce inter racial economic differences is the discriminatory 
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allocation of public expenditure in favour of the Malays. In order to improve the 
economic conditions of Malays, the government significantly increased its expenditure 
on projects designed exclusively for Malays’ participation (Lim, 1973, 1983). As a result, 
resources were often allocated inefficiently (Jomo, 1990). Such policy can be restrictive 
on business activity and can focus entrepreneurial effort on rent seeking behaviour (for 
example, through privatization, licences and contracts). Directly unproductive profit 
seeking behaviour which includes rent seeking behaviour, as a subset has been defined as 
ways of making profit, by undertaking activities which are directly unproductive 
(Bhagwati 1982). An economic rent is a return to a resource owner in excess of the 
owner’s opportunity cost (Tollison, 1987:144). It is often presumed that the existence and 
hence pursuit of rents in such circumstances tends to undermine economic development 
(Shapiro 1990: 127). To this extent, the policy may be counterproductive and thwart the 
development of a vibrant and resilient bumiputera business community. The Foreign 
Investment Committee guidelines contain more detail on bumiputera participation 
(Foreign Investment Committee 2004; Ministry of Finance, 2004).  
 
If efficiency is the main criterion to judge the allocation of public expenditure on 
restructuring Malaysian society, then without doubt the ethnic based distribution policies 
have failed. This is because many of the programmes and projects initiated by the 
government since 1970 were riddled with corruption and crony interests (Jomo, 1994; 
Gomez and Jomo, 1997). If, on the other hand, political stability forms the basis for 
efficient economic production, and if initial conditions and shocks matter (Keynes, 1936; 
Kaldor, 1972; Nelson, 1996; Crafts, 1997; Setterfield, 1998), then undoubtedly the 
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amount of expenditure (which averaged about RM2.2 billion per year which constituted 
approximately 2 per cent of total government expenditure) allocated to establish stability 
can be considered a relatively small price to pay in return for rapid economic growth. As 
Rasiah and Shari (2001, p.75) pointed out, while ethnic based distribution policies, 
especially those involving the promotion of crony interests, sapped the economy of rents, 
many critical instruments assisted poverty alleviation and distribution, which helped 
enhance political stability. In addition, Khong (1991) and Rasiah and Shari (2001) 
reported that discriminatory allocation of public expenditure in favor of the Malays 
actually strengthened intra ethnic solidarity amongst the Chinese. According to Rasiah 
and Shari “it is believed that the Chinese, fearing increased ethnic encroachment into the 
market by the state, started ethnic networks to protect their interests in the private sector, 
thus uniting even the once clannishly divided Chinese” (2001:72). This uniting gesture 
further stabilized and minimized ethnic politics.  
 
Another study conducted by Doraisami (1996) identified political stability as the leading 
factor behind Malaysia’s economic success. Doraisami surveyed members of the 
Malaysian Economic Society and asked them to rank in order their perceptions of the 
factors responsible for Malaysia’s economic success. The results of the survey in Table 
2.7 suggest that a majority of the Malaysian economists considered political stability to 
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Table 2.7         Factors Associated With Malaysia’s Economic Success 
R a n k    C a t e g o r y        S c o r e  
1   Political  Stability       547 
2   Foreign  Investment      419 
3   Good  Macro  Management      371 
4   Development  Planning      331 
5   Good  Resource  Endowment     324 
6   Literate  and  Disciplined  Workforce     294 
7   Good  Infrastructure      280 
8    G o v e r n m e n t   G u i d a n c e       2 7 4  
9   Labor  Market  Flexibility      218 
10   Minimal  Government  Intervention     202 
 
Source: Doraisami, 1996, p.32 
 
Table 2.8 presents Malaysian economists’ views on Malaysia’s manufacturing export 
success. Again political stability is ranked first among other factors. 
Table 2.8          Factors Associated With Malaysia’s Manufacturing Export Success 
R a n k    C a t e g o r y        S c o r e  
1   Political  stability       488 
2   Foreign  Investment      454 
3   Export  Promoting  Incentives     414 
4   Literate  and  Disciplined  Workforce     317 
5   Good  Macro  Management      297 
6   Resource  Endowment      270 
7   Development  Planning      254 
8   Labor  Marketing  Flexibility     234 
9    G o v e r n m e n t   G u i d a n c e       2 3 1  
1 0    L o w   W a g e s        2 0 9  
 
Source: Doraisami, 1996, p.32. 
 
Despite the constraints of the NEP, the Chinese equity ownership increased significantly 
from 27.2 per cent in 1970 to 44.9 per cent in 1990 (Gomez and Jomo 1997). In so far as 
the NEP seemed to respond to the problems of poverty, unemployment and inter-ethnic 
economic imbalances that had emerged before May 1969, it was received favourably and 
widely seen as a sincere attempt to transcend problems created by colonialism and 
perpetuated by laissez faire policies after Independence. It must also be noted that many 
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of country’s existing economic and political institutions and problems are rooted in the 
colonial experience, including the reforms in the 1950s to win hearts and minds from the 
communist-led, anti-colonial insurgency (Gomez and Jomo 1997). The emergence of an 
elite, politically influential group of businessmen since the mid 1980s has not been 
limited to Bumiputeras, despite the official ethnic bias of political patronage and the 
ethnic nature of national politics. There has since then been greater inter-ethnic elite 
cooperation in business matters. Although the NEP has not been a total success, many 
significant improvements had been achieved during its 20 year span (Lin, 1994). 
Commentators generally agree that this redistribution strategy at least partially explains 
the improvement in income distribution (Medhi, 1994; World Bank 1993).  The NEP was 
conceived as a positive sum gain in improving the economic well being of the Malays, 
but not at the expense of others and in the context of a growing economy (Chowdhury 
and Islam, 1996).   
 
At the same time, this policy of positive discrimination is changing gradually. In 2003, 
acceptance to public Malaysian universities was based solely on merit and foreign 
companies with new investments in manufacturing no longer have to have 30 per cent 
bumiputera ownership (Economic Analytical Unit, 2005). However, the marginalization 
and downgrading of distributional considerations as well as other non-economic concerns 
in favour of growth and industrialization is unlikely to resolve the complex problems 
continuing to divide and destabilize Malaysian society. Also, without the stability 
achieved through mutually acceptable compromise, it may be difficult to ensure the 
socio- political stability necessary for rapid industrialization and growth. 
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When the Seventh Malaysia Plan expired in 2000, Malaysia had successfully transformed 
from an agricultural production structure towards a modern manufacturing structure. 
Through initiatives set out by the state, the economy reduced its reliance on primary 
products, such as rubber and tin, and in the process become one of the world largest 
manufacturers of semiconductors and a sizeable producer of electronic and electrical 
products. Industry has supplanted agriculture as the major contributor to GDP, as 
illustrated by Table 2.9 
Table 2.9: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Malaysia, 1955-2000 (in percentage) 
  1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Agriculture 40.2 40.5 31.5 30.8 27.7 22.8 20.7 18.7 10.3 8.7 
Mining  6.3 6.1 9.0 6.3 4.6 10.0  10.4  9.7 8.2 6.6 
Manufacturing  8.2  8.6  10.4 13.4 16.4 20.0 19.6 27.0 27.1 33.4 
Service  45.3 44.8 49.1 51.3 49.5 47.2 49.3 42.3 51.3 52.6 
Sources: Malaysia, 1971; 1981; 1986; 1991; 2001. 
 
The data in Table 2.9 show that the manufacturing sector experienced an increasing 
trend, rising modestly during the 1960s. In 1990, the manufacturing sector surpassed the 
agricultural sector in contributing to GDP growth. Nonetheless, the agricultural sector 
still dominated production capacity of the economy, contributing 40.2 per cent, 27.7 per 
cent and 22.8 per cent of GDP in 1955, 1975 and 1980 respectively. 
 
Although the incentives set out by the Malaysia Plans had brought about significant 
changes to both the production structure and exports of the Malaysian economy, the 
industrialization programme was not without criticism, particularly with the heavy 
  55 
industrialization strategy implemented during the Phase 3 period (1981-85, Figure 2.7). 
Several authors (Jomo, 1990, 1994; Gomez and Jomo, 1997) argued that the push for 
heavy industrialization by the Mahathir administration was an expensive mistake. They 
argued that the economy had been burdened by unnecessary protectionist measures which 
required the infant industries to be sheltered. The scale of investments in terms of capital 
meant that there was less capital for other uses, leading to additional foreign borrowings 
and mounting foreign debts incurred by the public sector to finance the massive 
industrialization projects which peaked at USD7450 million in 1986. 
 
Heavy industrialization has also failed to develop strong and extensive linkages with 
other sectors of the economy (Cheong and Lim, 1981; Malaysia, 1986; Jomo, 1990).The 
outputs of most of the heavy industries chosen by the Mahathir administration for 
development, such as steel, cement, petrochemicals, shipbuilding and repairs faced strong 
international competition due to excessive global production capacity with little 
likelihood of viability. This led Jomo (1990, p.128) to comment that “for a more 
integrated and balanced industrialization programme, the question is not whether or not 
to develop heavy industries, but rather which ones to support, for what ends, and under 
what conditions”. There was thus a need to reassess the heavy industrialization policy. 
 
2.3        Privatisation and Government Linked companies 
Privatisation is another part of the Malaysian transformation story. Government 
businesses usually are established in response to significant economies of scale and 
transaction costs, such as contracting costs and insecure property rights, which give rise 
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to natural monopolies (Economic Analytical Unit, 2005). A government assumes control 
if it is concerned about guaranteeing an adequate supply of essential goods and services 
at reasonable prices. Government may also establish these businesses in order to 
subsidise high risk markets and for political and distributional goals. However, in an 
environment with multiple calls on government funds, governments are coming under 
increasing pressure to improve the efficiency of their business interests. The privatization 
master plan guides the Malaysian Government’s privatization program. Between 1983 
and 2003, 474 privatization projects were undertaken, transferring nearly 111,000 jobs 
from the Government payroll and raise over USD6.31 billion in revenue (Economic 
Planning Unit, 2004). The aims of the privatization program are to enhance economic 
competitiveness and reduce the government’s administration and financial burden (Tull 
and Reveley, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, the privatization process has slowed as fewer businesses are being made 
available for privatization and private sector investment is yet to recover to pre-1997 
levels (Asian Development Bank, 2004). Privatisation, part of Malaysia’s liberalization 
package, appears to have been especially abused for the development and consolidation 
of politically linked businessmen (Gomez and Jomo 1997). This has involved the transfer 
of assets, other sources of income and significant control of the national economy to the 
politically influential. As Craig (1988:257) has noted, given its rather unique 
‘political/bureaucratic/business complex’, privatization in Malaysia is ‘unlikely to be 
more than a rearrangement of economic and political power’. Extensive political 
nepotisim and patronage have grown with privatization in the absence of an independent, 
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accountable monitoring body to ensure proper implementation of the policy. The 
possibilities for massive gains have therefore been high (Gomez and Jomo 1997). Despite 
this, the creation and deployment of rents in the Malaysian economy so far point to a 
combination of different forces at work. Rents have also been created and allocated in 
ways that encourage investments in new productive activities which have contributed to 
the diversification of the national economy from its colonial inheritance, as well as 
various industrialization campaigns, including export promotion, import substitution and 
heavy industrialization (see the case of Tan Sri Samsudin of Sapura cited in Gomez and 
Jomo 1997). In a sense Tan Sri Samsudin success has won him more opportunities. Such 
performance criteria have become increasingly significant in recent years and helps 
explain why rentier activity has not undermined Malaysian growth (Mansor 1993). 
Access to considerable resource rents has undoubtedly facilitated economic growth and 
diversification. Investments in agriculture and tourism have also been induced. In this 
regard, the availability of resource rents most notably from petroleum, petroleum gas, tin 
and timber has been very significant for growth, exports, government revenue and hence 
fiscal capacity, allowing the government a greater degree of latitude than that enjoyed by 
most other economies and governments in the world.  
 
The other important goal of the creation and deployment of rents in Malaysia has been 
redistribution, especially along inter-ethnic lines. By providing rentier opportunities to 
some Chinese and Indian businessmen, the state has also managed to reduce dissent 
among the non-Malay communities (Gomez 1996).  The case studies on Vincent Tan and 
T. Ananda Krishnan (Gomez and Jomo 1997) help to show how political patronage has 
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been beneficial for the growth of non-bumiputera companies under their control. By 
injecting these rents into publicly listed companies to get majority control, they have 
effectively used these quoted companies for corporate expansion. Yet although yielding 
handsome pecuniary returns, substantial profits and capital gains, the business operations 
of most Bumiputeras and some non-Bumiputeras benefiting from government allocated 
rents are mainly non-entrepreneurial (Gomez and Jomo 1997) although as Schumpeter 
has recognized, entrepreneurs have also captured rents (see Yoshihara 1988; Clad 1989; 
Mehmet 1990; Gomez 1994). There is probably much justification for these criticisms, 
since most politically connected businessmen have tended to concentrate their rent 
appropriating activities in the relatively protected import substituting manufacturing, 
services and other non-tradables such as real property, construction and infrastructure, 
while others have gained mostly from often complex paper shuffling, asset stripping and 
other similar corporate manoeuvres, rather than from significant gains in productivity or 
international competitiveness.  
 
The attempts by corporate figures to tie up with influential politicians and the use of 
political patronage to develop new frontier businessman can also exacerbate tensions 
among rival business interests. This is likely to impede the development of a more 
dynamic, entrepreneurial and progressive capitalism in Malaysia. Since government 
leaders are aware of the importance of foreign capital for sustaining growth and 
particularly continued industrialization, privatization, especially for investments, has 
been actively promoted. Despite the rapid divestment, the Government still maintains a 
stake, although not necessarily a controlling one, in a large number of listed entities. In 
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2004, the Malaysian government oversaw 40 listed government linked companies, 
accounting for around 34 per cent of the total market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia. 
The combined assets of these companies are approximately USD61.05 billion or more 
than half of Malaysia’s GDP (Abdullah, 2004). While there is potentially some argument 
for having government involvement in corporatised businesses such as utilities and 
telecommunications, government involvement in private companies such as Nestle 
Malaysia appear harder to justify (Economic Analytical Unit, 2005).   
 
The Vision 2020 statement envisaged the private sector driving economic growth. The 
Malaysian government has a plethora of ‘Master Plans’ to support Malaysia’s economic 
expansion. One of the issues influencing the Government’s involvement in planning is its 
desire to ensure an equitable development process. While a certain degree of planning is 
a sensible addition to any policy process, the overuse of plans has the potential to stifle 
entrepreneurial ability by making businesses over reliant on such guidance. The 
Malaysian government retains strong links with much of corporate Malaysia (Gomez and 
Jomo 1997). Petronas, the oil and gas company, and by far Malaysia’s largest company, 
is wholly government owned. Government controlled institutions have a majority equity 
stake in seven of the top ten listed companies and frequently trades in these stocks to 
drive the market up. The government also holds ‘Golden shares’ in strategic national 
companies such as Malaysian Airlines, Telekom Malaysia and Tenaga Nasional, an 
electricity company, which give the Government the final decision in the corporate 
direction of the business. Therefore, if the Government’s policy objectives differ from 
what might be best for shareholders, then minority shareholders suffer. The ability to 
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influence companies for policy purposes also suggests a certain lack of transparency and 
potentially raises issues about corporate governance. That said, in 2004 the Malaysian 
government introduced key performance indicators and  performance-linked pay for 
government-linked companies in an effort to improve efficiency, reduce the budget 
deficit and possibly prepare government-linked companies for divestment. In practical 
terms, the Government is unable to sell significant shareholdings all at once. The size of 
their equity stakes preclude rapid divestment because of the impact it would have on the 
stock exchange (The Edge Malaysia, ‘Reforming the GLCs and Khazanah’, July 12, 
2004, p.58). 
   
At various times since Independence, the Malaysian Government has targeted industries 
it believed would contribute to Malaysia’s economic development, with varying degrees 
of success. Government attempts at influencing industry development and economic 
growth by ‘picking winners’ is a second best method of ensuring efficient use of an 
economy’s resources compared to markets. At present, there are direct and indirect tax 
incentives available for 262 activities ranging from the cultivation of tea, the manufacture 
of bicycles and the establishment of convention centres (Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority, 2004). While the breath of incentives increases the cost to 
government, it lowers the risk of resource misallocation because the incentives are not 
focused on a single sector. Improvement in several crucial areas such as transparency, 
preferential treatment for bumiputeras and regulatory burdens facing business could 
enable Malaysia to attract the private investment it needs to drive the economy further. 
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Two examples of targeting are Proton the national carmaker and more recently, the 
Multimedia Super Corridor. Originally, the idea of having a national car company was to 
jump start the industrialization process by creating supporting industries such as 
component part manufacturing, research and development, distribution networks and 
engineering. Proton has gone some way to achieving these aims, directly and indirectly, 
creating 24 franchise holders, 350 component makers, 250 vendor companies, 100 000 
jobs and investing close to USD2.1 billion in the domestic market (The Edge Malaysia, 
“Proton under microscope”, 2 August 2004). However this has come at a high cost. 
Duties ranging from 40 to 300 per cent on vehicle parts and cars protected Proton and the 
respective component manufacturers from competition. Only some of the component 
manufacturers are successfully serving international car makers and quality issues and 
insufficient overseas marketing have led to a systematic decline in Proton’s market share 
and profits.  
 
The Multimedia Super Corridor is still in its infancy and it is too soon to comment on its 
success. The idea of creating a clustering effect for ICT and multimedia is not new. 
Penang has had considerable success in creating a cluster for the electronics industry, and 
Silicon Valley is a classic example of the benefits of clusters. What is different about the 
Multimedia Super Corridor is that it is government mandated rather than market driven. 
Some commentators suggest the Corridor has diverted companies that would otherwise 
have gone to Penang (Economic Analytical Unit, 2005) simply based on the tax and 
investment incentives business can obtain by being a Multimedia Super Corridor 
approved company. This is business diversion rather than creation. Aside from in 
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efficiencies, another problem arising from targeting is it creates an entrenched culture of 
rent seeking regarding investment decisions. In practically every government report, 
particularly ones discussing development, investment and tax incentives always are 
options listed to encourage investment. When the Government provides additional 
incentives for business to move into a particular area, investors end up chasing and 
expecting tax advantages, rather than basing their investment decision on market 
principles. Such behaviour also does not encourage an entrepreneurial spirit among 
domestic investors. A privatization program that is transparent, competitive and efficient 
will go some way to strengthening Malaysia’s investment climate. A more open 
privatization process also provides domestic firms with greater exposure to market forces 
and competition. Many commentators point out that in the past, privatization awards were 
made in an opaque manner, without public debate or competitive bidding, often with 
decades of long concessions going to politically influential companies or individuals 
lacking viable business plans (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2004, Gomez and 
Jomo, 1997).  
 
In response, the Malaysian Government has placed several privatizations on hold while 
policies and processes are reviewed by independent consultants for future sales. It also 
plans to make the bidding process for contracts more transparent, although details remain 
sketchy (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004). Nevertheless, this could be a positive step if 
it results in a more transparent, competitive process (Asian Development Bank, 2004).  
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2.4         Governance and Transparency 
In an economy where the government is heavily involved both through substantial 
infrastructure development and corporate holdings, it is particularly important that good 
principles of governance and transparency are applied in decision making. Transparency 
International ranked Malaysia 39 out of 146 economies in its 2004 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, better than Italy, the Republic of Korea and Greece with a score of 5 
out of 10 (Figure 2.9). This is an improvement on 2002, but still lags behind a number of 
regional economies (Transparency International, 2004). To address this issue, the 
Malaysian government unveiled the National Integrity Plan in April 2004.  
 
Three of the five stated aims are effectively to reduce corruption and abuse of power, 
enhance efficiency in the public service delivery system and overcome bureaucracy and 
enhance corporate governance. Measurable outcomes of the plan include moving 
Malaysia’s standing in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index to 30
th 
position by 2008, a reduction in the number of corporate fraud cases and increasing the 
number of contracts awarded through open tender (Abdullah, 2004). The government has 
established the Malaysian Institute of Integrity to monitor the Plan’s implementation. 
Several programs have been introduced to address corporate governance issues. The 
mandatory Accreditation program requires directors of listed companies to undergo 
training programs to raise the standards of governance (Economic Planning Unit, 2003). 
Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirements have been refined to ensure listed companies 
prepare their annual audited accounts in line with standards approved by the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board. Bursa Malaysia also requires disclosure of compliance with 
  64 
the Corporate Governance Code through its listing requirements. All listed companies 
must report on corporate governance in their annual reports and company directors must 
report separately on internal controls (Economic Analytical Unit, 2002). Bank Negara 
Malaysia has issued new regulations to improve governance in the banking sector, 
including guidelines governing the functioning and composition of banks’ boards of 
directors (Asian Development bank, 2004). The Malaysian Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, introduced in 1998, was designed to improve corporate governance and makes 
it a criminal offence to disseminate false or misleading information (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2004). Minority shareholders also have greater protection through 
lowering the class action requirement and strengthening the disclosure requirement of 
listed companies (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1999). 
Figure 2.9: Corruption Perception Index, score out of 10, selected countries, 2002 













Source: Transparency International, 2004 
2.5       Coping with the Asian Financial Crisis 
The literature on the East Asian crisis is now voluminous as well as contentious. At the 
risk of oversimplifying, we can identify two approaches to the issue. One looks at 
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exogenous factors such as the volatility of private capital flows and the behaviour of 
foreign investors affecting such behaviour. Private short term capital surged into the East 
Asian region on a wave of irrational exuberance. Foreign investors then deserted the 
region in a stampede, provoked by exaggerated fears of deteriorating economic 
fundamentals. Such volatility wreaks havoc on individual economies. Compounding the 
malaise in the region is the problem of Japan. Weakened by mediocre growth throughout 
the 1990s and stymied by a looming domestic recession, Japan has failed to act as a 
locomotive (Islam and Chowdhury, 2000).  
 
The Japan effect is another example of an exogenous variable affecting the rest of East 
sia. Sachs (1997) and Radelet and Sachs (1998) are prominent examples of mainstream  A
economists who subscribe to the exogenous theory of the Asian crisis and believe that the 
policy fundamentals that characterized success in the past are intact. Politicians within 
the region are certainly sympathetic to the theory, most notably Dr. Mahathir Mohamed. 
Commentators representing international agencies such as Stanley Fischer of the IMF 
(Fischer 1998) and Joseph Stiglitz of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1997) certainly ascribe 
some importance to the exogenous theory of the crisis but concede that domestic policy 
mistakes and institutional imperfections played a significant role in bringing about the 
crisis. Thus, the regional trauma originated from both exogenous and endogenous factors. 
In its report on the East Asian crisis, the World Bank (1998) extends this explanation. 
The ADB (1998), in its annual survey of the region, concurs, as does the IMF (1998).  
The crisis in the region also reflects a deeper problem of governance. It stems from a mix 
of political patronage, financial sector frailties, weak corporate governance and lax 
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bankruptcy laws. When this mix evolves in a context of capital account liberalization, it 
can fuse a currency crisis and a financial crisis into a fatal phenomenon (Krugman, 1998, 
1999). This is in brief the complex story of the East Asian crisis. Obviously, the 
generality of the explanation ignores country specific details. The fact that some 
economies have been affected a lot more than others implied that the domestic forces 
behind the crisis were more prevalent in some countries than in others. Such contagious 
behaviour can thus end up punishing both weak and strong economies. From a policy 
perspective, a great deal hinges on one’s convictions. If the crisis is believed to be the 
product of exogenous factors, then its solution lies in international assistance to the 
affected economies and reform of the global financial system. If the crisis is believed to 
be primarily the product of domestic policy errors and embedded institutional 
imperfections, a sustainable solution involves large scale institutional reform (Islam and 
Chowdhury, 2000). 
 
The Asian financial crisis impacted severely on the Malaysian economy. Growth fell 
arply and unemployment rose significantly. Timely responses from government  sh
enabled the Malaysian economy to weather the Asian financial crisis better than other 
regional economies. To help strengthen Malaysia’s financial and capital markets, the 
Government introduced the Financial Sector Master Plan and the Capital Market Master 
Plan, whose policies would be implemented between 2001 and 2010 (Economic 
Analytical Unit, 2005). In contrast to several other economies in the Asian region, 
Malaysia did not require IMF assistance to cope with the aftermath of the regional 
financial meltdown. Nevertheless, they did implement measures consistent with IMF 
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recommendations such as fiscal restraint in the early stages of the crisis (ADB 2004). The 
Malaysian authorities implemented controls on international capital flows in September 
1998 in a bid to separate the influence of the currency on interest rate movements. It was 
hoped this would reduce speculative attacks on the currency and insulate the domestic 
economy from the effects of short term speculative capital flows (East Asia Analytical 
Unit, 1999). At the time these capital control measures were a controversial policy move 
because of supposed incompatibility between restrictions on short term capital flows and 
an open foreign direct investment regime. However, the Malaysian economy openness, 
high quality bureaucracy and lack of a balance of payments crisis allowed Malaysia the 
option of using these tools to stabilize the capital market (Asian Development Bank, 
2004). Many economists now perceive capital controls as effective in achieving desired 
stability under certain extreme conditions, allowing recovery measures and reforms to be 
undertaken (Bhagwati, 1998; Krugman 1998; Rodrik 1998; and Stiglitz 1998).   
 
Up until June 2005, conditions were not putting pressure on the Malaysian Government 
 revalue or float the ringgit. The terms of trade have declined over the past three years,  to
but only by four per cent. Although the ringgit appears undervalued at the current peg, it 
is much easier to support an undervalued currency than an overvalued one, because all 
the monetary authorities have to do is provide ringgit to the foreign exchange market. In 
its 2004 Article IV consultation, the International Monetary Fund saw no reason to 
revalue the peg at this time citing a large current account surplus, comfortable level of 
reserves, low inflation, a relatively sound financial system, manageable external debt and 
a gradually diversifying economy (International Monetary Fund, 2004). Some Malaysian 
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commentators argue that the ringgit peg provides stability and certainty to business 
decisions, assisting long term strategic decisions. Another reason the Malaysian 
Government is not moving hastily is the Chinese renminbi peg to the US dollar. The 
discussion above on China’s industrial rise revealed that a large number of Malaysian 
exports compete with Chinese exports on world markets. A revaluation of the ringgit peg 
without a corresponding change in the renminbi peg therefore could have ramifications 
for the competitiveness of Malaysian exports vis-à-vis Chinese exports (Robert A. 
Mundell cited in the Star July 12, 2005). Despite current support for the peg, in the longer 
term the International Monetary Fund thought that a move toward greater exchange rate 
flexibility would be beneficial for Malaysia if it were well prepared, pursued from a 
position of strength, and carefully sequenced (International Monetary Fund, 2004). In 
reality, Malaysia’s external debt, trade balance and inflation rate will determine whether 
the Malaysian authorities make any changes to the current system (Economic Intelligence 
Unit, 2004). However, Malaysia de-pegged the ringgit on July 21, 2005 immediately after 
China abandoned its own currency peg (Ariff, 2005).  
 
Bank Negara has now in place what is termed a “basket peg”, which means the ringgit is 
ow tied to a basket of currencies. The ringgit is free but not floating freely. It is now  n
under a “managed” float. Cynics would call it a “dirty” float. To them, a “clean” float is 
synonymous with a “free float”. The latter is labeled “clean” as the exchange rate under 
this mode is determined by supply and demand for the currency without government 
interventions. In the economics literature, there has always been a debate about whether 
or not the currency market should be left free or be tempered. In practice, most 
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governments do intervene, as it is too risky to let their currencies be exposed to the 
vagaries of market forces which tend to overshoot. Yet it would be a costly mistake to 
ignore the market signals (Ariff, 2005). A managed float provides a middle ground where 
one can have the benefit of exchange rate flexibility without excessive instability. The 
managed float implies that the central bank (Bank Negara) would intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to smoothen short term fluctuations. Thus, for example, the central bank 
would sell ringgit if there were a strong demand for the currency and buy ringgit if there 
were excess supply. Therefore, it was wise of the central bank to opt for a managed float, 
instead of re-pegging the ringgit (Ariff, 2005). A re-peg would have given vent to more 
speculation and waiting, without addressing the problems associated with exchange rate 
distortions. In fact, the current system, for all intents and purposes, is not different from 
the one the country had before the 1997/98 financial crisis (Ariff, 2005). 
 
In mid 1998, the government established three institutions to cope with the sharp increase 
 the banks non performing loans (NPL), implement refinancing and restructuring, and  in
strengthen the corporate reporting framework. The Government established the Corporate 
Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) to facilitate voluntary corporate debt 
restructuring between creditors and viable debtors.  Danaharta, an asset management 
company, was established to buy NPL from the banking system. Danamodal, a special 
purpose finance vehicles was also established to recapitalize banks, strengthen the 
banking industry and help consolidate and rationalize the banking system (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 1999). Establishing Danaharta and the CDRC also facilitated elimination 
of non core business as part of debt restructuring agreements (Khatri, 2001). After the 
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work completion of these agencies, Malaysian authorities will rely more on market based 
restructurings including mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcy, which require a strong 
legal and corporate governance framework.   
 
To strengthen the banking system further, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) initiated a 
erger program for domestic banking institutions in 1999 to consolidate Malaysia’s 54 
kruptcy laws give creditors greater protection. Restructuring 
ndertaken under Danaharta and the CDRC have enabled creditors to recoup some of 
m
domestic financial institutions into ten ‘anchor’ banking groups (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2002). In 2004, BNM introduced a new interest rate framework. The Overnight Policy 
Rate (OPR) replaced the three month intervention rate as the indicator of monetary policy 
stance. The OPR has two roles. The first is a signaling device to indicate monetary policy 
stance; it serves as the primary reference rate in determining other market rates. The 
second is a target rate for the day to day liquidity operations of Bank Negara. Monetary 
operations of Bank Negara target the overnight inter bank rate. Liquidity management 
aims to ensure the appropriate level of liquidity that would influence the overnight inter 
bank rate to move close to the Overnight Policy Rate. The Monetary Policy Statement, 
released on a quarterly basis, announces changes to this rate. Should there be a change in 
the monetary policy stance between these periods an additional monetary policy 




their investments. Authorities have reduced companies’ ability to impose restraining 
orders on creditors under the Bankruptcy Act (Economic Analytical Unit, 2002). During 
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2001 to 2003, the government undertook reforms to Bursa Malaysia, the Malaysian stock 
exchange as part of the Capital Market Master Plan to have an internationally competitive 
capital market. These reforms included creating a single consolidated Malaysian 
exchange to concentrate liquidity and widen access to investments and products, creating 
a single clearing house, shifting to a fully electronic trading system on the Malaysia 
Derivatives Exchange Berhad (MDEB), introducing a circuit breaker mechanism to 
promote market stability, giving greater access to initial public offerings, facilitating the 
listing of large companies, revamping listing requirements and deregulating restrictions 
on intermediaries so as to broaden market reach and improve accessibility (Economic 
Planning Unit, 2003). In further developments, Bursa Malaysia was demutualised in 
January 2004.  
 
These efforts have introduced a considerable degree of stability to Malaysian financial 
arkets. Non performing loans measured on a six month basis, have fallen from 8.1 per  m
cent as at end 1998 to 6.2 per cent as at July 2004. Measured on a three month basis, non 
performing loans have fallen from 13.6 per cent to 8.3 per cent over the same period. The 
risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio of banks was 13.5 per cent in March 2004, up from 
10.5 per cent in December 1997 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004). In August 1998, Bursa 
Malaysia was only one quarter of the value of the peak in February 1997, but has now 
regained about three quarters of its market capitalization (CEIC, 2004).  The financial 
system has greater depth and strength than it did before the financial crisis, although as 
discussed above, the banking sector could consolidate further, delinquent loans still are 
higher than before the Asian Financial Crisis and foreign financial institutions have 
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limited Malaysian investment options (Table 2.10). That said, the finance sector certainly 
is strong enough to support further expansion of the Malaysian economy. 
Table 2.10  Financial system, 1997, 1998 and 2003   
       1997   1998   2003 
Number  of  finan ial  institutions       86 c    80   44 
nt 
on performing loans as a percentage of total loans    4.1    13.6    8.9 
 
enerally, foreign investors in Malaysia's manufacturing sector can hold 100% equity in 
 of their production. However, effective from 17 June 
Of  which  commercial  banks     35   35   23 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector,     165.1    159.8    154.2 
per cent of GDP 
 
Risk  premium  on  lending,  percentage  points    3.8   1.0   3.7 
 




Sources: CEIC 2004, World Bank 1999, 2004
 
2.6            Liberal Equity Policy 
G
projects which export at least 80%
2003, 100% foreign equity holding is allowed for all investments in new projects, as well 
as investments in expansion/diversification projects by existing companies irrespective of 
their level of exports. Regulations and legislation covering companies, capital markets 
and accounting are straightforward and similar to many countries (Economic Analytical 
Unit, 2005). However, Malaysia does not have a national competition policy and only 
energy and the communications and multimedia sector have made legal provisions for 
competition policy. In other sectors, competition regulation mostly is undertaken through 
control over prices and entry conditions, for example permits and licences. These controls 
aim to achieve socioeconomic objectives, such as encouraging bumiputera 
entrepreneurship rather than to promote market competitiveness. The absence of formal 
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competition policies potentially can make it difficult for regulators to deal with problems 
such as collusion (Lee, 2004).  
 
Foreign companies in the manufacturing sector are allowed to employ expatriates where 
ertain skills are not available in Malaysia. A company with foreign paid-up capital of 
alaysia's company tax rate is attractive at 28% and is applicable to both resident and 
ide range of tax incentives for 
c
US$2 million and above will be allowed up to 10 expatriate posts, including five key 
posts, that is, posts that are permanently filled by foreigners. The Government also 
requires foreign investors, to the best of their ability, to recruit and train Malaysians so as 
to reflect the country’s population composition at all levels of employment (Foreign 
Investment Committee, 2004). That said, expatriate workers are likely to remain an 
important source of labour in certain industries for a number of years. 
 
2.7 Attractive  Tax  Incentives 
M
non-resident companies. Malaysia also offers a w
manufacturing projects under the Promotion of Investments Act 1986 and the Income 
Tax Act 1967. The main incentives are the Pioneer Status, Investment Tax Allowance, 
Reinvestment Allowance, Incentives for High Technology Industries and Incentives for 
Strategic Projects and Incentives for the Setting-up of International/ Regional Service-
based Operations. Malaysia also has a very high trade orientation, quite low average 
tariffs, modest inter industry tariff dispersion and limited incidence of non-tariff barriers 
(Economic Analytical Unit, 2005). Malaysia is a member of the Cairns Group, and is an 
active member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and of regional economic 
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arrangements including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation. The Malaysian economy is relatively open to both trade in goods 
and foreign investment, although rice and automotive products are notable exceptions 
(World Trade Organization, 2001).  In the AFTA context, Malaysia places a high priority 
on the early implementation of the common effective preferential tariff scheme which 
provides for concessional tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade. However, Malaysia continues to 
offer significant protection for its automotive industry. Malaysian market access for 
foreign-service providers remains limited in the financial and professional services 
sectors. The car industry, in particular, attracts substantial tariffs, ranging from five to 
200 per cent which may have hampered a recovery in the Malaysian imported car market 
(Athukorala, 2002).  
 
According to the World Trade Organization (2001), while the automotive sector has been 
ccessful in winning a large share of the domestic market, its exports are modest,  su
contrary to stated objectives, suggesting a lack of external competitiveness. In January 
2004, the Malaysian Government reduced tariffs on cars sourced within the ASEAN 
region as part of their requirements under the ASEAN free trade agreement. However, 
the Government then increased the excise tax on all cars, both domestic and international, 
but gave a 50 per cent rebate to domestically produced vehicles (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, ‘Proton on a slippery slope’, July 15 2004, p.54). In effect, higher excise duties 
replaced the reduced import tariffs to maintain protection of domestic manufacturers, 
reducing the incentive for Proton and other local car makers to improve efficiency. The 
excise tax rates are effective for one year. The Government also announced it would 
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delay further a complete harmonization of tariffs for the automotive sector from 2005 to 
2008. 
 
2.8             A Vibrant Business Environment 
alaysia's market-oriented economy, supportive government policies and a large local 
ess with international corporations have 
hts generally are well protected in Malaysia, although there is some 
ternational concern with the enforcement of intellectual property despite recent 
M
business community that is ready to do busin
made Malaysia a highly competitive manufacturing and export base. A market-oriented 
economy and government policies that provide businesses with the opportunity for 
growth and profits have made Malaysia a highly competitive manufacturing and export 
base. In addition, Malaysia's rapid move towards the k-economy allows companies to do 
business in an environment that is geared towards information technology.  One of 
Malaysia's major pull factors is its large pool of young, educated and trainable workforce. 
Many of Malaysia's university graduates are trained overseas in fields such as 
engineering, and accountancy, allowing them to adapt easily to an international corporate 
environment. English is widely used in Malaysia, especially in business, thus facilitating 
the investor's communication with local personnel and suppliers. The country's legal and 





strengthening of legislation. Both foreign and domestic investors are entitled to fair 
compensation in the event the Government appropriates investors’ assets (Malaysian 
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Industrial Development Authority, 2004). Foreign companies doing business in Malaysia 
often stipulate in their contracts that any potential litigation must take place in foreign 
courts (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004). Malaysia is also a member of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Despite these improvements, Malaysia 
remains on the intellectual property “Watch List” along with 34 other economies. Pirated 
software accounts for 63 per cent of software in use in Malaysia, less than countries such 
as China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand but still much higher than 
Singapore, Australia or Korea (Figure 2.10).  
 
In its Watch List statement, the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
xpressed concern about the continued high rate of production and export of pirated  e
optical disc media, counterfeiting, lack of effective patent and data protection for 
pharmaceutical products and lax enforcement (United States Trade Representative, 
2004). This in turn requires stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights. The legal 
foundation exists for intellectual property rights, but it would seem there could be greater 
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Source: Business Software Alliance, 2004 
 
2.8.1  Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
In Malaysia there are various chambers of commerce and trade associations made up of 
corporations from different countries. These organizations are invaluable sources of 
general business information, advice and assistance, and complement the role of 
government agencies such as MIDA (Malaysia Industrial Development Authority). The 
major organizations are the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(MICCI), Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM), the Japanese Chamber of 
Trade and Industry (JACTIM), and American-Malaysian Chamber of Commerce 
(AMCHAM), as well as several trade associations such as the Malaysian-American 
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2.8.2  Developed Financial Facilities 
 well-developed financial and banking sector has enhanced Malaysia's position as a 
ynamic export base in Asia. Sophisticated financial facilities are available through 
eir nationwide network of branches. There 
 
ompanies) into the country. These MNCs, especially those which pursued active vendor 
A
d
domestic and foreign commercial banks and th
are also representative offices of several foreign banks that wish to establish a presence in 
the region. Besides the commercial banks, merchant banks, finance companies and 
industrial finance institutions are major sources of credit to the industrial sector in 
Malaysia. Exporters in Malaysia can also take advantage of the credit facilities offered by 
the Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Berhad (Exim Bank), while another institution, 
Malaysia Export Credit Insurance Berhad (MECIB), offers export insurance cover and 
guarantees. To complement Malaysia's financial system, the government has established 
an international offshore financial centre (IOFC) on the island of Labuan located off the 
north-west coast of Borneo. Companies in Labuan enjoy minimal taxes as well as 
confidentiality. To-date, more than 3,500 offshore companies have started their 
operations in Labuan. These include offshore banks, trust companies, and insurance and 
insurance related companies. The Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority 
(LOFSA) is the agency which promotes and develops Labuan as an IOFC (MIDA 2005). 
 
Over the last three decades, Malaysia has developed a large pool of ancillary and 
supporting industries that was initiated with the entry of MNCs (Multinational
c
development programmes, have contributed greatly towards the development of local 
small-and-medium scale industries (SMIs) that are highly competent and competitive 
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with some even penetrating export markets (MIDA, 2005). Most large Malaysian 
companies have been involved in trade and industry for generations, and many have 
excelled in international and regional markets. Thus, foreign investors seeking joint-
venture partners in Malaysia will be able to select from a wide range of companies to find 
one that matches their needs. MIDA also assists foreign investors in business match-
making to start joint-venture projects or to undertake contract manufacturing. 
 
2.9 Vision  2020 
Malaysia is a nation whose growth has been carefully shaped and guided by strategic five 
ear development master plans.  Providing the ultimate backdrop to these plans is Vision 
a that sets out specific goals and objectives for long term 
y
2020, a national agend
developments (Abdul Hamid, 1993). Vision 2020 envisages that Malaysia shall become a 
fully developed and industrialized country by the year 2020 in all aspects. The Malaysian 
government announced Vision 2020 in 1991 following several years of slow growth 
relative to the 1970 to 1980 period. Vision 2020 outlined a broad plan for Malaysia to 
achieve developed economy status by the year 2020. Specific targets in the statement 
included increasing real GDP eightfold between 1990 and 2020 translating to average 
annual growth of seven per cent and increasing per capita income by a factor of four. In 
broader terms, attaining economic competitiveness involved sectoral diversification, 
productivity gains, technology usage, low inflation and entrepreneurship. The 
Government expected to support these goals through providing a supportive legal and 
regulatory environment, prudent fiscal and monetary policy management, supportive 
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physical infrastructure and economic deregulation. Vision 2020’s nine main objectives 
were to establish: 
1.  a united, peaceful, integrated and harmonious Malaysian nation; 
2.  a secure, confident, respected and robust society committed to excellence; 
nd the 




nd business, but left open the option to intervene if authorities deemed it necessary in 
3.  a mature, consensual and exemplary democracy; 
4.  a fully moral society with citizens strongly imbued with spiritual values a
highest ethical standards; 
5.  a culturally, ethically and religiously diverse, liberal, tolerant and unified society; 
6.  a scientific, progressive, in
7.  a caring society with a family based welfare system; 
8.  an economically just society with inter ethnic economic parity and
9.  a fully competitive, dynamic, robust, resilient and pro
 
The policy also stated that the Government would reduce its role in economic p
a
order to achieve their goals. In addition, the policy also envisaged a more competitive, 
market disciplined, outward looking, dynamic, self reliant, resilient, diversified, adaptive, 
technologically proficient and entrepreneurial economy with strong industrial links, 
productive and knowledgeable human resources, exemplary work ethics and strong 
emphasis on quality and excellence. Up until 1997, real GDP growth was ahead of 
schedule in terms of attaining an eightfold increase in real GDP by 2020. However, the 
Asian financial crisis saw real GDP fall dramatically in 1998. In mid 1991 after the 
expiry of NEP, the government announced a new National Development Policy (NDP) in 
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conjunction with a ten year Second Outline Perspectives Plan (OPP2) for 1991 to 2000 as 
well as the Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP) for 1991-1995. Hence while the OPP2 and 6MP 
were supposed to provide medium term economic policy perspectives, Vision 2020 
provided the long term objectives. In fact Vision 2020 reiterated some of the major policy 
changes introduced by the government especially as the economic liberalization 
undertaken since the mid 1980s encouraged the private sector with privatization and 
some deregulation (Gomez and Jomo 1997). The Vision 2020 framework proclaimed that 
there can be no fully developed Malaysia until Malaysians can overcome all challenges 
that have confronted Malaysians since its independence (Mahathir, 1991). 
Understandably, there has been some enthusiasm, especially on the part of non 
bumiputeras, for Vision 2020’s explicit commitment to forging a Malaysian nation 
(bangsa Malaysia) transcending existing ethnic identities and loyalties. But whereas the 
NEP sought national unity in improved inter ethnic relations, ostensibly to be realized by 
achieving inter ethnic economic parity, Vision 2020’s goal stresses an equally narrow, 
materialistic and economistic emphasis on growth (Gomez and Jomo 1997).  
 
However, while not representing new policy changes in a real sense, it nonetheless made 
conomic policies already in place more explicit, coherent and legitimate. Whereas the  e
earlier policy changes were often justified as temporary responses to the recession and as 
concessions to revive the economy, the post 1990 policy announcements were legitimized 
as the imperatives of rapid modernization, the promise of a good life in the future and the 
rapid growth and industrialization that have occurred since the late 1980s. Whether 
Vision 2020 adequately addresses the main contemporary challenges faced by Malaysian 
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society is a different question. It has certainly shifted attention away from the previous 
narrow emphasis on inter-ethnic distributional concerns without abandoning them 
altogether. It has also given priority to the challenge of late industrialization without 
seeming oblivious of human welfare. The unique quality of Vision 2020 is that it aims to 
achieve the status of a developed country that is distinctive and molded according to its 
own features without following others. It has its own specification and identity, whereby 
Malaysia should not be developed only in the economic sense but be a nation that is fully 
developed along all dimensions; economically, politically, socially, spiritually, 
psychologically and culturally (Okposin et al. 1999) 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
Investment is important to Malaysia. It is sought as a source of capital and foreign 
eans of securing industrial technology, managerial expertise,  exchange and as a m
marketing know-how and business networks to achieve higher levels of growth, 
employment, productivity and export performance. Investment has contributed 
significantly to Malaysia’s economic development and has made possible the 
transformation of the country from a producer of primary commodities to a modern 
industrializing economy. The Malaysian Government encourages growth in higher value 
activities and sees the economy moving to high technology and knowledge based 
industries. Although targeting certain industries remains entrenched in Malaysian 
policymaking there are encouraging signs that the focus is shifting towards creating an 
enabling environment for private sector business to drive investment and economic 
growth. In 2003, the Government unveiled new measures to improve further the 
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investment climate and lure back foreign investment but a number of constraints remain, 
in particular a shortage of skilled labor. Malaysia’s strategy towards high technology 
sectors also requires stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights. Although the 
legal foundation exists for these rights, court enforcement of laws has been inadequate. 
Malaysia’s progress in structural reforms has important implications for foreign 
investment. A privatization review recently initiated by the Government under which 
sales of controlling stakes in state enterprises are being postponed while independent 
consultants review the procedures and plans for future sales could be a positive step if it 
results in a more transparent, competitive  process (Asian Development Bank, 2004).  
 
Strengthening education is an important part of the Malaysian Government’s 
development goals. The generally high quality and depth of Malaysia’s educational 
system is one of the reasons for Malaysia’s economic success. However, education is also 
one of the biggest challenges as Malaysia develops from a production to a knowledge- 
based economy. The openness of Malaysia’s economy means education is a crucial part 
of the enabling economic environment, providing business with the skills they need to 
compete successfully on the world stage. For this reason, expanding research and 
development, improving teachers’ skill and encouraging Malaysians to embark on further 
study are important goals. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing Malaysia is implementing 
the various policies designed to promote growth and economic restructuring. The top 
levels of government have advanced several ideas that, if implemented, will take 
Malaysia to the next level of development. Thirteen years ago, the Vision 2020 statement 
identified the need for small and medium enterprises to be dynamic, self reliant and 
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prepared to think long term. However, a plethora of incentives and grants still are 
available for domestic investors. Incentives can be restrictive on business activity and can 
focus entrepreneurial effort on rent seeking behaviour. To this extent, incentives may be 
counterproductive and thwart the development of a vibrant and resilient business 
community. Domestic private investment remains low and some fear that the 
Government’s statements on how the challenges ahead will be addressed are expressions 
of intent that might not be realized. 
 
However, there are encouraging signs that the Government is leaning towards a more 
nabling environment. The Government is changing its focus to infrastructure quality not  e
quantity, with no new mega projects in the pipeline. In 2004, Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi pointed out that the Malaysian Government already had many incentives and did 
not believe that incentives had to be monetary. Rather the environment must be 
conducive to doing business at a low cost. The Prime Minister also announced that 
Proton could not depend on government protection forever (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, “Wish List”, June 3, 2004, p.20). Bank Negara’s governor also has stated the 
public sector’s role in the economy will be scaled back and will primarily focus on 
providing an enabling environment to strengthen the role of the private sector in the 
economy (The Edge Malaysia, “Economic Rebalancing to intensify, says Zeti”, 4 August 
2004). On all measures, Malaysia’s business environment is attractive despite several 
issues that are considered to being restrictive on business activities. It is relatively easy to 
establish a business in Malaysia or with a Malaysian company. The legal and regulatory 
environment is similar to many commonwealth countries and few industries are 
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completely off limits to foreigners. The average Malaysian’s quality of life also has 
improved in line with the stronger economic growth. The challenge now for Malaysia is 
to maintain this momentum. Policy makers will do well to remember Krugman’s words 
in his open letter to former Prime Minister Mahathir on the day capital controls were 
announced: “Remember, above all, that the point of this policy departure should be 
purely and simply to buy space for economic growth. It should not be used in an attempt 
to prove points about the soundness of the pre-crisis economy or anything else. If 
Malaysia truly does succeed in achieving a recovery that will be lesson enough for the 
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CHAPTER 3   LITERATURE REVIEW         
.1 Introduction 
hapter one highlighted the need to research into the partner selection issues surrounding 
rategic alliances as these have been identified as the major determinant of success or 






failure. It also noted that this need is very urgent in a developing country context, 
particularly Malaysia. Malaysia has had in existence a number of strategic alliances 
encompassing various sectors in the industry but these have not been researched 
previously to establish how these alliances have been selected and eventually performed.   
 
The survey of literature on strategic alliances is presented in three sections within this 
c
because strategic alliance is complex, with our understanding of how strategic alliance is 
created significantly over time. The second section looks at the evolution of existing 
theories to the phenomenon of strategic alliances, roles, motivation and challenges in 
organizations. This section provides a historical context to the literature and draws on 
learning from disciplines considered to be parent theories of strategic alliance. The third 
section compares and contrasts previously proposed theories, models and experiences 
relating specifically to strategic alliance in organizations. A representation of these key 
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Figure 3.1   Organization of the literature within Chapter Three 
 
The general aim of a literature review is to build a theoretical foundation upon which the 
research is based by reviewing the literature to identify research issues which are worth
he major factors underlying the growth of alliances are most commonly cited as the 
pid spread and ever shortening life span of 
 
researching because they are controversial and have not been answered by previous 
researchers (Perry 1994: 5). In the process, the review not only centers on the research 
problem but also on the links between the research problem and the wider body of 
knowledge. In other words, the review should demonstrate a link between the immediate 
field of the research problem and its parent discipline. The literature may be used in 
sharpening the focus of the study and to give structure to its questions and designs. In all 
cases, the researcher needs to connect the proposed study to the literature (Punch, 1998). 
In following these established rules, the researcher has sought to become familiar with 
the literature on the strategic alliance as the parent discipline of this thesis, which in turn 
has directly given rise to strategic alliance partner selection as the immediate discipline. 
 
3.1.1  Globalization 
T
globalization of tastes and markets, and the ra
modern technology. Levitt (1960) is credited with having drawn attention to the 
increasing homogenization of taste leading to global markets. Since Levitt’s (1960) 








Parent disciplines of 
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influential article was written, the process has gained pace despite numerous researchers’ 
(Ohmae, 1985; 1989, Porter, 1986; Douglas and Wind, 1987; Bleeke and Ernst, 1991) 
attempts to show that the process only applied to a narrow range of industries, for 
example, consumer electronics. Kotler (1986) suggests, for instance, that no more than 
about three per cent of the world’s production is truly global. Ohmae’s research (1989), 
however, has shown that over 600 million consumers in the triad (United States of 
America, European Union and Japan) are developing strikingly similar consumer needs 
in a wide range of areas. This process of globalization has been accelerated in recent 
years by improved communication, greater travel both for business and leisure, and 
increased spending power. Chandler (1990), in fact takes the globalization of markets as 
a given in his analysis, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. If the 
globalization thesis is accepted, its impact on the global strategy of the MNC will be a 
major one. Hrebiniak (1992) pointed out: 
Competitive advantage under global strategy is derived, in large part, from the sharing 
 
and leveraging of skills or capabilities across country boundaries. 
 
ad to opportunities for major economies of both scale and scope by stimulating global 
 
Takeuchi and Porter (1986), for example, demonstrate how international marketing can 
le
thinking, and by ensuring that this thinking influences the configuration of their value 
chains, in part through the centralization of marketing back up, and in helping the 
organization develop universal, modified or country tailored products as perceived 
circumstances dictate, dependent upon the degree of country specific demand in each 
country served. 
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Stopford and Turner (1985) reinforce the argument that there is a need for globalization, 
by adding the technology dimension, pointing out that all of what they describe as the 
eta-technologies, namely micro electronics, genetic engineering and advanced material 
ia and other forms; and 
 and economic 
 knowledge, in addition to the traditional 
conomic forces of labour, land and capital, to wealth accumulation has received 
is as much in identifying the areas where 
cal responsiveness is key, as those where a global product is appropriate. Ghemawat 
and Spence (1986) propose the development of a globalization index focusing on the 
m
sciences is subject to global competition. They suggest that the major forces leading to  
globalization are:   
a)  technology, principally through the micro electronics revolution; 
b)  cultural evolution, that is, the heterogenisation and homogenization of tastes 
through med
c)  the breaking down of barriers, for example, by deregulation
integration. 
 
Another key trend driving strategic alliance growth is the globalization of business and of 
knowledge used in business. The importance of
e
considerable attention. The rapidity with which knowledge can be communicated and 
translated globally into new products and services has contributed to the growing use of 
strategic alliances in today’s highly competitive, global environment (Badaracco, 1991; 
Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Roos et al. 1997). 
 
There is general agreement in the literature that the movement is not all one way, and that 
the secret of organizational commercial success 
lo
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drivers and impediments to globalization. Overall, they conclude that the countries ripest 
for global product penetration are small countries with metropolitan but expensive tastes. 
Piest and Ritsema (1990) also offer a word of caution in rushing to the theme of 
ubiquitious globalization by enumerating the large number of material, technical and 
fiscal barriers that exist in the European Union after 1992 and which will, therefore, act 
as a brake to the market globalization process.  
 
Overall, however, globalization is taking place in a growing range of industries, and 
organizations looking to survive over the medium term future will need, it is suggested, 
not just to have a good product that will sell well in a single country, but one with a more 
lobal market appeal. Increasingly, organizations will need the resources, either alone or 
Improved transportation systems give companies easier access to faraway markets. Both 
economic, technological and cultural exposure.   
 
3.2           Defining Strategic Alliance  
e key contributions of this thesis to the 
eneral corpus of knowledge on alliance partner selection. Numerous definitions abound 
d authorities. At the outset it should be noted that 
the term strategic alliance connotes a process of inter organizational linkages or 
g
in partnership with others, to produce and market goods on a world wide scale, and the 
ability to identify and achieve sustainable competitive advantage in global terms. In this 
connection, Auster (1987) notes: 
Improved information and communication systems allow rapid global transactions. 
of these factors accelerate the rate of technological diffusion and create increasing socio-
 
 
The purpose of this section is to establish a working definition of “strategic alliance”. 
This is important because it emerges as one of th
g
concerning strategic alliances from varie
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networks. Essentially, what is anticipated here are different forms of cooperation and 
collaboration among participating organizations (Buttery et al. 1999: 415). Therefore, 
because of the generic nature of the phenomenon, the term strategic alliances has been 
used interchangeably with concepts such as business networks, clusters, strategic 
partnering, collaborative arrangement, cooperative strategy, flexible specialization and 
linkages. 
 
Buttery et al. (1994: 17) prefer business networks in their usage and define it as “two or 
more organizations involved in mutually beneficial relationships that maintain all 
participants as separate corporate entities”. Their definition implies that although partners 
in a network may carry on business operations independently from the network, they may 
ool skills and resources leading to a new venture in order to jointly create an advantage 
 to the partners’ strategic intent, the commitment of and access to partners’ 
sources and opportunity for organizational learning. Hence for them, a strategic alliance 
is a close, long term, mutually beneficial agreement between two or more partners in 
p
(Buttery et al. 1998:27). The freestanding nature of partners implied in this definition is 
important for this thesis and in line with Lipnack and Stamps’ (1986) position that 
describes participants in a network as freestanding and cohering through shared values 
and interests. 
 
Spekman et al. (1998) note that despite differences in organizational form portrayed in 
the literature such as joint ventures and co-marketing agreements, each of these alliance 
definitions converges on several salient themes; goals that are both compatible and 
directly related
re
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which resources, knowledge and compatibilities are shared with the objective of 
enhancing the competitive position of each partner (Spekman et al. 1998:748). 
 
Whilst this definition is more comprehensive than that of Buttery et al. (1994) given 
above, the inclusion of the descriptor ‘long term’ by Spekman et al. is slightly 
problematic because strategic alliance should be measured not by time frames but by the 
attainment of respective partners’ objectives. Yoshino and Rangan (1995:104) make this 
same point in response to erroneous and simplistic interpretations by many researchers of 
idespread announcements on dissolution of alliances as ‘failures’. Yoshino et al. (1995)  w
argue convincingly that alliance expiry dates, termination of alliance because of 
accomplishment of main objectives, or conclusion of the life span of an alliance due to 
lack of alignment or fit between business and strategy resulting from environmental shifts 
after years of cooperation, could all scarcely be construed as ‘alliance failure’. Cauley De 
La Sierra (1995:5) also makes the same point in noting that there is no set time limit for 
alliances, ‘their duration is a function of the objectives and structure of the partnership, 
the prevailing business conditions and the management capabilities of the partners’. 
Moreover, because revenues or intangible benefits from each key account should exceed 
the costs of establishing and maintaining the relationship within a certain time span 
(Blois 1999), relationship longevity is not a guarantee of customer profitability. Thus, 
some alliances may be short lived while others may be long term, depending on goal 
attainment. 
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Wheelan and Hunger (2000) offer a simple but profound definition of strategic alliances 
that differentiates them from normal company to company dealings. For them a strategic 
alliance is “an agreement between firms to do business together in way that go beyond 
normal company to company dealings, but fall short of a merger or a full partnership” 
heelan et al. 2000:125). Therefore, alliances can range from informal handshake 
 generally remain competitors outside the 
lationship (Cauley De La Sierra 1995:4). She adds that most alliances have well 
(W
agreements to formal agreements with lengthy contracts where parties may exchange 
equity or contribute capital to form a joint venture. This definition is fairly flexible as it 
includes both formal and informal networks.  
 
Cauley De La Sierra (1995) offers important insights into the international dimensions of 
alliances and the differences between alliances and traditional joint ventures. She prefers 
to use the term ‘competitive alliance’ to convey the point that alliances are ventures 
between strong international companies that
re
defined, often limited strategic objectives and are designed to serve regional and global 
markets. Moreover, regardless of structure, all alliances entail some degree of inter 
corporate integration among partners; less integration than an outright merger but more 
than a simple buy/sell relationship (Cauley De La Sierra 1995:4). More importantly, she 
makes the point that alliances are different from the traditional multinational company 
(MNC) host joint venture (JV) and the strong weak relationships inherent in such 
ventures because they are partnerships among equals. Furthermore, she makes the same 
point as that of Doz et al. (1998) that many companies are entering into not only single 
ventures, but also entire networks of alliances which portray high fluidity and flexibility. 
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Beamish and Killing (1996), in the same vein as Cauley De La Sierra (1995), emphasize 
the international aspect of alliances and explain why they are referred to as strategic in 
nature. They points out that international alliances are cooperative arrangements formed 
by organizations from two or more countries (Beamish et al. 1996:1613). An alliance is 
considered strategic when it involves the allocation of resources by the alliance manager 
tures 
nd consortia (Mockler, 1999). 
 of each sponsoring firm.” He pointed out that strategic 
lliance can take many forms. They can be either permanent strategic alliances that do 
to areas deemed pertinent to the alliance’s future success, vis-à-vis value creation.   
 
Webster’s dictionary defines strategic as “important” and alliance as “association of 
interests”. Strategic alliances then are associations important to alliance partners and 
formed to further their common interests. They can involve franchising and licensing 
agreements, partnership contracts, equity investments in new or existing joint ven
a
 
Parkhe (1993) defined strategic alliances as “relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative 
arrangements, involving flows and linkages that use resources and/or governance 
structures from autonomous organizations, for joint accomplishment of individual goals 
linked to the corporate mission
a
not predetermine dissolutions of the strategic alliances or time limited strategic alliances 
that predetermine dissolutions of strategic alliances. 
 
Strategic alliance forms are given a wide variety of names in the literature. Porter and 
Fuller (1986) talk of ‘international coalitions’, while Oliver (1990) dubs such 
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arrangements ‘IOR’ (Interorganisational Relationships). Jarrilo (1988) uses the term 
‘strategic networks’, while Miles and Snow (1986) choose ‘dynamic networks’ as their 
escriptive term. Borys and Jemison (1989) talk of ‘hybrid organizational arrangements’, 
tive strategies are transition mechanisms that 




while Kanter (1989) coins PALS (P-pool resources, A-ally, L-link, S-system). Perlmutter 
and Heenan (1986) talks of ‘industrial systems constellations’, and Ulrich (1983) uses 
‘MOE’ (multi-organizational enterprises). 
 
Cullen (2002) defined strategic alliances as partnerships between two or more firms 
which decide they can better pursue their mutual goals by combining their resources i.e. 
financial, managerial, technology, as well as their existing distinctive competitive 
advantages. Alliances often called coopera
p
possible for each company alone. Alliances typically fall under one of three categories: 
•  Joint ventures – when two or more companies create an independent company. 
•  Equity strategic alliances – in which two or more partners have different relative 
ownership shares (equity percentages) in the new venture. 
•  Non equity strategic alliances – when agreements are carried out through contract 
rather than ownership sharing. Such contracts are often with a firm’s supplier
distributors or manufacturers or they may be for purposes of marketing a
information sharing such as with many airline partnerships. 
 
There are three main types of strategic alliances (Lorange and Roos, 1992). These are 
informal international cooperative alliances, formal international cooperative alliances 
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and international joint ventures. Figure 3.2 outlines the major differences among the 
types. 
Figure 3.2     Types and Characteristics of International Strategic Alliances 
Involvement  Competitors  Required  Entity 
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marriage of 
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industry, for e ainstay of competitive strategy. 
een a company and a foreign government or 
mong companies and governments. The European Airbus Industry consortium 
 and Roos, 19
Global strate ic alliances are wo
xample, global all
rking partnerships
iances have become a m
med betw
 between compani
cross industries. In th
es o ore than
Alliances are also sometimes for
a
comprises France’s Aerospatiale and Germany’s Daimler-Benz Aerospace each with 37.9 
percent of the business; British Aerospace has 20 percent, and Spain’s Construcciones 
Aeronauticas has 4.2 percent (Mockler, 1999). 
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Alliances may comprise full global partnerships often joint ventures, in which two or 
more companies, while retaining their national identity, develop a common, long term 
strategy aimed at world leadership. The intent of the Daimler-Chrysler global partnership 
was to achieve these kinds of objectives, though by 2001 it had run into problems. 
Whereas such alliances have a broad agenda, others are formed for a narrow and specific 
ves and viewpoints. However, this thesis adopts the definition proposed 
y Hamilton et al. (1995; 1996) which defines a strategic alliance as: “A durable 
function including production, marketing, research and development and financing 
(Mockler, 1999). 
 
From the above it is apparent that there is a wide body of literature that considers the 
issue of what constitutes a strategic alliance. As seen in Figure 3.3, strategic alliances can 
vary along a broad continuum and it has been viewed by varying authorities from 
different perspecti
b
relationship established between two or more independent firms, involving the sharing or 
pooling of resources to create a mechanism (corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a 
business activity or activities of strategic importance to one or more of the partners for 
their mutual economic advantage”. The derived definition and its key variables reflect the 
nature of systems thinking which guides this thesis. Typically a strategic alliance will be 
the result of conscious intentionality of a proactive kind. Not only are strategic alliances 
typically proactive, they are also selective. There is a choice of partners, usually 
involving some consideration of at least some of the possible candidates for the role of 
alliance partner. What is more, any decision in principle to engage in a strategic alliance 
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represents a serious policy choice in favor of controlled cooperation rather than unbridled 
competition.  
 
Again, the strategic alliance may have a formal substance, typically in documentary or 
contractual form. This documentation may specify objectives, priorities, any limitations 
on the scope of the alliance and may also include `divorce arrangements’, a means of 
rminating the alliance if it does not work out. In short, the strategic alliance is typically  te
a conscious, intentional, proactive, selective act, in turn implying a choice on the 
cooperation/competition dimension. Its operating structure is often heavily relationship-
dependent, yet this alliance may have a formalized, documentary basis. All these 
considerations render the alliance phenomenon an interesting case for exploring the issue 
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Figure 3.3  Types of Collaborative Relationships 
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3.3  Economics Theories Relevant To the Phenomenon of Strategic Alliances 
 
3.3.1 Background  Theory 
A consideration of the economic theories underlying strategic alliance formation logically 
starts with a review of the major ideas most commonly advanced as a basis for the 
evelopment of this inter-organisational genre. The theories will contribute some of the 
a viable understanding of the drive to alliance formation 
t and institutional contacts will follow the major theories of 
n. Culture, trust and institutional contacts are often left out of the 
d literature on strategy but these elements are of paramount 
portance when bringing together not only two or more corporate cultures, but also two 
d
material necessary to construct 
and management, and of alliance evolution. These theories are: 
a) transaction cost analysis   
b) international trade theory 
c) resource-based theory of competitive advantage 
d) resource dependency perspective 
e) the learning organization  
f) chaos theory  
g) institutional theory 
 




or more national cultures as well. Cultural compatibility of whatever kind is also an 
important ingredient for fostering an environment of trust/bonding between alliance 
partners. The level of trust within an alliance will depend significantly on the cultures of 
the alliance and the alliance partners. Trust, as will be shown, also has an impact on 
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transaction costs. The result of the impact of culture and trust will be the ability of the 
alliance partners to bond and work together to reach their own goals. 
 
3.3.2  Transaction Cost Analysis 
Strategic alliance theory is most frequently based in the literature on the transaction cost 
model which claims that alliances are set up and survive when this alliance form of 
rganisation represents the lowest level of transaction costs in comparison with other 
panies (hierarchies), or, at the other extreme, totally 
complex and uncertain; 
)  Operating through the market gives rise to major risks of opportunism; and  
hanism is vital for resource allocation and 
ima
otivation 
d  to  excessive governance cost. 
o
forms, notably fully integrated com
fragmented markets. 
 
In Williamson’s schema (1975) the key driving forces towards hierarchy are that: 
a)  There are major economies of scale and scope; 
b)  The market is 
c
d)  Operating through the market gives rise to high risk of information loss. 
He sees these key driving forces towards markets: 
a)  The efficiency of the market price mec
opt l profitability; 
b)  Only the market system will stimulate entrepreneurship and m
adequately; 
c)  Hierarchies lead to excessive bureaucratic disabilities; and 
d) Hierarchies  lea
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Strategic alliances, when viewed as a hybrid organizational form, have some of the 
characteristics of hierarchies and some of markets, with the following typical profile; 
et price mechanism; and 
replaced by 
 that is, coordination costs remain potentially high. 
m 
)  The situation seems to call for an organisation displaying characteristics of 
h partners very dependent on each other over an 
 form meets both partners risk profiles; and 
Their hierarchy characteristics may be: 
a)  Economies of scale and scope; and 
b)  Ability to deal with complex and uncertain markets, but there is a high risk of 
opportunism by one partner or the other, and a high risk of information loss. 
Their market characteristics may be: 
a)  The degree of operation of the mark
b)  entrepreneurship and motivation, which are more commonly found in alliances 
than in large corporate hierarchies. But bureaucratic disabilities are often 
culture conflict and governance costs,
 
Fro transaction cost analysis, it appears that the strategic alliance may be an 
“appropriate” organisational form in certain circumstances (which are not objective as 
they rely on the perception of the parties to identify, measure and priorities), notably if: 
a
flexibility and the need for cooperation; 
b)  The alliance is judged to be the best way to gain access to certain necessary and 
specialised assets; 
c)  Neither party alone could market the end product as effectively; 
d)  The market is “thin”, making bot
extended time scale; 
e)  The alliance
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f)  Opportunities for realising scale/scope economies exist. 
 
The alliance may involve the contribution of assets by one partner which are covered by 
d, in the absence of an 
or buy its partner’s whole 
usiness. The situation may involve the transfer of tacit knowledge or know-how which 
stics, such as retention of motivation, entrepreneurship, 
nd the price mechanism, and some hierarchy characteristics, for example, scale , scope, 
scope economies, for example, their contribution network, an
alliance, the other partner would need to set up its own network 
b
is most effectively done on a cooperative basis when overall goals are compatible, that is, 
in an alliance. In collaboration with third world partners, the alliance form is, it is 
suggested (Beamish, 1988; Yeung, 1997; Gray and Yan, 1997; Olson and Singsuwan, 
1997; Li and Shenkar, 1997; Luo and Chen, 1997; Erden, 1997; Tallman, Sutcliffe and 
Antonian, 1997; Pearce and Branyiczki, 1997), often the best way to retain local 
motivation, bridge the organisational cultures, and meet local political needs. Most 
commonly, the alliance enables partners to limit risk, and gain access to assets they do 
not have but need. 
 
In addition to the above specific conditions that may give rise to alliances, other 
conditions are those meeting the “balance of forces” argument, that is, in situations 
requiring some market characteri
a
and learning economies. The balance of forces argument also requires the minimisation 
of relevant transaction costs, for example, opportunism or information leakage for 
markets, and bureaucratic disabilities for hierarchies. In the world of transaction cost 
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economics two primary forces are commonly believed to operate (Williamson, 
1975;1985); First, pressure towards equilibrium; and second, natural selection. 
 
However, in actual as opposed to theoretical situations, these forces are frequently 
impeded in their operation by four inhibiting forces, namely: friction, immaturity, 
perfections and time lags. Friction may occur in a market when institutional factors 
ost of information impactedness, be calculated and 
im
prevent immediate adjustment to changed circumstances. Immaturity occurs as new 
markets develop and, in their evolution, give rise to forms that may not survive in the 
longer term. Imperfections may occur in all markets save the genuinely uni-locational 
commodity form, and give rise to a variety of distortions. Time lags may incur costs and, 
at any one moment, make the precise nature of evolution unpredictable. Thus even if 
there are underlying forces towards the minimisation of transaction costs, the above 
inhibiting factors may well prevent the predicted least-cost form emerging. Both 
Williamson (1975) and Nelson and Winter (1982) retain the concept of “efficiency” in 
their writings as the key to organisational change, but Hannan and Freeman (1989) 
doubts its predominance, and believe that it rarely overrides institutional and political 
considerations. The pressure of “natural selection” and “efficiency”, then, do not 
necessarily operate smoothly or certainly in the real world. There may, therefore, be 
organisational forms that survive, even though they do not minimise transaction costs but 
achieve other desired ends. 
 
Further weaknesses of the transaction cost model are that the relevant costs defy 
calculation. How for example, the c
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added to that of opportunism? Further, it is not a model necessarily known to the 
 when the cost of governing 
ehaviour by rules becomes prohibitive, and when a cooperative mechanism emerges as 
decision-takers setting up alliances and cannot, therefore, as a model, motivate them. The 
only argument overcoming these weaknesses, namely that forces will drive organisational 
forms towards the most efficient ones through natural selection, is theoretically attractive 
to the determinist, but difficult to demonstrate empirically. It is, however, advanced in a 
sophisticated form by Ghosal and Nohria (1987) in their presentation of a congruence 
approach to a contingency theory as applied to multinational enterprises of both an-   
integrated and a federated or network form. They claim that structure will be 
systematically differentiated so as to “fit” the different environmental and resource 
contingencies faced by different organisational subunits. Under norms of rationality 
(Thompson, 1967), organisations facing heterogeneous task environments seek to 
identify homogeneous segments and establish structural units to deal with each. Perhaps 
so, but the norm of rationality may be only fitfully observed. 
 
The concept of transaction cost minimisation underlies Ouchi’s (1981) concept of clans 
or uni-cultural strategic alliances, which are most appropriate
b
an alternative, that is, where both parties to the transaction share a common goal or set of 
values and loyalties. Strict clan mores, including trust, are important to avoid the need for 
the governance rules of hierarchy. These elements of trust/bonding will emerge 
importantly in the later part of this chapter. 
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The transaction cost model is a somewhat mechanistic one (Miner, 1980; Wood and 
Bandara, 1989; Donaldson, 1990; Griesinger, 1990). In fact, Griesinger’s (1990) use of 
e concept of the human motivation of “betterment” introduces a Theory Y (McGregor, 
misation of transaction costs, except on a ceteris paribus basis. 
stead, the aim is to minimise total costs. Thus, if a firm is not able to produce 
th
1960/1985) element to the predominantly Theory X emphasis of Williamson’s (1975) 
transaction cost schema. 
 
As Coase, Robertson and Langlois and others have made clear, transaction cost analysis 
does not push for a mini
In
something at a reasonable cost internally, it may be forced to buy it in the market despite 
substantial transaction costs because this gives the best total cost outcome. This, in turn, 
means that there is no inconsistency between transaction cost analyses and various 
resource based or capabilities approaches. The extent to which a firm can reasonably 
contemplate internalisation is dependent on its access to the resources and capabilities 
needed to do something itself. The relevance of transaction cost analysis does not hinge 
on whether the actors in the story were consciously aware of the existence of transaction 
costs under that name. Virtually all economic theory is a codification of behaviour that 
has been important for years, perhaps centuries, before economists got around to telling 
us what we have been doing. In relation to transaction costs, awareness of opportunism 
and uncertainty has been known for centuries and appropriate attempts have been made 
throughout the period to minimise their effects on market activity. 
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The transaction cost approach, however, sits uneasily alongside the resource dependency 
perspective as the two theories are based on contrasting views of the economic world. To 
e transaction cost economist, the “forces” driving towards efficiency will in a given set 
 turns out, chiefly 
uropean-Pacific Rim, with their nature and underlying rationale. It is necessary, 
hy an organisation from one country would seek 
th
of environmental circumstances make the organisational form with the lowest transaction 
costs the surviving form. To the resource dependency perspective theorist, the world is 
fundamentally perceptual and socially enacted; thus, cooperation will come about from 
the perception of mutual advantage, of vulnerability and of the need to safeguard power. 
But the existence of transaction costs do provide economic “forces” that may, in the 
longer run, impel the enterprise towards the most efficient form and, to that extent, the 
concept will always have relevance; the transaction cost model provides a useful set of 
concepts against which to assess organisational form, even though it may rarely be a 
motivating force since few practitioners may be explicitly aware of it. 
 
3.3.3  International Trade Theory 
This thesis is concerned with cross-border strategic alliances, as it
E
therefore, to attempt to understand w
competitive advantage by collaborating with an organisation from another country. 
Dunning (1974) proposes the basic reasons why multi-national corporations are able to 
achieve competitive and comparative advantage in his “eclectic approach”. This approach 
has three conditions attached to it: 
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a)  ownership -  that the organisation should possess ownership advantages in 
particular markets, whether due to brand names, technology or some other 
nse for fear of information leakage; and 
gral, since otherwise the organisation 
would elect to export from its more familiar and already tested home base. If the 
rganisation without eclectic 
dvantages to succeed in international trade is, with a partner, so to configure and 
intangible asset; 
b)  internalisation – that it believes it is advantageous to internalise its specific assets, 
that is, not to lice
c)  localisation – that there is  at least one immobile foreign-factor input that is of 
advantage, for example, low labour costs. 
 
The locational factor appears to be key or inte
internalisation condition is weakened, the opportunity for strategic alliances emerges. The 
theory of foreign direct investment, and of alternative organisational forms to develop 
business across frontiers, is set out effectively by Rugman (1985) who develops a logical 
decision-tree for choosing between the various alternatives. 
 
Porter and Fuller (1986) argue that the way for an o
a
coordinate the joint value chain that it thereby gains competitive and comparative 
advantage. Bartlett (1979; 1986) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) suggest, in the form of 
the “Transnational” enterprise, a modern form for the MNC quite similar to that of the 
strategic alliance. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) argue that managers are being forced to 
shift their thinking from the traditional task of controlling a hierarchy to managing a 
network. This idea of shifting forms emerges from the international structural stages 
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model associated with Stopford (1980) and Stopford and Wells (1972). The model is 
graphically illustrated in Figure 3.4 below. The model suggests that the first step towards 
the internationalisation of a company is to set up an international division. 
 












Increasing Foreign Sales as Percentage of Total Sales 
Adapted from Stopford (1980) and Stopford and Wells (1972) 
 
Subsequently, if orga
range of products, they may adopt a geographically based area structure. If they 
nisations expand their sales without substantially increasing their 
experience a substantial increase in foreign product diversity, however, they may take the 
worldwide product division route. Ultimately, when both foreign sales and foreign 
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shown this form to be extremely difficult to operate smoothly. The evolution of the trans-
national concept represents an attempt to solve the matrix problem by a change of 
philosophy. 
 
In order to depict a broad trend in internationalisation of the corporate scene it is useful to 
mploy Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) fairly lean characterisation of this scene. Crainer’s 
d economy had 
xhibited a mixture of “multinational”, “international” and “global” companies. They 
e
(1996:223-224) characterisations which are richer and more helpful in the development 
of the thesis argument, will form the background for the later argument. 
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) claimed that, until the 1980s, the worl
e
define these terms as follows. “Multinational” companies were federations of subsidiaries 
with a holding company centre, with each subsidiary marketing product to suit the 
domestic markets in which it operated. This was, according to Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1989), the dominant model in the pre-Second World War period. The “international” 
company structure became more common after this war. The primary task of 
international companies was to transfer knowledge and expertise to overseas 
environments. Local subsidiaries were more dependent on the “centre” than in the 
multinational model but there was some local adaptation. The classical “global” 
organisation model was one of the earliest internationalised corporate forms. It built 
global-scale facilities to produce standard products and shipped them world-wide. It was 
based on the centralisation of assets, with overseas operations used to achieve global 
scale. 
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A new form is now emerging, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) contend, which they describe 
as the “transnational”. The transnational is characterised by the fact that it is a truly 
dge leading to innovation. 
 the central issue 
cing all companies. Figure 3.5, on the following page illustrates the position of the 
ticated concept than earlier organisational 
rms for the international enterprise. With its emphasis on a network philosophy and the 
world-wide enterprise, neither owned in one country, nor controlled from one unified 
corporate headquarters. To operate effectively it needs to control three distinct flows: 
a) the flow of parts, components and goods; 
b) the flow of funds, skills, and scarce resources; and 
c) the flow of intelligence, ideas, and knowle
 
Increasingly, the management of complexity, diversity, and change is
fa
transnational. Formal organisation charts reflect only one aspect of the “cement” that 
binds the organisation together. It is, of course, held together more strongly by the 
managerial decision making process which depends on the information flows. Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1989) believe it is not a new organisational form that is needed to meet the 
needs of the future but a new philosophy that will achieve global competitive advantage, 
local differentiation and global learning by transforming the “anatomy”, “physiology” 
and the “psychology” of the global enterprise. 
 
The transnational is a newer and more sophis
fo
absence of domination by a home-country based head office, the philosophy can embrace 
equally well the enterprise based on a network of allicances as it can the integrated 
corporation. Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) transnational concept can be seen, for 
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example, in Fujitsu’s approach to the development of the global Fujitsu “family” of 
companies. 














Source: Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) 
 
is emerging amongst strategic theorists in Japan. 
onaka (1989) sees information as the key to success. Information is of two types – 
is emerging amongst strategic theorists in Japan. 
onaka (1989) sees information as the key to success. Information is of two types – 
Interestingly, a similar philosophy   philosophy 
N N
syntactic, that is, bare data, and semantic, that is, information with concepts and meaning. 
Meaning creation (semantic information) is an inductive process, and to have a good 
chance of success needs to have considerably redundancy of information. Deductive 
syntactic, that is, bare data, and semantic, that is, information with concepts and meaning. 
Meaning creation (semantic information) is an inductive process, and to have a good 
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management (syntactic information) needs no redundancy of information, but it is 
basically uncreative. 
 
Nonaka (1989) calls this “compressive management”, an interesting echo of Ansoff and 
cDonnell’s (1990) “accordion” management, similarly devised to deal with the 
system that straddles national boundaries. An alternative paradigm proposed in this 
he international firm as a member of various open and shifting 
coalitions, each with a specific strategic purpose. 
orange (1988), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), and of Nonaka (1989) in their rejection of 
 Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage 
ny theory of international trade must be based on a coherent theory of competition. 
 strands of economic 
theory (Barney, 1986), amongst which the more prominent are: 
M
uncertainties of the modern turbulent environment. This process can also lead quite 
acceptably to hybridisation of the company’s headquarters, with perhaps one headquarter 
in Japan, another in the USA, and perhaps a third in Europe. As Contractor and Lorange 
(1988:26) point out: 
One model of the multinational corporation sees it as a closed internalized administrative 
chapter is to view t
 
There is considerable congruity between the philosophical standpoints of Contractor and 
L
the rigid hierarchy of the traditional MNC, strongly controlled from its home base, even 
allowing for local product variation. A world of sometimes shifting but continually 





Theories of competition have evolved from a number of distinct
  114 
1.  The Theory of Industrial Organisation Economics which developed out of 
classical micro-economic theory (Scherer, 1980). This is fundamentally structural and 
determinist, arguing that the performance of a company within an industry is strongly 
8/1965) takes a quite different approach, substantially ignoring 
dustry structure, and regarding the differentiation of the product, and organisation-to-
constrained by the structure and basic conditions of the market. Little independent role is 
attributed to management, entrepreneurship or strategic choice. Industrial Organisational 
theory has been incorporated in strategic management theory, principally through the 
work of Caves and Porter (1977), Caves (1980) and Porter (1981, 1985). In this thesis, 
the basic tenets of Industrial Organisation Economics are accepted as a limiting factor in 
establishing the relative profitability of various markets, but not as a major profit 
determining force. 
 
2.   Chamberlinian Economics, as set out in the Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
(Chamberlain, 193
in
organisation differences, as the prime source of competitive advantage. Where such 
differentiation exists, even though it be slight, buyers will be paired with sellers, not by 
chance and at random (as under pure competition) but according to their preference. In 
conditions of monopolistic competition, as Chamberlin (1938/1965) describes it, each 
organisation strives to exploit its unique competencies and strengths. This leads on to the 
modern concept of the resource-based theory of the organisation (Hamel, 1990;1991; 
Grant,1991). 
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3.   The  Schumpeterian  Economic  Contribution is different again. Schumpeter 
emphasises change and discontinuous change in particular. Far from seeing organisations 
s identical, technology growth as coefficient and the pressure towards equilibrium as 
ive destruction”, and the discontinuous nature of 
conomic development, presages much later Chaos Theory (Gleick, 1987; Stacey, 1991), 
…most firms, at any given point in time, face both IO and Chamberlinian 
competition and live under the constant threat of either Schumpeterian shocks or 
industry’s current structure can be profound. 
Sustain
from th
onetheless, the holy grails which all organisations seek to find and to keep. Coyne 
(1986) identified it as stemming from: 
a
ever present, Schumpeter (1950:83) claims that; “The process of Creative Destruction is 
the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every 
capitalist concern has got to live in.” 
 
For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur and innovation are the driving forces of capitalism 
(Barney, 1986). The theory of “creat
e
with the latter’s emphasis on the impossibility of usefully forecasting economic 
development through methods of trend extrapolation, although the bounded instability 
concept in chaos theory is not explicitly present in Schumpeter. 
 
However, all three strands of competition theory are relevant to the search for sustainable 
competitive advantage. Barney (1986:798) pointed out: 
revolutions. Moreover, the impact of previous Schumpeterian revolutions on an 
 
able competitive advantage itself is a factor that cannot be measured, only inferred 
e measurement of other trends like profit, market share and sales turnover. It is 
n
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a) customer’s perception of  a consistent superiority of the attributes of one 
organisation’s products over its competitors, this being due to a capability gap; 
b) the capability gap being durable over time; and  





ively sought by an examination of an 
rganisation’s existing resources and core competencies, an assessment of their profit 
services. Some activities are performed so much better than the competition and 
competencies. When a series of activities are organised into a system that works 




ggested by this writer that it is this configuration of knowledge, skills, core 
encies and superior products that strategic alliances seek to achieve, where t
s believe that they cannot achieve it alone. 
Strategic alliances come in a variety of forms but are normally, at least implicitly, 
founded on the resource-based theory of competitive advantage. This theory (Grant 1991) 
holds that competitive advantage is most product
o
potential, and the selection of strategies based upon the possibilities this reveals. Amit 
and Schoemaker (1993) describe the process as relating an organisation’s unique 
“strategic assets” to key “strategic industry factors”, or, as Snyder and Ebeling (1992:26) 
put it: 
…the firm is a system of activities, not a portfolio of individual products or 
are so critical to end products or services that they can be described as core 
better than the sum of its parts, this business process can also create competitive 
 
k is, then, to assess the current core competencies the organisation has and fill 
er resources or competencies gap is thrown up by the inventory taking of existing  
es and competencies, in relation to the perceived potential profit opportunities. 
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This is where strategic alliances come in. They are a way of extending resources and 
isation. However, it is suggested that the emphasis placed upon the sequence 
 which this exercise is carried out is of some importance. Throughout the eighties, 
d) implement the chosen strategy. 
 
The thi f the industry is the prime 
determ it Impact of Market 
Strateg 987), variation of profit levels in organisations 
ithin industries is at least as great as that between industries. Furthermore, there is the 
capabilities, hence core competencies, in order to develop sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
 
Most strategists would concede, no doubt, that insight into strategy options can only be 
perceived by an examination of both the external environment and the internal strengths 
of the organ
in
strongly influenced by Porter’s (1980) views which involve a sophistication and 
development of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm from the Industrial 
Organisation tradition, the strategic process has been most commonly described as being 
to: 
a) analyse the industrial environment for opportunities; 
b) assess internal capacity to take advantage of them; 
c) identify, evaluate and select the appropriate strategies; and 
nking behind this process is that the attractiveness o
inant of profitability. However, as can be seen from the Prof
y (PIMS) data (Buzzell and Gale, 1
w
undoubted long-term profit record of the Hanson Group and others (Porter,1986), the 
fundamental strategy underlying which frequently involves investing in apparently 
  118 
unattractive industries but aiming to run companies efficiently, which casts further doubt 
on this emphasis. The PIMS approach can also lead an organisation that believes it has 
identified an attractive opportunity to embark on an investment in that opportunity area, 
without paying sufficient attention to the question of whether the supposed opportunity 
actually builds upon its existing core competencies. 
 
The resource-based theory of competitive advantage would deflect an organization from 
investing in an enterprise that was not strongly related to its core competencies. Only 
strategies based upon existing core competencies could, it would hold, lead to the 
cquisition and maintenance of sustainable competitive advantage. Snow and Hrebiniak 




(1980) found that organizations concentrating on a distinctive competence, consistent 
with their chosen strategy, regularly outperformed competitors. The resource-based 
approach emphasises the sustainability of organization heterogeneity, and highlights 
imperfections in factor markets: “The exclusive focus on equilibrium and structural 
dimensions is absent. Instead disequilibrium and process dynamics loom primary (Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993:42).” 
 
If the opportunity requires certain competencies in addition to those already present 
within the organization, a strategic alliance with a partner with complementary skills and 
resources may represent a low
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3.3.5  The Resource Dependency Perspective 
A strong motivation for setting up alliances can be found in the Resource Dependency 
Perspective (RDP). This theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) proposes that the key to 
rganizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources. Thus, in the last 
sort, it is organizational power and the capacity of the organization to preserve itself, 
at determines competitive success, not merely organisational efficiency as proposed, 
, the unit of analysis for the RDP is the 
the much earlier theory of social exchange which holds 




inter alia, by the Transaction Cost approach. Thus
organization-environment relationship, not the individual transaction. Problems arise not 
merely because organizations are dependent on their environment, but because the 
environment is not dependable. 
 
To deal with this uncertainty, organizations attempt to manage their environment by 
cooperating with key parts of it, for example, by forming alliances. An RDP approach 
treats the environment as a source of scarce resources and therefore views the 
organization as dependent on other organizations also in the environment. The resource 
dependency theory stems from 
th
combinations of resources at their disposal, it will often be mutually beneficial to the 
organizations in the pursuit of their goals to exchange resources (Levine and White, 
1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962). 
 
Thompson (1967) suggests that organizations seek to reduce uncertainty and inter alia 
enter into exchange relationships to achieve negotiated and more predictable 
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environment. Sources of uncertainty include scarcity of resources, lack of knowledge of 
how the environment will fluctuate of the available exchange partners and of the costs of 
transacting with them (Achrol and Stem, 1988). 
aces the problem of how to 
anage its resources with the concomitant loss of independence, since unchecked 
ulnerability, and hence to 
vercome perceived constraints on their autonomy in choosing their strategic direction. 
dependency can do so only at the expense of other competitors; and  
 
The degree of an organization’s dependence is a function of the critical nature of the 
resources to the parties involved in the exchange, and of the number of and ease of access 
to alternative sources of supply. Where few alternatives exist and the resources are 
essential, a state of dependency exists (Jacobs, 1974). This creates a power differential 
between trading partners and the dependent organization f
m
resource dependence leads to a state of strategic vulnerability. 
 
Such strategic vulnerability can be tackled in a number of ways. Western organizations 
may do it, for example, by multiple sourcing of materials and components, internal 
restructuring, merger or acquisition; Japanese ones, by the establishment of semi-captive 
suppliers within keiretsu groups. The establishment of a strategic alliance can thus be 
regarded as an attempt by organizations to reduce strategic v
o
There are, in Thompson’s view (1967), two basic forms of external constraint imposed by 
the environment, which affect the organization’s available resources: 
a)  competitive constraints, where organisations live off the same resource pool. 
This is a zero sum game and alliances seeking to reduce this form of 
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b)  symbiotic situations, where the output from one factor is the input for another, 





un fforts to manage that uncertainty. 
 establishing 
favourable relationships with those they are dependent upon and with alternative sources 
 their domain. 
 
 
of institutional linkages is likely to be directly correlated with the level of 
transactions between factors. 
 
wever, such an analysis is essentially static and ignores the fact that two partners 
changing resources and skills may realise synergies in a dynamic dimension. 
alliances can be seen as attempts by organizations to establish a negotiated environment, 
 to reduce uncertainty. On the basis of this argument, alliances will occur most 
en when the level of competitive uncertainty is greatest, since the level of competitive 
certainty is positively correlated with e
 
In RDP motivated alliances both parties typically strive to form relationships with 
partners with whom a balance of desired resources can be achieved at minimum cost, and 
with a desirable level of satisfaction and determinacy, and thus, whenever possible, with 
similar sized organizations. This approach is echoed by Kotter (1979:89) in what he calls 
the external dependence perspective, thus: 
  Organizations cope (inter alia) with external dependence by
in
Kotter (1979:89) goes on to state that one way of doing this is by means of “joint 
ventures and other complex coalitions with other organizations.” 
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The central questions addressed by the resource base view concern why firms differ and 
how they achieve and sustain competitive advantage. Penrose (1959) argued that 
eterog
ntage. Wernerfelt (1984) suggested that evaluating firms in terms of 
 resource factors differ 
 their tradability and that these factors can be specifically identified and their monetary 
alue determined via a strategic factor market. Barney (1991) later established four 
nts.  
h enous capabilities give each firm its unique character and are the essence of 
competitive adva
their resources could lead to insights different from the traditional industrial/organization 
perspective (Porter, 1980). Barney (1986) suggested that strategic
in
v
criteria to more fully explicate the idea of strategic tradability. He suggested that firm 
resources and capabilities could be differentiated on the basis of value, rareness, 
inimitability and substitutability. 
 
Resources are based in a context and depending on characteristics of that context a focus 
on resources could create strategic inflexibility and core rigidities for a firm that would 
lead to negative returns (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Oliver (1997) analysed the issue of a 
firm’s sustainable advantage in terms of resources based and institutional factors and 
suggested that firms are able to create or develop institutional capital to enhance optimal 
use of resources. Firms therefore have to manage the social context of their resources and 
capabilities in order to generate re
 
Little research using a resource based view framework has examined strategy differences 
in the social context of emerging economies. Like most resources that create competitive 
advantage, resources for competitive advantage in emerging economies are on the whole 
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intangible. However, they are not necessarily product market based, as would be 
suggested by the knowledge based view of the firm (Conner & Prahalad, 1996). Although 
some capabilities are standard across all economies (for instance, first mover 
advantages), others are especially prominent in emerging economies. Multinational 
nterprises often focus on the revenue generating potential of emerging economies. 
th domestic and foreign, that wish to enter and exit a market. 
hanna and Palepu (1999) suggested that business groups need to take particular care in 
e
Accordingly, multinational enterprises have focused on the marketing challenge of 
creating and capturing the huge latent value associated with big emerging economies 
such as China, India and Russia. Firms that are able to manage the daunting 
circumstances in emerging economies reap the benefits of first mover advantages; these 
include being the first participants in new product markets, reputation effects and the 
economic advantages of sales volume and of pre emptive domination of distribution and 
communication channels. 
 
In emerging economies, however such advantages are difficult to establish without good 
relationships with home governments. Early relationships give tangible benefits, such as 
access to licenses, whose number is often limited by a government. Diversified business 
groups have evolved in many emerging economies. Such groups often obtain licensing 
advantages because of their government relationships. As institutions change, business 
groups, which have dominated emerging economies, will have less and less advantage 
relative to competitors, bo
K
restructuring once institutional changes take place that reduce the frictions and 
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asymmetries mentioned above. More freedom and decentralization for business units 
need to be initiated. 
 
In emerging economies, local competitors may have developed capabilities for 
relationship based management in their environment that substitute for the lack of 
institutional infrastructure. These assets may be used domestically or in transferring 
abroad to other emerging economies where such assets would likewise be useful. 
Developing distribution mechanisms may protect a domestic firm in an emerging 
economy against entry by foreign firms. Furthermore, focusing on a market that has not 
et globalised might allow a domestic firm in an emerging economy to dodge the 
to which they place corporate learning as a high priority on their alliance agenda, and 
y
onslaught of multinational rivals. Additionally, competing in a global market may be 
possible in a commodity area where natural resources or labour give a low cost advantage 
(Aulakh, Kotabe & Teegen, 2000). In essence, a firm must understand the relationship 
between its company assets and the changing nature of the institutional infrastructure as 
well as the characteristics of its industry. In so doing, the emerging economy firm may be 
able to become an aggressive contender domestically or globally by using its resources as 
sources of competitive advantage (Dewar & Frost, 1999). 
 
3.3.6 Corporate  Learning 
This thesis puts forward the contention that strategic alliances are most frequently formed 
from resource dependency motives, and that the ability of the partners to achieve and 
sustain competitive advantage in their chosen market is strongly influenced by the degree 
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seek to cause the alliance to evolve in a direction based on that learning. Kogut (1988) 
suggests a joint venture is used for the transfer of organisationally embedded knowledge 
at cannot be easily blueprinted or packaged through licensing or market transactions.  
l 
mbiguity attempts to capture the difficulty in linking action and result, which is 
s Roos and von Krogh (1992) emphasise, strategic alliances should be competence 
th
 
In a sense, corporate learning can be seen as the dynamic counterpart to the resource 
dependency theory of the organization. Thus, an organization will diagnose its resource 
and skill deficiencies in relation to a particular external challenge, and through the 
process of deliberate and planned corporate learning set about remedying its weaknesses. 
 
The concept of unique ‘know how’ that is contributed and sought by partners in alliances 
is contained within Reed and Defillipi’s (1990) concept of “causal ambiguity”. Causa
a
exemplified in the fact that some organizations are able to achieve outcomes that other 




driven, that is, explicitly adding to either the task or the knowledge system or to the 
organizational memory of each partner. The idea of the organization as a residuary for 
learning is a popular one. Decision theory emphasises the importance of the search for 
information to enable organizations to make informed choices. Hamel (1990; 1991) 
stresses the role of learning as a source of competitive advantage through the 
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development of unique competencies. Senge (1990; 1992) and de Geus (1997) describe 
l. Howsoever achieved, individual 
arning adds to the competencies of the organization but is in theory easily appropriated 
n. Organizational learning develops at a level beyond that of the individual, 
d systems of an organization in its 
re competencies and may therefore 
rvive the tenure of individuals. Corporate organizational learning may be construed as 
vidual and joint core competencies – and in 
learning organizations as the survivors of the future. 
 
Corporate learning may be regarded as having two fundamental dimensions in the 
literature: 
a)  individual learning (Argyris, 1964); and 
b)  organizational learning (Johnson, 1987) 
 
Individual learning may be rational or intuitiona
le
as when the individual with the developed competence is attracted into leaving the 
organizatio
and becomes embedded in the rituals, routines an
culture. As such it is more deeply rooted in its co
su
consisting of both types described above. 
 
The ease with which learning takes place within an alliance depends upon first, the type 
of learning and, second, the relationship between the nature of the learning and the 
condition of the would-be receptor. Many alliances are formed ostensibly for short term 
gains or to deal with temporary situations. These obscure the nature of the true strategic 
alliance, in which the intent is a learning one – the enhancement of joint sustainable 
competitive advantage as the extension of indi
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which long term mutual benefit is supported by trust/bonding, commitment and a 
ll alliances, opportunity learning, for example, who are the best distributors? 
 can be identified and achieved, and, with effort, technology learning also. Process 
willingness to be flexible and robust in dealing with the tensions inherent in the 
partnership. 
 
The key learning dimensions (see Senge, 1990; 1992; de Geus, 1997) of intent, 
receptivity and transparency, when associated with the different types of learning – 
namely, technology, process, opportunity and the learning philosophy – lead to an 
extremely varied learning situation, alliance by alliance. For the greatest benefit to be 
achieved by an alliance partner, the key learning dimensions need to be present in large 
measure. In a
–
learning, and the highest form of learning, the learning philosophy, takes longer to 
achieve, and normally require a culture change before they are permanently embedded. 
Continuous learning and flexibility to meet changing challenges may well be 
characteristics that are found together in dynamic alliances. 
 
Global competition requires a simultaneous need for global-scale efficiencies, worldwide 
learning and local responsiveness. A single firm is unlikely to possess all the resourced 
and strategic capabilities to achieve global competitiveness. Thus, strategic alliances are 
formed to acquire the desired strategic capabilities more rapidly (Nohria, Garcia Pont, 
1991). 
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In the context of strategic alliances that involve competitive collaboration, the 
competitive advantage of a firm can be protected only through its capability to 
accumulate invisible assets by a carefully planned and executed process of organizational 
learning. Despite the potential advantages of collaboration, a further argument stresses 
that collaboration may create favourable conditions for inter partner learning and thus 
ay allow one partner to appropriate and internalize resources that another partner 
ft a new skill 
ccessfully to a closely related competence base. Firms operating in the same business 
m
contributed (Balakrisnan, Koza, 1993; Nakamura et al., 1996; Lane, Lubatkin 1998; 
Kumar, Nti, 1998). Such appropriation is a particularly critical issue when alliances 
associate competing firms. When the partner firms in an alliance are also competitors in a 
product market, there will be many opportunities for inter partner learning and major 
competitive consequences of such learning (Pucik, 1998; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 
1989; Hamel, 1991). Alliances between competitors can lead to the loss of critical 
proprietary knowledge, to increased dependence of one partner vis a vis the other and 
even to the takeover of one partner by the other (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). 
 
Research on inter organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Dosi, 1988; Moingeon and Edmondson, 1996) has shown that firms are better able 
to acquire new capabilities when they already have a competence base that is similar to 
the new knowledge that they seek. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) use the term absorptive 
capacity to express this idea. In this view, firms are more likely to gra
su
typically share a common competence base because they use similar technologies, satisfy 
similar customer needs, serve similar customers and offer related products. Building on 
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this idea, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) argue that firms which share similar concerns and 
face similar problems, and therefore have similar dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986; Bettis and Prahalad, 1995), can more easily learn from one another. Competing 
firms, because they operate in a similar context, often confront similar issues and hence 
develop overlapping dominant logics. Therefore, alliances between competitors are likely 
to create a context that favours inter partner learning (Hamel, 1991). Park and Russo 
(1996; 878) argue that the potential for appropriately in a joint venture setting clearly is 
higher when the partners are direct competitors and present empirical evidence that 
supports elements of this argument. 
 
Although they operate in a similar context, firms that compete in the same industry are 
also likely to possess specific, idiosyncratic skills and capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Nelson, 1991; Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1991). Differences in the resource 
endowments of factors such as technologies, engineering and production capabilities, 
products and market presence create the potential for firms to combine complementary 
ssets, through alliances in order to pursue new business opportunities. In addition, firms  a
with complementary resource endowments potentially have significant opportunities to 
learn from one another. Despite the organizational safeguards that firms often set up to 
limit uncontrolled information disclosure (Bresser, 1988), firms can use the alliance as a 
means of acquiring new resources from their partner in those areas where they have 
deficiencies. If collaboration is to be a mechanism by which firms acquire such resources, 
then not only do the partners’ resource endowments need to differ, but the firms must 
also make different contributions to the joint endeavour. 
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Crossan and Inkpen (1995) argue that the ability to extract knowledge and skills through 
alliances may become vital to survival. Osland and Yaprak (1995), state that developing 
strategic alliances to learn from a partner can be a faster and more effective method of 
acquiring specific knowledge. Learning is becoming a focal tool for future 
competitiveness in strategic relationship (Bronder, C and Pritzl, R, 1991). Bronder and 
Pritzl (1991) developed a model for successful strategic alliances and in this model they 
at 
e reasons for the failure of some organizations and the success of others are obviously 
 a global economy characterised by 
sensitized important issues for successful strategic alliances. The model consists of four 
phases and in the final phase they address “learning” as a contributor to the prosperity of 
alliances. Learning facilitates the partner’s motivation in achieving the objectives of the 
alliance relationship. Through mutual learning in a cooperative environment, partners of 
strategic relationships will benefit from shared knowledge, information and resources. 
 
 3.3.6.1  Role of Organizational learning  
According to Luthans et al (1995), in order to survive in increasingly complex and 
dynamic environments, organizations need to do more than just adapt. They propose that 
the future success of organizations lies in the ability to learn and create knowledge. This 
notion is further enhanced by the comments made by Luthans et al (1995) who state th
th
complex. However, there is little doubt that in
anybody, anywhere, anytime and anyhow, that to succeed and even to survive in the long 
run, organizations must be able to learn. They can no longer just react to change they 
must anticipate change. 
 
  131 
The concept of the learning organization and organizational learning has been described 
and influenced by the work of a number of writers. Learning can be seen as a process of 
gaining new knowledge or insight, leading to individuals modifying their behaviour and 
actions. Garvin (1993) views a learning organization as an organization skilled at 
creating, acquiring and transferring knowledge and modifying its behaviour to reflect 
ew knowledge and insights. Learning develops the insights, knowledge and associations 
 some complications relating to the individual competences of the involved 
rganization. Lei and Slocum (1991) highlight a problem associated with this relationship 
 the shared value adding 
n
between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions and future actions (Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985). It is the intelligence of organizations that will produce a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). In the foreign entry literature, 
advocates of the internationalization process school, or the Uppsala stage model 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), have argued that firms expand slowly from their domestic 
bases into progressively distant areas. Experiential learning from previous entries is the 
driving force behind new investments (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996; Davidson, 
1983). 
 
3.3.6.2   Importance of learning in strategic alliances 
Cooperation in strategic alliances encourages a reflective learning environment which 
provides benefits through the mutual transfer of knowledge and perhaps transaction cost 
minimization. However, despite the synergy that these relationships endure, there may 
also be
o
and suggest that the biggest cost and risks associated with
  132 
venture are that partner can lose their sources of competitive advantage to their partners 
very rapidly if they are not careful. 
 
To avoid this barrier of cooperative alliances, the structure should include a learning 
framework that enables alliance partners openly to reflect their knowledge and 
information while retaining the visions for the alliances as well as their individual firms. 
This mechanism should be integrated into the relationship to allow all parties to benefit 
from shared knowledge. 
 
Strategic alliances are constructed in order to effectively transfer knowledge, skills and 
resources. This entire process relies on a learning mechanism to complete the cycle. So 
much so, that the relationship is actually a learning process. Without understanding the 
impact learning can have, the benefit of transferring and receiving effective and accurate 
information is limited. The environment of these relationships is summarized by Senge 
992) who describes a learning organization to be where people continually expand their  (1
capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of 
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free and where people are 
continually learning how to learn together. The definition addresses issues such as 
cooperation and shared learning which are important to learning alliance relationships. 
Crossan and Inkpen (1995) emphasize that the ability to extract knowledge and skills 
through alliances may become vital to survival. Doing so will require organizations to 
take a more serious look at their capacity to learn. 
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Creating a learning alliance assists in overcoming the dilemma described above because 
partners are aware of the importance learning plays in the relationship. The type of 
learning that is encouraged in these relationships is aimed at creating a cooperative 
environment that encourages the sharing of information and experiences to enhance the 
knowledge of individuals and the organization. 
 
3.3.7 Chaos  Theory 
Chaos theory attempts to explain apparent disorder in a very ordered way. The root of the 
theory states that things are not really random, just complex. Many apparently random 
events can be represented by a simple computation that, when iterated many times, 
produces complex results (Wheatley, 1999). Generally a meteorologist named Edward 
orenz is given credit for identifying the phenomenon we now refer to as chaos. In short, 
ostulates that a sensitive dependence on initial conditions is 
ak signals may be problematic 
nsoff and McDonnell, 1990), and will the development of the alliance be on a path 
inexorably moving towards the production of commodity products at a state of stable 
L
Lorenz’s chaos theory p
present so that a small change in the initial conditions can drastically change the long 
term behaviour of a system (Doherty and Delener, 2001). 
 
The theoretical model of this thesis is now building into one involving partners with felt 
resource dependencies building their skills to achieve joint competitive advantage 
through joint and individual organisational learning. The next issue concerns the 
predictability of the external environment. If analysed with sufficient care, can its future 
be discerned, given that, inter alia, the perception of we
(A
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equilibrium? Chaos Theory, adapted from Gleick (1987) and building on Schumpeter 
(1950) suggests not. 
 
The application of chaos theory to the international business world stems from a growing 
unease with the capacity of the economist’s stable equilibrium theory to describe the real 
world sufficiently effectively to be useful for prescriptive purposes. The dominant 
economic, and by importation, strategic management paradigm is of stable equilibrium. It 
is approached through an analytical process in which the organization adapts to its 
environment to achieve a chosen goal. In the strategic management paradigm, this leads 
 success by the attainment of that goal through the achievement of sustainable  to
competitive advantage. In the economic paradigm, the forces driving towards equilibrium 
and the commoditisation of product tend to destroy that competitive advantage over time 
as new entrants come into the market, copy and improve, and steal it away. The vision is 
presented within a static framework of analysis, at best with a series of analytical pictures 
taken in the present, and forecast chosen times in the future. However, this economic 
paradigm and method leads to difficulties. In particular, stable equilibrium organizations 
tend to ossify and ultimately fail from lack of imagination, and from belief in the 
everlasting potency of their methods, technologies and products (Mintzberg, 1989; 
Miller, 1990; and Pascale, 1990). Decision takers generally embrace the concept of 
equilibrium because it reduces uncertainty, promotes the belief that economic questions 
have long term answers and reduces angst. However, as Stacey (1991) points out, in 
reality the environment is constantly changing, and contains too many variables to be 
predictable in anything more than the very short term. 
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The strategic planning process, with its sequential steps of industry environment, 
competitor and internal analysis, is unlikely to be successful, even if rigorously applied at 
regular periodic intervals. It does not promote imaginative solutions, and the state of the 
analytic data is almost certain to have changed considerably between periodic plan 
developments. A more robust model replaces “The Planning System” with the “Planning 
Agenda” (Stacey, 1992b; 1992c), and the Stable Equilibrium Organization with the far 
more flexible Learning Organization. Analysis seeks to recognise patterns of activity 
 or 
ity demonstrates over reaction to change and leads to amplified 
lity of the organization leads to failure from lack of a base 
 activities. Between the extremes of the 
nimaginative and the excessively unstable lies a border area of bounded instability that 
rather than causality. Chaos theory identifies three distinct states of activity within an 
environment, which includes the organization as part of it rather than distinctly apart: 
 a)  stable; 
 b)  unstable;  and 
  c) boundedly unstable (Gleick, 1987) 
 
Stable activity is brought about by negative feedback to a stimulus which causes damping 
and a move back to equilibrium. This activity is uncreative, and describes an organization 
unprepared to respond to major environmental change, like a steep shift in technology
of tastes. Unstable activ
activity. The underlying instabi
capable of dealing efficiently with routine
u
can be managed creatively. An organization operating in such an area needs to be adapted 
to the routine environment, but also to be capable of displaying imagination; this is the 
learning organization (Gleick, 1987; Senge, 1990; 1992; Stacey, 1991; 1992b; 1992c). 
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In Stacey’s (1991) terms, to be creative one need to operate at the borders of stability and 
instability, and to recognise not causality but patterns of activity that recur and if 
understood, that can lead to insights. Those that succeed in chaos will be those who see 
patterns where others search for specific links between causes and events. 
 
This theory, taken from the world of natural science, is intuitively attractive when 
translated to the realm of social science. It also provides a logical development of the 
n organization 
ust practise creative destruction on itself to sustain competitive advantage. It must 
mpassing various facilities, organizations, and 
anagers with different, oftentimes conflicting objectives (Bowersox et al. 2000). 
   
insights of the Schumpeter competitive model of the 1930s in which capitalism is 
developed through irregular periods of “creative destruction” where existing technologies 
and products become suddenly obsolete, and are replaced with new and better ones 
perceived to meet market needs. In the 1930s, Schumpeter stressed that a
m
destroy its old advantages by creating new ones and, if it does not, some rival may well 
do so (Stacey, 1992a; 1992b; 1992c). 
 
Research has established and repeatedly shown a positive link between variables such as 
network visibility, predictability, and consistency and overall strategic alliance 
performance levels. The importance of strategic alliances and coordination among 
partners are well documented factors of strategic alliances performance (Wagner et al. 
2002). However, achieving strategic alliance coordination among partners is difficult 
when dealing with networks enco
m
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Reviewing several aspects of a strategic alliance partner selection, it is easy to see how a 
chaotic system could become commonplace. For example, when selecting a partner, each 
partner interprets key variables of importance to them and makes a decision. The 
complexity begins with the difficulty associated with understanding and predicting the 
decision making process of each partner. However, forecasting and planning becomes 
exponentially more complex when the behaviours of potential alliance partners, each with 
a unique decision set, are aggregated together. This is a complicated and challenging 
radox currently facing strategic alliance managers. Chaos theory underscores the 
hilst continuing to pursue the existing business efficiently. The organization 
pa
importance of establishing strategic alliances between partners. Without a coordinated 
effort both within an organization and between organizations, a small adjustment made in 
the strategic alliance network may have dramatic consequences for other strategic 
alliance participants throughout the network. Not only is alliance relationship type 
behaviour paramount to strategic alliance success, when adjustments are required, 
effective, immediate, and comprehensive communication of the changes are highly 
critical. 
 
The concept of chaos theory may also help to explain why a strategic alliance that has 
been performing at a high level for a significant period of time can become chaotic under 
new market conditions. Therefore, strategic alliance managers in these organizations 
must realise the challenges created by constant variation in the marketplace and structure 
their strategic alliances accordingly. The successful organization, then, needs to live with 
the tension created by pursuing an innovative strategic agenda of constant learning and 
change w
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needs, therefore, to be flexible, but also to have efficient systems. It is perhaps these 
n size, international strategy or 
ansaction costs (Gray and Yan, 1992). While there is relatively little comparative 
ere is some evidence, both direct and indirect, 
primary requirements that make the strategic alliance such a popular current 
organizational form for, to be successful, it must be both flexible and stable. With its 
head controlled by two or more strategic partners, it cannot easily lapse into complacency 
and closed-mindedness and, with diverse cultures to balance within it, when successful it 
is constantly handling the problems of complex learning and adaptation. Perhaps the 
safest way to use chaos theory in strategic alliance is not in the instigation of 
organizational change, but in the use of its principles in dealing with issues that arise 
within the organization. By embracing organizational phenomena previously seen as 
dysfunctional, such as interpersonal conflict, and using it as a source for transformational 
change by applying principles found in chaos theory (Shelton, 2003), an organization can 
become more responsive to change agents while continuously moving ahead and growing 
from the inside out without the fear of complete chaos. 
 
3.3.8  Culture, Strategy and Alliances 
When an organization seeks to enter a new market or to supply a current one it may seek 
a foreign partner to form an alliance. The formation and operation of alliances offer 
several possibilities for the interaction of strategy and culture. First, companies from 
different nations may express differential preferences for the location of their alliances 
and the form that they take. For the most part, such preferences have been explained by 
using organization level variables such as organizatio
tr
research on the topic of alliance choice, th
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that the decisions on which partner to choose and on the location of the alliance itself 
may be linked to the values of the decision-makers and organizational characteristics 
which reflect the cultural milieu. 
 
In their study on strategy types in Malaysian industrial companies, Sim et al. (1997) 
provided evidence that the strategic typology of Miles and Snow (1978) can be applied to 
Malaysian industrial firms. The slightly higher preponderance of prospector and analyser 
strategies reflected the rapidly growing and changing markets in Malaysia which 
necessitated firms to be responsive to market conditions. In the Malaysian context, this 
situation could be attributed in part to the smaller size of firms in Malaysia and the 
greater tendency towards more personalized decision making among CEO’s in Malaysia 
im et al. 1997). 
cross cultures, this may pose problems in a number of ways. The two 
artners may not have the same understanding of what mutual forbearance implies. In 
(S
 
Many of the theories explaining the existence of alliances are based on a consideration of 
transaction costs. Under certain conditions, organizations may benefit more from 
internalising their exchanges through a third unit in which each holds an interest. In one 
of the best known expositions of this approach, Buckley and Casson (1988) argue that 
both sides must resist the temptation to take advantage of the cooperative arrangement to 
gain a better strategic position if the enterprise is to be a continuing, mutual success. If 
the alliance cuts a
p
part, this may be due to communication difficulties, but it may also be due to culturally 
influenced beliefs concerning loyalty to a foreign partner (as opposed to domestic 
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industrial allies), the importance of fixed fluid agreements and the long term strategic 
outlook of the partners. Where the perception of the agreement is rendered non-congruent 
by cultural biases, the risk of accidental transgression of the mutual forbearance tenet is 
heightened. The issue of “loyalty” pre-figures a conceptual concern that the prevailing 
theoretical approaches to alliance adopt an instrumentally rational approach rather than 
being space for the affect influenced judgements of potential and actual partners. 
 
One of the hurdles on which alliance may founder is perceptions of time. Several years 
after describing his four cultural dimensions, Hofstede added a fifth dimension based in 
part on the perception of time (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). Hofstede and Bond (1988) 
have said that Hofstede (1980) did not discover this dimension in his original research 
because there was little difference in the way that Western societies perceived the linear 
passage of time. It was only when parallel work was done in Asian countries that the 
distinction emerged. Contrasting time constructs and differing time horizons can have 
portant effects on the operation of international joint ventures. Japanese organizations  im
are known for their strategies of long term market penetration and growth, while 
American organizations seek short term profit maximisation. In part, these contrasting 
strategies stem from different views of wealth accumulation, but they are also underlain 
by quite different time horizons. Contrasting views of time by dominant and minority 
partners in international alliances can alter the strategies themselves (Ganitsky and 
Watzke, 1990). Dominant partners with longer time horizons may favour market 
protection strategies in their own milieux but market development strategies abroad. 
Chinese managers are more likely to trade time for accuracy when making a decision 
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than their American counterparts (Baird, Lyles and Wharton, 1990). Where the view of 
time or time horizons differs between partners, as between Western and Asian or Latin 
countries, both operational and human resource difficulties are likely to arise. 
 
Difficulties may also arise from basic conceptions of how the alliance should operate. 
The Baird, Lyles and Wharton (1990) study uncovered significant differences between 
the views of the Chinese and US managers on the way that alliances should be run and 
the role that managers should play. Among other attributes, the managers differed on the 
use of authority and power, managing appropriate levels of uncertainty, and the preferred 
type of links between managers and subordinates. There was an especially pronounced 
difference on the subject of allocation of routine and important work. Such pronounced 
ttitudinal differences do not necessarily mean that a cross border alliance will fail, but 
tion costs for organizations located in high power distance 
ultures will cause them to prefer the more direct control mechanisms implicit in wholly 
a
they do mean that greater effort may be needed in order to understand and accommodate 
the partner’s point of view. 
 
Shane (1993) argues that a preference for high power distances in a national culture 
denotes a lower level of trust. From this, he hypothesises that countries with higher power 
distance scores should prefer wholly owned subsidiaries over alliances as a means of 
foreign investment. Adding power distance to Contractor’s (1990) market based model 
for explaining preference for alliances over other types of investment arrangements 
produces a significant increase in explanatory power. Shane interprets this result as 
implying that higher transac
c
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owned subsidiaries. A similar argument has been made in relation to the preferred 
location of alliances. Because new alliances of any type create uncertainty, managers may 
seek situations in which uncertainty can be reduced or minimised. In cultural terms, this 
means finding partners and locations with a small cultural distance from the investor. If 
Shane’s (1993) view is valid, then it would add power in its own right to Contractor’s 
(1990) model. 
 
The impact of cultural distance on alliances can be seen in the uncertainties that their 
managers encounter. In a study of role ambiguity faced by managers of international 
alliances, Shenkar and Zeira (1992) found that reported role ambiguity differed according 
to cultural distance. The authors used five indices of cultural difference, Hofstede’s four 
dimensions [Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, and Masculinity 
(Hofstede, 1980)] and a summary of the four which they called cultural distance. The 
composite measure was not significantly related to role but the four individual 
imensions were. Shenkar and Zeira (1992) found perceived role ambiguity was higher  d
when power distance and masculinity gaps were higher. However, higher role ambiguity 
was also related to smaller differences in collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. This 
would seem to imply that, for some cultural dimensions, being too close is likely to pose 
more problems than being reasonably distant. If two cultures have similar but not 
identical demands for uncertainty avoidance, it may be difficult to know how much 
information is required before a subordinate feels confident in acting, let alone trusting or 
bonding. If the difference were larger the problem would be better defined and the 
solution perhaps more obvious. The discovery of contrasting culture effects among 
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Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions also points to the dangers of simply summing a group 
of cultural measures and labelling the result “cultural distance”. 
 
Within the cross border alliance literature single-minded attention has been paid to 
alliances between Japanese and Western organizations, especially the cause of their high 
failure rates (Brown, Rugman and Verbeke, 1989). While a number of explanations for 
failures have been offered, notably the mismanagement of the alliance once they have 
been established, there are indications that some of the failures, at least, are due to 
cultural differences. One possible difficulty may lie in the very definition of success for 
an alliance, or indeed any other enterprise (Turpin, 1993). Japanese managers typically 
mphasise increased market share and the introduction of new products. For American  e
managers, high returns on investment, and maximising returns to shareholders, are 
paramount. Cultural influences here may be expressed directly, through the criteria 
managers use to judge their own performance, and indirectly, through the mechanisms set 
up to manage the joint venture itself. The tendency for American-Japanese alliances in 
Japan to be headed by Japanese may ensure that short term profitability will not be high 
on the list of priorities. This practice reflects a cultural preference for retaining prestige 
posts for nationals, as well as the practical considerations of local connections and 
language facility. 
 
The differences in the objectives of Japanese and American partners are underlined by 
the factors that lead to Japanese satisfaction with alliance performance. Organizational 
learning, development of human resources and market diversification may all be factors 
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which weigh heavily in the evaluation of alliance performance for Japanese participants. 
Japanese managers seem to recognise a wider variety of benefits that may flow from the 
alliance, so their levels of satisfaction are not tied to a single indicator. This seems to be 
true for a variety of partners, not simply Americans (Cullen, Johnson and Sakano, 1995). 
 
lliance, especially one of intended short duration, maintain loyalty to the parent 
 
One of the key factors in the success or failure of an international alliance is the 
management of human resources. Depending on the location, ownership and mission of 
the alliance, there may be some ambiguity as to whether the alliance’s employees belong 
to the alliance or to one of the parent organizations. This ambiguity can be exacerbated 
by the time horizon of the alliance and the value of loyalty to be found in the partner 
organization’s cultures. The difficulty here may lie in the question, not just to whom the 
employee is loyal but to where that loyalty is directed. Japanese, who are lent to an
a
company in line with strong long term employment prospects and the system of 
mentoring which facilitates advancement. Mexican employees limit their commitment to 
organizations, in part because of the strong collectivist attitudes centred on the family 
(Teagarden and von Glinow, 1990). Failure to understand the framework in which 
partners evaluate loyalty and trust may lead to unrealistic expectations or failure to fulfil 
those of one’s counterpart. 
 
The success of a cross border alliance depends on the perceived “fit” of the partners. For 
most writers, the term “fit” refers to the congruence of strategic goals, organizational 
structures or personnel resources. For others, however, it has come to include the fit 
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between cultures and its effect on human resource issues. A lack of congruence can affect 
organizational effectiveness: 
  This lack of congruence would be any conceptual incongruity between the host 
system, performance apprai
and foreign HRM systems; for example, a highly specific selection system ( or reward 
sal system or career path structure) versus a selection system 
that does not include assessment, recruitment devices and other mechanisms associated 
ith highly specific systems (Teagarden and von Glinow, 1990:27). 
 
If the alliance brings together cultures whose understanding of how employees are 
recruited, motivated and evaluated is at variance with one another, the alliance project 
may be severely handicapped. 
 
The idea of fit or congruence can be applied to more general characteristics of alliances. 
ultural distance, they found that greater national distance, as they termed it, led to 
ers, they tended to be less committed to the alliance and to 
ncounter more conflict over its direction. Although there was no direct measure of 
w
Meschi and Roger (1994) examined fifty-one joint ventures between Hungarian 
organizations and partners from five other countries. Using a perceptual measure of 
c
significantly less organizational effort and organizational attachment, as well as higher 
levels of conflict. If the managers of the alliances perceived that Hungarian culture was 
distinct from that of their partn
e
effectiveness, it seems safe to conclude that national distance does not inhibit the 
effective functioning of alliances, at least in this particular context. The distance between 
organizational cultures of partners was also examined as a factor affecting social 
effectiveness. While organizational culture also had an impact on social effectiveness, in 
general it was less important than that of national culture. 
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Cross border alliances represent an attempt by managements from two or more national 
cultures to work together toward some common goal. The research in this area, illustrated 
in Figure 3.6 below, shows that national culture plays a significant part in determining the 
shape of cross border alliances, the partners involved and, most importantly, their 
chances of success. Precisely because the two cultures are brought into intimate contact, 
the difficulties that may arise from operating with different cognitive and affect 
frameworks are easier to recognise. Despite the evidence that national culture is a crucial 
onsideration in the design and operation of cross border alliances, there has been  c
relatively little research directed towards understanding its actions (as opposed to its 
effects), perhaps because of the difficulty of matching theoretical concerns to appropriate 
methodological approaches (Parkhe, 1993). 
Figure 3.6  Previous Studies on National Culture 
Issue Study  Cultures  Examined  Findings 
Managerial roles in 
alliances 
Baird, Lyles and 
Wharton (1990) 
China, USA  Differences  in 
managerial philosophy 
and expected behaviour 
Transaction costs and 
alliance formation 
Shane  (1993)  Several  Power distance helps 
alliances 
trust in cross-border  explain preferences for 
Role ambiguity in 
alliances 
Shenkar and Zeira 
(1992) 
Several  Cultural distance affects 
role ambiguity 
Human resource context 
effectiveness 
Teagarden and von  International alliances in  Culture affects the 
international alliances 
and alliance  Glinow (1990)  Mexico  employee relations of 
Cultural distance and Meschi and Roger  International alliances in 
Hungary 






Source: Cullen, Johnson and Sakano, 1995 
 
 
3.3.9  Trust/Bonding and Organisations 
s received    mechanism of organisationa
 (Bradach ccles, 1989), a
 
Trust ha attention as a l control and as an 
alternative to price and authority  and E s a response to the 
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emphasis on opportunism that pervades agency theory and transac
the operation of alliance forms of organisation (Powe iles and 
now, 1992; Miles and Creed, 1995). In at least some of these cases, the focus has been 




plating a long-term relationship that adaptations to future contingencies will be 
tion cost economics 
(Etzioni, 1988; Bromiley and Cummings, 1992), as a key factor in managerial beliefs and 
philosophies (Sitkin a
element in 
nd Roth, 1993; Miles and Creed, 1995), and  as  a necessary 
ll, 1990; M
S
on the inadequacies of the assumptions that u
 
Despite the increased interest in trust, there does not yet appear to be a consensus on the 
place of trust in organisation theory. Trust functions, according to Powell (1990:305), as 
a remarkably efficient lubricant to economic exchange [that] reduces complex realities 
far more quickly and economically than prediction, authority, or bargaining. In line with 
these notions of the essential nature of trust, Bromiley and Cummings (1992) argue that 
the level of trust within an organisation affects its structure and processes. Trustworthy 
behaviour, according to Bromiley and Cummings (1992), actually reduces tr
c
There is a little question that within the alliance form trust requirements are high and the 
consequences of failing to meet them are severe. Alliance partners are expected to forego 
the right to pursue self-interest at the expense of others (Powell, 1990:303) and recognise 
their co-dependence with upstream and downstream partners. Within alliance trust allows 
reduced transactions costs (Bromiley and Cummings, 1992) and assures those 
contem
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made in a jointly optimal way (Lorenz, 1998:201). It may be that alliances depend on 
minimal transaction costs to obtain both their responsiveness and efficiency. 
Definitions of trust have involved two principle concepts; (1) reliance (Giffin, 1967, 
Rotter, 1980) and (2) risk (Gambetta 1988, Mayer et al. 1995). Currall and Inkpen (2002) 
define joint venture trust as the decision to rely on another joint venture party under the 
condition of risk. Risk creates the opportunity for trust (Rousseau et al. 1998). Thus, trust 
is based on social judgements such as assessment of the other party’s benevolence, 
competence (Currall, 1992), together with assessment of the costs if the other party turns 
ut to be untrustworthy. This thesis acknowledges that various conceptualizations of trust 
exist in the organizational studies literature. Viewing trust as a decision to take action 
allows the joint venture researcher to extend the level of theory and measurement to the 
firm, which is the level where most research involving trust and joint ventures has been 
carried out. 
As Inkpen and Currall (1998) discussed, joint venture trust has both antecedents and 
consequences, which means that trust plays a crucial role in the overall nature of joint 
venture processes (see also Sydow, 1998). Over time, as the partners and partner 
managers learn about each other and the joint venture becomes an operating entity, the 
level of inter firm trust will change, which means trust should be viewed as an evolving 
rather than static concept (Currall and Inkpen, 2003). Trust requires familiarity and 
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As the relationship progress, previous successes, failures, and partner interactions will 
influence the level of trust (Hirschman, 1984). For example, when a joint venture is 
formed, there is a subjective probability that a partner will cooperate. Experience will 
lead to adjustment of the probability, which in turn may lead to a shift in the level of 
trust.  The next important theory which received scant attention in the literature but has 
huge implication on the study of strategic alliances is institutional theory.  This chapter 
will also consider this alliance theory for which the thesis is based. 
3.3.10   Institutional  Theory 
Much market activity is arranged through the existence of institutions embedded in 
economic, political and cultural arrangements (Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; North, 
1990). Institutions are shared, collective understandings or rules of conduct reflected in 
laws, rules, governance mechanisms and capital markets (North, 1990; Scott, 2001), 
 




Firms do not have an unlimited array of strategic actions from which to make choices. 
Rather, in order to enhance their likelihood of success, they choose from a defined set of 
legitimate options as determined by economic opportunity, resources and institutional 
forces within an industry and a country or region (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Hoffman 
1999). Firms are embedded in social frameworks of norms, values and rules o
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that define appropriate economic behaviour and influence strategic choices (Fligstein, 
1996). 
Institutional arrangements can produce entry barriers or create opportunities for action. 
Therefore, institutional arrangements as reflected in government legislation, the nature of 
property ri
 
ghts and the presence or absence of professional and commercial norms of 
behaviour, determine the boundaries and paths for acceptable action. As a result, 
variation in strategic actions across contexts may be a function of differences in the 
 
ave much geographic and 
cultural similarity, Orru, Biggart and Hamilton (1997) found significant variation in 
management practices across these countries. Thus, institutional arrangements influence 
 
existence, saliency and intensity of particular institutional arrangements. For example, 
Kogut, Walker and Anand (2002) found that inter industry firm diversification patterns 
varied across countries because of differences in institutional arrangements. Park and 
Ungson (1997) argued that the values and norms embedded in the institutions could also 
affect the development and management of strategic alliances. 
Bianci (2002) showed that a firm’s success with an international strategy was a function 
of its conformity to institutional norms most salient in the local country contexts. 
Additionally, even though Japan, South Korea and Taiwan h
the evolution of national economies, organizational forms and managerial actions.  
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Some countries may need changes in their institutional arrangements in order to compete 
in global markets (Rondinelli & Behrman, 2000). Governments create institutional 
arrangements that promote and facilitate effective macroeconomic policies, liberalize 
trade and finance, protect private property rights and privatize the ownership of state 
enterprises (Rondinelli & Behrman, 2000). However, Newman (2000) observed that too 
institutional forces have both an economic orientation (Clague, 1997; Coase, 1998; 
on (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). 
he 
le of institutions in an economy is to reduce both transaction and information costs 
much change in institutional arrangements creates chaos and may reduce rather than 
increase the opportunity for organizational changes necessary to compete effectively in 
global markets. Nonetheless, effective institutional change can be challenging to 
undertake (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; North, 1990).  
 
Institutional theory emphasizes the influences of the systems surrounding organizations 
that shape social and organizational behaviour (Scott, 1995). Institutional forces affect 
organizations’ processes and decision making. Perspectives derived to examine these 
North, 1990) and a sociological orientati
 
New institutional economics focuses on the interaction of institutions and firms resulting 
from market imperfections (Harriss, Hunter & Lewis, 1995). North (1990) argued that 
institutions provide the rules of the game that structure human interactions in societies 
and that organization are the players bounded by those formal and informal rules. T
ro
through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable structure that facilitates 
interactions. 
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From a sociological orientation, Palmer, Jennings and Zhou (1993) studied the 
institutional constraints on U.S. corporations’ strategies in developed market economies. 
Peng and Heath (1996) argued that the internal growth of firms in transition economies is 
limited by institutional constraints; as a result, a network-based growth strategy was 
xpected to be more viable in emerging economies. Peng (1997) analysed three large 
 changes in corporate culture that enabled firms, even that 
wned ones, to make improvements. Additionally, Lee and Miller (1996) found that in 
e
enterprises in China and confirmed this explanation. In addition, Child and Lu (1996) 
argued that the economic reform of large state-owned enterprises was moving very 
slowly because of material, relational, and cultural constraints. Similarly, Suhomlinova 
(1999) found that government institutions and influences had a negative impact on 
Russian enterprise reform. At the individual level, Lau (1998) suggested that political and 
market pressures were the institutional constraints faced by chief executives in Chinese 
enterprises. Thus, many emerging economy firms facing change were influenced by 
existing institutional realities. 
 
Institutions can also facilitate strategy, allowing enterprises to react to and play a more 
active role in an institutional environment if firms have an adaptive ability that allows 
them to move beyond institutional constraints (Oliver, 1991). Institutional change 
provided proper incentives and
o
Korea, a relatively developed economy, firms benefited from a number of cultural and 
institutional factors. For example, firms employing traditional technologies were more 
successful in obtaining government help by following legitimate technological norms. 
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The number of theoretical and empirical studies using an institutional perspective in 
emerging economies is limited, even though some theorists have argued that this 
perspective is the most applicable paradigm for explaining enterprise behaviour in 
emerging economies (Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994). Emerging economies, 
characterized by trends towards “marketization” and privatization, but still heavily 
f just constrained strategic choices (Bluedorn et. al, 1994), would be more 
levant. Such a research perspective would extend the ideas of a firm’s sustainable 
regulated, provide the necessary institutional influences in developing and testing 
theories. Previous research points to the importance of studying the speed and nature of 
institutional change and its impact upon enterprise strategies. Institutional factors also 
have many dimensions, each of which can change at a different rate. As Tolbert and 
Zucker (1996) pointed out, the process of institutionalization should be of interest in 
future theoretical and empirical work. The emerging economies are undergoing changes 
that will facilitate the study of institutional processes. This observation suggests that 
researchers should employ longitudinal designs to capture the process elements of 
institutional effects and compare experiences in economies at different stages of this 
process. 
 
Oliver (1991) argued that firms can change their institutional environments by 
developing strategic responses instead of adapting passively. Thus, studies related to how 
firms develop growth-oriented responses from an active strategic choice perspective, 
instead o
re
competitive advantages (Hennart, 1994; Oliver 1997) to an emerging economy context. 
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From the institutional economics perspective, how firms restructure themselves in 
response to institutional change could be a focus in strategy research. 
 
The current study of institutional effects on emerging economy firms has focused mostly 
on state owned enterprises (Child & Lu, 1996; Peng, 1997; Suhomliva, 1999). Obviously, 
state owned enterprises are directly affected by government institutions; however, the 
stitutional environment including cultural, political and other factors has effects on 
 for firms 
om multiple countries to share risk and resources, to gain knowledge and to obtain 
in
other enterprises (private firms, international joint ventures) in emerging economies 
(Sullivan, 1998; Temple & Voth, 1998). The need to explain the process and outcomes of 
institutional influences in non state owned enterprises is also important. Moreover, there 
is also a need to examine the enduring institutional effects in privatized enterprises. 
Lastly, the effects of the larger institutional context on individual responses rather than on 
whole firms (Calori, Johnson & Sarnin 1992; Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta, 1993) have 
not been thoroughly studied. A focus on individual responses to institutional form might 
cause confusion in studies that cross multiple levels of analysis ranging from societal to 
individual but a more comprehensive examination of the societal and firm level effects on  
Managerial responses will enhance understanding of the total institutional effects on 
individual managerial behaviour as well as top management team orientations. 
 
3.4  Role of Strategic Alliances 
The proliferation of strategic alliances has been increasing in the last decade across all 
business sectors. Strategic alliances represent one of the most popular strategies
fr
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acce to new markets. Forming stra ss  tegic alliances has become one of the most common 
acity, (4) provide speed, (5) provide access to 
sources and skills not owned and (6) provide information. According to Fumio Sato, 
business by itself. The technology has become so advanced, and the markets so complex, 
 
Likewise, Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1994:96) observes that alliances between companies, 
whether they are from different parts of the world or different ends of the supply chain, 
entified among the top reasons for forming strategic alliances by a Coopers and 
means of entering new international markets (Lane & Beamish, Osborn & Hagedoorn, 
1997). Strategic alliances include such collaborative venues as equity joint ventures or 
non equity agreements relating to manufacturing, marketing, distribution and research 
and development. Alliances are designed to allow partners to share risk and resources, 
gain knowledge and obtain access to markets. International alliances are cooperative 
arrangements with cross-border flows and linkages that utilize resources from 
autonomous organizations headquartered in separate countries (Parkhe, 1991). The 
general intent of strategic alliance is to establish and maintain a long term cooperative 
relationship in order to compete more effectively with firms outside the relationship 
(Jarillo 1988; Walker & Poppo, 1991). 
 
It is important to appreciate the now common use of strategic alliances in the 21
st century 
by organizations, both for profit and not for profit, as a means to (1) reduce uncertainty, 
(2) provide flexibility, (3) provide cap
re
CEO of Toshiba Electronics Company (Sato, 1993): 
It is no longer an era in which a single company can dominate any technology or 
that you simply can’t expect to be the best at the whole process any longer. 
are a fact of life in business today. Growth strategies and entering new markets have been 
id
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Lybrand study (Coopers and Lybrand 1997, cited in Elmuti and Kathawala 2001). This 
observation is in line with Ohmae’s (1992) views that companies simply do not have the 
time to establish new markets one by one. Moreover, “today you have to be in all 
important markets simultaneously if you are going to keep competitors from establishing 
their positions. Globalization will not wait. You need alliances and you need them now 
but not the traditional kind of joint ventures” (Ohmae 1989:147). According to the 
Coopers and Lybrand (1997, cited in Elmuti et al. 2001) study, 50 percent of firms 
involved in alliances market their goods and services internationally compared to 30 
percent of non allied participants. Indeed, strategic alliances have become increasingly 
popular, that they have moved from being a way to enter foreign markets of peripheral 
interest or gaining some returns from peripheral technologies, to become a part of the 
mainstream of corporate activity (Beamish and Killing 1996:1613). 
 
Strategic alliances are becoming more and more prominent in the global economy. Peter 
Drucker, who has been called the father of management theory states: “The greatest 
change in corporate culture, and the way business is being conducted, may be the 
ccelerating growth of relationships based not on ownership, but on partnership”  a
(Drucker, 1996). The number of strategic alliances has almost doubled in the past ten 
years and is expected to increase even more in the future (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 
1997). According to a study conducted by Anderson Consulting, “82 percent of 
executives believe that alliances will be a prime vehicle for future growth” (Kalmbach 
and  Roussel, 1999). The study also predicts that within five years, strategic alliances will 
  157 
account for 16-25 percent of medium company value and 40 percent of the market value 
for about a quarter of the companies. 
 
The potential of strategic alliances strategy is enormous. If implemented correctly, it can 
dramatically improve an organization’s operations and competitiveness (Brucellaria, 
997). According to a survey conducted by Coopers & Lybrand, 54 percent of firms that 
use strategic alliances in many ways: 
1. To privatise state-owned companies while continuing to profit from and to 
 
rformance quickly, especially in developing 
 local businesses to foreign 
1
formed alliances did so for joint marketing and promotional purposes (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1997). Companies are forming alliances to obtain technology, to gain access to 
specific markets, to reduce financial risk, to achieve or ensure competitive advantage 
(Wheelan and Hungar, 2000). However, while many organizations often rush to jump on 
the bandwagon of strategic alliances, few succeed (Soursac, 1996; Malott, 1992; Michelet 
and Remacle, 1992). The failure rate of strategic alliances strategy is projected to be as 
high as 70 percent (Kalmbach and Roussel, 1999). 
 
Governments worldwide encourage and stimulate strategic alliances (Mockler, 1999).  In 
cooperation with multinational firms, governments 
some degree control the businesses 
  2. To attract capital while nurturing local businesses 
3. To bring technology to their country 
4. To improve overall economic pe
countries, without entirely relinquishing control of
operators. 
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 3.5 
The Co
the top reasons for forming strategic alliances (Coopers & Lybrand, 1997). As Ohmae 
 time to establish new markets one by 
•  Production, 26 percent 
  Design collaboration, 23 percent 
 percent 
ses, 19 percent 
 is sound and no doubt well established in the 
icism by leading business commentators, 
cluding Michael Porter who has argued that alliances are mere transitional devices 
Motives for Creating Strategic Alliances 
opers & Lybrand study rates growth strategies and entering new markets among 
(1992) points out; “Companies simply do not have
one”. In today’s fast paced world economy, this is increasingly true. Therefore, forming 
an alliance with an existing company already in that marketplace is a very appealing 
alternative. Partnering with an international company can make the expansion into 
unfamiliar territory a lot easier and less stressful for a company. Coopers and Lybrand 
(1997, cited in Elmuti et al. 2001) more specifically identify the following types of 
alliances amongst their clients: 
•  Joint marketing/promotion, 54 percent 
•  Joint selling or distribution, 42 percent 
•
•  Technology licensing, 22 percent 
•  Research and development contracts, 19
•  Other outsourcing purpo
 
The rationale behind the use of alliances
extant literature. This is so despite initial scept
in
rather than stable arrangements and hence destined to fail (Porter 1990). Porter’s 
pessimism has been discounted by both Ohmae (1989:144) who submits that alliances are 
not mere tools of convenience as they are important “instruments of serving customers in 
a global environment” and Yoshino et al. (1995:103) who argues that alliances enable 
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firms to focus on and invest in a few selected core competencies, leverage the 
competencies of other firms, and thereby grow into formidable global competitors. Due 
to the perceived utility of alliances, many organizations often rush into joining the 
bandwagon of strategic alliances. Indeed, Farris (1999, cited in Elmuti et al. 2001) 
observes that over 20,000 corporate alliances were formed worldwide between 1997-
1999 alone while alliances over the past 10 years have doubled and the increase is 
expected to be unabated (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1997, cited in Elmuti et al. 2001). 
Another study conducted by Anderson Consulting, reports that 82 percent of executives 
believe that alliances will be the prime vehicle for future growth and that by 2004, they 
will constitute $25-40 trillion in value (Kalmbach and Roussel 1999, cited in Elmuti et al. 
2001; Ettorre 2000:7) 
 
Not all companies can provide the technology that they need to effectively compete in 
their markets on their own. Therefore, they are teaming up with other companies who do 
ave the resources to provide the technology or who can pool their resources so that 
 
h
together they can provide the needed technology. Both sides receive benefit from the 
partnership. Technology transfer is not only viewed as being significant to the success of 
a strategic alliance, according to Hsieh (1997): “host countries now demand more in the 
way of technology transfer”. Indeed, many companies are forming alliances looking for 
the best quality or technology, or the cheapest labour or production costs (Quinn, 1995). 
 
Some companies may find that that financial risk that is involved in pursuing a new 
product or production method is too great for a single company to undertake. In such
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cases, two or more companies come together and agree to spread the risk among all of 
titive (Page 1998). For many small companies the only way 
ey can stay competitive and even survive in today’s technologically advanced, ever-
f other MNEs form developing countries (Ting, 1985; 
onkiewicz, 1986). However, a considerable part of the network is not necessarily ethnic 
them. One example of this is found in strategic alliances between Boeing, Aerospatiale of 
France, British Aerospace, Construcciones Aeronauticas of Spain and Deutsche 
Aerospace of Germany. These airplane manufacturers created an alliance to spread out 
the extremely high costs of developing a new large jet airplane (Wheelan and Hungar, 
2000; Das and Teng, 1999). 
 
Alliances are particularly alluring to small businesses because they provide the tools 
businesses need to be compe
th
changing business world is to form an alliance with another company or companies. 
Small companies realize the mutual benefits they can derive from strategic alliances in 
areas such as marketing, distribution, production, research and development and 
outsourcing (Page 1998). By forming alliances with other companies, small businesses 
are able to accomplish bigger projects more quickly and profitably, than if they tried to 
do it on their own. Self reliance is an option few companies will be able to afford (Booz, 
Allen and Hamilton, 1997). 
 
Malaysian firms in particular exhibit a preference for joint ventures (Sim, 2006) which is 
similar to the behaviour o
M
based, but based on industry relationships (Sim, 2006). The strategic alliance motivations 
of Malaysian firms were basically the search overseas for low cost bases and markets 
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(Sim, 2006) and other location based advantages, brought together by an extensive web 
of ethnic networks and aided by government encouragement and institutional framework.  
 
3.6  Challenges in Implementing Global Alliances 
The trend toward strategic alliances in business has not brought about the results 
envisioned by the participants in many cases. Most studies tend to focus more on the 
rm ns they fail. It is the risks and 
auvinism and different 
ttitudes to business can all make the going rough. Problems can be particularly acute 
dete inants of their success rather than for the reaso
problems that need to be analysed more fully to determine the true reasons why over 60 
percent of strategic alliances fail (Kalmbach and Roussel, 1999). 
 
Cultural clash is probably one of the biggest problems that corporations in alliances face 
today. “These cultural problems consist of language, egos, ch
a
between a publicly quoted Western holding company, keenly focused on shareholders 
value and Japanese partners who have different priorities (Kilburn, 1999, p22). The first 
thing that can cause problems is the language barrier that they might face. It is important 
for the companies that are working together to be able to communicate and understand 
each other well or they are doomed before they even start. From a different perspective, 
Steensma et al. (2000) indicated that national cultural traits directly influence strategic 
alliance formation and moderate the relationship between perceived technological 
uncertainty and alliance formation. 
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Risk sharing is the primary bonding tool in a partnership. A sense of commitment must 
be generated throughout the partnership. In many alliances cases one company will point 
e failure finger at the partnering company. Shifting the blame does not solve the 
will surely lead to disaster in the future. Many companies enter into alliance to 
ombat industry competition. In this case, the company is probably already doomed and 
ances where companies remain competitors in- 
ite of their strategic alliance. If it were to happen that one company would go off on its 
th
problem, but increases the tension between the partnering companies and often leads to 
alliance ruin (Lewis, 1992). Building trust is the most important and yet most difficult 
aspect of a successful alliance. Many alliances have failed due to lack of trust causing 
unsolved problems, lack of understanding and despondent relationships (Lewis, 1992,p 
46). 
 
In today’s business world, many strategic alliances are formed for the wrong reasons. 
This 
c
is just taking another along for the ride (Kilburn, 1999). Many strategic alliances 
although entered into for all the right reasons, do not work. Dissimilar objectives, in 
ability to share risks and lack of trust lead to an early alliance demise. Many managers 
enter into an alliance without properly researching the steps necessary to ensure the basic 
principles of cooperation (Lewis, 1992). 
 
Action taken by subordinates that are not congruent with top level management can prove 
particularly disruptive, especially in inst
sp
own and do its own marketing and sell its own product while in alliance with another 
company it would for sure be grounds for the two to break up and they would most likely 
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end up in a legal battle (Bruner, 1999). Other problems that can occur between companies 
in trade alliances are different attitudes among the companies, one company may deliver 
its good or service behind schedule or do a bad job producing their goods or service 
which may lead to distrust among the two companies. 
 
Relational risk is concerned with the probability that partner firms lack commitment to 
the alliance and that their possible opportunistic behaviour could undermine the prospects 
f an alliance. Such opportunistic behaviours include shirking, appropriating the partner’s 
. The sources of performance risk according to a 
cent study by Das and Teng (1999) include environmental factors, such as government 
 and development and from production can create serious 
ifficulties for the protection of intellectual property and the realization of its potential 
o
resources, distorting information, harbouring hidden agendas and delivering 
unsatisfactory products and services (Das and Teng, 1999). Because these activities 
seriously jeopardize the viability of an alliance, relational risk is an important component 
of the overall risk in strategic alliances. 
 
Performance risk is the probability that an alliance may fail even when partner firms 
commit themselves fully to the alliance
re
policy changes, war, and economic recession, market factors, such as fierce competition 
and demand fluctuations and internal factors such as a lack of competence in critical 
areas or sheer bad luck. 
 
Strategic alliances might also create a future local or even global competitor. The 
coupling from research
d
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value (Garnsey and Wilkinson, 1994, p.138). Likewise, a company can insist on 
contractual clauses that constrain partners from competing against it in certain products 
or geographic regions (Wild et al., 2000). Other problems in strategic alliances include a 
breakdown in trust, a change in strategy, the champions moved on, the value did not 
materialize, the cultures did not mesh and the systems were not integrated (Kalmbach and 
Roussel, 1999). 
 
Effective global alliances are usually tediously slow in the making but can be among the 
best mechanisms to implement strategies in global markets. In a highly competitive 
nvironment, alliances present a faster and less risky route to globalization. It is 
ceuticals, 
e
extremely complex to fashion such linkages, however, especially where many 
interconnecting systems are involved, forming intricate networks. Many alliances fail or 
end up in a takeover in which one partner swallows the other. McKinsey & Company, a 
consulting firm, surveyed 150 companies that had been in alliances and found that 75 
percent of them had been taken over by Japanese partners. Problems with shared 
ownership, the integration of vastly different structures and systems, the distribution of 
power between the companies involved, and conflicts in their relative locus of decision 
making and control are but a few of the organizational issues that must be worked out. 
But recent economic woes in Asia have turned the tables somewhat, with Western 
companies having to buy out their financially stressed allies in order to survive. 
 
Often, the form of governance chosen for multinational firm alliances greatly influences 
their success, particularly in technologically intense fields such as pharma
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computers and semiconductors. In a study of 153 new alliances, researchers found that 
a real sense, an alliance becomes 
 new form of competition. In fact, according to researcher David Lei (1997), perhaps the 
y sensitive areas, creating mistrust and secrecy which then undermine the 
urpose of the alliance. The difficulty that they are dealing with is the dual nature of 
the choice of the means of governance, whether a contractual agreement or a joint 
venture, depended on a desire to control information about proprietary technology. Thus, 
joint ventures are often the chosen form for such alliances because they provide greater 
control and coordination in high-technology industries. 
 
Cross border partnerships in particular often become a race to learn with the faster learner 
later dominating the alliance and rewriting its terms. In 
a
single greatest impediment managers’ face when seeking to learn or renew sources of 
competitive advantage is to realize that cooperation can represent another form of 
unintended competition, particularly to shape and apply new skills to future products and 
businesses. 
 
All too often, cross border allies have difficulty in collaborating effectively especially in 
competitivel
p
strategic alliances – the benefits of cooperation versus the dangers of introducing new 
competition through sharing their knowledge and technological skills about their mutual 
product or the manufacturing process (Figure 3.7). Managers may fear that they will lose 
the competitive advantage of the firm’s proprietary technology or the specific skills that 
their personnel possess. The cumulative learning that a partner attains through the 
alliance could potentially be applied to other products or even other industries that are 
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beyond the scope of the alliance and therefore would hold no benefit to the partner 
holding the original knowledge. As noted by Lei (1997), the Japanese in fact have far out 
learned their U.S. allies in developing and applying new technologies to other uses.  
 
The enticing benefits of cross-border alliances often mask the many pitfalls. In addition 
to potential loss of technology and knowledge or skill base, other areas of incompatibility 
ften arise such as conflicting strategic goals and objectives, cultural clashes and disputes  o
over management and control systems. Sometimes it takes a while for such problems to 
evidence themselves, particularly if insufficient homework has been done in meetings 
between the two sides to work out the implementation details. The alliance between KLM 
Royal Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines linking their hubs in Detroit and 
Amsterdam for example resulted in a bitter feud among the top officials of both 
companies over methods of running an airline business – the European way or the 
American way and over cultural differences between the companies as well as a power 
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Figure 3.7  The dual role of strategic alliances 
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s of Alliances,” 1997. 
3.7  Salient Factors Influencing Strategic
First, cultural heritage has 
 Alliances 
ve a strong effect on executives’ strategic  been found to ha
rientations. Differences in national culture result in the formation of differing 
al to affect strategic decision 
o
managerial ideologies which in turn have the potenti
processes in firms (Chung & Lee, 1989; Hitt, Dacin, Tyler & Park, 1997). For example, 
Texas Instruments (TI) and Hitachi managers had to bridge their cultural differences and 
learn to work together over time prior to the development of their memory chip joint 
venture (Hitt et al., 1997). This was due to significant differences in their decision 
making processes. TI managers used a common American approach, whereby managers 
would meet to discuss an issue, brainstorm solutions and then make a decision. 
Alternatively, Hitachi managers often held informal discussions and agreed on a decision 
prior to a formal meeting where the decision was ratified. Similarly, CFM International, 
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the successful joint venture designed to produce jet engines between GE and Snecma of 
France, had to overcome culturally based differences in problem solving. Snecma’s 
managers desired using outside consultants from the French armed services and 
government to help solve problems, but GE preferred to rely on its own managers. 
Managers from both firms worked to overcome these differences and the joint venture 
has been successful (Slocum & Lei, 1993; GE Aircraft Engines News Release, 1995). 
 
Second, differences in level of economic development can produce differences in alliance 
motives. The objectives of alliances partners often differ when one partner is from a 
eveloped country and the other is from a lesser developed or developing country. Firms 
enture called the `Aero 
entre of Excellence’ will overhaul airplane engines in Subang, Malaysia. Malaysia 
Airlines’ goal is to upgrade its aerospace technological capabilities, whereas GE gains 
d
from developed countries frequently seek out new market opportunities for their 
products. Partners from developed countries look to partners from developing countries 
to provide access to local knowledge, including customs and business practices, political 
connections as well as the ability to satisfy the host government’s foreign investment 
requirements. On the other hand, partners from lesser developed or developing countries 
seek access to technology, export opportunities and the opportunity to gain international 
alliance experience. Thus, partners differ by level of economic development with respect 
to alliance motives and expected benefits (Beamish, 1988, 1994). 
 
The joint venture between GE and Malaysia Airlines exemplifies the different motives of 
alliance partners from developed and developing countries. The v
C
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access to a new market. In fact, GE plans to use the Aero Centre to service all of its Asia 
Pacific customers (GE Aircraft Engines News Release, 1996). 
 
Sulaiman et al. (1999) in their study on factors affecting Malaysian joint ventures 
performance posited that absorptive capacity, foreign parent assistance, articulated goals, 
trust, and culture and goal conflict may impact IJV (international joint ventures) 
erformance and knowledge acquisition. Contrary to prior research and their predictions, 
my, the degree of transferring knowledge and the 
ssistance received from the foreign parents. Factors that inhibit performance include the 
the alliance process. Government support in the form of national and industrial policies 
p
absorptive capacity, articulated goals, and culture and goal conflict did not significantly 
predict performance. However, foreign parent assistance was strongly and significantly 
related to all measures of performance. While trust was not found to be significantly 
related to overall performance or to knowledge acquisition, significant and surprising 
negative relationships were found between trust, human resource performance, and 
business performance. 
 
Sulaiman et al. (1999) in their study on performance and problems of international joint 
ventures in Malaysia suggested a number of factors to facilitate overall effectiveness of 
IJV such as the degree of autono
a
influence of the foreign parents in decision making and the extent to which IJV has had to 
deal with problems. 
 
Finally, differences in government support and foreign investment policies can influence 
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can motivate certain forms of industrial development. Foreign investment policies that 
require a significant amount of local investment constrain the pool of available partners 
nd influence the decisions of foreign firms with respect to the capabilities they seek in a 
 basic proposition that the social and institutional framework is 
 distinguishing feature in many Malaysian firms as well as other Asian firms and need to 
a
partner. Additionally, government regulation requiring indigenous ownership of business 
operations may result in the surrendering of control by foreign partnering firms. Given 
the need to relinquish control of resources, foreign partners may require that domestic 
partners have expertise in manufacturing, possess local knowledge of the target market, 
and have close ties to government officials. These requirements reduce the risk of value 
loss as foreign firms sacrifice ownership for greater guarantees of alliance success. More 
importantly, however, foreign firms which must deal with such regulation may demand a 
greater degree of commitment on the part of their domestic partners (Ghemawat, 1986). 
For example, foreign firms may seek partners that are willing to invest considerable 
amounts of fixed assets into the alliance and are especially dependent on alliance success 
for their future viability.  
 
In this way, foreign firms’ fear of surrendering control may be offset by commitment to 
common goals. Sim (2006) indicated the key role government, ethnic network and 
relationships played in the internationalization of Malaysian multinational companies. 
His findings reinforced the
a
be incorporated in any further development or refinement on MNE (Multinational 
Enterprises) theories. In Malaysia, the government took a very active role in promoting 
the internationalization of Malaysian firms. Investment promotion missions abroad were 
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organized and often led by the Prime Minister. The Malaysian government linked 
companies benefited from its government links and business associates to form joint 
ventures and strategic alliances. As a result, MNEs operating in the Asian context have to 
manage this institutional context successfully (Sim, 2006).  
 
In summary, there are differences in cultural, economic and institutional forces between 
developed and newly developed or developing countries that lead to different priorities 
for firms headquartered in separate countries. Prior to an alliance, it is difficult to assess a 
potential partner’s intentions.  
 
3.8  Partner Selection – Justification for research 
A Technology Associates and Alliances (1999) survey asked 455 CEO’s to rank the 
importance of certain success factors for strategic alliances and the results of that study 
indicated that 70% percent of the CEO’s  were of the opinion that partner selection was 
e most critical success factors for strategic alliances. 
gic alliance must be structured so 
at it is the intent of both parties that it will actually succeed through the need for speed, 
th
 
Hence, partnership selection is perhaps the most important step in creating a successful 
alliance. A successful alliance requires the joining of two competent firms, seeking a 
similar goal and both intent on its success. The term “competent firm” is relative to the 
involved parties strategies, objectives and goal. A strate
th
adaptation and facilitated evolution. The foundation of a successful strategic alliance is 
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laid during the internal formation process (Lorange et al, 1992). This internal formation 
process includes partner selection and the initial agreement between parties. 
 
Selecting an appropriate partner and itemizing the rules of the alliance are the most 
intensive process in the formation of an alliance. Yet done correctly, they help ensure a 
higher quality, longer lasting relationship. No business relationship is guaranteed but 
hen given enough information it has a more solid foundation upon which to build.  w
Having selected a partner, the alliance should be structured so that the firm’s risks of 
giving too much away to the partner are reduced to an acceptable level. Figure 3.8 depicts 
the four safeguards against opportunism by alliance partners. Opportunism includes the 
theft of technology or markets that Hill (1999) describes. The safeguards are walling off 
critical technology, establishing contractual safeguards, agreeing to swap valuable skills 
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Figure 3.8  Safeguards against Opportunism 
 
Source: Adapted from Hill (1999, p. 415) 
 
An alliance is a lot like a marriage. There may be n  buying 
and selling of equity. There are few, if any, rigidly binding provisions. It is a loose
tners bring to an alliance a faith that they will be 
ronger together than they would be separately. Both believe that each has unique skills 
k & Russo, 1996). Although it is difficult to 
entify precise failure rates, Hennart, Kim and Zeng (1998) argued that international 
Walling off critical technology
o formal contract. There is no
 
evolving kind of relationship. Both par
st
and functional abilities the other likes. And both have to work diligently over time to 
make the union successful (Ohmae, 1992). 
 
Strategic alliances have become increasingly important, but a high level of dissatisfaction 
with actual outcomes relative to expectations has been reported and many are not 





reduced by  Agreeing to swap valuable skills and 
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Seeking credible commitments 
Establishing Contractual Safeguards 
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strategic alliances are likely to have high dissolution rates. Approximately 50-60% of 
alliances formed are unsuccessful in accomplishing the partners’ objectives. Besides the 
inherent risk, one of the most often cited reason for alliance failure is the incompatibility 
of partners. 
 
While much of the literature has been focused on the justification and formation issues of 
alliances, the main cause of failure is partner selection, hence the focus of this thesis in 
this area. Leading business journals are only beginning to discuss this failure rate (Elmuti 
t al. 2001:206).  
allman and Shenkar, 1994), (2) outcomes, which encompass studies 
lating to failure and performance (e.g. Brown, Rugman and Verbeke, 1989; Makino and 
e
 
Strategic alliances research can be broadly categorized into three areas; (1) antecedents, 
which include motives promoting strategic alliance formation and partner selection (e.g. 
Geringer 1991; T
re
Delios, 1996; Pearce, 1997), and (3) specific management issues pertaining to, for 
example, control and conflict (e.g. Fey and Beamish, 2000; Yan and Gray, 1994). The 
issue of partner selection is arguably pre-eminent in this list of topics for the success and 
stability of the joint venture. “Marriage” is widely held to be determined by the 
compatibility of the alliance partners (Luo, 1997; Saxton, 1997). Consequently, 
considerable empirical work has been done with a view to identifying the determinants of 
a good match (Harrigan, 1988; Lasserre, 1984; Luo, 1998). 
 
  175 
The choice of the right partner can yield important competitive benefits, whereas the 
failure to establish compatible objectives or communicate effectively can lead to 
surmountable problems. Furthermore, the need to understand both partners’ similarities 
e a time consuming process. Developing 
n understanding of partner’ expectations and objectives can also take time. However, 
in
and differences is paramount in ensuring the success of alliances. Partners enter 
collaborative ventures with certain expectations and objectives. Thus, it is critical for 
managers to identify and understand effective partner selection criteria prior to entering 
into joint ventures. This is especially important in an international setting where 
differences in culture, infrastructure, economic development, and government policies 
increase the complexity of the context in which the alliance is embedded (Slocum & Lei, 
1993). The decade of the 1980s saw a burgeoning amount of cross cultural research 
focused on Japan. Relatively little attention has been focused on Malaysia. Therefore, the 
decision to form an alliance is a critical one. After a firm has made the decision to engage 
in an alliance, its selection of an appropriate partner is the next critical decision (Hitt, 
Tyler, Hardee & Park, 1995). Koot (1988) argued that the partner selection process is 
difficult but also critical to alliances success. Some research exists on partner selection 
(Geringer, 1988; Lane & Beamish, 1990; Saxton, 1997) but more research is required to 
explain the basis on which firms select partners. 
 
The choice of a partner is an important factor affecting alliance performance. Finding the 
right partner requires careful screening and can b
a
many alliances are formed by chance meetings or through previous experience with the 
partner. For example, Texas Instruments and Hitachi developed a joint venture to produce 
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memory chips. However, the two firms first began a working relationship in 1988 by 
conducting joint research. Thereafter, they incrementally extended their relationship (Hitt 
et al, 1997). The joint venture success is partially the result of the partner selection 
process. In an international setting, informal brokering of an alliance can be fraught with 
problems. Firms need to be cautious in selecting partners because there is considerable 
risk and investment involved. However, due to competitive pressures, many firms rush 
into alliances without adequate preparation or understanding of partners’ needs and, all 
too often, these alliances fail. 
 
While partner selection is an integral component of alliance success, very little research 
has devoted explicit attention to this issue and these are discussed below. Where literature 
as examined the subject, this has generally been limited to a mere outline of the reasons  h
for the establishment of an alliance and how such an alliance is then operated. 
Tomlinson’s (1970) investigation of the joint venturing process in India and Pakistan 
represents an early study in this area. Although this study provided much food for 
thought in relation to how partners are selected, it cannot be regarded as the last word on 
the subject because Tomlinson’s results were tempered by certain factors. Firstly, his 
research was based on local markets in India and Pakistan, his sample being forty nine 
British firms involved in seventy IJVs in these countries. Added to this, his selection 
categories were not mutually exclusive. There is also the fact that since some of the IJVs 
had been formed more than twenty years before he interviewed his respondents, the 
information he received might not have been accurate even if it had come from 
executives. If it had come from workers who had not been directly involved in selection, 
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there was even less chance of the results being completely accurate. A further study, 
undertaken by Tomlinson and Thompson (1977), dealt with firms in Canada and Mexico. 
The study was, however, limited in that it did not examine how often or how earnestly 
certain partner characteristics were looked for by either side, or any particular variables 
which might have a bearing on the criteria used. Further, the research related to 
hypothetical IJVs which might be formed in the future; it did not deal with actually 
implemented IJVs.  
 
In order to examine whether JVs behave differently if they involved local partners with 
different operating characteristics, Renforth (1974) looked at the process of IJV 
rmation between American multinational corporations and local family or non family  fo
firms in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. As in Tomlison and Thompson (1977) a 
degree of artificiality may have been accorded to some of the answers because 
respondents apparently evaluated criteria relating to hypothetical IJVs. Renforth (1974) 
tried to split the criteria into whether they had a strong, mild or no influence on the choice 
of partner, but it was shown that at 0.01 level, the categories chosen failed to show 
statistically significant differences in means. The researcher did, however, draw from his 
information the conclusion that sound and equitable results could be obtained from IJVs 
which could accept differences relating to philosophy, policies or operating methods 
produced by the incorporation of a family or non-family firm partner. The family variable 
was the only contextual variable documented by Renforth – he did not expand upon any 
other context variable which might have a bearing on the ranking of specific selection 
criteria. 
  178 
In his study on foreign direct manufacturing investment in the USA, Daniels (1971) also 
made a limited investigation of investment through IJVs. He concluded that firms looked 
for partners who were of similar size. In this way, it was argued a company could be 
selection of partners and relative bargaining power. He concluded with four 
lection criteria, each having a hypothesized positive relationship with IJV performance. 
These criteria comprised of complementary resources provided by the partners, past 
assured that the two firms gave the JV about the same importance (Daniels, 1971). Two 
firms of similar size would then be set in close equilibrium for the purpose of bargaining 
(Daniels, 1971; Geringer, 1991). A study by Adler and Hlavacek (1976) was concerned 
with JVs which operated in the field of product innovation and which were ‘large’ and 
‘small’ in comparison with one another. Within the non-random sample employed, the 
researchers listed typical criteria used by such firms to choose JV partners. This listing 
included a soundly based market distribution system in the market to be served, a suitably 
sized sales force, with sound skills and imagination calling on a range of customers 
previously established, the level of technology to improve on or add to one’s own 
technological base, the type of personnel required, a given available minimum financial 
resource and relative company size. However, the study was limited in that it provided no 
knowledge covering relative frequency or the importance attached to each, nor did it 
make any attempt to establish how such criteria might differ from those employed for 
those JVs which were more or less the same size or who were not concerned with product 
innovation. 
 
Forty manufacturing IJVs in the USA were used by Awadzi (1987) to look at the links 
between the 
se
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business association between partners, links between businesses and links between 
foreign partners’ and IJVs businesses. Again, the study was limited in that Awadzi did 
not identify differences in priority among different resource contributions or contextual 
variables which might influence these priorities. Neither did he specifically state what 
contributions would be acceptable as complementary resources; he left this choice up to 
the respondents. None of his selection criteria showed significant positive relationships 
with IJV performance except for non-financial complementary resources. 
     
One of the first to systematically conduct an in-depth study of partner selection criteria 
was Geringer. He found that a partner’s national culture, past experience, size and 
structure were as important in partner selection as task related criteria, such as partners’ 
nical know how, financial assets, managerial experience and access to markets 
selection is even more critical to IJV success 
 the context of newly emerging economies which are characterized by dynamic and 
tech
(Geringer, 1988). However, much work remains to understand the criteria by which firms 
select effective alliance partners. Understanding partner expectations can ease both the 
structuring and functioning of the alliance. 
 
In his summary of prior research, Geringer (1991) posits that the process of partner 
selection is considered to be of crucial importance to the formation and operation of IJVs 
(international joint venture). Local partner 
in
complex environments as the right partner can increase the IJV’s adaptability, improve 
the strategy environment configuration and reduce uncertainty (Luo, 1997). Although the 
importance of selecting the right partner to the success of the joint venture has been 
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proposed by a number of authors (Killing, 1983; Geringer, 1988; Dacin et al., 1997; 
Medeof, 1997), relatively little empirical research has been reported in the literature 
(Beamish, 1987; Luo, 1997). Geringer (1991) contributed to the extant literature by 
developing a simple twofold typology of partner selection criteria. He distinguished task 
related and partner related dimensions of selection criteria to provide a better 
understanding of the partner selection process and how firms proceed in selecting 
partners.  
 
Task related criteria are associated with the operational skills and resources that a venture 
requires for its competitive success. Task related criteria therefore refer to those variables 
that are intimately related to the viability of a proposed IJV’s operation, irrespective of 
hether the chosen investment mode involves multiple partners. Typical example are 
trategic motives for alliance formation and selection criteria. In a further study 
w
patterns, technical know how, financial resources, experienced managerial personnel and 
access to marketing and distribution channels. Partner related criteria, in contrast, refer to 
those variables that become relevant only if the chosen investment mode involves the 
presence of multiple partners. Typical examples are the national or corporate culture of a 
partner, compatibility or trust between the partners’ management teams, the degree of 
favourable past association between the partners, and the size or corporate structure of the 
partner.  
 
Using Geringer’s typology, Glaister (1996) investigated aspects of selection criteria in 
UK alliances with partner firms from Western Europe and also examined the relationship 
between s
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Glaister (1997) compared the differences in the relative importance of task and partner 
hey essentially found that relative to partner related criteria 
sk related criteria had a lesser weight in the process of partner selection, a finding 
 industrial 
xperience, foreign experience and acquaintance with Western culture, existing long term 
related selection criteria in UK international joint ventures from the perspective of a 
sample of UK firms and foreign firms from advanced industrial economies. Some support 
was found in the latter study for the hypothesis that the relative importance of task related 
selection criteria vary between UK firms and foreign firms, but no support was found for 
the hypothesis that relative importance of partner related selection criteria vary between 
UK firms and foreign firms. 
 
In their study of joint ventures between West European and Russian firms Arino et al. 
(1997) explored the task and partner related criteria West European firms use when 
selecting a Russian partner. T
ta
which is consistent with Geringer’s (1991) finding that the relative importance of 
selection criteria is contingent upon the strategic context of partnership. 
 
In connection with Indo-German technical collaborations, Kumar (1995) identified a 
number of partner selection criteria for choosing technology receiving partners from the 
viewpoint of maximising learning success. These criteria range from
e
relationships with local partners, contacts and connections of local partners, to production 
facilities and qualified local personnel. The German technology suppliers were asked to 
evaluate the selection criteria they applied in choosing their Indian partners, while the 
latter were asked to rate how important they thought the same criteria were for their 
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German partners in selecting them. Kumar (1995) essentially found that while the Indian 
partners evaluated the selection criteria more positively than the German partners, based 
on the mean measure of the selection criteria both groups of partner firms ranked the 
selection criteria comparably. The most important criterion was the ‘connections of 
Indian partner in the local community,’ whereas the least important in the view of both 
was the ‘Indian partner’s foreign experience’ and his ‘familiarity with Western culture.’ 
 
In their analysis of partner selection criteria employed by the US and Korean firms when 
forming international alliances, Dacin et al. (1997) noted a number of significant 
differences in the characteristics sought for alliance partners. They basically found that 
e US executives placed strong emphasis on the financial assets of a partner as well as  th
its intangible resources. In contrast, Korean executives placed significant emphasis on the 
potential partner’s technical capabilities (e.g., the ability to develop new processes or 
product technologies) along with other special skills that could be learned from the 
partner and the partner’s willingness to share its expertise. Considering the complete 
range of important criteria adopted by both groups of managers, Dacin et al. (1997) also 
noted several similarities in the criteria used although their relative ranking in importance 
for partner selection differed. Partner selection should also be integrated with the 
strategic motives of IJV partners. In other words, both foreign and local partner firms 
should be able to identify what criteria to use in choosing partners and what criteria are 
crucial to their goal accomplishment (Luo, 1998).   
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Given the differences in cultural, economic and institutional factors between developed 
and developing countries, and building on the expected varying level of relative 
portance of strategic motives between groups of partner firms, it is further expected 
ed in different countries. These firms 
eed to select partners that have compatible goals, appropriate skills, effective motivation 
im
that the relative importance of partner selection criteria for IJV formation will vary 
between foreign partner and local partner groups. The changing global context requires 
firms to develop new global strategies. Improved telecommunications coupled with rapid 
technological development are driving firms to find new ways of maintaining a 
competitive edge. Firms from newly industrialized countries (NIC) such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia and Brazil are applying competitive 
pressure to firms from traditional industrialized nations. While firms from these NICs 
share some similarities (e.g., emphasis on the group versus individualism, adherence to 
authority), important differences can be traced to their unique cultural heritage, distinct 
ideologies, and differing economic and political infrastructures (Deyo, 1987; El Namaki, 
1986; Kim, 1992; Lodge & Vogel, 1987). It is imperative that firms from industrialized 
nations be aware of both similarities and differences if they are to compete effectively 
and form alliances with firms from these countries. 
 
In forming alliances, selecting the right partner is of paramount importance but it 
becomes more critical in alliances between firms bas
n
and complementary strategic orientations. This is because managers must find ways to 
develop win-win deals for these alliances to be successful. However, it is more difficult 
to find compatible partners in cross border alliances because firms based in different 
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countries may have largely different criteria in selecting partners and thus seek different 
benefits from the alliances. For example, the joint venture between GM (US) and 
Daewoo (Korea) was unsuccessful, largely because the two firms had different strategic 
orientations and goals and as a result were largely incompatible. Because of these 
differences, Daewoo was seeking growth and access to new markets while GM’s 
overriding goal was to achieve reasonable financial returns. Because the financial returns 
were negative, GM management was unwilling to make further investments to achieve 
the growth desired by Daewoo. As a result, they ended their partnership, both losing 
substantial investments in the joint venture (Hitt, Tyler, Hardee & Park, 1995). 
 
It is unlikely that alliance partners will have complete agreement on alliance objectives 
and expected benefits because the institutional context in which the alliance is embedded 
aries by country. A significant amount of economic action is embedded in cognitive, 
ed in a broader political, economic and social context that shapes action (Dacin, 
entresca & Beal, 1999). Emerging markets have become a critically important global 
v
cultural, structural and political factors that shape firm behaviour (Zukin & DiMaggio, 
1990). 
 
Partner selection does not occur in a vacuum. Much firm behaviour is nested or 
embedd
V
phenomenon and there is need for more research on them. In particular, there has been 
little research on strategic alliances with partners in emerging markets (Lee & Beamish, 
1995). Beamish (1994) argued that joint ventures, the most common form of strategic 
alliance are the dominant strategy used in emerging markets by multinational firms. 
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Firms search for strategic alliance partners that have resources they can leverage (Hitt, 
Dacin, Levitas and Borza, 2000). They can leverage resources that are complementary by 
integrating them to create synergy. Or firms can learn skills and capabilities from their 
partners that enhance their own competencies and thus, their competitive advantages. 
However, the types of resources firms seek to leverage and the capabilities they need to 
learn will vary with their market context (emerging or developed). Although there may be 
some similarities in the resources emerging and developed market firms seek from 
partners, there are differences in the importance each places on certain resources, 
capabilities and characteristics. The theoretical explanation for the differential partner 
selection criteria used by firms from Malaysia is largely drawn from the resource based 
view of the firm and organizational learning theory. 
 
Geringer (1991) is one of the few people to have studied the subject at any great length. 
He sets out several factors which need to be considered in the selection of suitable joint 
enture partners. Figure 3.9 illustrates the process of selecting a joint venture partner. The  v
left hand column shows a flow chart of the phases involved in the selection process, and 
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Figure 3.9  Partner Selection Process 
 
P eds to distinguish its future goals and act accordingly. Such aims 
m arket, gaining access to new technology, distribution 
networks and marketing experience, or rationalizing production, exploiting economies of
New market, finance, 
technology, economies of 
scale, costs, rationalization 
etc 
Definition of future goals 




Identification of prospective 
partners 





1. Strategic compatibility 
2. Complementary skills 
and resources 





6. Compatible management 
8. Mutual dependency 
9. Communication barriers 
teams 
7. Trust and commitment 
tation 
Complete joint venture 
implementation 
Source: Williams and Lilley, 1993 
rimarily, a company ne
ay involve expanding to a new m
 
scale, or minimizing transaction and production costs. Once the company’s future 
objectives have been identified, the next step is to decide how they can be accomplished. 
If the need for a joint venture is then identified, the subsequent problem is the selection of 
a suitable partner.  Initially, companies need to be concerned with strategic compatibility, 
complementary skills and resources, relative company size, and financial capability. It 
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should thus become apparent which firms cannot provide the necessary attributes to form 
a successful joint venture.  
 
Resource based and organizational learning perspectives help explained why firms select 
articular alliance partners (Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996). Firms have specific  p
resources endowments (Barney, 1991) but may need additional resources to be 
competitive in particular markets (Hitt, Nixon, Clifford & Coyne 1999). Such a need is a 
primary reason for strategic alliances and for the selection of specific alliance partners. 
Resources of particular interest in cross border alliances include financial capital, 
technical capabilities, managerial capabilities and other intangible assets, such as firm 
reputation. In addition to seeking local market knowledge and access, developed market 
firms with large resource endowments try to leverage their resources by selecting alliance 
partners with complementary capabilities and unique competencies. Alliances provide the 
opportunity to combine the resources of both partners, yet often firms enter alliances to 
build their own resource endowments. That is, they wish to acquire knowledge and learn 
new skills and capabilities (Mothe & Quelin, 1998). Less resource endowed firms may 
desire to learn new technical and managerial capabilities, whereas more resource 
endowed firms want to gain knowledge of markets and build relationships to provide 
access to those markets (Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998). Thus, the interactive learning 
opportunities gained from the experiences of partners in an alliance (March & Levitt, 
1999) help firms add to their capabilities even tacit components and build their resource 
endowments (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Resource endowments and organizational 
learning are particularly important in alliances between developed market firms and 
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emerging market firms.  Pan (1996), in the context of Chinese IJVs, suggests that local 
players partner with foreign partners to gain access to key upstream resources such as 
product and manufacturing technology as well as expertise and training to manage it. 
Lyles and Steensma (1997) and Lyles et al. (1999) observe similar instances for IJVs in 
Hungary and Malaysia, respectively. To summarize, foreign partner essentially possesses 
valuable upstream skills and assets such as technology, know how and brands that require 
huge capital investments but are globally fungible, i.e., transferable from one market to 
another. In contrast, local partners possess skills and assets that are specific to the local 
context but are limited in their application in the rest of the world (Anand and Delios, 
2002).  
 
Emerging markets provide a particularly rich setting to understand the firm 
haracteristics used in partner selection. For example, differences in the nature of formal 
ance is a relatively new form of organizing (Lewin, 
ong & Caroll, 1998). Also, important differences in the underlying institutional 
c
and informal institutions in these two contexts affect the extent of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in resource decisions. Over time, formal institutions shape the informal rules 
by which organizations operate. The relative economic and social stability in developed 
countries promotes the development and acceptance of rules of exchange. In contrast, the 
economic and sometimes social instability in emerging markets produces ambiguity and 
uncertainty regarding the rules of exchange; in this context, the rules are largely emergent 
(North; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). 
 
In emerging markets, the strategic alli
L
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infrastructures of emerging and developed markets affect managers’ strategic orientations 
(Garten, 1996). Luthans, Patrick and Luthan (1995) suggested that even countries that are 
geographically proximal can be economically, politically and culturally distant in 
significant ways. Finally, although emerging economies have grown at a stronger pace 
than most developed country economies, many of the businesses in emerging markets are 
young or recently privatized (DeCastro & Uhlenbruck, 1997) and their resource 
endowments are unlikely to be strong. Thus, emerging market firms may use alliances as 
a means of acquiring tangible and intangible resources to develop their capability to 
compete in their domestic and global markets with multinational firms from other 
countries. Firms from developed countries tend to have richer resource endowments, but 
they nevertheless also search for partners with specific resources, tangible and intangible 
to complement their resource bases. Child and Faulkner stated that when one of the 
partners comes from an emerging country and the other from a highly developed 
economy, their configuration of objectives will almost certainly differ from that in the 
case of partners from two developed countries (1998;297). Thus it is important to 
consider the different contexts in which strategic alliance partner selection decisions are 
embedded.  
 
The pace of political change and the size of economic gains have not been uniform across 
ll emerging economies. Macroeconomic stabilization, a precondition for external  a
financial assistance has been particularly difficult to achieve. The development of market 
institutions such as legal infrastructures that provide the basis for effective corporate 
governance, has been even slower and more difficult (ERBD, 1998). Economic and 
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political shocks have greatly increased the uncertainty and risk for both domestic firms 
and foreign investors. Missing institutional features for instance shortages of skilled 
labour, thin capital markets, infrastructure problems as well as political and economic 
instability and public suspicion of foreign firms have deterred inward foreign direct 
investment. The primary impediment appears to be the lack of well defined property 
rights that convey exclusivity, transferability and quality of title (Devlin, Grafton & 
Rowlands, 1998). Lack of strong legal frameworks has allowed a large increase in 
opportunism, rent shifting, bribery and corruption (Nelson, Tilley & Walker, 1998). 
These problems have particularly affected the ability to enforce property rights even 
where legislation has been enacted (Estrin & Wright 1999). As a result, institutional 
capacity building was and continues to be a key for attracting inward FDI (Rondinelli, 
1998).  
 
The rapid and widespread adoption of market based policies by emerging economy 
overnments raises important issues for the strategies adopted by private enterprises, both 
 
g
domestic and foreign. At the same time as domestic policies are becoming more market 
oriented, emerging economy governments are opening their countries to foreign markets 
and joining regional trading associations. New relationships between foreign and 
domestic enterprises are emerging as strategic alliances replace export processing zone 
and subcontracting arrangements. Enterprise strategies in emerging economies are 
therefore facing strong environmental pressures for change, yet this change is neither 
smooth nor automatic nor uniform across different markets. 
  191 
3.9  Limitations of the Literature Review on Partner Selection 
The literature indicates that much prior work on alliance partner selection examined the 
lection decisions made by foreign entrants, commonly from developed nations 
d out in the context 
. Previously, Hitt, 
acin, Levitas, Arregle and Borza (2000) employed a resourced based framework to 
h distinct, 
se
(Geringer, 1988). Disappointingly, very little research has been carrie
of emerging economies. As an example, it was not possible to obtain any verifiable data 
on the number of strategic alliances formed in Malaysia or the percentage of all 
businesses in Malaysia that would fall into that area. There was also no single directory 
or readily available list of international strategic alliances in Malaysia. 
 
With the exception of Shenkar and Li (1999), little work has been done on how firms 
domiciled in developing economies approach alliance partner selection
D
examine different alliance partner selection decisions made by firms in developed and 
emerging markets. However, Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright (2000) argued that 
research should be extended to increase the understanding of institutional forces present 
in emerging economies. In response, this research will extend the work of Hitt et al 
(2000) by comparing the characteristics of international strategic alliance partners 
preferred by managers in firms based in Malaysia, one emerging economies with 
differing institutional environments. Thus it is imperative to consider the different 
contexts in which strategic alliance partner selection decisions are embedded. 
 
In conclusion, extant research in the partner selection criteria did provide valuable 
insights into the partner selection criteria. However, it failed to establis
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mutually exclusive criteria that can be generalised. In fact, establishing criteria that can 
lly 
ia market research. In other words, once the decision to cooperate has been made, the 
be generalised is very difficult. Geringer (1991) also acknowledges this and suggested 
that “the relative importance of partner selection criteria may be determined, on a 
contingency basis by the variables associated with the strategic context of the strategic 
alliance and the parent firm”.  Indeed, the actual process by which potential alliance 
partners are first identified seems to have been largely ignored in the literature in 
preference for a focus on selection outcomes. This omission is somewhat surprising given 
that the selection process, deemed to be fundamental in the pursuit of high performing 
ventures, can be disassembled into at least two stages; initial identification and 
subsequent evaluation of potential candidates (Williams and Lilley, 1993). While much is 
known about the latter exercise, the former has received little attention from scholars.  
 
It is plausible to assume that the default proposition implicit in the literature is that 
partner selection is made on the basis of objective information gathered systematica
v
identification of potential partners follows a linear process whereby a large number of 
candidates are systematically screened according to the predetermined criteria identified 
by Geringer (1991) and others. Sources used in the initial identification of potential 
alliance partners may include embassies and consulates, government agencies, 
management consulting companies and investment advisors (Tsang, 1995). However, 
there is evidence to indicate that investors do not follow this approach in practice (Wong 
and Ellis, 2002). It can thus be seen that past research into identifying the selection 
criteria which companies use, and particularly into defining those variables which might 
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show why firms place differing importance on the criteria they apply, has not been very 
successful.  We can, however, draw certain conclusions from the research undertaken. 
First, the importance given to partner selection is an obvious and important variable. It is 
a definite and specific decision in the creation of strategic alliances and we can see what 
selection criteria were used and how important they were in the decision. The 
significance granted to selection of a suitable partner is grounded in the importance of 
compatible and complementary skills, resources, procedures and policies to a successful 
strategic alliance.  
   
Former Malaysian Prime Minister (1981-2003), Dr Mahathir bin Mohamed, is well 
known for his campaign for the preservation of “Asian Values” and they have permeated 
 relations between state and market in Malaysia. Thus, this study of international 
vide a social context for examining how 
stitutional changes provide opportunities for probing how competitive advantage 
tive advantages in emerging economies are based on network 
the
strategic alliances also casts light on the path of economic change in a non western 
society. To the extent that a considerable proportion of the discourse of strategic alliance 
is characterized by the developed country and universalistic, “one size fits all policy 
approach”; a different approach is called for. 
 
3.10           Conclusion 
Emerging economies such as Malaysia pro
in
changes. Many competi
relationships and close business government ties, with firms becoming effective 
monopolies in their home markets. As the institutional context changes, there are 
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necessary changes in both firms’ asset structures and orientations. Opportunities as well 
as challenges must be met by new resources. For instance, business groups in the past 
have had advantages based on asymmetries in foreign direct investment. They must now 
change and evolve toward a business model that does not rely on government lobbying or 
generic financial investment strategies (Galvez & Tybout, 1985). Product markets must 
also evolve as more dynamic competition develops. 
 
Emerging market economies are not homogeneous, even within the same geographic 
region. Latin America, East Asia, Africa/Middle East and Central and Eastern Europe, 
ken as four groups have manifestly different starting points, but even within these 
tries may be expected 
 adopt market based strategies at different times and rates because institutional factors 
ta
regions countries differ markedly. In Central and Eastern Europe, there are clear 
differences in regime between countries such as Hungary and Poland and countries of the 
former Soviet Union. Moreover, even though the now independent republics of the 
former Soviet Union had a common starting point, they have pursued different paths to 
transition and have achieved different degrees of progress (ERBD, 1998). Similarly in 
East Asia there are clear differences between formerly centrally planned countries such as 
China and Vietnam and other emerging economies such as Korea. 
 
The term “emerging economies” suggests a process that takes place over a considerable 
period of time. Enterprises in different markets and different coun
to
are also changing at different times and rates. This observation suggests a need for 
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longitudinal studies. However, there has been little research using a longitudinal 
approach. There is therefore both need and scope for further longitudinal studies. 
 
The focuses of research on emerging economies to date have been China and some 
ountries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, 64 countries in four regions (Latin 
This chapter has surveyed the economic and cross-border theories in which strategic 
alliances are becoming an increasingly popular organisational form. The first part of the 
c
America, Asia, Africa, Middle East and Central and Eastern Europe) have been identified 
as emerging economies. There is therefore, a need for considerable broadening of the 
research agenda to embrace development in these countries. Many of these countries 
have received little research attention; this is especially true of the Southeast Asia region. 
Therefore more research is required on this region because individual emerging 
economies are progressing in widely different ways. 
 
chapter notes the changing nature of the economic world in which industry boundaries 
are becoming blurred, economic units are becoming pan-national, and enterprises are 
becoming federated and increasingly flexible. It draws attention to two of the major 
forces behind these changes, namely the shrinking of the world in communications terms 
conducing to the globalisation of tastes and markets. Secondly, the chapter looked at the 
globalisation of technologies, accompanied by shortening product life-cycles, leading to 
the need for greater levels of investment than single companies can easily accommodate. 
It suggests that all these forces lead to the renaissance of cooperative strategy and to 
strategic alliances in particular.  
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The second part of the chapter reviewed some basic theories of strategic alliances as they 
emerge from macro trade theories, and in particular those strands of theory upon which 
the propositional model (described in Chapter Five) and the research reported in this 
thesis is based. The transaction costs approach is outlined as the economic efficiency 
theory most frequently cited to justify particular organisational forms on the grounds of 
economic efficiency; the modern theory of international trade is described to illustrate the 
place of strategic alliances in the ever changing configurations and forms of coordination 
that perceived cross-border demands and needs are bringing about.  
The principal traditional economic theories of competition are then referred to as 
ackground to the resource based theory of competitive advantage. The resource 
dependency perspective is outlined as one of the most commonly cited motivational 
theories for strategic alliances, and the concept of corporate learning as the philosophy 
that enables those resource dependency defects to be remedied through focussed 
knowledge accumulation. The theoretical section then cites modern chaos theory as an 
important constituent contribution to the theory that competitive advantage depends as 
much, on the bounded instability that stimulates creativity, as on the stability that brings 
about efficiency. If the lineaments of this theory are accepted, the advantages of the 
inherently flexible and changing alliance form may be preferable to the more rigid 
integrated corporation. According to Nonaka (1989), the globalisation process must 
involve overlaps, an element of chaos in the interests of creativity, and therefore 
substantial redundancy of information flows, for only through information excess can 
new forms develop. 
 
b
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The importance of this thesis should be emphasised again here. Firstly, it helps fill the 
gap in the literature on strategic alliance partner selection and secondly, it fills the current 
void on the lack of study into alliance partner selection in Malaysia. Although actual 
o categorise the extant 
terature that was reviewed. These variables include macro and micro environment 
usage of the term ‘strategic alliance’ dates back to the mid 1980s in Malaysia, this author 
has not located any published study that analyses the partner selection issues involved in 
strategic alliance. This, however, does not imply that strategic alliances have not been in 
existence in Malaysia. In fact they have, but have been referred to as networking, joint 
ventures or partnerships. More recently, the Malaysian press has been inundated with 
news about the emergence of many more such alliances. Examples include the option of 
securing a strategic alliance partner for the national carmaker Proton (Star 2004), the new 
distribution alliance between Honda and DRB Hicom (Star 2003), the expansion of 
Telekom Malaysia into Indonesia, Tan Chong enters joint venture in Vietnam, Golden 
Hope venture into South Africa, Ingress drives into Asean markets, Proton in China car 
tie-up, Faber Group expands operations in India and many more. 
 
This chapter has met its objectives as outlined in section 3.1. It established a working 
definition of strategic alliance and used its key components t
li
components, culture and institutional context that run through the entire chapter. Then it 
reviewed alliance background economic theories to the phenomenon of strategic alliances 
and strategic alliance partner selection as immediate disciplines of the thesis, 
respectively. The chapter undertook case reviews of alliance management gleaned from 
the extant literature in both the West and developing countries. This process was 
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analytical rather than merely describing the extant literature (Perry 1994; Zuber-Skerrit et 
al. 1986) thereby fulfilling the requirement of theoretical triangulation (Yin 1994). 
 
The literature review process gave rise to three research questions and a holistic 
conceptualisation of the strategic alliance partner selection process. The review found 
at although there is growing body of literature on strategic alliance, the focus is only on 
y (1994) the list of research questions and 
search gaps are outlined in this summary section. 
panies search for in a partner 
candidate? 
ial conditions were critical for the future success of the partnership 
ch partner bring to the partnership to add value? 
4.  What initial obstacles in the partnership were most difficult to overcome? 
th
either one or two of the alliance components and each theoretical approach focuses only 
on preferred managerial aspects of developed countries to the neglect of others vis a vis 
emerging countries. Therefore this thesis seeks to plug this gap by analysing partner 
selection process from a holistic and Malaysian companies perspectives and synthesising 
the strengths of each theoretical approach. 
 
The literature review unearths a list of research questions and gaps which this thesis seeks 




1.  What key characteristics did Malaysian com
2.  What init
and what were the main differences between the two organizational cultures?  
3.  What did ea
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5.  Were the legal contracts effective to protect the interest of Malaysian firms? 
6.  What kind of things did companies identify in their partner that made them 




 on the causes of their high failure rate, 
currently around 70 per cent. 
lliance partner selection plays a pivotal role in determining the outcome 
research into strategic alliance partner selection 
al aspects of strategic alliances to the neglect of a holistic approach 
 
is possib
ap es in terms 
trust it and what kind of actions or initiatives did the co
accelerate the process of trust building? 
7.  How important were the interpersonal relationships and how did th
relationships change as time went on? 
search gaps: 
1.  Although strategic alliances are on the rise around the world not much 
empirical research has been undertaken
2.  The a
of alliances, yet not much research has been undertaken on this critical 
process. 
3.  There has been no empirical 
and relationship in Malaysia. 
4.  Present research on strategic alliance has focused only on preferred 
manageri
to alliance managerial problems such as partner selection process. 
In addition to the research questions and gaps, this chapter has established that although it 
le to derive a general holistic conceptualisation of alliance partner selection 
plicable to both developed and emerging economies, there are vast differenc
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of institutional contexts analysed here, hence requiring different respective strategies. For 
ing the need to inform the process of 
artner selection in Malaysia. The generation of research questions from the literature 
 
 
example, because developing country alliances operate in highly volatile and information 
void environments, strong relationship cultures and political skills are required of alliance 
managers. Thus, what appears at the outset to be dysfunctional behaviours of 
organisations may actually, be coping strategies. 
 
Overall, the purpose of the remaining chapters of this thesis is to close the research gaps 
and provide answers to the research questions. The fulfilment of these tasks will lead to 
solving the key research problem posed concern
p
review essentially depicts the exploratory nature of this thesis using the case study 
approach as its research procedure (Perry 1994). The importance of this chapter lies in 
the fact that it has established a conceptual context upon which the methodology (Chapter 










  201 
CHAPTER 4   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
hapter one outlined the reason for using the case study method to understand the 
a. Chapter three then set out to 
view the extant literature on strategic alliance, from which justification for the research 
roject was outlined in terms of the current literature on strategic alliance. From the gaps 
tic 





relatively new phenomenon of strategic alliance in Malaysi
re
p
in the literature, three research questions were derived and emerged for investigation.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and justify the choice of methodology for this 
study, based on the epistemological and ontological assumptions made in the context of 
the nature of the research problem. The chapter begins by juxtaposing the positivis
p
selection of the interpretivist paradigm and its phenomenological orientation in the 
context of the research. This leads to the justification of the case study method. Research 
procedures are outlined to ascertain the real and desired situations regarding strategic 
alliances in Malaysia. Data collection strategies are outlined, and issues of case selection, 
units of analysis, case studies, piloting of data collection instruments, are addressed. 
Issues of research quality are considered and the measures adopted to optimize the 
reliability, validity and generalisability of data and findings are outlined. Issues of bias 
and triangulation are also discussed. Finally, the ethical issues involved in the study are 
discussed. The key steps in the selection of a research methodology are outlined in Figure 
4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1: Overview of Research Study Methodological Selection 
Review and evaluate 
research paradigm 




  Three factors influenced the selection of the research paradigm which was used to 
address the research questions. The first of these was the nature of the research questions 
themselves. Secondly, recommendations on research approach were sought from within 
the strategic alliance literature. Thirdly, recommendations were identified within the 
literature pertaining to research strategy. These three influences are represented in Figure 
4.2 below. This thesis stresses the point that methods should follow from research 
questions. How we do something depends on what we are trying to find out. This point is 
selected 
design
Research design  Review and evaluate 
methods  selected 
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stressed because, too often in the past teaching of research methods, we have put the 
methodological cart before the substantive (or content) horse (Punch, 1998). This has 
been called ‘methodolatry’, the idolatry of method, and has been particularly 
characteristic of (though not exclusive to) the quantitative approach. According to Punch 
(1998:5): 
  Many previous research methods books have taught methods ‘in the abstract’. 
hand, and defining and analyzing research problems, on the other. I think research 
problem and question identification, definition and analysis. In actually doing research, 
 
They are only about methods, and there is little connection between methods, on the one 
methods texts now need to be more eclectic, and stronger in connecting methods to 
methods can constrain and influence the questions that can be asked. 
evotion of method that so often overtakes the discourse in the social science fields 
Punch (1998:21) uses the term ‘methodolatry’, a combination of method and idolatry, to 
describe a preoccupation with selecting and defending methods to the exclusion of the 
actual substance of the story being told. ‘Methodolatry’ is the slavish attachment and 
d
(Janesick, 1994:215). ‘Methodolatry’ thus means putting method before content. It is first 
learning the method, then, finding research questions that can fit into the method. It is 
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Figure 4.2:  Overview of factors Influencing Research Methodology Selection 
 
4 n for the pa ogy 
Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss at length the strengths and 
weaknesses of the positivistic and interpretivist paradigms, it is important to establish 
why one paradigm is considered more appropriate than another. Thus, the purpose of this 
 R. Hussey 1997:47). In fact, a study 
as to be framed within the philosophical and theoretical perspectives (Creswell 1998). 
Factors Influencing Research 
Methodology Selection 
Nature of the research 
questions themselve 
Recommendations from  Recommendations 
from review of 
literature on research 
methodology 
review of literature on 
strategic alliance
.2             Justificatio radigm and methodol
section is to briefly differentiate the two paradigms. 
 
It is important for researchers to recognize and understand their ontological and 
epistemological orientation within their personal paradigm as this will determine the 
entire course of their research project (J. Hussey and
h
Philosophical points of view range from both perspectives, such as epistemological and 
ontological assumptions, through ideological stances, such as postmodernism and critical 
perspectives, to more narrowly defined theories comprising propositions and hypotheses 
  205 
(Flinders and Mills 1993, cited in Creswell 1998). Once a paradigm is chosen it is 
advisable for the researcher to remain within that paradigm in line with the Kuhnian 
tradition (Kuhn 1970), since it is difficult for the researcher to argue simultaneously that 
(s)he believes that social reality is separate and external, and that it is merely a 
construction of the mind. This researcher adopts a single paradigm although others have 
argued for a mixture under terms such as multiparadigm and metatriangulation (Gioia and 
Pitre 1990; Lewis and Grimes 1999). At the methodological level, however, mixing 
methodologies is possible for data collection (J. Hussey et al. 1997; Creswell 1994; Jick 
1979; Gable 1994). Researchers must also demonstrate familiarity with controversies and 
positions taken by authorities within a corpus of knowledge (Perry 1995). It is imperative 
that researchers clearly outline the epistemological or philosophical basis for “claiming to 
know what we know; the substantive basis for our knowledge claims” (Easton 1998: 73). 
 
The two main research paradigms propounded in the literature are the 
positivist/quantitative and interpretivist/qualitative paradigms, although there is 
considerable blurring between the two (J.Hussey et al. 1997; Checkland 1999; Perry 
1995; Pawson and Tilley 1997). The term interpretivist has been used interchangeably 
with the concept of phenomenological as a paradigm in the literature. However, to avoid 
confusing the use of the word phenomenology as a methodology with that of being a 
paradigm, this researcher has opted to stick with the Weberian concept of interpretivism. 
It is also important to note that although the preference of this researcher is for the 
phenomenological paradigm, it is advisable to regard the two paradigms as the two 
extremes of a continuum (J. Hussey et al. 1997:48). Thus, although positivism is 
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associated with deductive reasoning and phenomenology with inductive reasoning, 
scientific and social inquiry in practice typically involves an “alteration between 
deduction and induction” (Babbie 1998:60). During the deductive phase, one tends to 
reason towards observations, during the inductive phase, one reasons from observations; 
both deduction and induction are routes to the construct of social theories. Wallace’s 
(1971) ‘wheel of science’ aptly depicts this alternation. 
 
Creswell (1994) draws on a number of authors, including the work of Guba and Lincoln 
(1988), to delineate the assumptions of the two paradigms. He identifies five sets of 
assumptions against which differing traditions of inquiries, even within a qualitative 
quiry, could be evaluated. These assumptions are related to the nature of reality (the  in
ontology issue), the relationship of the researcher to that being researched (the 
epistemological issue), the role of values in a study (the axiological issue), the choice of 
language in research (the rhetorical issue), and the process of research (the 
methodological issue). Table 4.1 (page 203) depicts the contrasting assumptions of the 
two paradigms.  There has historically been a correlation between the purpose of the 
research (whether it is aimed at theory verification or theory generation) and the approach 
used in the research (quantitative or qualitative). Quantitative research has typically been 
more directed at theory verification, while qualitative research has typically been more 
concerned with theory generation. While that correlation is historically valid, it is by no 
means perfect, and there is no necessary connection between purpose and approach 
(Punch, 1998). That is, quantitative research can be used for theory generation (as well as 
for verification) and qualitative research can be used for theory verification (as well as for 
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generation), as pointed out by various writers (for example, Hammersley, 1992; Brewer 
and Hunter, 1989). However, while the connection is not necessary, it is nonetheless 
likely that theory generation research will more often be qualitative. Research directed at 
theory generation is more likely when a new area is being studied, and exploration of that 
new area is more likely to use the unstructured fieldwork techniques of qualitative 
research (Punch, 1998:17). 
 
Whether description or explanation is the appropriate purpose for a research depends on 
the topic, on the context and practical circumstances of the research, and especially on 
how much theorizing and knowledge exist in the area. Theory generation research was 
iven new legitimacy in social science by the development of grounded theory. Glaser 
felt that we had plenty of theories but few confirmations of them – a position made very 
emphasis took hold, the discovery of new theories became slighted and, at some 
 
Glaser and Strauss argued that the emphasis on verification of existing theories kept 
appropriate use of verificational logic and rhetoric, and discouraged the development 
g
and Strauss (1967:10) stated this clearly in their original grounded theory publication: 
  Verification is the keynote of current sociology. Some three decades ago, it was 
feasible by the greatly increased sophistication of quantitative methods. As this shift in 
universities, virtually neglected.  
researchers from investigating new problems areas, prevented them from acknowledging 
the necessarily exploratory nature of much of their work, encouraged instead the 
in
and use of systematic empirical procedures for generating as well as testing theories 
(Brewer and Hunter, 1989). This gives us a useful general guideline for when each 
purpose might be appropriate. When an area has lots of unverified theories, an emphasis 
on theory verification research seems a good thing. On the other hand, when an area is 
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lacking in appropriate theories, it is time for the emphasis to shift to theory generation 
(Punch, 1998). 
 
Table 4.1    Assumptions of the two key paradigms 
Assumption Question Quantitative  Qualitative 
(Positivist)  (Interpretivist) 
Ontological  What is the nature of 
reality 
Reality is objective and 
singular, apart from the 
researcher 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple as seen by 
participants in a study. 
Epistemological  p 
searcher to that 
researched?  ched 
What is the relationshi
of the re
Researcher is 
independent from that 
being resear
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched 
Axiological  What is the role of 
values? 
Value free and unbiased  Value laden and biased 
Rhetorical  What is the language of 
research? 
Formal 
Based on set definitions 
Impersonal voice 





Use of accepted 
quantitative wo qualitative words 
Methodological  What is the process of 
research? 
Deductive process 
Cause and effect 
 
Static design categories 





























Accurate and reliable 
through verification 
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4.2.1        Strengths and weaknesses of the positivistic paradigm 
he philosopher, Auguste Comte (Giddens 1974) was the first to coin the term 
ositivism. Comte had envisaged that sociology was to be the apex of positivism: “the 
ience of man completed the historical evolution of the hierarchy of the scientific 
derstanding of that 
nd 1999:57). Popper’s idea of pursuing objective knowledge 




disciplines, and for the first time made possible an adequate un
evolution” (Giddens, 1974). Later Emile Durkheim was to vehemently defend Comte’s 
traditional version of positivism which was under attack; a version that accentuated the 
supremacy of logic and scientific knowledge as the paradigm of all valid knowledge, and 
the solution to the major practical problems facing mankind (Giddens, 1974). Durkheim 
understood sociology to be the objective study of ‘social facts’ were to be considered as 
‘things’ (Checkland 1999:268). In an occasion dubbed as the ‘positivist dispute’ in 
German Sociology in 1960, positivism was used in a derogatory sense by the Frankfurt 
School to describe the assertions of Karl Popper that science offers the best method in the 
pursuit of objective knowledge (Giddens 1974; Checkland 1999), a tag that Popper 
resents (Popper 1994).  
 
Popper describes the method of science not in the traditional sense, but as the “method of 
bold conjectures (hypothesis) and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them 
(falsification)” (Checkla
th
incrementalism of which he is the revered proponent as evident in his numerous classical 
works (Popper 1957, 1963a, 1963b, 1980, 1972, 1977, 1994). He argues that sociologists 
must adopt the procedural rules, standards and intellectual conventions of science and 
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embrace the point that there are no such things as ‘truth’ other than conjectural, relative 
truth (Popper 1957). To summarize, the basic tenet of positivism is that a science of 
society, comparable with natural science, is both possible and desirable. This proposition 
rests on three assertions: that the methodological procedures of natural science may be 
directly adapted to the study of human social actions, that the outcome of research in the 
social sciences will take the form of causal laws, and that the results of social research are 
value free (Giddens 1974). The goal is to explain social ‘regularities’, ‘rates’, 
‘associations’, ‘outcomes’, ‘patterns’ through an explanatory formula: “regularity = 
mechanism + context” (Pawson and Tilley 1997:71). Methodologies that avail 
themselves to this paradigm include cross-sectional studies, experimental studies, 
longitudinal studies and surveys. 
 
The importance of positivism, particularly logical positivist explanation, is recognized as 
one of the most viable approaches available to explain a phenomenon. In the more recent 
evaluation research, logical positivism clearly forms the basis of ‘realistic evaluation’ or 
cientific realism’ where programmes and policies demand realistic evaluation results  ‘s
(Pawson and Tilley 1997). Pawson et al. (1997) suggest that taking sides in the ‘paradigm 
wars’ maybe tautological. Babbie (1998) argues the place for positivism in social 
research and points out the interacting links between positivism and phenomenology by 
noting that “every observation is qualitative at the outset” (Babbie, 1998). However, the 
fact that “qualitative data seem richer in meaning is partly a function of ambiguity” 
(Babbie, 1998). Babbie further argues that in social science, unlike in science, paradigms 
cannot be true or false, or even supplanted as in the Kuhnian tradition; as ways of 
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looking, they can only be more or less useful (Babbie, 1998). R. Hussey et al. (1997) also 
point out the popularity of positivism in business research because the data used is highly 
specific and precise. However, the authors also point out that both paradigms should be 
viewed as being at the extremes of a continuum. 
 
The strengths of positivism notwithstanding, there are weaknesses that undermine its 
usefulness to the subject matter of this research: that is strategic alliances in Malaysia. At 
the outset, the positivist ontological position vis-à-vis reality, namely that social reality 
xists independently of the researcher, is not useful for this exploratory research as it 
eptions of their own activities (J. Hussey et al. 
997); a strictly structured research design imposes certain constraints on the results and 
e
seeks an understanding (Schutz 1954) of the alliance managers’ varying perception and 
meaning of the alliance partner selection process. Objects, people, situations, and events 
do not, in themselves, posses meaning; meaning is conferred on these elements by and 
via human interaction (Berg 2001:9). Similarly, the positivist position on the 
epistemological question of ‘How do we obtain knowledge of that reality?’ is 
inappropriate, because it postulates that the act of investigating such a reality would have 
no effect on that reality. Therefore, its concomitant methodologies designed to establish 
fixed laws in a sequence of linear cause and effect is also less useful except in situations 
where triangulation is to be maximized. 
 
In essence, the main criticism of the positivistic paradigm include the points that it is 
impossible to treat people as being separate from the social contexts and they cannot be 
understood without capturing their perc
1
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may ignore more relevant findings; because researchers bring their own interests and 
values to the research, they cannot be objective and they also become part of what they 
observe; and capturing complex phenomena in a single measure such as statistical 
variables can be misleading.  
 
4.2.2  Strengths and weaknesses of the interpretivist paradigm 
Interpretivism is the generic paradigm of the social sciences (Giddens 1979) comprising 
variants from phenomenological sociology, philosophical hermeneutics through to social 
onstructionism. Interpretivism developed in reaction to the dominance of positivism in 




th centuries, arguing that there were fundamental dif
natural and human sciences. Defenders of interpretivism argued that the basis of 
distinction stemmed from the different aims of explanation versus understanding 
(Schwandt 2000). Max Weber, a key proponent of this paradigm, argued that the social 
sciences seek to understand social phenomena in terms of meaningful categories of 
human experience and therefore, the ‘causal functional’ approach of the natural sciences 
is not applicable in social inquiry (Schutz 1954). Weber recognized the nature of 
subjectivity in studying humans, and noted that whilst physical systems cannot react to 
predictions made about them, social systems can. He pointed out that the self 
consciousness of human beings and the freedom of choice, which that consciousness 
entails, implies that an observer can never obtain an up to date account of the subject’s 
state of mind which would be correct for the agent to accept (Checkland 1999:70). The 
social scientist can only reveal trends rather than laws and that (s)he will be reduced to 
studying not exactly social reality but only the logic of situations, producing findings of 
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that kind: ‘In situation A, a likely outcome is B’ without any guarantee that this will hold 
in any particular situation (Checkland 1999:71). Weber’s interpretive social science 
based on the ‘attribution of meaning’ is closely related to Edmund Husserl’s (1999) work 
on phenomenology in the early 20
th century. 
 
In sum, the basic premise of the interpretivist paradigm is that, unlike the physical 
sciences which deal with objects external to the researcher, the social sciences deal with 
action and behaviour which are generated from within the human mind (J. Hussey et al. 
997). Moreover, there is a clear interrelationship between the investigator and what is 
s of international strategic alliance partner selection practice and 
en to interpret what the envisaged goals were in Malaysia alliances and what the actual 
1
being researched. Verifying what actually exists in the social and human world depends 
on the researcher’s interpretation. According to Weber, any interpretative analysis of 
subjective meanings depends upon ‘empirical rules’ hence the development of his 
methodological tools, notably the typology of ‘rational action’ and the ‘ideal type’ 
(Giddens 1974:7). Methodologies most appropriate here include action research, case 
studies, ethnography, feminist perspectives, grounded theory, hermeneutics, and 
participatory enquiry. 
 
Interpretivism is the most relevant paradigm for this research because in seeking to solve 
the research problem stated in Chapter one, this author sought to ascertain what the 
general trend is in term
th
outcome was. Because alliance management involves senior executives and operational 
staff at many levels within partnering organizations, any methodology adopted to seek an 
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understanding of the different perceptions must undoubtedly be within the interpretive 
paradigm, whatever that methodology might be. The fact that alliance partner selection is 
a dynamic process or lived experience rather than a static reality to be captured using 
snapshot methodologies supports this. Strauss and Corbin’s position (1990:1) that 
qualitative methods are useful for unraveling and understanding what lies behind any 
phenomenon about which little is known is also supportive. Maxwell (1996:17-18) 
affirms this, noting that qualitative studies are useful for understanding meaning for 
participants in a study, the context within which the participants act, deciphering 
unanticipated phenomena and influences, generating new theories, understanding the 
process by which events and actions take place, and even developing causal explanations 
contrary to the traditional view. 
 
There are, however, a number of weaknesses in this paradigm. The first, which is 
illustrative of the politics of paradigms, is the accusation by those inclined to quantitative 
methods that qualitative research is soft science and only exploratory, or subjective 
enzin and Lincoln 1994:7). Such criticisms are tautological since they fail to address  (D
the fundamental concerns raised within this paradigm vis a vis the ‘fuzzy problem 
situation’ in social and managerial systems (Checkland 1985a:765). The point is also well 
put by Borman, Lecompte, and Goetz (1986:51, cited in Berg 2001:10): criticism of 
qualitative research arises out of an ‘erroneous equation of the term ‘empirical’ with 
quantification, rather than with any real defect in the qualitative paradigm itself’. 
Moreover, the positivist paradigm, which is based on linear methodologies, is less useful 
for understanding complex/chaotic situations arising from the ‘Lorenz attractor’ or 
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‘Butterfly effect’ first raised by Edward Lorenz’s 1961 computer weather model (Gleick 
1987:23). Indeed, as Drucker (1974) points out, management is a practice rather than a 
science. Even proponents of the unity of science such as (Popper 1957), who assume that 
facts can be gathered in the social sciences in much the same way as in natural sciences, 
have unfortunately devoted little attention to the particular problems of social science 
(Checkland 1999:265-266). Overall, it must be accepted that “qualitative research is 
legitimate in its own right and does not need to be compared to achieve respectability” 
(Creswell 1998:75-76). What is actually happening is that the various paradigms are 
beginning to ‘interbreed’ and inform one another’s arguments (Lincoln and Guba 
2000:164).     
 
Nevertheless, there are genuine difficulties associated with qualitative research which 
include the time required to undertake qualitative research and the costs involved. 
Problems may also emerge in the analysis and interpretation of data, there is often 
ifficulty in achieving validity and reliability in qualitative research, and there are ethical 
lves around the meaning of the lived experiences for participants in a study 
bout a phenomenon. This approach explores the structures of consciousness in human 
d
issues arising from the researcher’s intrusion into the ‘personal sphere’ of those being 
researched (Burns 1995:13; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991:32; Sarantakos 
1998:52). 
 
4.2.3  Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is closely aligned to the interpretive paradigm. A phenomenological 
study revo
a
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experiences (Polkinghorne 1989, cited in Creswell 1998). Researchers seek the essential, 
s’: an appearance is 
invariant structure (or essence) or the central underlying meaning of the experiences, and 
emphasize the intentionality of consciousness based on memory, image and meaning 
(Creswell 1998:52). This lines of inquiry originated from the questions Husserl (1999:41) 
posed in the early 20
th century about the phenomenology of knowledge: “what is 
essentially contained and grounded in such a phenomena; from what factors are they 
constructed; what possibilities of combination do they found when they are taken 
essentially and as purely immanent; and what general relations flow from them?” In 
short, “what is the structure and essence of this experience for these people?” (Patton, 
1990:69). For Husserl, consciousness is always directed towards an object: “there is an 
indissoluble unity between the conscious mind and that of which it is conscious” (Stewart 
and Mickunas. 1974:9). Once the problem of knowledge is solved then there are two 
additional problems for Husserl (1999:3): the first is one of ‘transcendence’ -how can 
consciousness reach out beyond itself and ‘make contact’ with an object wholly external 
to it? The second is ‘correspondence’ –how can we be assured of an agreement between 
the act of knowing and the object known? Husserl solves the first part of the problem 
through his theory of intentionality, an account of how acts of consciousness refer to 
objects, and the second problem by developing a phenomenological version of the 
correspondence relation between act and object (Husserl 1999:3-4). 
 
Husserl was at great pains to differentiate his version of phenomenology from the 
Hegelian tradition which reduced reality to ideals. The central concept in Husserl’s 
phenomenology is ‘consciousness’ or the ‘presence of appearance
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anything of which one is conscious (Stewart et al. 1974:3). Husserl rejected the positivist 
scientist. It follows that the social sciences deal not 
ith the reality of the world but rather with human relationships within this world. Thus 
tendency to treat consciousness as an empirical phenomenon to be investigated by 
quantitative methods. Stewart et al. (1974:4) point out that quantitative methods are 
inappropriate in this regard for two reasons: first, consciousness itself is not an object 
among other objects in nature; and second, there are conscious phenomena which cannot 
be dealt with adequately by means of experimental science. This demonstrate that 
phenomenology does not limit its investigations only to those realities which are 
objective in a materialistic sense because it makes no assumptions, as does positivism, 
about what is, or not, real. At a philosophical level, phenomenology seeks a return to the 
traditional tasks of philosophy–one which rises above the proposition that all reality is 
capable of being investigated by empirical means, the search for a philosophy without 
presuppositions, the intentionality of consciousness, and to refute the subject-object 
dichotomy (Stewart et al. 1974:5).  
 
Phenomenology is important for this research because its method of approach is rooted in 
the notion of the lived-world. The researcher acts in the social and human world rather 
than observes it as a disinterested 
w
inter-subjective relationships and the question of knowledge of the other person are 
important in phenomenology (Stewart et al. 1974:126-127). Phenomenological data 
analysis proceeds by analyzing specific statements and themes, and a search for all 
possible meanings. The researcher also sets aside all ontological prejudgments through 
bracketing his or her experiences and relying on intuition, imagination and universal 
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structures to obtain a picture of the experience (Creswell 1998). The data may be 
collected using case studies (Perry 1994). Notwithstanding the strengths of the 
phenomenological approach to research, there are challenges. A phenomenological study 
may be challenged if the researcher does not possess a solid grounding in the 
philosophical precepts of phenomenology; participants in a study are not carefully chosen 
to reveal their experiences of the phenomenon; the personal experiences of the researcher 
are not adequately bracketed; and the researcher gives little thought to how, and in what 
way, his or her personal experiences will be brought into the study (Creswell 1998). The 
author is mindful of these limitations and has attempted to take them into account in the 
actual study. There is also an air of realism to this research on strategic alliances in 
Malaysia where time, resources and space have imposed limitations on the research 
methodology. Use of soft system methodology (SSM) to guide the case study research 
and in the data analyses indicated the need for realism. Using case studies to generate 
case base knowledge claims also has parallels with the epistemology of realism in 
alliance management studies (Easton 1998:73). Even phenomenology is inherently 
realistic. As Pintrich and Schunk (1996:86, cited in Leedy 1997:161) say: “Individual’s 
personal and subjective self-perceptions are important … regardless of the ‘accuracy’ of 
the perceptions …”. Moreover, Patton (1990:69) agrees that the “subjective experience 
incorporates the objective thing and a person’s reality”. 
 
Realism is concerned with searching for an understanding of a common reality for many 
(Perry, Riege and Brown 1998). This reality, although it may only be approximate to the 
unobservable, is justified by optimizing the causal account of all evidence under specified 
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circumstances. For Pawson et al. (1997), to be realistic is to acknowledge that there is no 
s, the 
xploratory nature of the research problem (Chapter one) and the research questions 
w (Chapter three). Although some methodologists prefer 
universal logic of evaluation, no absolute science of valuing, no general warranty of 
decision making applicable to all judgements. Thus a basic realist formula in the post 
positivist sense is: mechanism + context = outcome. The aim is to generate incremental 
knowledge for programme implementation through adaptive learning and 
accommodation rather than solutions (Popper 1963a, 1980; Etzioni 1968; Dror 1983; 
Hogwood and Gun 1984; Checkland 1985a, b, 1999; Vickers 1965; Churchman 1971). 
That there is no absolute form of human knowledge in modern science (Popper 1980; 
Kuhn 1970, 1993) is relevant here (see also Bloor 1991). In summary, there is ample 
justification for the application of a largely qualitative methodology for this project. The 
next section will present the arguments for the selection of a case study approach. 
 
4.2.4       Case Study method 
The justifications for choosing the case study method derive from the interpretive 
paradigm, the broad phenomenological nature and its realistic underpinning
e
derived from the literature revie
to avoid the influence of the paradigmatic debate on the choice of methodology, opting to 
begin only with the type of evidence to be collected, hence proper definition of the 
research questions (Yin 1994:7; Platt 1992:46; Stake 2000:435; Timney 1992), an 
awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the positivist and phenomenological 
paradigms and their influence on the choice of methodology has a beneficial effect on 
knowledge development (Perry 1995:21). To ensure that the choice of methodology is 
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defensible the author has considered the importance of paradigm choice (Creswell 1994; 
1998, Berg 2001; Easton 1998; Perry and Coote 1994) as well as the nature of the 
research problem, and the logic underpinning the design and questions, particularly the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 1994:1,7; Platt 1992:46; Stake 2000:435). 
 
Thus, the author believes that a defensible methodology should be based on the 
justification of the paradigm (interpretivism), the general methodology most consistent 
with that paradigm (phenomenology and realism), and the specific methodology (case 
udies and soft systems methodology) most relevant to the field under study (the  st
strategic alliance partner selection process and the alliance manager’s construction of 
meanings of this process which remains unexplored in Malaysia). The case study method 
is most useful for studying a phenomenon that cannot be detached from its contextual 
conditions. Yin (1994:13) provides the most authoritative definition of this method, “a 
case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident”. In addition, a case study is able to cope with the technically 
distinctive situation that has numerous variables of interest than data points, relies on 
multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) and is guided by prior development of 
theoretical propositions in its data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994). Case study 
research includes both single and multiple case studies, multi sited or within site, focus 
on a case or on an issue (intrinsic, instrumental) and can include quantitative evidence 
(Yin 1994; Stake 1995). 
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In choosing a case to study, purposeful sampling may be used. Data analysis may take the 
form of a holistic analysis of the entire case or bounded system, or an embedded analysis 
of a specific aspect of the case. From the data analysis, a detailed description of the case 
eing extensively used in social science research and practice oriented 
elds such as management and even evaluation research, formerly the province of 
surveys and quasi experiments (Yin 1994). The method is also a popular mode for Phd 
emerges, themes are analysed and the researcher makes an interpretation or assertions 
about the case. According to Mintzberg (1979:587) it is the responsibility of the 
researcher to abstract from the particular to the general and to develop concepts from 
his/her measurements in the field; the researcher “shirks” his/her responsibility when this 
task is left to the manager of an organization. Where there are multiple cases, a detailed 
description of each case and the themes within must first be provided (within case 
analysis), followed by a thematic analysis across the cases (cross case analysis), as well 
as an interpretation of the meaning of the case (Yin 1994; Creswell 1998). In the final 
interpretative phase, the “lessons learned” from the case are reported by the researcher 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985, cited in Creswell 1998). In terms of the generalisability of the 
findings, Yin (1994:10) notes that case studies, like experiments, are generalisable only 
to theoretical propositions rather than to populations. Like the experiment, the case study 
does not represent a ‘sample’, and the researcher’s goal is to expand and generalize 
theories (analytical generalization) and not enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization). 
 
The utility of the case study method has been appreciated in a wide range of fields. It is a 
method that is b
fi
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dissertation research in all these disciplines and fields (Yin 1994; Perry 1995; Timney 
1992; Adams and White 1994; Martinsuo 2001; de Weerd Nederhof 2001). Case studies 
have been useful for theory building (Eisenhardt 1989; Parkhe 1993a; Maxwell 1996) and 
are particularly useful for studying strategic alliances (Easton 1998; Lawrence and Ul-
Haq 1998; Parkhe 1993a), as well as general management and marketing (Milliken 
2001). In his critical appraisal of international joint venture research, Parkhe (1993) 
argued that certain core questions at the heart of the international joint venture (IJV) 
relationship have been overlooked by studies which are methodologically impeccable but 
theoretically weak. In particular, he reasoned that prevailing norms emphasizing 
sophisticated analyses of data drawn from mail surveys and secondary sources are 
fundamentally ill suited for dealing with the inherent “messiness” of cross border 
cooperative alliances.  
 
Parkhe proposed instead a research program geared towards a deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms of interfirm cooperation and motivated by goals of theory development. 
He further added that the “maximally efficient procedure” for advancing IJV theory 
egins with the iterative dialogue of ideas and evidence that is characteristic of the  b
multiple case study research method. In contrast with the “hard” or quantitative 
approaches used in previous partner selection research, and given the “soft” nature of this 
aspect of inter firm cooperation, the primary emphasis in this study was on the collection 
of qualitative data (Parkhe, 1993). This choice was also consistent with other research 
investigating international joint ventures in emerging economies (Steensma and Lyles, 
2000). Various tactics were employed to establish the quality of the research. These 
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included, but were not limited to, the incorporation of multiple sources of evidence at a 
site to improve construct validity, pattern matching analysis (relating to internal validity), 
an experimental like replication logic to guide sampling decisions (relating to external 
validity), and the use of replicable protocol when conducting field work (improving the 
reliability of the study) (Parkhe, 1993; Yin 1993). 
  
Part of the reason for the paucity of research in emerging economies is that data and 
methodological issues plague strategy researchers in these countries. For example, 
theories promulgated for developed economies may not be appropriate for emerging 
onomies (Hoskisson et al. 2000). On the empirical side, researchers face sampling and  ec
data collection problems, difficulties in measuring firm performance and a variety of 
timing issues. Moreover, emerging economies are not a homogenous or clearly 
identifiable and recognizable group. First, theory development in emerging economies 
can be problematic. There are major issues to be addressed with respect to the replication 
of tests of hypotheses and research instruments developed and used in developed 
countries in an emerging market context. Research designs may be misspecified as 
essential conceptual differences between developed and emerging economies are not 
taken into account. Eisenhardt (1989) provided a road map to developing theories from 
case studies that may be appropriate in an emerging market context. Second, obtaining a 
representative sample of enterprises through conventional sampling technique can pose 
problems in emerging economies. For example, there was no single directory or readily 
available list of international strategic alliances or joint ventures in Malaysia. The 
problem of identifying random samples suggests the importance of corroborating findings 
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between studies. However, it should be noted that there is always the danger that a series 
of studies may all be biased if they face the same sampling problems. A further problem 
with replication arises from the likelihood that surveys will take place at different times 
(Hoskisson et al. 2000). Mail questionnaires also suffer from well known general 
problems in which very low response rates are achieved.  
 
Ragayah (1999) in her research on Malaysian foreign investments indicated that, while a 
proper questionnaire was developed to elicit information that might be able to 
systematically test some of the established theories, the responses were quite 
isappointing.  Respondents particularly steered away from any question related to  d
financial matters, an experience also reported by Lecraw (1981) and Chia (1996), and 
provide only those already published, normally in the firms’ annual reports. As a result, 
the number of respondents is too small to form any systematic generalizations of the 
results and belie the enormous effort put into obtaining and executing the interviews. The 
absence of a culture involving disinterested social scientists may make for difficulties in 
establishing trust between respondent and researcher. Analysis of strategy issues 
frequently requires the gathering of subjective information from directors of enterprises. 
The potential problems relating to the reliability of directors’ responses to requests to 
assign scores to batteries of questions relating to strategy are also well known (Hoskisson 
et al. 2000). As such, face to face interviews may be a key means of gaining access to 
data sources (Lee and Miller, 1999). More sophisticated case methodologies were 
adopted by Collis (1991) and Hitt et al. (1998), who used detailed field based archival 
and interview data to develop in depth case studies. As well as the need, expressed above, 
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for further careful theory building, there is an important need for development of a case 
study approach in research in emerging economies (Cho, Kim and Rhee, 1998). Overall, 
the case study method is the most useful for the study of the role of the alliance manager 
in the strategic alliance partner selection processes in Malaysia because it has the 
methodological features that are suitable for capturing the dynamism of alliances and the 
connectedness among and between actors in alliances where the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994, Easton 1998). More so, it 
is the epistemological and ontological justification for using case studies based upon 
realism that further strengthens the argument for its use. 
 
4.3          Research procedures: data collection strategies 
In this section, an overview of the selection procedures for the case studies used in the 
thesis and justifications for the adoption of the soft system methodology to complement 
e case study method is in order. 
 to April 2005. To assess the empirical veracity of the 
artner selection process in Malaysia, the formation of eighteen Malaysian-foreign 
 some depth. Since the focus of the study was on the 
th
 
4.3.1     Selection of case studies 
A total of eighteen case studies were involved in the research undertaken in Malaysia 
during the period December 2004
p
strategic alliances were analyzed in
partner selection process, it was compulsory that those performing these functions in the 
partnering organizations be interviewed. However, where possible other actors such as 
operational personnel were also included in the interview schedule to complement 
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secondary sources in triangulating data. In-depth interviews were guided by a case study 
protocol that the author developed to enable consistency and data reliability across cases 
in the context of a holistic multiple case design. Using this protocol as a guide was useful 
since the aim was to derive an analytical model for alliance partner selection in Malaysia. 
The protocol was optimized by a sense of the research environment in order to clarify 
answers to the three main research questions outlined in Chapter three, which in turn seek 
to solve the research problem stated in Chapter one. The case study protocol offers the 
benefit of a set of specified rules to the researcher investigating phenomena that are often 
messy in the social and human world (Yin 1994). Although the protocol helps the 
researcher avoid the problems of a poorly designed research process, he is not necessarily 
restricted to the guide questions. Here the author is endeavoring to discover and 
understand the respondent’s own rich meanings and subjective perceptions as well as the 
realistic context of the alliance from an alliance manager’s perspective. 
 
The sample case study protocol in Appendix 2 contains copies of: 
•  A letter to the managing director or senior executives explaining the nature of the 
study 
study and seeking permission to use their respective alliances as a case in the 
 
•  An introductory letter introducing the purpose of the study and author to the 
identified personnel who, in most cases, was also a senior executive responsible 
 
  An interview schedule profiling the participant and organization 
for overseeing the alliance in addition to other duties 
•  Consent form to be signed by each participant 
•
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This research project used a semi structured interview as the principal data gathering tool. 
 well validated 
avana, Delahaye & Sekaran 2001; Denzin & Lincoln 1994; Eisenhardt 1989; Gilchrist 
designed along Yin’s (1994) 
ork on case study research and the systems approach. Taped interviews and written 
secondary documents collected in the 
ectivity, a 
ualitative approach using action research, systemic methodologies, a continuing learning 
of what goes on in human affairs; it does not assume that the rich complexity of the world 
Qualitative techniques based on interviews, as were conducted, are
(C
1992; Minichello et al. 1995; Zikmund 1997). Minichello et al (1995:101) believe 
indepth interviews, including semi structured interviews, are particularly appropriate for 
theory building methodologies as is the case with this study. 
 
4.3.2       Checkland’s soft system methodology 
The case study protocol that guided in depth interviews was 
w
notes were then written out and corroborated with 
field. The data analysis was then modeled using Checkland’s (1999) soft system 
methodology (SSM) defined as a system based methodology for making sense of real 
world problems in which known to be desirable ends cannot be taken as given. 
 
SSM, unlike the ‘hard’ approach to problem solving based on a typical goal seeking, 
static input output model, accepts irrationality and is characterized by subj
q
or inquiring process, and accommodation of differing world views. It is interpretational in 
nature and therefore complements the case study approach in seeking to understand 
‘fuzzy problem situations’ in social and managerial systems. According to Checkland 
(1985:765): 
  The ‘soft’ tradition does not regard goal seeking as an adequate model for much 
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can be captured in systemic models, and hence regards system models produced within 
‘soft’ traditio
the ‘hard’ tradition not as ‘models of X’ but only as ‘models of the logic of X’. Hence the 
n regards system models as models relevant to arguing about the world, not 
models of the world; this leads to ‘learning’ replacing ‘optimizing’ or ‘satisfying’; this 
odel as described in Figure 4.3. Defining root definitions following the CATWOE 
product of their genetic inheritance and previous experiences, continually negotiate and 
themselves. 
usiness environment, is Checkland’s (1985a, 1985b) incorporation into ‘soft’ systems 
methodology of Sir Geoffrey Vickers’ (1965) concept of an ‘appreciative system’, 
tradition talks the language of ‘issues’ and ‘accommodations’  rather than ‘solutions’. 
 
Checkland’s main contribution to systems thinking is in the expression of human problem 
situations and in root definitions of relevant human activity systems using the CATWOE 
m
elements has proved popular in action research. The underlying principle here is a notion 
of criticism which goes beyond Karl Popper’s idea of falsification or critical rationalism 
whereby in social affairs, unlike in natural science, truth cannot be established according 
to whether the hypothesis withstands falsification (Flood and Jackson 1991). Instead, 
people hold different viewpoints of which all are neither right nor wrong. Therefore, the 
critical intent of the ‘soft’ tradition is to unravel these different conceptions of reality, 
following Weber’s ‘attribution of meaning’, Husserl’s idea of ‘intentionality’ in the 
phenomenology analysis and Dilthey’s ‘hermeneutic circle’ as to what is observed by 
human actors. The success of SSM in real situations, according to Checkland (1999:283-
284), is its ability to grapple with ‘social reality’ defined as: 
  The ever changing outcome of the social process in which human beings, the 
renegotiate with others their perceptions and interpretations of the world outside 
 
Figure 4.3 expresses the general shape of the SSM methodology and explains the 
mnemonic CATWOE. Also important, in the context of an increasingly uncertain global 
b
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entailing relationship building and learning as opposed to the goal seeking model of the 
hard tradition, as well as Churchman’s (1971) ‘inquiring systems’. Continuous learning 
in business networks is crucial to their successful management. SSM was used to build 
up the richest possible picture of the ‘real world’ situation. 




1. The problem 
situation:  7.  Action to 





2. The problem 
situation   5. Comparison 
of 4 with 2 expressed
4. Conceptual models 
3. Root definitions of 
relevant systems using 
CATWOE 
4a.   Formal 





C (customers)                 Who would be victims or beneficiaries of this system were it to exist? 
A (actors)                       Who would carry out the activities of this system? 
T (transformation process)  What input is transformed into what output by this system? 
W (Weltanschauung)      What image of the world makes this system meaningful? 
O (owner)                        Who could abolish this system? 
E (environmental constraints)  What external constraints does this system take as given? 
 
Source: Checkland (1999). 
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4.3.3  Case study selection process-justification of the sample selection 
Purpose sampling has been adopted fo arch. This is because qualitative inquiry 
typically focuses in depth on relativ ll samples specifically  for certain 
features, unlike quantitative methods which depend on larger samples selected randomly 
(Patton 1990). The logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information 
rich cases for in-depth study. Th her is advised to select information-rich cases 
from which much can be learned about issues central to the purpose of the research 
(Patton 1990). The selected information-rich cases should ill tions under 
study and hence solve the key research problem. Whilst different purposeful sampling 
strategies may be considered, such as th pling or purposeful random 
sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994:28), ultimately the sampling strategy must be 
selected to suit the purpose of the study, the resources available, the questions being 
posed and the constraints (Patton 1990). This
s
 
A key feature of this study’s research design is the use of multiple cases and data analysis 
based on comparing the findings of the individual cases. Individual cases are selected for
dependent investigation and it is the conclusions, based on each individual case, that 
ases (Parkhe 
r this rese








are considered to be the information needing replication by subsequent c
1993). In case study research, sampling is purposive, rather than random. Following an 
experiment like replication logic, cases are selected from a specified population for 
theoretical rather than statistical reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 1989). Subsequent cases 
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are selected to extend the emerging theory to a broad range of organizations and this 
provides the confidence that the emerging theory is generic (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
A referral sampling technique is appropriate when research is concerned with a small, 
specialized population of people who are knowledgeable about the topic (Aaker and Day 
1990; Patton 1990). A key issue in the referral sampling technique is to be careful in the 
selection process of those who are able to refer an interviewee. Miles and Huberman 
(1994) stress that opportunistic referral and other kinds of intensity type sampling 
ommonly used in qualitative research are extremely beneficial to inductive research and 
esch, 1990, p.8). By asking a number of people, who else to talk with, the known 
c
help in theory building and analysis. Referral sampling typically identifies cases of 
interest from people who know people who know what cases, are information rich. 
Others (Tesch, 1990; Patton, 2002) suggest that samples in qualitative studies are usually 
not wholly pre-specified, but can evolve once fieldwork begins. Initial choices of 
informants lead you to similar and different ones; observing one class of events invites 
comparison with another; and understanding one key relationship in the setting reveals 
facets to be studied in others. This type of sampling is an approach for locating 
information rich key informants or critical cases. As mentioned above the process usually 
begins by asking well suited people “who have access to potential research subjects” 
(T
population gets bigger and bigger as you accumulate knowledge on new information rich 
cases. 
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Patton (1987, 2002) cites seminal work conducted by various business gurus that utilized 
this sampling technique. The best known ones were the (1) Peters and Waterman (1992) 
study  In Search of Excellence, which used this technique, asking a broad group of 
knowledgeable people to identify well run companies; and (2) Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s 
(1983) study of innovation reported in The Change Masters, which focused on 10 core 
case studies of the “most innovative” companies. Kanter began by asking corporate 
experts for candidate companies to study. These nominations then snowballed as she 
broadened her inquiry, and then converged into a small number of different expert 
informants. Further, Paton (2002) highlights the advantages of purposeful sampling as the 
respondents selected are based on their being “information rich” and “illuminative”. 
Hence, these respondents offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest. 
Unlike quantitative methods, sampling then is aimed at insight about the phenomenon, 
not empirical generalization from a sample of the population. The logic and the power of 
purposeful sampling derives its greatest strength from the emphasis of it leading to an in 
epth understanding. Hence, as qualitative research is information rich, one can glean a  d
great deal of information about issues of central importance to the purpose of the 
research. 
 
The ideal sample size in qualitative research remains unresolved, and is never expected o 
be resolved because the researcher does not seek statistical generalizations but theoretical 
generalizations (Yin 1994; Miles et al. 1994). However, confidence in the findings can be 
optimized through sampling strategies such as maximum variation, extreme and deviant 
cases, with-in case sampling, multiple-case sampling and theoretical/literal replication 
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strategy (Creswell 1998; Miles et al, 1994). Nevertheless, although the findings may be 
optimized, the issue of generalisability does not change. Miles et al. (1994:29) clarifies 
that: “[w]e are generalizing from one case to the next on the basis of a match to the 
underlying theory, not to a larger universe. The choice of cases usually is made on 
conceptual grounds, not on representative grounds”.  
 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) make a point that qualitative researchers usually work with 
small samples of people, nested in their context and studied in depth; unlike quantitative 
researchers, who aim for larger numbers of context stripped cases and seek statistical 
gnificance. In that research of Strauss and Corbin (1998), 20 in depth interviews were 
o know, the purpose of the inquiry, 
hat is at stake, what will be useful, what will have the credibility, and what can be done 
si
conducted for the study of online consumer behavior. The selection of the optimal sample 
size is a question that most researchers are perplexed about, and this is cited in the 
writings of most authors in qualitative research methods (Patton, 1990). According to 
Patton (1990), selecting the optimal sample size for the interviews depends on what is to 
be found and why and how the findings are to be applied. 
  
Further on this topic, Dick (1990) suggested that the sample size should be 1% of a target 
population of up to 200 and, as a minimum, the sample size should not be less than 12. 
What comes through with the research is that there are no rules for sample size in a 
qualitative inquiry. It all depends on what you want t
w
with the available time and resources (Patton 2002). Silverman (2001) also supports the 
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view that interviews are best suited for small samples, as in-depth questioning of the 
samples is the offset. 
  
Initially a minimum of thirty was selected for this study from 1500 possible cases, 
excluding the pilot case as recommended by Perry (1994) for PhD research. However, 
only eighteen alliances have been used in the data analysis because of the time and cost 
constraints on the part of the researcher. This is still justifiable for this study because the 
ghteen cases represent 1.2 per cent of all public listed companies in Malaysia. Again, 
s and Sutton, 1986; Yin, 1989).  
ei
the final sample was chosen on conceptual grounds rather than with the aim of getting a 
representative mix of firms. In other words, by selecting a broad mix of both small and 
large contractual and equity strategic alliances from a number of sectors and industries, 
the aim was to rule out possible industry specific effects and to demonstrate that the 
underlying theory is generic by identifying those elements common to all partner 
identifications. Similarities observed across a diverse sample of strategic alliances offer a 
surer basis for evaluating propositions than constant elements observed in a homogenous 
sample of firms (Harri
 
The sample was chosen on a “purposive” sampling basis from Malaysian firms. The 
method of generating data may tend to restrict the findings generalisability largely to 
managers forming the sample (Sulaiman and Gupta, 1996). However, given the 
exploratory character of the study coupled with its being on a sensitive subject, this 
sample frame was considered appropriate so as to be able to receive reasonable number 
of responses needed for a meaningful analysis and derivations (Sulaiman and Gupta, 
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1996). A broad representation within each business group was selected so that the 
classification that emerged captured their diverse nature, supporting the robustness of the 
classification (Jarratt, 1998; Ramaseshan and Loo, 1998; Sim and Ali, 2001).  Moreover, 
in their study on performance and problems of international joint ventures in Malaysia 
(Sulaiman et al. 1999) found no significant effect of industry types as well as foreign 
partners towards decision making process of Malaysian firms. A similar method was 
utilized by Sim (2006) in his research on internationalization strategies of Malaysian and 
ingaporean firms.  
 being eighteen years), one was eight years old and two were about 
o years old. 
S
 
Considering that Malaysia is a small open, but vibrant economy, and has a small market, 
the sample size was deemed justifiable. As Patton (1990:185) says, the validity, 
meaningfulness and insights derived from such studies have more to do with the 
information richness of the selected cases and the observational / analytical capabilities of 
the researcher than with the sample size. Moreover, case studies of organizations serve 
the purpose of systematically gathering enough information about a particular 
organization to allow the investigator to develop an insight into the life of that 
organization (Berg, 2001:233). The sample includes fifteen cases that might be 
considered as seeking to replicate the principles advocated in the extant literature and 
emulated by international alliance cases evaluated in Chapter three; and three cases of 
less successful alliances shown by their near foreclosure and breakdown in mutual trust. 
To achieve variation in management experience, fifteen of the cases were more than ten 
years old (the oldest
tw
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4.3.4  Selection of unit of analysis 
As with case selection, clearly delineating the unit(s) of analysis is important to avoid 
over collection. A study that contains specific propositions or questions is more likely to 
stay within feasible limits (Yin 1994). Units of analysis can be an individual(s), some 
event, an entity, decisions, programs, implementation process, or organizational change. 
Often defining the beginning or end points of the case is not an easy task. As a rule of 
thumb, the definition of the unit of analysis and therefore of the case relates to the way 
the initial research questions have been defined (Yin 1994:22). Where the unit of analysis 
is a small group the persons to be included within the group must be distinguished from 
those outside it. The same must also be done with events in a specific geographic area. 
And for any unit of analysis that might be chosen, specific time boundaries are needed to 
define the beginning and end of the case to be studied.  
 
The unit of analysis of this study is drawn from a pool of General Managers (GM) and 
of Malaysian businesses. The requirements of this  directors within the various sectors 
task may be actually performed by alliance coordinators or liaison officers. Their job is to 
coordinate amongst partners and undertake all the necessary management tasks. Although 
the alliance manager appears to represent an ‘embedded’ rather than ‘holistic’ unit of 
analysis, the constraints exerted by an alliance’s business environment requires 
understanding. This has been accounted for by specific questions entailed in the case 
study protocol (Appendix 2). An embedded unit is amenable to in-depth examination of a 
specific phenomenon in operational detail, in contrast to holistic designs with no logical 
sub-units giving rise to abstract analysis and lacking clear measures or data (Yin 
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1994:42). However, embedded designs also have major weaknesses, particularly when 
the case study focuses on the sub-unit level and fails to return to the larger unit of 
analysis (Yin 1994:44). Therefore, for this study the environmental context of the alliance 
anager is pertinent to alliance partner selection outcome, as the business environment in 
r ensured that company 
ocumentation was requested effecting relationships. 
m
developing countries is highly volatile as noted in Chapter two. 
 
4.3.5  Case studies: interviews, data collection 
The author initially made contact with some of the organizations known to the author to 
request permission to study their alliances. Permission letters were also sent out to other 
possible participating organizations. The permission letters were followed up with 
telephone calls and field visits to obtain verbal confirmation. Names of alliance managers 
were obtained and wherever possible, introductory letters were delivered. At the same 
time agreed interview times, contact details and venues often at company premises were 
obtained. Agreed dates were then confirmed with participants’ personal secretaries by 
phone within the week. Frequently initially agreed times were cancelled due to 
unforeseen events affecting the participant, leaving the author to catch the participants as 
and when they were available. In the interview process, meticulous notes were taken 
complemented by tape recording where permitted. In order for data triangulation to take 
place (Yin 1994; Patton 1990; Miles et al. 1994) the autho
d
 
During the interviews the author was conscious of the need to balance the extremes of 
possessing a predetermined theoretical framework (Yin 1994:46) on the one hand, and 
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having no theory to test on the other (Eisenhardt 1989:536). This experience confirms 
that researchers take their own assumptions into the process and that they shape their 
interpretation of events (Allison 1971; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1994). The author tried 
to balance out these assumptions by having an open mind, sensitized by the systems 
conceptual framework outlined in the Chapter three and guided on by SSM to appreciate 
the actor’s worldview (Weltanschauung) in order to improve both explanation (Erklaren) 
and understanding (Verstehen) of the alliance partner selection phenomenon in a 
developing country context. Miles et al. (1994) also advocate the use of conceptual 
frameworks moderated by the need to avoid over instrumentation in exploratory research. 
Patton (1990:69) points out that even the “subjective experience incorporates the 
objective thing and a person’s reality” regardless of such a perception’s validity. That 
searchers’ enter the research field with inherent biases is not beyond realism, what is  re
important is that such possibilities must be acknowledged in the research report. 
 
Gaining initial access to existing strategic alliances in Malaysia was somewhat 
problematic given the sensitivity of the topic as perceived by potential informants. All the 
firms in the study requested confidentiality as a condition of participation and are 
accordingly disguised. The reluctance of firms to participate in the research was strongly 
detected by the researchers and is a common problem of research in Asian countries (Sim 
and Pandian, 2003). In each case studied, approaches were made on the basis of 
connections or referrals made on behalf of the researcher. In addition to providing 
intimate access to key decision makers, these introductions played an important role in 
establishing a level of initial trust in the interviewer-interviewee relationship. Thus, this 
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approach although not suited to studies driven by goals of statistical generalization, 
served to improve the level of confidence in the truth value, or the internal validity of the 
findings. 
 
Data collection activities were based mainly by means of semi-structured interviews with 
 number of potential partners identified and the reasons why each was chosen 
r rejected. Nevertheless, because of the time frames involved, there was a danger of 
open ended questions. Newman (1994) asserts that semi structured interviews have the 
highest response rates of all research methods, permit the longest questionnaires and 
allow the interviewer a vast array of questioning techniques. Jarrat (1996) advocates a 
semi-structured approach to in-depth interviews that enables the researcher to cover a 
specific list of topic areas, with the time allocated to each topic area being left to the 
discretion of the interviewer. The open structure ensured that unexpected facts or 
attitudes were fully explored. The questions were identified by reviewing relevant 
literature on partnerships and identifying key issues in partnership management: criteria 
used in partner selection (Geringer, 1991), evolution and management of the interpartner 
relationship (Ring and Van de ven, 1994) and inter partner trust (Madhok, 1995). 
Informants were asked about the history of each alliance formed with particular attention 
paid to the
o
missing information or biased recollections of past activities (Golden, 1997). For 
example, when reconstructing stories of how each investor met their alliance partner, 
informants commonly cast themselves as the active player in the search process. This 
potential hazard reinforced the need for data triangulation followed up with post 
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interview verification of transcripts. The data will also include direct quotations from 
people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs and thoughts (Christy and Wood, 1999). 
 
Patton (2002, p.346) states that there are four major reasons for using semi structured 
interview: 
•  The exact instrument used in the evaluation is available for inspection by those 
 
interviewers must be used. 
•  The interview is highly focused so that the interview time is used efficiently. 
•  Analysis is facilitated by making responses easy to find and compare. 
 
In this study, only one interviewer (the researcher) was utilized, to ensure consistency. 
The approach also makes the interview more systematic and helps reduce interviewer 
judgment (Tesch 1990). The semi structured interview also makes data analysis easier 
because it is possible to locate each respondent’s answer to the same questions rather 
who will use the findings of the study. 
•  Variation among interviewers can be minimized where a number of different 
 
uickly, and to organize questions and answers that are similar (Patton, 1987). Hence, a 
stances can be taken into account (Patton, 2002). Collecting data through 
researchers may seek only those answers that agree with their original hypotheses. This 




semi structured interview approach reduced the extent to which individual differences 
and circum
interviews also creates the potential for bias on the part of the interviewer. For example, 
‘self fulfilling prophesy’ problem 
operational definitions and research protocols (de Vaus, 2001:83). This thesis addre
this issue through setting guidelines on the interviewing process and related
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The interview data was then collated and segmented through the NUD*IST qualitative 
computer analysis program that provided a robust analysis of the results (discussed in 
further details below). Within these constraints the interviews provided a powerful tool to 
gain insights and perspectives at the firm level. Because it is a personal and interactive 
form of data collection, interviews can be an effective method for eliciting information on 
sensitive topics (Crano and Brewer, 2002:223). Most Malaysian managers were more 
open to discussing sensitive issues on a one on one basis rather than providing written 
material. Interviews also provided the contextual and circumstantial factors behind 
organizational decisions and brought variables and issues to light that were not previously 
apparent (Hakim, 2000:36). This helped to explain why the firms acted in certain ways. 
When discussing interviews as a research technique, Gillham (2000:13) points out that 
what people say may not be what they actually do. 
  
The interviews ranged from 45 to 120 minutes with an average duration of around 90 
minutes. Throughout the interview, interviewer applied skills in active listening, 
reflecting responses, paraphrasing and probing to encourage a rich and fruitful discussion 
and an accurate understanding of what was disclosed (Seidman 1998). All informants 
agreed to be taped in order to accurately record the data. Interviews were transcribed 
fully within five days of each visit and transcripts were then returned to informants for 
verification. The eighteen case studies are the formal presentations of the evidence 
contained in the evidentiary database. 
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4.3.6       Confidentiality      
This study was approved by the Murdoch University’s Human Ethics Committee. A copy 
 the approval can be found at Appendix B. Given concerns over confidentiality on the 
ifferentiating Criteria  Sample Stratum  Code 
of
part of participating firms, all of the participating firms requested anonymity. To protect 
confidentiality, neither the name nor the location of any business, has been provided. The 
18 firms in the study ranged in size from under USD5.26 million in turnover to more than 
USD131.57 million. Each firm derived at least 20 percent of its revenue from outside its 
domestic market. Industries covered included automobiles, constructions, 
telecommunications, consumer products and manufacturing. To identify the type of 
industry and the size of the business, codes have been utilized, as set out in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4  Respondent Codes 
D
Industry Grouping  Automobiles  A 
Construction  C 
Telecommunication  T 
 product  CP  Consumer
Manufacturing  M 
Size of Firm (based on Annual  $20,000,000 or less  2 
Turnover)  $20,000,001 to $100,000,000  12 
Greater than $100,000,000  4 
Geographical location  Kuala Lumpur  KL 
Penang  P 
Kedah  K 
 
 
4.4              Research quality issues 
Discussions about quality standards and verification in qualitative research lead to the 
questions of how do we know that a study is believable, accurate and right? Because truth 
is relative (Kuhn 1970), the possibility of any method being totally ‘objective’ is doubtful 
(Patton 1990:482). Accepting subjectivity, the researcher ought to accept that one’s 
  243 
perspective  fects fieldwork, car af efully document all procedures and be open in 
f the tured. In the case study app the 
research design, which is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, offers itself to 
a set of logical tests of qualit ust-worthiness, credibility, confo bility 
to establishing the quality of esearch are relevant to ca study 
research because it is a form o cal research. These tests include: construc ity, 
ternal validity, external validity and reliability. 
g data collection. A chain of evidence 
stablishes the linkages between the research problems through to the study’s 
describing limitations o  perspective ven roach, 
y that include tr rma
and data dependability (Yin 1994). According to Yin (1994:33), tests that are applicable 
 any empirical social r se 
f empiri t valid
in
 
4.4.1  Construct validity 
This test seeks to verify whether a sufficient set of measures has been developed by the 
investigator to measure the concepts being studied, and how subjective judgments have 
been minimized in data collection. Although this test has been noted to be problematic in 
case study research (Yin 1994:34), it is incumbent upon the researcher to specify the 
variables relating to the original objectives of the study, and to demonstrate that the 
selected measures really do measure the concepts being studied relative to other 
measures. 
 
Yin (1994:34-35) recommends three tactics for increasing construct validity. One is to 
collect multiple sources of evidence, during data collection, so as to encourage 
convergent lines of inquiry. Here the evidence is triangulated from different data sources. 
Second, is to establish a chain of evidence durin
e
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conclusions. To enable this, the researcher should ensure the accessibility of the field 
guide to data collection, the case study notes and ensure sufficient citation in the case 
report to the evidence contained in the database. The third tactic is to allow key 
informants to evaluate the draft case study reports where it concerns them. This process is 
to ensure the accuracy of the evidence. 
 
For this study the author ensured that the case study protocol raised questions that were 
levant to the work of alliance managers as portrayed in the extant literature. The views 
relating to the establishment of the alliances, 
cluding government documents where necessary, were also collected. Summary reports 
re
of alliance managers were verified by interviewing other respondents involved in the 
alliance within and by collecting secondary data through annual company reports, 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), newspaper articles and other publications from the 
firms visited. Data from other published sources, including published materials in 
business and professional periodicals and journals and internet web sites were used to 
supplement the primary material. This use of data from various sources will also allow 
the author to cross check and verify data and to ensure validity. Where possible, other 
respondents in the network that played a peripheral role such as the regulatory function 
were also interviewed to comment on relevant questions in the protocol. To enhance the 
chain of evidence tactic, documents 
in
of cases were sent to informants for validating the evidence and, where possible, 
discussions on the findings took place during later filed visits to certain sites. For 
example, the author had numerous discussions with the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry officials during a second visit to cross check observations. 
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4.4.2       Internal Validity 
Concerns about internal validity are strongest for causal or explanatory case studies 
where the investigator seeks to ascertain a causal relationship between two variables. If 
the investigator does establish such a relationship without accounting for other more 
relevant factors (spurious variables) then the research design has failed to deal with 
external threats to internal validity (Yin 1994:35). Internal validity for case study 
research also has to deal with the broader problem of making inferences where an event 
(past) cannot be directly observed. Hence the questions raised include (Yin 1994:35): Is 
the inference correct? Have rival explanations and possibilities been considered? Is the 
evidence convergent? Does it appear to be airtight? 
 
One tactic that addresses internal validity is that of pattern-matching (Yin 1994). Others 
include prolonged engagement in the field, persistent observation, triangulation, peer 
alysis, and member checks of data, interpretations and  debriefing, negative case an
conclusions (Lincoln and Guba 1985:301-315). 
 
In this study, where possible, the pattern exhibited by a case was matched and compared 
with the existing literature reviewed in Chapter three. The data was also cross checked 
with secondary documents and corroborated with information documented by other 
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4.4.3           External validity 
sults to some broader theory (analytical 
eneralization) (Yin 1994:36). To satisfy the test of external validity, replication logic 
 other similar cases even 
 further replications have not been performed. 
.4.4          Reliability 
to ensure that the process of the study is consistent, 
This test deals with the problem of ascertaining whether a study’s findings are 
generalisable beyond the immediate case study. In case study research the goal is not to 
generalize to a larger universe (statistical generalization), instead the researcher is 
endeavoring to generalize a particular set of re
g
was adopted in the study which determined sample selection. Here cases are selected to 
replicate the underlying theoretical propositions. Whilst accepting the generalizations are 
not automatic as a theory must be tested through replications of the findings in more 




The objective of this test is 
reasonably stable over time and across researchers and methods (Miles et al. 1994:278). 
The issue is: can the research procedures be retraced by later researchers on the same 
case and expect to arrive at the same findings and conclusions? If this can be assured, 
then errors and biases will have been minimized. A prerequisite for this is the need to 
properly document the procedures followed in the earlier case, or to establish a clear 
‘audit trail’. Yin (1994:37) recommends outlining as many steps as possible and to 
conduct research as if someone was watching over you in order to satisfy this test. For 
this purpose, the case study protocol is a reliable replicable guide and typically includes 
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the field procedures, the case study questions and a guide for a case study report (Yin 
1994). This is complemented by the case study database and individual case reports. 
 study protocol is a central document for repeatability. The 
-91). 
lthough it is impossible to completely eliminate these biases, the researcher is required 
tandard of interviewing was 
aintained throughout the cases as much as possible. The author went through the 
er which the participant had been given in advance, and explained the 
 
For this study, the case
protocol derives from the analytical literature review, checked using systems theory and 
later pilot tested in Malaysia. Sources of documentary evidence entailing the case study 
database, field notes and secondary sources of data are stored in the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry library and MIDA library.  
 
4.4.5       Bias 
There are a number of biases that may pose threats to the validity of conclusions. These 
include the selection of data to fit the researcher’s existing theory, the selection of data 
that stand out to the researcher, the effects of the researcher on the site or individuals 
(reactivity), the effects of the site on the researcher, and changes in the researcher during 
the course of the research (Miles et al. 1994:263; Patton 1990:473; Maxwell 1996:90
A
to explain his/her possible biases and how these biases will be minimized. Thus Maxwell 
(1996:91) quotes Fred Hess who points out that “validity in qualitative research is not the 
result of indifference, but of integrity”. 
 
The author in the course of the research ensured that the s
m
introductory lett
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purpose of the consent form. After this, an opening remark was made regarding the 
interest of the author in knowing more about the alliance. Throughout the interviews, the 
author talked little except where there was a need to probe further. 
 
On two occasions, however, an interview was disrupted because the participant had to 
leave for an unscheduled meeting and the author had to return at another time convenient 
to the participant. When this happened, the interview environment and mood of the 
participants changed from when the rationale of the study was first explained. 
Unfortunately, a researcher has no control over such factors except to appreciate them. 
oreover, before an interview the author read as much as possible background 
d. To minimize this 
ossibility the author said little except to pose questions. The discussion was allowed to 
M
information about a case based on secondary data collected from newspapers, the Internet 
or annual reports collected during preliminary visits. 
 
The author wishes to admit also that he knew some members of the participants. This 
raises questions of possible biases creeping into the research, especially if they knew or 
could easily anticipate the researcher’s opinions or backgroun
p
flow freely without the author expressing affirmative or negative views about the 
propositions being put forth. By recognizing this possible threat to the validity of the 
findings the author fulfils the views of Fred Hess (quoted in Maxwell 1996:91) that holds 
that “validity in qualitative research is not the result of indifference, but integrity”. 
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4.4.6        Triangulation 
The case study method is amenable to using many different sources of evidence unlike in 
search strategies such as experiments, surveys or histories (Yin 1994:91). The main 
g and 
erefore is more likely to be accurate. Patton (2002) discusses four types of 
iangulation: 
n ( of data sources) 
re
benefit from using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of 
inquiry, for triangulation. Triangulation is defined to be “a validity procedure where 
researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information 
to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000:126). Triangulation 
may include multiple methods of data collection and data analysis, but does not suggest a 
fixed method for all the researches. The methods chosen in triangulation to test the 
validity and reliability of a study depend on the criterion of the research (Golafshani, 
2003). This renders any finding or conclusion in a case study more convincin
th
tr
(i)  data triangulatio
(ii)  investigator triangulation  (among different evaluators) 
(iii)  theory triangulation (of perspective on the same data set) 
(iv)  methodological triangulation (of methods) 
 
This study utilized all triangulation methods except for methods triangulation. The latter 
was judged to be unfeasible because of resource constraints and where there were 
operational difficulties; respondents may have had different attitudes towards qualitative 
and quantitative research resulting in different answers being given. Also, qualitative and 
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quantitative methods may end up measuring different things which may be difficult to 
reconcile into a single picture of the situation (Patton 1990:187-189). 
 
Data were collected from different sources including documents and people’s 
perspectives. Although the nature of PhD research prevented using different 
investigators, (Perry 1994) the author requested key participants to review findings, as 
suggested by (Patton 1990). All the participants agreed with the interview transcript sent 
back to them for review as this case was a sensitive one in terms of the relationship 
context of Malaysia. To eliminate the excesses of self reporting the views of the alliance 
managers from one firm were put to the managers of the same firm to validate their 
claims during interviews. Theory triangulation was also applied during the literature 
review and data analysis phases of the research where different perspectives were used: 
(i) strategic management, (ii) network approach, and (iii) relationship marketing. The 
research protocol, which reflects the different theoretical perspectives contributed to the 
triangulation process at the data collection stage. Overall, triangulation helps reduce 
 
system bias in the data and enhances the verification of findings and conclusions. 
4.4.7  Software – Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis  
The use of software to support the work of qualitative researchers is maturing (Weitzman 
and Miles 1995; Weitzman 2000). The range of available useful tools to support many 
different approaches to qualitative research is now available. The interview data content 
was analyzed using NUD*IST (non numerical unstructured data, indexing, searching and 
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theorizing). The different strategic decisions in each case were mapped, as were the 
issues that were found to be important in the partner selection process. The factors 
identified were rank ordered, and non-parametric tests of significance were applied. 
 
Researchers have pointed to the benefits of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (Coffey & Atkinson 1996; Gahan & Hannibal 1998; Buston 1999:183-202). 
stem that assists in 
creating a more comprehensive and rigorous analysis of qualitative data (Richards 1999; 
Gibbs 2002). NUD*IST allows researchers to organize large amounts of field work data 
into coherent logical structures. It then enhances the researcher’s ability to analyze this 
material rigorously. The system works by building and integrating documents into a data 
base. The data base for this thesis included the research project outline, records of 
interviews, field notes, memos, other internal documents and links to external documents. 
Interviews elicited a number of common themes, ideas and concepts that related to the 
research questions. These themes were used to segment and code each document. Under 
e NUD*IST system these various data segments are known as ‘nodes’. The software 
The length of these nodes was at the researcher’s discretion. Some segments of 
information were only one sentence long, while other nodes comprised a full paragraph. 
The above sets could also be combined and the data compared across groups. Thus 
documents were developed into a system of interconnected data sets. This obviated the 
NUD*IST is recognized as a leading computer based software sy
th
system could then simultaneously retrieve these nodes from all the coded documents. 
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need to continually search back and forth through written documents for like information, 
which allowed for a more accurate analysis of the data. Coding the data also required an 
analysis of the entire transcript and or field notes. This helped to ensure a comprehensive 
examination of the material. 
Whilst generalisation in qualitative research remains a thorny issue amongst qualita
4.5         Generalisation of findings 
tive 
researchers (Patton 1990; Maxwell 1996:96-97), this author wishes to limit discussion of 
this subject to the case study method described by Yin (1994) and adopted for this 
 (1994:32) recommends that the researcher should aim for 
Level two inferences as the use of theory becomes the main vehicle for generalizing the 
results of the case study. 
In this research a number of steps have been adopted to enhance the goal of achieving 
this type of generalization as recommended by Yin (1994). First, evidence was collected 
from (a) documentation which includes MOAs (memorandum of agreement), letters and 
newspaper cuttings, (b) archival records, which includes organizational records, past 
research. Yin (1994:30-31) differentiates between ‘statistical generalisation’ and 
‘analytical generalisation’ or Level one inference and Level two inference, respectively. 
In the former type, “an inference is made about a population on the basis of empirical 
data collected about a sample” (Yin 1994:30). In the latter type, inference is derived from 
replicated results from cases to the theory being tested and not to the population. It is 
crucial to understand that statistical generalization is not the method of generalizing the 
results in case studies because cases are not ‘sampling units’ (Maxwell 1996:96-97; 
Patton 1990:486). Thus, Yin
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annual reports and departmental reports, (c) semi structured interviews. Although the 
researcher adhered to the research protocol in the field, access to data was contingent 
upon the willingness of firms and government officials to release data. To summarise, the 
research findings of this study can be evaluated against the general partner selection 
practices established from the literature in Chapter three. 
The issue of ethics in q
4.6              Ethical considerations 
ualitative research is a cardinal principle and the author is 
committed to the highest standards. Researchers have to ensure they have adequately 
addressed the following issues in professional codes of ethics including the value of the 
project to society, competence boundaries, ensuring informed consent, avoidance of 
deception, an evaluation of harm and risk, ensuring privacy and confidentiality, ensuring 
data accuracy and integrity, ownership of data and conclusions, and use and misuse of 
results (Christians 2000: 138-140; Miles et al. 1994:290-297; Stake 2000:447-448). The 
researcher addressed these issues in his application submitted to the Murdoch University 
Human Ethics Committee which was subsequently approved without condition at its 
meeting of October 2004. Aspirations to these values continued into the design of the 
study, selection of methodology, data collection and reporting. 
4.7             Conclusion 
This chapter has adhered to the tasks set out for it as outlined in section 4.1. It considered 
the importance of paradigms to the research and justified the selection of the 
interpretivist/phenomenological paradigm. The selection of this paradigm is based on the 
exploratory nature of the research and the need to interpret meaning from rich data 
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embedded in a cultural context. It then moved on to justify choosing the case study 
method for the research. The chapter adopted Yin’s (1994) approach to case study 
research because of its comprehensiveness and clarity on procedures. This will provide 
data for more extensive subsequent research and testing of propositions and hypotheses 
as part of an ongoing research on Malaysian firms. The method is a popular mode for 
PhD research in all fields and is useful for theory building particularly in strategic 
alliances (Easton 1998). 
Following this, research procedures were outlined. The chapter contains the justification 
for using the soft systems methodology in the data analysis, and highlighted the 
importance of ethics throughout this intellectual journey. The chapter considered validity 
issues, including bias and triangulation and documents the use of other sources to validate 
the findings from the actual research. It also justified why computer software packages 
for content analysis were used in the data analysis. In terms of generalizations the chapter 




The next chapter (chapter five) provides the results of cross case analyses of the eighteen 
case studies and highlights all the thematic issues. The data found in Chapter five is based 
on raw data derived using the research paradigm and methodology laid out in this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5         CROSS CASE ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
In this case study the research aims were to examine strategic alliance partner selection in 
Malaysia and investigating the factors influencing these firms decisions to enter into an 
alliance in order to gain a better understanding of how to manage strategic alliances 
the difficulties encountered, how the relationship management varies with the 
the resulting effects on the process of trust 
building. To explore the decision-making mechanics of strategic alliance partner 
selection, an embedded case study research methodology was used.  
enon is 
successfully. To achieve the research aims, this study explores the following: 1) the 
criteria used by Malaysian companies to select their partner, 2) the contributions that each 
company bring to the partnership and 3) management of the inter-partner relationship, 
including 
characteristics of the foreign partner, and 
 
This methodological choice is appropriate when the investigation must consider both the 
phenomenon (partner identification) and the context in which the phenom
occurring (Yin, 1993). A key feature of this study’s research design is the use of multiple 
cases and data analysis based on comparing the findings of the individual cases. 
Individual cases are selected for independent investigation and it is the conclusions, 
based on each individual case, that are considered to be the information needing 
replication by subsequent cases (Parkhe, 1993). Subsequent cases are selected to extend 
the emerging theory to a broad range of organizations and this provides the confidence 
that the emerging theory is generic (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Subsequent analysis 
and evaluation of the data generated from the interviews then allowed a reevaluation and 
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development of the initial theoretical argument and conceptual framework first identified. 
Extracts from these interviews are used in the data analysis. The analysis extrapolates 
om the analytical summary of each case transcribed earlier on. The research questions 
sed on the “discovery of 
gularities” and the “discerning of patterns” (Tesch, 1990) and it is these interviews 
fr
were derived from the extant literature on strategic alliance and are targeted at filling the 
research gaps identified in Chapter three. The foundations of the research methodology 
used in this research are the debate about the philosophical approaches to research with 
the dichotomy identified as Positivism and Phenomenology.  
 
The continuum is identified (Stiles, 1995, May, 1993) as positivism-empiricism-realism-
idealism with idealism being at the phenomenological extreme. This research uses the 
perspective of realism in which as Stiles (1995) observes: “there is a need to understand 
the process by which people interpret the world” and “theory is used to explain 
observations from the social world”. The “qualitative paradigm” identified by Stainback 
and Stainback (1988) as one where “reality changes with changes in people’s 
perceptions”; where “reality is what people perceive it to be” and where “values will 
impact on the understanding the phenomena” is the appropriate one to address the issues 
of the type of “filters” on their perception of potential strategic alliance partners that 
Malaysian companies self-impose. This approach has also found favour with consultants, 
giving them something of substance to preach, peddle and practice (Lawrence and Ul-
Haq, 1998). The analysis of the interview transcripts focu
re
which illuminate the preconceptions and proclivities of senior executives in Malaysian 
companies, and offer insight into the presumptive reasons for action. 
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The purpose of this chapter are to provide a brief background to each case, to compare 
and contrast the cases using the cross-case analysis approach (Yin 1994) to find themes in 
the cases. This process draws from data embedded in case reports transcribed by the 
author. These themes are in turn linked to the theoretical findings of strategic alliances 
and their experiences in the context of developing country like Malaysia in the final 
section of the chapter. The findings of this chapter create a holistic analytical model for 
strategic alliance partner selection, which will be presented in Chapter six. Thus 
important research gaps in the literature on alliance partner selection will have been 
filled. At the outset, it must be noted that this chapter is based on in-depth interviews and 
secondary sources. Where references are made to an alliance manager without sources 
being immediately provided in the text, the reader should read this as being from direct 
interviews undertaken during research. Sources that are not based on interviews are 
clearly referenced in the normal way. Secondary data sources also helped triangulate the 
data.  
 
At the outset, it is important to lay out at the beginning of this chapter what constitutes an 
alliance manager. Generally, performing alliance cases in Malaysia are bound to have 
senior executives appointed as alliance managers. Their actual designation in their 
respective companies within the international division varies from senior managers to 
general managers. Throughout the discussion in this chapter, this position is referred to as 
an alliance manager. 
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Case 1   Telecommunication Company 
TM International is the vehicle overseeing and managing the overseas ventures of TM 
Berhad, Malaysia’s largest and leading telecommunications group. The principal activity 
of the company is the establishment, maintenance and provision of telecommunication 
nd related services under the license issued by the Ministry of Energy, Water and 
ent to group revenue, up from 23 percent and 9 percent respectively 
 the corresponding period last year.  
corded an average compounded annual 
a
Communications. Having had its origins in the international ventures division, TM 
International has today made the successful transition from an operating division to 
wholly owned subsidiary. It has operations and financial interests in countries namely Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Malawi, 
Guinea and Iran. In 2006, overseas operations contributed 30 percent to Group Profit 
After Tax and 24 perc
in
 
To give an idea of past performance, TM re
growth rate of some 38 percent in its Asian investments in revenue terms over the past 
five years (2001-2005). This growth rate has been led by its Bangladesh operations at 
60.4 percent, followed closely by its Sri Lankan operations at 41.2 percent. Their top 
three overseas investments are Dialog (Sri Lanka), XL (Indonesia) and TMIB 
(Bangladesh). In India, TM acquires 49% stake in India’s spice Telecom, secures critical 
piece in regional footprint. In Cambodia, TM reaches agreement with SAMART 
corporations to acquire full stake in CASACOM, 24.4% stake in SAMART I-Mobile Plc. 
Rapid growth strategy of existing investments including possible strategic alliances 
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which would provide TM with outstanding international partners such as the Asian 
Mobility Initiative (AMI) and Vodafone. 
achute Industries of South Africa (PISA) and 
HSB produces military parachutes to be marketed to the OIC (Organization of Islamic 
ce) an outh East Asian Nations) region. PISA is one 
 
Case 2   Manufacturing Company 
NC Holding Sdn. Bhd. is an investment holding company with a stable of 23 operating 
subsidiaries engaged in various activities.  NC Holding has 5 main business units namely, 
Transportation, Manufacturing, Property and Plantation, Defence and other support 
services. The manufacturing group consists of textiles and apparel and automotive 
engineering. The group is involved in several areas of the textiles and apparel industry. 
Its integrated textile mill produces a variety of fabrics and surgical dressing and is the 
main supplier of 100% cotton fabric to the Malaysian batik industry. The group is also 
involved in industrial tailoring, specializing in functional clothing for emergency services 
and military personnel. In addition to clothing, the textiles division which was eatablished 
as a joint venture company between Par
N
Conferen d ASEAN (Association of S
of the largest and most established military parachute manufacturers in the world. 
 
Case 3   Plantation Company 
GH Plantations long history reaches back to 1844. Daniel and Smith Harrison formed a 
partnership with Joseph Crossfield in Liverpool, England to set up a trading business 
dealing in tea and coffee. It was this partnership that developed into what GH Plantations 
is today. In 1982 this company was acquired by the locally incorporated Harrison 
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Malaysian Plantations Berhad following an agreement between Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (the National Equity Fund set up by the Malaysian Government to invest on 
behalf of Bumiputras. Backed by the solid foundation in plantation practices, GH 
Plantations moves towards new frontiers to meet its customer needs. Since its first foray 
into the downstream business in oils and fats through the acquisition of palm oil refining 
businesses in the 1980s, GH continues to serve its customers in the downstream sector 
ia the acquisition of refining facilities overseas and through overseas joint ventures. 
lude   in January 2002 and 
v
They inc the purchase of Unimills B.V in the Netherlands
Hudson and Knight (Pty) Ltd, South Africa on April 29, 2004; joint ventures include GH-
Nhabe Edible Oils Co. Ltd. Vietnam (Nhabe), a joint venture between GH and 
Vietnamese Government agency Vocarimex.  The group has also established footholds in 
Bangladesh and China with associate company, the Leverian group. In 2004, Golden 
Hope became the largest plantation company listed on Bursa Malaysia. Today it has 
14,000 shareholders and nearly 20,000 employees. It owns 81 estates, 23 oil mills, two 
rubber factories, one bulking installation and five overseas operations. 
 
Case 4   Manufacturing Company 
The Sime Darby Group is Malaysia’s leading multinational and one of Southeast Asia’s 
largest conglomerates. Founded in 1910, the Group has grown from a single company 
offering a single product and service in one country into a strong and dynamic 
international group with a comprehensive range of business activities carried out by more 
than 28,000 employees in over 300 companies in more than 20 countries. Known for its 
financial and management capabilities, S. Darby Group is listed on the Main Board of 
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Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad with a market capitalization in excess of US$3.68 
billion as at 30
th June 2006. In addition to its original plantations core business activity, 
S. Darby is also a major player in the motor vehicle, heavy equipment, property and 
energy and utilities industries. While the core businesses are located in Malaysia, the 
roup has extensive trading and manufacturing interests in the People Republic of China 
R), Singapore and Australia. The Group also 
G
(including Hong Kong SAR and Macau SA
operates in Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia. In 2006, S. Darby 
Berhad, through its subsidiary, Sime Darby Auto Imports Sdn. Bhd was appointed the 
official importer of BMW and MINI vehicles in Malaysia. The appointment, which 
continues a fruitful relationship between BMW and Sime Darby that goes back to the 
1980s when Auto Bavaria Sdn. Bhd. was appointed as authorized importer and distributor 
of BMW products in Malaysia, also enhances the already strong partnership between 
Sime Darby and BMW. 
 
Case 5   Engineering Company 
Somi Group Berhad is an investment holding company, with subsidiaries involved in the 
Oil and Gas support services offering various products and services such as drilling fluids 
and related engineering services for drilling operations, supply of industrial and 
production chemicals and production enhancement, energy logistics and logistics 
engineering. Somi’s business operations are conducted through its main subsidiary and 
associate companies around the globe.  In 2003 the company entered into a technology 
transfer collaboration with ShinMaywa Industries Limited of Japan for the fabrication 
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and distribution of a wide range of new improved refuse compactors. In the Middle East, 
the group formed a joint venture with Enterprise Nationale des Travaux, a drilling 
contractor owned by Sonatrach, the Algerian national oil company. 
y  
ithin this specialized 
dustry, Impress is proud of the fact it has been able to make a regional presence amidst 
petitio world players trying to gain a foothold in this 
 
Case 6   Manufacturing Compan
Impress group has established itself as a prominent automotive component manufacturer 
and a contractor in the power and utility industry. Over the ten years of manufacturing 
different products for various customers, Impress has acquired valuable know how in 
utilizing roll forming, joining and bending technologies. To accelerate the learning 
process, Impress has an on-going technical assistance agreement with Katayama Kogyo 
Ltd. of Japan as well as other types of collaborative arrangements with companies using 
similar technologies from outside the region. For their expansion programme in the 
ASEAN region, they despatched their key personnel as expatriates to impart the 
technology to the local members there. In Indonesia, Impress has formed a joint venture 
with local partner Herman to form PT Impress Malindo Ventures. W
in
stiff com n from the more established 
region. Whilst Impress is the sole player in Malaysia, Impress is one of only two players 
in Thailand with a full-fledged manufacturing plant. Impress is proud to be associated 
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Case 7   Car Manufacturing 
Perodua was established in 1993. The joint venture partners/shareholders of Perodua and 
their respective shareholding are UMW Corporation (38%), Daihatsu of Japan (20%), 
MBM Resources (20%), PNB (10%), Mitsui of Japan (7%). The company’s operations 
commenced early 1994 and the first vehicle, the ever so popular, Perodua Kancil was 
introduced to the Malaysian market in August 1994. To date, Perodua has 32 sales 
branches and 142 sales outlets nationwide to serve its’ customers efficiently. Perodua 
vehicles are sold in 13 other countries including United Kingdom and Egypt. Up to end 
of March 2004, Perodua has successfully sold approximately 803, 126 units of vehicles 
of various models both locally and abroad. 
ase 8   Car Manufacturing     
as i as a private limited company under the name 
appropriate, to optimize capacity usage and 
ven for gaining market access. The collaboration with Mitsubishi is part of the product 
 
C
Proton w ncorporated in 1983 
Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Berhad and was subsequently listed on the Main Board of 
the then Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now Bursa Malaysia) on 26 March 1992. Proton 
commands a substantial share of the domestic market for passenger cars and over the 
years building up distribution networks in key market centers across four regions namely 
United Kingdom/Western Europe, The Middle East, South East Asia and Australasia. In 
light of the increased competition and liberalization within the domestic automotive 
industry, rapidly changing trends and industry challenges, PROTON has formed strategic 
alliances with international partners for mutual benefit. These collaborations are also for 
the purpose of acquiring products, where 
e
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alliance strategy and will enable PRO  t TON o quickly develop additional products and 
ice) certification, a testament of the Group’s 
bility to produce best quality products. 
technical expertise in specific areas. The business arrangement with Chery Automobile 
Company Limited of China provides the opportunity for both companies to work 
together, amongst others, to co-source materials and components. PROTON, via Lotus 
Engineering Malaysia, had also entered into a collaboration agreement with Jinhua 
Automobile Limited of China to promote PROTON’s products to China, one of the most 
vibrant automotive markets in the world. 
 
Case 9   Plantations Company   
Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad is one of Malaysia’s leading conglomerates in South East Asia 
with core businesses in plantation and property. The Guthrie Group’s main core business 
of plantations lies in South East Asia with plantation operations spanning from Kedah to 
Sabah in Malaysia, and from Sumatera, Kalimantan to Sulawesi in Indonesia. In 2001, 
Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad completed the acquisition of 26 Indonesian companies 
involved in the cultivation of oil palm and production of palm oil and palm kernel from 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency. Together they are known as Minamas Plantation 
thus enhancing the size of the Group’s land bank two-fold. In 2004, the company became 
the first plantation company in the world to be granted EUREPGAP (European Retailers 
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Case 10  Engineering Company 
Puncak Niaga Holdings Berhad was incorporated in 1997 with interest in infrastructure 
activities specializing in water treatment engineering and water related activities. It is 
also the first water treatment and supply concession company to be listed on Bursa 
Malaysia under the infrastructure Project Company guidelines issued by the Securities 
Commission. Puncak Niaga achieved another milestone when the company signed an 
agreement with DHI Water Environment Health (DHI) from Denmark to set up a state of 
the art water treatment research center in Kuala Lumpur. Under the agreement, DHI will 
work with Puncak Niaga for a period of three years and the agreement could be renewed 
n a yearly basis upon mutual agreement by the two companies. 
ase 11  Construction Company 
ulama up of companies with complimentary activities, 




Bina Dar n Berhad (BDB) is a gro
established to primarily pave the Kedah State Economic Development Corporation’s 
advent into Malaysia’s private sector. BDB is principally an investment holding company 
and its subsidiaries, Darulaman Realty Sdn. Bhd., Syarikat Bina Kuari Sdn. Bhd., Kedah 
Sato Sdn. Bhd. (a joint venture company with Sato of Japan), Darulaman Golf Resort and 
BDB Hotels Sdn. Bhd are engaged in property development, quarrying and road 
construction activities, civil and general constructions and operations of golf resort. The 
above subsidiaries have substantial resources and excellent track records which enhances 
BDB’s efforts to propel the group into a major force in its diverse range of businesses 
within and outside Malaysia. One of its subsidiary company whic
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in Indonesia under the name PT Darulaman has entered into joint venture agreement with 
Management 
nd the Boeing Aircraft Company. The Malaysia Airlines global network comprised 32 
ations. Of the 86 international destinations, 17 were 
an Indonesian company to undertake quarrying business in Aceh, Indonesia 
 
Case 12  Airline Company 
In 1980, Malaysian Airline System (MAS) became the first major government agency to 
be privatized. Breaking the barriers of the new millennium, MAS has now a fleet of 
nearly 100 aircraft serves more than 100 destinations around the world. As part of their 
expansion, they have recently allied with Cathay Pacific of Hong Kong to provide a 
code-sharing agreement to enable more weekly flights to Hong Kong. At a time when 
collaboration and partnership prevails, Malaysia Airlines has forged many agreements 
with regional and international airlines to provide various services including catering, 
maintenance and inter airline passenger transfers. Malaysia Airlines’ efforts have also 
received awards from various institutions including the Asian Institute of 
a
domestic and 86 international destin
operated in collaboration with other airline partners. Code sharing involves one carrier 
using its designator code on a service operated by another. The ticket will carry the code 
of one airline, while the service will be provided by another under its own brand. Under a 
code share arrangement, passengers enjoy a seamless product, as a single airline will 
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Case 13  Oil and Gas Company  
Petroleum Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) is wholly owned by the Malaysian 
government and is vested with the entire ownership and control of the petroleum 
resources in Malaysia through the Petroleum Development Act 1974, an Act of 
Parliament. Over the years, PETRONAS has grown to become a fully integrated oil and 
gas corporation and is ranked among FORTUNE Global 500’s largest corporations in the 
world. PETRONAS has four subsidiaries listed on the Bursa Malaysia and has ventured 
globally into more than 33 countries worldwide in its aspirations to become a leading oil 
nd gas multinational of choice with various joint venture partners.  
ince its inception, PETRONAS’ business has grown to encompass the full spectrum of 
as ex d globally, in the areas of upstream oil and gas 
on, development and 




oil and g plorations, both locally an
exploration and production to downstream oil refining, marketing and distribution of 
petroleum products, shipping and property investment. In the downstream activities 
overseas, PETRONAS operates an expanding network of service stations in Cambodia, 
Thailand and Sudan. It also has a joint venture to import, store, bottles, distribute and 
market LPG in Vietnam, China, India, Thailand and the Philippines. Its South African 
subsidiary, Engen Ltd. has a large network of service stations marketing and distributing 
gasoline and other petroleum products in South Africa and neighbouring countries. In the 
upstream activities, PETRONAS is actively engaged in the explorati
p
activities are undertaken and managed through production sharing contracts with a 
number of international oil and gas companies as well as with subsidiary PETRONAS 
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Carigali Sdn. Bhd. In 2005, PETRONAS entered into a strategic partnership with Tharwa 
Petroleum Company of Egypt in oil exploration activities in four blocks located in the 
western desert of Siwa, West Ghazalat and El Saloom. In the other related industry, 
PETRONAS has formed a strategic alliance with China’s carmaker Nanjing Automobile 
Corporation to look into the possibility of using its PETRONAS E01 engine technology 
for the carmaker’s vehicle line up. PETRONAS also officially became a Premium Partner 
to the BMW SAUBER F1 Team, extending its longstanding arrangement with SAUBER 
to the new BMW managed team. In Australia, PETRONAS signed a joint development 
agreement with BRP-ROTAX to further develop and commercialise PETRONAS high 
performance engine family. 
 
Case 14  Utilities Company  
YTL Corporation Berhad is one of the largest companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and 
together with its five subsidiaries has a combined Market Capitalisation of almost US$9.1 
billion. The company was listed in 1985, has also had a secondary listing on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange since 1996. YTL was the first Asian non Japanese company to be listed 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The YTL Group’s core businesses are ownership and 
management of regulated utilities and other infrastructural assets, serving 10 million 
customers in three continents. In Australia, YTL owns a 33.5% stake in ElectraNet Pty 
Ltd, which owns and operates the power transmission grid for the State of South 
Australia. ElectraNet operates under a 200 year power transmission concession in the 
ate. In United Kingdom, YTL owns a 100% stake in Wessex Water, one of the most 
ater rs in the United Kingdom. Wessex Water is a utility 
st
efficient w  and sewerage operato
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concession in perpetuity. This significant acquisition represents YTL’s first major foray 
into Europe, and marks the beginning of another exciting chapter in the growth and 
development of the YTL Group. In Indonesia, YTL has a 35% stake in PT Jawa Power 
which owns a 1220MW coal fired power plant located at the Paiton Power Generation 
Complex in East Java, Indonesia. Jawa Power is the second largest IPP in Indonesia and 
has a 30 year PPA with PT PLN (Persero), the state owned electric utility company. 
 
Case 15  Motor Vehicle Assembly Company 
Tan Chong Group was founded in 1957. In 1962, Tan Chong Motor managed to get the 
franchise from Nissan Japan and became the pioneer company to introduce Japanese 
vehicles to the Malaysian public. By 1970, Nissan had become one of the top selling 
brands in Malaysia and Singapore. Nissan cars sold in Singapore are fully imported from 
Japan, whilst those in Malaysia are locally assembled. In 1974, Tan Chong was listed on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and since then the Group has broadened its business 
operations to include motor vehicle assembly and parts manufacturing, heavy vehicles, 
equipment and machinery, property investment and financial services, tours and trading. 
Geographically, Tan Chong Group’s business activities span the Asian Pacific region, 
perating in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brunei, Australia, and Papua New 
s opportunities in Macao and China.   
o
Guinea. Now the Group is also initiating new busines
Their assembly plant in Kuala Lumpur also assembles other makes of cars such as 
Renault and Mercedes under contract. Tan Chong has also participated in a joint effort to 
develop the first Asean vehicle with Nissan Japan and the franchisees in Thailand and the 
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Philippines. The product – Nissan AD Resort, uses components sourced from 
participating countries and enjoys preferential duty treatment in these countries. 
 
Case 16  Industrial Group Company 
UMW Holding was founded in 1902. Over eighty years, UMW has progressed to be one 
of the largest locally owned companies in Malaysia with a diversity of interests ranging 
from the motor vehicles, distribution of principal industrial equipment, to manufacturing, 
engineering, construction, agriculture, leasing and insurance. Strategic alliances with 
global players have positioned the group as a leader in its core businesses. UMW is in 
partnership with some of the well known multinational corporations from Japan, the 
United States and Europe. UMW also has a 38 percent investment in Perodua which 
manufactures the second national car. Overseas, the group has operations in Singapore, 
hailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea and China. In the automotive section, 
n’s Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota 
T
UMW has formed a joint venture with Japa
Tsusho Corporation to assemble, market and distributing Toyota cars and commercial 
vehicles. Lubetech and UMW Pennzoil are joint venture companies manufacturing and 
marketing Pennzoil lubricants. Pennzoil is the number one selling motor oil in the United 
States for the past 20 years and running. KYB-UMW Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., manufactures 
shock absorbers and power pumps and systems using technology from Kayaba Industry 
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Case 17  Automotive Company 
DRB HICOM in one of Malaysia’s leading corporations, playing an integral role in the 
nation’s road to industrialization. DRB HICOM maintains a strong position in the 
automotive, manufacturing, assembly and distribution industry through its involvement in 
passenger cars and four wheel drive vehicles market segment, the national truck project 
and the national motorcycle project. Besides automotive, the group’s core business 
focuses are also in services, property and infrastructure and defence sectors. DRB 
ICOM’s leadership within this sector is reflected through niche segmentation via the 
evelopment of new and innovative technology applications and continued strategic 
lliances with renowned global names such as Audi, Honda, Mitsubishi, General Motors, 




Isuzu, M dra of India, Kawasak
continuously seeks new alliances to strengthen its base further and develop new business 
potentials that will strengthen both DRB HICOM and its partners. In the defence 
industry, DRB HICOM has entered into strategic alliance with a number of renowned 
international defence manufacturers. Among them are FNSS from Turkey, Daimler 
Chrysler from Germany for military vehicles, Alvis from United Kingdom for all terrain 
mobile platform, Mowag from Switzerland for army vehicles, Iveco from Italy for heavy 
duty military trucks, Giat Industries from France for artillery system and Raba from 
Hungary for special vehicles components. 
 
Case 18  Maritime Company  
Business Focus Sdn. Bhd (BFSB) is a dynamic Malaysian conglomerate with diversified 
interests in growth industries, with particular emphasis on maritime activities. BFSB was 
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initially set up to undertake the privatization of Penang Shipbuilding Sdn. Bhd. BFSB 
was incorporated in 1991 as a private limited company under the Companies Act 1965. 
Over the years BFSB has formed strategic alliances with many international companies to 
spearhead its activities. One of them is Wavemaster International of Australia. 
Headquartered in Western Australia, Wavemaster International is a leading designer, 
developer and builder of high performance aluminum ferries and other vessels for the 
orld market. Formed in 1984, Wavemaster International is Western Australia’s oldest 
lished mance aluminum ships. The company has delivered 
is involved in retail banking activities in Albania. In 
outh Africa, BFSB is represented by one of its subsidiary as project manager for 
w
and estab  builder of high perfor
over seventy vessels during the past 18 years to customers in Europe, Africa, the Middle 
East, North Asia (including Japan), South Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific. 
In Malaysia, Wavemaster has a yacht center located in Langkawi in the state of Kedah, 
North West of peninsular Malaysia.  
 
Their marine technology academy has also formed strategic alliances with reputable 
universities abroad such as University of New South Wales and Australian Maritime 
College to provide a world class marine and defence technology, education and training 
program. BFSB is also involved in tourism industry in Peru via its associated company, 
Peru Hotel S.A. (PHSA). PHSA has four hotels in Cuzco, Peru. BFSB involvement in the 
financial services sector is led by Business Focus Capital Sdn. Bhd. which is involved in 
commercial and investment banking activities in Ghana through its 37.25% equity stake 
in Metropolitan and Allied Bank (Ghana) Limited.  In addition, BFSB has also invested 
in Arab Albania Islamic Bank which 
S
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Sandton Hotel in Johannesburg, South Africa. BFSB ventures abroad not only see the 
company establishing strategic synergistic alliances but also allow a flow of technology 
and expertise in and out of Malaysia. These alliances include those with the major global 
players in their respective industries such as Blohm Voss and Ferrostaal AG for the petrol 
vessel project.   
 
5.2  Partner Selection 
Geringer (1991) suggests that partner selection criteria may be grouped into task-related 
and partner related criteria. While task related criteria refer to the complementary 
capabilities the partner may offer, partner related criteria are closer to the notion of ability 
to work with the partner. According to the data, the most prominent criteria Malaysian 
companies look at when searching for a potential partner fell into the categories 
suggested by Geringer (1991). Task related criteria include knowledge of the market 
conditions, knowledge of the environment, patents, experience of management and 
political influence. It basically focuses more on operational and performance 
haracteristics, tangible or intangible, human or non human. Partner related criteria 
al to maintain a continuing and stable relationship, position 
c
include reputation, potenti
within the industry, professionalism, honesty and seriousness, fit, and enthusiasm for the 
project. Representatives of Malaysian companies that entered into strategic alliances 
referred in the interviews to some sort of search process, one which at least considered 
the merits or otherwise of various potential partners.  
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A recurrent theme in these testimonies was that of using a presumed similarity between 
potential alliance partners as a way of narrowing the field of choice, to screen out the 
whole range of possible candidates. Interviewees spoke here of wanting partners who 
were of comparable size, similar structure, having comparable decision making 
processes, and sometimes the wish was expressed for alliances with foreign companies 
having a similar culture. Thus, firms tend to seek a partner whom they perceive to have 
complementary assets from which synergies can be realized. They prefer firms of similar 
size and structure in order to minimize the risk of domination, excessive dependence and 
n equitable balance of benefits. It may be noted that this approach is both rational and 
e is usually paramount; hence managers seem to 
se conscious and subconscious filters to reduce the enormous range of possibilities to a 
a
bounded at the same time. It is rational in its plausible linking of means to ends yet it is 
clearly bounded in the classic sense of Cyert and March (1963; 1992) in that many of the 
things in terms of which similarity may be apprehended are unknowable, or at least not 
knowable with certainty or precision.  
 
The classic formulation of bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1963) opined that (1) 
the human capacity for rational cogitation is limited (2) people will not engage in an 
exhaustive search for relevant information (3) they will not interpret data objectively 
(without bias) (4) they will not consider all options, but foreclose on the first “good offer” 
(will satisfy not optimize). Thus, managers first do not consider the infinite number of 
possibilities available to them as espoused in economic theory due to the inability of the 
human mind to grasp and process all these possibilities, and second, the need to take 
action within a relatively short time fram
u
  275 
manageable number (Lawrence and Ul-Haq, 1998). This consideration becomes more 
important as one move from tangible to intangible phenomena as one makes, so to say, 
the perilous journey from company asset size to comparing corporate cultures. But the 
search for similarity as between partners is not the whole story. Especially where cross 
border cooperation is concerned, it often appears that the issues of choice and bonding 
are affected by a mix of history, circumstance and sentiment.  
 
Almost all interviewees assert the similarity principle, that is, the idea that alliances are 
most likely to work when the partners are alike in significant ways thus suggesting that 
the screening of possible alliance partners may also owe something to history, 
circumstance, political culture and national sentiment, and even that the criteria may 
embrace social ideology. At the same time there is a possible inconsistency. This is that 
at least sometimes complementarity, implying dissimilarity of the partners, will be the 
essence of an alliance. This phenomenon is often observable in the smaller countries like 
Malaysia. The case for complementarity is made very clearly by the Chief Executive 
fficer (CEO) of one of the Malaysian company interviewed referring to that company’s  O
alliance; “We have learned how best to launch our product after having learned what our 
partner experience has been. We admire how they develop business by phone, even 
selling products on their side they look at our branch network with five people or less per 
branch, and compare it with their average of nine. Also they are very good at serving 
customers, and we are very good at developing profitable customers”. In short, 
differences are exploited for organizational learning and business realization. 
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The main deficiency of Malaysian companies when investing abroad is their lack of 
market knowledge in terms of business conditions, products, and clients. When searching 
for a partner, the first condition Malaysian companies’ look at, is whether the potential 
partner will be able to provide that knowledge. In one extreme case, one of the largest 
agricultural companies in Malaysia felt no company in Indonesia would be able to 
provide this knowledge, given the lack of commercial agricultural activities with a 
market orientation in the recent past. This was one reason for this Malaysian company to 
partner with another country company already operating in Indonesia instead of joining 
ith an Indonesian one. Knowledge of the economic environment, the regulatory system, 
the political one. They explicitly stated that they avoid involving politicians although 
w
and the capacity to have an influence on politicians were also appreciated by some of the 
Malaysian companies. Interestingly, only two companies in the sample did not find the 
latter a significant factor in partner selection. Because of the merger development of 
many multinational companies and the reduced number of local entities, Malaysian 
companies did not value local partners as a source of key political and business 
connections. 
 
According to one of the interviewees, the choice of a partner is more important than 
funding: “If you don’t have funds, you don’t undertake the project, and that is it; but if 
the partner isn’t a good one, then you’re in trouble,” This remark reveals the importance 
of knowing the characteristics of the partner. It is difficult, however, for Malaysian 
companies to discern which companies are good ones. This is why reputation is 
important. Malaysian companies look for a good reputation in the business sense, not in 
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having a partner with some political influence was considered very important in an 
untested and fluid legal environment for some tasks, such as obtaining approval to set up 
 new office or in registration, custodial and settlement procedures. In order to have a 
al partner. This is not to say that these 
ompanies do not appreciate their partner’s reputation or continuity in the relationship, 
a
sense of the potential partner’s reputation in business, Malaysian companies wanted to 
know what a potential partner had done in the past and what it was doing currently. 
Interestingly, agricultural and manufacturing companies, with one exception, attributed a 
great deal of importance to reputation in the core or related business area of activity. In 
contrast, one of the consumer goods companies did not mention reputation as a 
characteristic to look for in a potential partner. 
 
Most of the Malaysian companies in the sample acknowledged that they were investing 
abroad in hopes of long run future benefits, rather than taking the kind of ‘hit-and-run’ 
position that seemed to characterize some of the early entrants. Thus, these Malaysian 
companies needed a partner with a certain degree of stability and the capability to stay 
with them in a continuing manner. The quest for stability seems to be closely related to 
the search for reputation. Most of the companies that had looked for a partner with a good 
reputation also acknowledged they had looked for a continuous relationship (Lorange and 
Roos, 1992). Again, the companies in the consumer goods industry did not mention 
stability as a desirable condition in a potenti
c
but that they either takes these conditions for granted or attach greater importance to 
other conditions. 
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Also, related to the partner’s reputation, is its position within the industry. This feature 
was stressed by the manufacturing companies, one of the engineering services company 
and the consumer products companies. One of the manufacturing companies participated 
in a consortium involving a number of manufacturing companies from other countries as 
well as two Malaysian companies. All of the partners were leading manufacturing 
companies in their respective countries. As already mentioned, another manufacturing 
company had decided not to have a local partner in an overseas venture because they did 
not think they could find a local manufacturing company that could bring to the 
partnership either experience in local consumer needs or funding in the local currency. 
ccording to the consumer products companies, a partner’s sound position in the industry 
anagerial responsibility within the local affiliates. The process of 
A
may help in a number of ways, for instance, saving startup costs if the partner’s facilities 
can be easily accommodated to the Malaysian practices, or providing connections with 
local companies. 
 
Professionalism in the widely adopted sense is also appreciated in a potential partner.  
Companies in Malaysia and Asian region with managers that already have a western 
mentality and managerial skills are scarce but very much appreciated. Yet, a significant 
number of Malaysian companies believed they will have to wait for the next generation 
of young people with a western mentality, given the impossibility as one manager stated 
of older people adapting their mindset to rapidly changing conditions. However, foreign 
companies’ expectations for young Malaysian and Asian people with minds open to 
western influence were very high. They expected the younger generation to play a key 
role in future m
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replacing expatriates as local managers gradually assume the former positions had begun 
e largest China producer of their own product line. One of the 
dustrial companies also talked about fit. Product complementarity had made it easy for 
in all companies interviewed. In one case, the Malaysian general manager of a joint 
venture, with a majority stake by the Malaysian company, had previously been employed 
by the foreign partner. 
 
Malaysian companies looked for honesty and seriousness in their partners. Obviously, 
these characteristics are valued in any context. The difficulties Malaysian companies 
have in ascertaining their presence in various companies abroad have to do with the fact 
that these words may have different connotations in the two cultures. What is considered 
ethical or unethical behavior by Malaysians and by their alliance partners may not be the 
same. What Malaysian companies look for is common ground in this area. Fit between 
companies was also mentioned by two of the interviewees. One of the consumer products 
companies said they had looked for a company about the same size as their own; in fact, 
they partnered with th
in
the Malaysian company to restructure its manufacturing facilities to adapt them to the 
new joint product. Some Malaysian companies thought enthusiasm for the project on 
their alliance partner’s side was important. Such willingness to succeed was perceived as 
a signal of commitment to the partnership, a necessary condition for success. By now it 
should be clear that task-related criteria are closely connected with the contributions each 
company will make to the partnership, and that partner related criteria will affect the 
process of managing the relationship. 
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5.2.1  Summary of Partner Selection Criteria in Malaysia 
Research has demonstrated differences in the criteria utilized by executives in developed 
and emerging economies in strategic decision making (Hitt et al., 1997). This work 
suggested that firms from different countries tend to approach strategic problems in 
different ways largely as a function of variances in their strategic orientations. Based on 
differences in history, culture and economic factors, it is predicted that there will be 
differences in the partner selection criteria employed by Malaysian companies and 
foreign companies. Economic behavior in Malaysia is embedded in a vast network of 
institutionally defined relationships between business and government. While Malaysia 
as experienced rapid economic development, its stage of industrialization remains 
inue to increase and much 
Alternatively, to acquire market share in export markets, Malaysian firms had to be low 
h
behind that of many western countries. Malaysian exports cont
of this development has been supported by a system of state capitalism that encourages 
vigorous economic expansion into new markets. As a result, the predominant goal of 
Malaysian companies has been growth.  
 
This longer term emphasis focuses Malaysian companies on growth opportunities with- 
less emphasis on short-term financial outcomes compared to companies in many other 
countries. The Malaysian government’s emphasis on growth influenced technological 
policy. For many years since the conceptualization of Vision 2020, there has been an 
increase in government supported science and technology initiatives stimulating an 
increase in the number of private R&D institutes such as SIRIM (Standards and Industrial 
Research Institute of Malaysia) and Multimedia Development Corporation (MDC). 
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cost producers. As a result, the emphasis on growth motivated Malaysian managers to 
develop aggressive strategies to acquire technological capabilities from external sources 
li, 1992).  (A
 
Analysis of the data showed that there were in fact, major differences in the criteria used 
to select alliance partners by Malaysian companies. The most significant criteria chosen 
by Malaysian companies in order of importance are depicted in Figure 5.1 
 
Figure 5.1: Partner Selection Criteria Used by Malaysian Companies 
1.  Technical Capabilities 
2.  Industry Attractiveness 
3.  Special Skills You Can Learn from Partner 
4.  Willingness to Share Expertise 
5.  Capabilities to Provide Quality 
 
Malaysian companies (90%) place significant emphasis on a potential partner’s technical 
uld learn from 
s partner (70%), and a partner’s willingness to share its expertise (65%). Thus, 
have technical 
w that their firm may not possess but wishes to learn. 
in a partner that is willing to share these capabilities 
 
capabilities (e.g., the ability to develop new process or product technologies). Beyond 
those already mentioned, Malaysian companies also placed importance on the 
attractiveness of a partner’s industry (80%), special skills that their firm co
it
Malaysian companies are specifically searching for partners that 
capabilities or marketing know-ho
Of course, they are also interested 
and skills with them (60%).  
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Finally, they are concerned about selecting a partner working in an industry with an 
nvironment favourable to achievement of the Malaysian firm’s goals. These criteria are 
ant support for this research’s expectations. For example, 
alaysian companies were less interested in the financial assets (e.g., capital) of their 
anies look externally for new and 
aluable technical capabilities. Certainly, the Malaysian government’s industrial policy to 
e
evident in at least twelve companies interviewed. There were other criteria found to have 
secondary importance for partner selection in Malaysia. For example, few of the 
Malaysian companies interviewed also placed importance on a partner’s intangible assets 
(e.g., firm reputation, brand name, human resources) and the cost of alternatives to an 
alliance (e.g., development of a wholly owned subsidiary in the new market). Malaysian 
companies also placed some importance on a partner’s ability to acquire its core skills 
suggesting an interest in a mutually beneficial alliance. 
 
The results provided signific
M
partner but placed a strong emphasis on the value of collaboration and sharing of skills 
and expertise. Additionally, the results also suggest that Malaysian companies may be 
relatively successful at partnering because they are interested not only in learning from 
their partners but also in a mutually beneficial relationship by providing their partner with 
important skills. Their prior experience of networking across businesses within the 
country and building ties with government officials suggests that both partners must 
benefit if an alliance is to be successful.  
 
The results also support the notion that Malaysian comp
v
promote business and attractive growth industries is exemplified through the Malaysian 
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companies’ emphasis on selecting partners in these attractive industries. While the most 
important criteria used by Malaysian companies to select partners strongly differ from 
some developed countries, consideration of their total selection models as explained 
above, suggests some similarities, as well. For example, there were 12 criteria used by 
developed country managers and 8 criteria used by Malaysian managers (out of 14 
possible criteria in this case study). In the final models, there were six criteria that were 
the same in both models, although they differed in their importance across the models 
heir relative ranking for partner selection differed). Thus, this study concludes that there 
ns from Malaysian alliance partners to be related to 
eir knowledge of the local conditions, and those from Malaysian companies to be 
(t
are some similarities in the criteria used for selecting alliance partners by Malaysian 
companies and developed countries. 
 
 5.3  Contributions to the partnership 
In previous decades, partnerships, particularly strategic alliances, were used as an entry 
mode to new countries out of necessity. Frequently, a local partner was needed to fulfill 
governmental requirements, but no important contributions were expected from this 
passive partner. More recently, the contributions from local partners are at least as 
important as those from the foreign company. More and more, the partners are 
interdependent, and each needs contributions from the other (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 
1991). The contributions from both the Malaysian firms and their alliance partner to the 
partnership are closely connected with the task related criteria for selecting a partner. 
Thus, we may expect the contributio
th
related to their business skills.  
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The main contributions from the alliance partner companies cited by Malaysian 
companies in the sample were their industrial facilities and production capacity as well as 
their market access. Local facilities provide a basis to start with, even if they require 
renovations. In one case, the alliance partner contributed its sound position in a related 
area, and in this way it provided access to key raw materials. One of the consumer 
products companies saw the labour force as one of the contributions of its alliance 
partner. Another company saw this kind of contribution as a negative one in that the ratio 
of production to staff personnel was comparatively low. Market access was another 
important contribution in some cases, and so was the alliance companies’ ability to 
manage their own people. The latter was also acknowledged by one of the manufacturing 
companies. 
 
Some additional contributions from alliance partner companies include the search for a 
good location and ability to manage the process of securing regulatory approvals. When 
the latter is done by the local partner or by a specialized local institute, the process speeds 
up because of the locals’ knowledge of regulation and procedures and personal contacts. 
 
The main contributions from Malaysian companies are knowledge transfer and financial 
resources. Knowledge transfer takes place at several levels: technical know-how, 
marketing skills and management systems. Not only manufacturing companies but also 
consumer products transfer technical know-how. Given the primary stages of the 
telecommunications system in certain countries they invested in, knowledge about new 
chnologies had to be transferred by the Malaysian telecommunication company joint  te
  285 
venturing with another foreign company. The need for the transfer of marketing skills is a 
natural consequence of previous market conditions in certain countries like China and 
Indonesia (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2000). The lack of competition in the centralized 
economic system of the recent past engendered no need for marketing related skills and 
apabilities. The production standards were set by the government, and companies just 
e another foreign company because of the 
olitical connections it had established while operating in Africa prior to this partnership. 
c
had to meet them, knowing that their products would find a demand. As an anecdote, one 
of the interviewees said that their Chinese partner was proud not to have their brand in 
the market, which shows a mentality totally at odds with a Malaysian one. In some cases, 
not just the marketing skills, but also the brand and the product image had been 
transferred to the partnership. 
 
The transfer of technical know-how and of marketing skills is necessarily accompanied 
by the transfer of management systems. This requires training the people involved. 
Malaysian companies provide extensive training programs, at both the managerial and the 
technical level. Often these programs take place in the alliance partners’ premises as well 
as in the Malaysian companies’ home office. Financial resources are also a main 
contribution from Malaysian companies. Their up-front investment serves as a guarantee 
or as a signal of commitment for financial institutions to provide the remaining necessary 
funds. Other contributions from Malaysian companies include experience and credibility 
and the initiative to undertake the project. Interestingly, the manufacturing company that 
had no hope for a local company partner chos
p
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If one asks representatives of Malaysian companies why their institutions entered into 
particular alliances they usually respond with quite specific answers: to give access to 
this market or that customer; to conjoin technology, systems, know-how and customers in 
various permutations; to provide reciprocal services for the customer cross-border, and so 
on. But if one asks these same people about the benefits of extant alliances one receives a 
surprising number of answers couched in terms of intangibles. One of these intangibles is 
the value of informed and objective opinion.  
 
A representative of one Malaysian company involves in cross border alliance suggested 
that a major gain from the alliances was having someone to talk to, on strategic and 
operational matters, who could be trusted, who had understanding, but was not part of 
your organization. He reported that, when alliance partners present options, they do not 
see the issue through the lens of your organization’s corporate culture, nor need they be 
constrained by your organization’s hierarchy or micro politics. The same issue was raised 
by the previously mentioned Malaysian company Chief Executive Officer. During the 
longish gestation period, all participants enjoyed the service of the group as a sounding 
board – informed, favourably disposed, but objective. Another way of expressing this is 
to say that the relationship preceded the specifics, and may come to be valued more than 
e specifics. Another relative intangible that was praised in many quarters was the gain  th
from transferring staff. One Malaysian company, for instance, stated that a number of 
young staff went to work in their partner’s home country and vice versa; what is more, 
personnel exchanges are not only between the respective head offices but between 
subsidiaries as well. Indeed the interviews provided numerous examples of these cross 
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border staff exchanges. Taking the interview testimonies collectively their staff 
exchanges were praised on three grounds: 
1.  they helped to cement the alliance;  
2.  they gave to staff, often quite young, a new perspective on the dynamics of 
their industry, one derived from another organization in another country; 
3.  cross border exchanges were prized as episodes in cross-cultural development; 
if one could learn to understand and perform effectively in the corporate and 
national culture of an alliance partner then a gain in personal development was 
being achieved.   
 
The above findings suggested that, once some cross cultural development has been 
achieved, one is better equipped to perform in a ‘third party’ country. So how, for 





(20 oned studies, a list of 18 most relevant contributions from 
artners was compiled. The relative ranks of contribution from the local partner from the 
giving them experiences in another European co
 
ht publications with detailed lists of potential partners’ contributions or “pote
needs of partners” were found in the literature: Stopford and Wells (1972), Raveed and 
nforth (1983) and Beamish (1987; 1994), Geringer (1991), Erden (1997), Glaister and 
ckley (1997), Dong et al. (1997) and De Mattos, Goncalves, Neto and Sanderson, 
01). From the aforementi
p
perspective of Malaysian companies are shown in Figure 5.2 while the relative ranks of 
contributions from the foreign partner are shown in Figure 5.3. Although the most 
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important local partner potential contributions, such as ‘general knowledge’ and ‘faster 
entry and access to market’ are predicted in the literature, ‘political intervention’ was 
laced at a very low position (16
th out of 18), contrary to existing literature on developing  p
economies. The importance of the items ‘faster entry into the local market’, considering 
other existing alternatives to the foreign partner’ (as licensing, exporting, or wholly 
owned subsidiaries), and ‘access to local markets versus subsidiary’ shows the 
importance of the market for the foreign investor. The latter results were also predicted in 
the literature, and reflect the potential of the Malaysian market. As is to be expected, the 
contribution of the foreign partner seen as most important is technology.  
 
This conclusion is strongly confirmed by the equally highly ranked contributions ‘to 
bring supplementary product lines to the joint venture’ and ‘to bring managers or experts 
in production, research and development or other technical area’ (know-how). The next 
item in importance was ‘access to foreign market for goods produced by the joint 
venture’. Clearly, technology is seen as essential to the present stage of development of 
the commercial biotechnology industry in Malaysia. Access to foreign markets is placed 
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Figure 5.2  Relative Rank of the Potential Contributions from the Local Partner 
Contributions Relative  rank 
(1=Highest Importance; 18=Lowest Importance)  
Capital 17 
Raw materials  10 
General knowledge  1 
Local financing  4 
Local personalities  6 
Political interventions  16 
Political advantages  12 
Governmental requirements  8 
Speed of entry into local market  2 
Access to local markets vs. subsidiary  3 
Local market for foreign partner’s products  5 
Export opportunities  15 
M   anaging director 9 
Mark ctor  eting dire 7 
Te el  chnical personn 11 
Low cost labour  14 
Technology 18 
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Figure 5.3  of Contributions from the Foreign Partner (1=Highest 
Importance; 11=Lowest Importance) 




Raw Materials  7 
General knowledge ntry   of foreign cou 8 
Political adva   ntage from foreign country 9 
Easier exports (joint venture products)  5 
Easier exports (local partner’s products)  6 
Managing director  11 
Marketing director  10 
Technical personnel  3 
Technology 1 
Supplementary products  2 
 
 
5.4 Relationship  management 
lationship management, it is noticeable that the mo  recent literature on 
o mention the importance of personal relations as a 
necessary condition of success (Faulkner, 1995; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). This is 
iews as one of the interviewees remarked: “It is 
g!” In the same vein, a managing director of one of the Malaysian 
ined with regard to their alliance with a foreign c pany that there was 
erpinning the alliance and that it was governed simply by the presence 
ign partner and the corresponding presence of 
the interviewee’s opposite number on the board of the Malaysian company. Again, the 
Turning to re re
strategic alliances has begun t
overwhelmingly confirmed in the interv
all about gellin
companies expla om
no legal entity und
of him on the supervisory board of the fore
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director of another Malaysian company discussed in the interview the importance of the 
d his foreign counterparts with whom they had a 
tages; gelling, golfing and personal 
lationships are as important as equity swaps”. Nevertheless, this thesis does not mean to 
suggest via these testimonies that there is anything non rational about the importance 
personal relationship between himself an
very persuasive and broad fronted strategic alliance. He also spoke of the foreign partner 
who came to Kuala Lumpur at the start of the alliance as being “fully integrated”. It is 
also clear that these personal relationships may be decisive for the inception of an 
alliance. One of the Malaysian companies described the opening and formal exchanges 
between his company and a potential foreign partner. These exchanges were not decisive 
“but when our chief executives met” it all fell into place. This interviewee added “we 
probably don’t need the equity in each other’s company anymore”, his way of signaling 
the solidarity of the relationship as relationship.  
 
Another of the Malaysian companies underlined not only the importance of a personal 
relationship between senior people from the allying institutions but the need for 
continuity of personnel: “And the relationship is important; you don’t want to have deal 
with different people”. One of the Malaysian companies’ interviewees described the long 
incubation period for a cross-border alliance, stressing the interpersonal dynamics 
throughout. It started when senior representatives discussed the idea informally while 
attending a seminar; the boards of directors all knew each other, the key personnel 
arranged trips twice a year to progress the negotiations; they ended up playing a round of 
golf, so that negotiations could continue in an appropriately relaxed ambience. “They are 
not only talking margins, ratios and percen
re
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ascribed to relationships in these alliances. The point is rather that this is not a 
conventional manifestation of rationality in a business context. Managing a partnership 
between Malaysian and their alliance partners is not a trivial undertaking. Operational 
and cultural difficulties between the two types of companies introduce difficulties 
specific to this kind of partnership. Nonetheless, the management difficulties may 
diminish if attention is paid to partner related criteria at the partner selection stage.  
 
If the partner related criteria are considered during the selection stage, it becomes easier 
to manage the relationship and the chances are that the partnership will be more 
successful. As in any other partnership, complementarity of the companies’ goals is a 
necessary condition for success (Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad, 1989). In the partnership of 
one of the industrial products companies, the goals of each participating company were as 
follows: the Malaysian company was interested in a continuous presence in the Chinese 
market; one of the Chinese partners was looking for an international partner with the right 
product and technology that would allow them to use some of the foreigner’s components 
in their own products; the other Chinese partner was looking for products of a very good 
quality that would be less expensive than imports, with knowledge about cold weather 
conditions. This strong complementarity of goals helped to overcome difficulties that 
rose in the relationship. One of the consumer goods companies, moreover, asserted that  a
cultural differences were not an issue because all the partners shared common goals. 
 
The initial conditions that make a Malaysian company rely on its partner include the 
partner’s reputation and its attitude toward the project. The telecommunication company 
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said that getting to know what the partner had done in the past was an important way to 
assess the partner’s capabilities. References about the partner from other companies also 
served this purpose. These Malaysian companies also showed their facilities to their 
foreign partner counterparts, as well as the results of previous projects in which they had 
been involved, to demonstrate their capabilities and their reliability. Another signal of the 
partner’s capabilities mentioned by one company was its attitude toward the project. The 
perception that the foreign company was enthusiastic about the project and believed the 
partnership with the Malaysian company represented the best means for carrying it out 
convinced the Malaysian company of the foreign company’s commitment. Structural 
eterminants of cooperation are called “task bonding” (Murnighan 1994) or “structural  d
bonding” (Han 1991; Wilson and Mummalaneni 1986). They entail the multiplicity of 
economic, strategic, and functional factors that develop during a relationship and involve 
explicit business benefits through technology and markets.  
 
Structural bonds reflect irretrievable investments in the relationship, social pressures to 
maintain it, and contractual barriers. They are linked fundamentally to economic 
exchange and defined by negotiated transactions (Emerson 1981). Concepts such as 
reciprocity, trust, opportunism, and forbearance have a particular meaning, given the 
actors’ cultural settings (Parkhe 1993). When building a relationship, structural bonds 
must be developed first. Two firms pooling their assets must perceive clear economic and 
strategic benefits from the association. When developed explicit economic and 
managerial benefits for the partners are a positive predictor of affective ties between 
managers (McAllister 1995; Nielson 1998). They are necessary to satisfy a minimum 
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level of dependability and reliability before a deeper emotional investment can exist the 
relationship. 
 
The Malaysian companies in the sample believed that success was enhanced when the 
foreign company relied on the direction set by the Malaysian company. In some cases it 
seemed critical that the foreign partner realize that the Malaysian company was central 
for the foreign company to fulfill its expectations for the future, and that its aspirations 
would be accomplished only through a partnership with the Malaysian company. At a 
broader level, this awareness of dependence on the Malaysian company led the 
government to continue privatization and even allow foreign capital investment. The 
personal qualities of the executives involved in the partnership also clearly influence its 
success. The interviewee in one of the consumer products companies said that personal 
traits of the Malaysian managers were key for success, they have to be committed to the 
project and to people’s relationships, have business aggressiveness, be able to implement 
volutionary solutions, and not be driven by the short term. For these managers to bring  e
the project to success, they have to be more concerned with laying the foundations of the 
business than with growth. Another interviewee stressed that, important as it ordinarily is, 
affinity among the management team members is even more crucial in a country where 
there is no external support auxiliary industry such as the packaging industry for the 
consumer products company and service and maintenance facilities.      
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, this study provides evidence that 
formation of trust and commitment is perceived by relationship bonding, which assists in 
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building interdependency between Malaysian and foreign partners. These findings 
suggest that structural bonding (i.e., economic, strategic, and organizational links) and 
social bonding (i.e., affective and personal) are crucial in building trust and commitment 
in the relationship between top managers in strategic alliances. Malaysian managers value 
the relationship as expressed through their perceived high levels of commitment. Lawler 
and Yoon (1996) define this type of exchange relation as having “relational cohesion”. 
They suggest that relational cohesion entails uncertainty-reduction processes as 
compliment to emotional/affective ones. It is the social bonding process that transforms 
the relation into one of value, which leads to commitment behavior. The results of this 
udy are in substantial agreement with Lawler and Yoon’s theoretical contributions in  st
the sense that it is the social bonding process that makes exchange a target for 
commitment and trust. It is possible that structural bonding, as an instrumental feature of 
exchange, drives a substantive relevant aspect of the relationship as shown in this study. 
Kramer (1991, p.201) finds that these interdependencies promote “psychology group 
formation” in dyads, thus enhancing the uncertainty reduction process. 
 
Second, relationship building influences trust differently for Malaysian managers. For 
Malaysian managers, an increase in the level of perceived economic and strategic bonds 
generates a positive, direct effect in building trust toward their partners. Increasing the 
economic benefits of the relationship may reduce the degree of ambiguity and anxiety 
characteristic of the Malaysian culture and thus improve the level of trust. Third, 
differences on how trust builds in each partner suggest that excessive dependency on a 
partner may be interpreted as an attempt to exercise power with negative consequences in 
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managing the relationship. Malaysians welcome praise, recognition, and approval when 
they perform well. As indicated by the theory of relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 
1996), continuous long term exchange becomes the self adjusting mechanism because of 
the emotional/affective component present and is more viable than hierarchy of control 
rategies suggested by transaction cost theory. This study findings, suggest that social  st
bonding assists in the transformation of the structure of dependency into 
interdependency. Moreover, high levels of perceived structural bonding from each 
partner suggest a mutually beneficial exchange in which risk of losing what the partner 
gives to the relationship is high enough to minimize the use of coercion (Molm 1997). 
Fourth, further analysis of the implications of this study suggests that approaching the 
interdependency between top managers in international strategic alliances from the 
perspective of a third culture could be insightful, given the different cultural backgrounds 
of the partners.  
 
Malaysian managers preserve their cultural identity while developing interdependence 
and interaction. Efforts should focus on how to manage the relationship from the 
perspective of a third culture. Previous research has suggested the adequacy of this 
approach (Chen and Meindl 1998). Conflict resolution may be possible when establishing 
this third culture. A third culture suggests a renegotiation and synthesis of the deep 
components of culture experience-attitudes, values and mores (Casmir 1993), including 
sharing meanings and actions between communicators, becoming more inclusive than the 
original ones, and facilitating the development of relationships by providing common 
communicative ground. This new culture is defined with norms and accepted behavior 
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that guide future interactions. Affective and emotional elements are necessary for 
Malaysian managers to process and build a trusting relationship with foreign partners. 
hen making decisions, Malaysians show a predominance of emotional states bundled 
countries 
Dimension Power  Individualism Masculinity  Uncertainty  Long-Term 
W
with sensibility and pride. If cultural distance contributes in building miscommunication, 
distrust, and disconnected and distant interpersonal relationships, this is the time to focus 
on intercultural fit as a prerequisite to relationship commitment. 
 
Hofstede’s (1997, 1980) and subsequent studies enhances this thesis understanding of 
organizational culture in developing countries. Figure 5.4 depicts the value indexes of 
relevant developing countries with similar context to Malaysia. 
 
Figure  5.4  Hofstede’s value index of five dimensions in selected developing 
 
























































Source: Hofstede (1997:26,53,84,113,166) 
As shown in Figure 5.4, the power distance indexes of developing countries are 
consistently higher than Western countries both by individual country standard and by the 
average of the two groups of countries. This thesis finding generally find support in the 
work of others in international management, particularly Punnett’s (1989) cluster 
analysis, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) value orientation model, Hall’s (1976) high 
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versus low context culture framework, and Gannon’s (1984) metaphors. Although 
Hofstede’s study is useful generally for the purposes of this thesis it must be 
a only  snapsh ving d 
as undertaken in 1980, faces the danger of being dated
ifficulties encountered 
Two main sources of ficulties, and thus hindrances to success, are the operational and 
ultural differences between Malaysian and their foreign alliance partners, with the 
cultural having a key impact on the operational. For instance, establishing some 
orientation toward results presented great difficulties among alliance partners and 
Malaysian companies. The latter feel a stronger pressure to achieve a certain goal that has 
been set, and have a keen awareness of time. This awareness results in concern for 
progress toward goals, although not necessarily with short term myopia. In contrast, 
while alliance partners are conscious of a goal to be reached, they do not seem to feel the 
time pressure or to be diligent in taking steps to achieve that goal. This led one manager 
to state that goal orientation was a second step after the alliance partner had perceived the 
impact of the operational performance on their rewards. Likewise, they seem not to take 
the initiative to solve problems that crop up; rather, they present them to the Malaysian 
partner with no suggestions for solutions. This happens at all levels in the organization. 
For example, a manager in a manufacturing company described the difficulties they faced 
in giving workers in the production line responsibility for fixing problems in the line. 
Another described how difficult it was to show people that they have to make their own 
acknowledged that his findings m y reflect  a  ot of evol  cultures an
because it w . 
 
5.5        D
 dif
c
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decisions and assume certain responsibilities even, for example, for the general 
manager’s driver to decide whether to fill the car with petrol. 
 
Operational differences in the way of running a business stem from drastically different 
concepts of a company and the functions it is expected to perform. To Malaysian 
managers, it is a well known fact that a company’s purpose is to provide some good or 
service and, in so doing, to make some profit. In certain parts of the world, however, 
according to the interviewees, the purpose of the company was to serve their own 
centralized and planned economy by complying with some production standards. For 
example, it was stated that in centralised economy, the partner initially considered that 
the more people were employed, the greater the profit would be. The foreign partner 
defended the position that labour was not a cost component to be included in the profit 
and loss statement. These radically different assumptions translate into important 
ifferences in management practices that, when brought together, engender difficulties.  d
Particular areas in which business practices differed and that brought difficulties in 
managing the partnerships include price setting, investment policies, cost analysis and 
control, quality control, and understanding the organizational structure. 
 
Bureaucratisation is another contextual condition that poses difficulties at the operational 
level. In several cases, the interviewees explained that discussions with representatives 
from the local partner were lengthy and ineffective because of the need to follow 
bureaucratic procedures that drew out the time necessary to make a decision. In one case, 
negotiation for the joint ventures was not carried out directly with the partner company 
  300 
but with a governmental committee. The negotiation, with many ups and downs, was 
hard to conclude.  
 
5.6 Trust building 
Building inter-partner trust as an aspect of managing the relationship deserves particular 
ttention. For a partnership to be formed there must be some initial trust between the 
very detail had been studied, discussed, and signed; the contract, 
owever, was then set aside and did not govern the relationship. While it is necessary to 
 to have a good, tight contract, this is by no means sufficient. The 
nvironmental conditions-
amely, that there is no market to sell either the shares or the specific assets in case one 
a
companies involved. As time passes, trust may be enhanced or destroyed (Gill and Butler, 
1996). In the early stages, the idea of trust seems akin to that of reliability. It takes time 
and interactions to build confidence in the partner’s good faith. 
 
All interviewees unanimously agreed that legal contracts play no significant role in the 
process of trust building. A few explained that the contract had been carefully designed 
by lawyers, and e
h
move prudently and
contract is the basis on which the partnership is developed. The challenge is to make it 
alive, but nobody will enforce it. One of the interviewees thought that contracts are 100 
percent effective when they bind institutions other than private companies; however, 
contracts between private institutions may work out, but they may also fail and prove 
useless. The fault lies not in the contract itself, but rather in the e
n
partner wants to abandon the venture. 
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Malaysian companies also face difficulties in assessing their counterparts’ 
trustworthiness. In particular, there are misunderstandings regarding commitment to the 
given word. While Malaysian companies may consider a verbal agreement binding, this 
does not seem to be the case to some of their foreign partners. Several of our interviewees 
described verbal agreements that had been reached one day and ignored the next. 
Language itself presents barriers to communication that make relationships harder, 
especially when a translator or interpreter is needed. Direct contact is important in 
building the relationship. One manager explained that he preferred his own poor English 
language over using an interpreter. A good interface becomes very important. Often, it is 
difficult for Malaysian companies to assess the validity of the data provided by the 
reign company counterpart; it then becomes critical to have a “feeling” for the 




Over time, the interactions between the partners help shape a deeper trust or else they 
destroy it. This process of trust building is influenced by how decision making is carried 
out, and by the companies’ attitude toward conflict resolution. Decision making by 
consensus involves lengthy discussion, but it brings the partners’ attitudes closer one to 
the other. One company said they never made majority decisions; instead they always try 
to build a consensus respecting the foreign company’s position. Another company said 
they try to reach a consensus, but up to a point. In some cases where it seemed impossible 
to overcome conflict and to reach an agreement, they used their voting rights. However, 
from the Malaysian companies’ perspective, it was difficult for the foreign partner to 
understand
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representatives has the last word on particular issues. Interpersonal relationships become 
the cornerstone of trust building. Interpersonal relationships develop over time. To 
Malaysian companies, some foreign companies may seem distrustful. The reasons why 
Malaysian companies may not trust foreign companies include the country’s history and 
the negative impression of capitalism left by the earlier behavior of foreign companies’ 
entrant into partnership. Recent or distant past conflicts and exploitative relationships 
with others tend to linger on in a nation’s collective memory (Tayeb, 2000). As a result, 
there is some resentment and skepticism toward the foreign company. Malaysian 
companies also, however, seem to appreciate a true friendship and distinguish this one 
from a mere forbearance born out of pure economic interests (Buckley and Casson, 
1988). Whether their motives were the reduction of production costs or the pursuit of 
market opportunities, the eighteen Malaysian companies in this study sought partners in a 
similar fashion by searching a partner they can trust and build relationship and also by 
exploiting their existing ties with others.  
 
The specific ties observed in the sample were as idiosyncratic as the strategic alliances 
themselves. Across the sample the most common ties were those where investors relied 
on their existing business connections. An implicit assumption in the literature on 
strategic partner selection is that the initial identification process consists of the following 
stages: 1) identifying those characteristics desired in a potential partner, (2) determining 
the appropriate channels or information sources to identify likely candidates, and (3) 
approaching the right prospects accordingly. In no case studied was this pattern of 
behavior observed. The foreign partner was first approached either by an interested 
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partner or an entrepreneurial intermediary. In some of these case studies, there was not 
even a motive to form a joint venture until after contact had been made. However, those 
alaysian companies that did take the initiative to search for foreign partners generally 
working with him. We had not worked together before. I think the trust is based on the 
After two years of observation, I felt comfortable that I had a good understanding of him. 
ests that those who have had prior 
gencies or government departments to either make introductions or provide a short list 
M
did so by exploiting their existing connections.  
It is hard to say whether you can trust anybody unless you have had the experience of 
fact that I had known him for over two years before we established this joint venture. 
 
In no case studied was the identification of partners facilitated by formal market research. 
When searching for alliance partners the informants in this study relied heavily on their 
existing connections with others. This is not to say that informants did not refer to 
economic criteria when explaining their selection process. Often they did. But in every 
such case it can be shown that the decisive factor in the selection process was more social 
than economic. In light of this, such firms economize by exploiting their existing sources 
of information, namely their interpersonal networks. Another explanation is the 
“Malaysia experience” argument which sugg
experience in the market are better able to identify potential alliance partners. Those 
without such experience will have to rely on intermediaries such as trade promoting 
a
of suitable candidates. Repeatedly in the interviews the critical ingredient of “trust” was 
identified as having driven the selection decision. One Malaysian company Chief 
Executive Officer spoke eloquently on this issue by saying that in his business ‘trust’ is a 
key element. According to him, even with good contacts, knowledge and know-how are 
two crucial ingredients to uphold this trust. While the full spectrum of social ties was 
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evident in the sample, these existing links served primarily as conduits for 
communicating information regarding the identification and trustworthiness of potential 
partners, rather than as platforms on which to engage in a partnership. Perhaps the best 
explanation for the case study evidence is that Malaysian companies adopt a simplistic 
approach in their search for international alliance partners. Instead of spending significant 
resources on a comprehensive search based on information sourced from a variety of 
channels and culminating in the identification of the best choice from among a large list 
of alternatives, the investors in this study relied on more informal information sources, 
considered very few alternatives, and generally chose partners considered to be “good 
enough”. The high level of uncertainty in the investment environment combined with the 
paucity of good quality information regarding the risk levels of different investment 
alternatives compelled the decision makers in this study to exploit their social networks 
in both their search for and evaluation of potential alliance partners.  
 
Consistent with Granovetter’s (1973) finding, weak ties or acquaintances provided 
investors with the greatest amount of information regarding investment alternatives. 
However, consistent with the claims of Burt (1992), Uzzi (1996) and others, strong ties 
between intimates provided a better base for establishing the trustworthiness of potential 
partners and embedding new ventures in an initial stock of trust appropriated from 
preexisting relationships. The cross case findings of this exploratory investigation support 
the idea that social networks provide a valuable resource for reducing international 
strategic alliances partner search costs. Specifically, the findings revealed that, while 
weakly linked bridge ties are valuable in identifying potential partners, searches based on 
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strong ties tend to be shorter and provide a more robust basis for inter-partner 
cooperation. In the context of strategic alliances, a potential investor may be expected to 
ly on existing ties with others when those ties expedite the diffusion of market 
 
re
information across international boundaries (Ellis, 2000; Rangan, 2000). Rather than 
trying to identify the ideal partner in the market, investors will limit their search to those 
potential partners about whom they have the greatest knowledge and then select the best 
choice from among this restricted set (Podolny, 1994). From this, it can be inferred that 
the identification of familiar partners negates some of the need for a thorough evaluation 
as the candidates’ traits are already known to the investor. Alliances built on trust enjoy a 
number of advantages because in the absence of such a foundation each partner will be 
more tentative in making contributions and more circumspect in hedging against 
opportunism (Madhok, 1995).  
 
Connecting these two ideas leads logically to the conclusion that alliances based on 
strong ties will exhibit higher levels of inter-firm cooperation. In summary, the role 
alliance managers’ play in the alliance management process can never be undervalued. 
As demonstrated by the cases in this thesis, what matters most are not the nicely worded 
legal agreements and initial partner compatibility, but how interaction is actually 
managed, because continuous realignment in the strategy needs to be a given rather than 
an option. Hence it is imperative for an alliance to demonstrate some early satisfactory 
results so as to keep partners on side.  
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5.7  Underlying Forces Driving Malaysian Companies into Partnerships  
The literature in Chapter three has identified some key driving forces for alliance 
artnerships. These have included globalization, market access, risk and uncertainty, 
 included those objectives relating to the need to 
establish, or be part of, a large global presence, to gain market knowledge and 
size, ensure competitive defence and/or to deal with regulatory and political 
p
access to technological skills, response to increasing competition and the need to 
consolidate market position. Data collected confirmed that a number of objectives for 
alliance entry existed in line with those noted from the literature. These objectives were 
categorized into: 
1)  Product focused drivers – encompassing those objectives associated with the need 
to develop new, or broaden current, product/service offerings and bring them to 
market ahead of the competition. 
2)  Market forces drivers – which
barriers to new market entry. 
3)  Financially focused drivers – referring to objectives associated with a means of 
maintaining, or improving, the individual firm’s financial position under given 
competitive circumstances (see Figure 5.5). 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that these categories were not mutually exclusive and 
many companies evidenced more than one objective in the data collected. 
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Market focus
Financial focus  Product focus 
Figure 5.5 Strategic alliance drivers 
 
Examination of the data further showed that the overriding aim for many respondents was 
the need to retain position and profit margins by entering and operating within one of the 
growing networks of ‘blocks’ created within the respective industries: 
We cannot compete with everyone. We end up having mega blocks as others ally 
resulting in block competition of big systems. We need to be in these systems. 
 
Thus, the partnership response within Malaysian companies demonstrated a direct link 
with the increasing competitiveness and dynamics of the business environment in which 
th  found that for some there was a reactive aspect 
overriding their approach to the alliance. For others the alliance strategy was used as a
partnership. Once 
establis
ese firms operate. However, it was
 
more positive and driven opportunity to move forwards. Further, the majority of 
evidence, collected, showed that, financial objectives, alongside market focused 
objectives, took priority as key drivers for entry into an alliance 
hed, however, product focused objectives were then pursued by the more 
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productive relationships, but were rarely a sole driving force for the partnership at the 
beginning. 
 
5.7.1  The level of Uniqueness 
The literature in Chapter three has suggested that, to varying extents, all resources and 
capabilities are unique due to the different levels of efficiency, utility or superiority with 
which they are used by a particular organization. It is the level of uniqueness that can, 
therefore, influence the cooperative or competitive intent of a partner firm. A number of 
factors were identified from the data which influenced the extent to which a particular 
key skill or competence might be considered to be unique. The most significant included 
e reputation of the partner, the relative size of the partner firm, the existing network the 
e cultural understanding or locational advantage of a 
become a member of a world wide network. We have 10 operations around the world. 
th
partner firm belonged to, and th
particular geographic region. These characteristics could reduce alternative options for 
the entrant firm. From the data collected, six companies identified that some level of 
uniqueness did exist in terms of a partner firm’s market presence, thus strongly relating 
this driver to locational access or existing network entry. This significantly limited the 
choice of partner: 
  We don’t come empty handed. We come along and say if you let us in you will 
 
A further three companies suggested that skills development was partially specific and 
therefore to some extent reliant upon the selected partner. This most frequently related to 
a particular partner’s skill of operating within, or understanding of, the local market. An 
additional two companies noted an element of uniqueness in respect of technology 
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development. In these cases the partner firm was viewed as critical in providing a key 
part of the technological skills relevant to the relationship. A further six companies 
ompetencies to the relationship. They were thus pursuing objectives which could not be 
for them to work, this provides a good symmetry, neither is dominant. 
.7.2  The Level of Value 
of market size, the ability to leapfrog political barriers, and 
chieving competitive defence all cited in eight companies interviewed: 
involved in the relationships recognized that both partners contributed unique skills or 
c
achieved through another partner. These relationships were planned to remain stable with 
no anticipation of take over or disbandment by either firm involved: 
  Both of us are equal partners, each has one element which is needed by the other 
 
It was therefore considered that the level of uniqueness of a key skill or competence can 
significantly influence the level of competitive or cooperative intent of an entrant partner. 
However, where both partners are characterized by equally high level of unique resources 
or competencies, this can encourage a higher level of stability within the venture and in 
that context both competitive and cooperative approaches may be generated within a 
relationship by this driver. 
 
5
The value of a key resource or capability of a partner firm had been identified from the 
literature as influencing the level of competitive and cooperative intent adopted by the 
entrant partner. Analysis of the population data indicated that a significant number of 
objectives associated with the market focused category of drivers were viewed by 
respondents as highly valuable. Market presence was noted in seventeen companies 
interviewed, with gaining 
a
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  It has cost us very few international customers but we have been able to get a 
world wide distributor through our partner, so this is value added success around the 
 
Noticeably, three of the respondents in this category identified value as being 
fundamental to their individual organization, rather than to the mutual partnership. 
Twelve respondents identified a high level of value associated with the product focused 
category of drivers. However, the emphasis upon individual rather than mutual value was 
even higher here, with thirteen respondents citing technology development, and 100 per 
cent of respondents noting that individual acquisition of skills development, should it 
art of the mutual relationship: 
law etc, all have to be improved to benefit the organization, this is our aim. Alliances 
 
A number of factors were cited which were seen to limit the extent to which value could 
be transferred to an individual partner. Of the responses, five and three companies 
respectively cited the scope and size of respective partner as being a key limitation in 
terms of value creation to the individual firm. This was largely in relation to the 
broadening of the product and service range, and to gaining market size, presence and 
knowledge in a previously unrepresented geographical or product area. Also, three 
rms of its perceived future contribution to the organization: 
 
world. 
occur, would be most valuable when transferred to their own organization, rather than as 
p
  It is not only cultural awareness, but in technical skills, in economic, taxation, 
allow skills gain, it is an element. 
companies noted the cost involved and the consequent cost/benefit of the investment in 
te
  The value our partner brings is significant. We cannot transfer or imitate this as 
costs are too high. 
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Synergies already generated by the mutual relationship, regulatory barriers and the pace 
at which transfer could be undertaken were also noted as key limiting factors. Thus, it 
may be suggested that it is the value as perceived by the entrant firm which will influence 
the extent to which a competitive approach will be adopted by that partner. However, this 
value will be judged in relation to the benefits/limitations of transfer which are identified. 
Analysis of the data therefore suggested that the extent of the perceived relative value of 
itive intent to be pursued by an entrant partner. 
 
5.7.3  The Level of Transparency   
The level of openness, or transparency of a partner firm, the literature suggests, will have 
a direct influence upon the realizability of a cooperative and competitive approach by an 
entrant partner. Initial investigation of this aspect focused on identifying the factors in a 
relationship that influenced transparency. These were found to operate at two different 
levels. At one level was those factors which were determined by the initial assumptions 
and agreements of the partnership, and a second level could be associated more with 
ongoing operational issues. Both levels are discussed in detail below. From the initial 
assumptions level of factors, the most frequently noted in the dataset was the perceived 
permanence of the partnership. This was thought to encourage a more flexible and open 
approach to the partnership and encouraged more commitment although it could take 
time to achieve. Equity investment was also viewed as a tangible sign of permanence in 
this respect: 
a partner firm’s key resources and capabilities can contribute towards a 
cooperative/compet
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  It is felt that equity involvement produces longer lasting links. This creates a 
time but the overall aim is to achieve complementarity and aim to develop together. 
on gaining t
symbolic value and strengthens the relationships. The learning aspect is existent all the 
 
Trust and clear recognition of expected mutual benefit was also noted by many 
respondents respectively as encouraging a greater level of openness and cooperation 
within the relationship: 
  We also have a China venture which is not making much at present it has no focus 
rust and loyalty. It is very important that you trust your partners. Doing 
business is not like playing a game. We are very serious. Many firms in China promise 
t the operational or ongoing level, four companies noted that the level of 
 returns from the partnership. Emphasis upon staff exchange and 
art of a big 
mily. 
 
The need for regularity and frequency of meetings, alongside the need to establish and 
develop a good operational structure for the partnership where clear mutual goals were 
identified and supported were also seen as having a direct bearing on transparency levels. 
The data also evidenced that different levels of transparency could be attributed to 
different industries. Levels of transparency were considered to be relatively lower in the 
spondent from the telecommunications sector registering disappointing levels of 
you a lot before joining a venture. Afterwards, they cannot keep the promise. 
 
A
communication had an influence upon the level of transparency which could be achieved. 
Where this was poor it created barriers, or at the very least extended the length of time 
needed to gain expected
joint training were also noted by three of the respondents: 
  You need to make sure that the key people in the office are experienced to other 
people in the partnership, not isolated. See that people understand they are p
fa
telecommunications industry, than with the airline or manufacturing industries, with 
re
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transfer achieved against expectations. As this sector is currently characterized by a 
greater level of competitive dynamics and environmental uncertainty, this is likely to be a 
reflection of a more defensive stance by firms in this industry. Thus, it was deduced from 
the data that the level of transparency of a partner firm can enable or disable the 
competitive intent of an entrant partner. However, the extent to which this is seen to 
occur will depend upon the original expectation level set by the entrant partner, and will 
be influenced by the dynamic context of the industry environment. 
 
5.7.4  The Level of Cultural Compatibility 
Literature on business partnerships identified that national and/or corporate differences 
can have impact on the ability of either partner to realize a chosen cooperative or 
competitive approach. Where low levels of compatibility exist this can encourage a lack 
of commitment to long term relationships and, therefore, facilitate a competitive 
perspective. Conversely where high levels of compatibility are evident, a longer term 
ooperative approach can be more easily established. Analysis of the sample data showed 
s significant in forming and maintaining a 
culture is confronted in a meeting, the German tends to be careful, but UK and US people 
though it is very conservative, they may have to change. 
c
that eleven companies noted corporate culture a
good relationship, whilst seven companies identified the need for high levels of national 
culture compatibility in this context. Problems stemming from poor national and 
corporate culture were acknowledged in four companies, which caused a strain on the 
relationship: 
  You experience a different business culture. If someone with a German business 
tend to typically more open. The partner is not a typical to our organization culture, 
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Despite fairly widespread recognition of the problems associated with cultural 
incompatibility, the interview data showed that a number of factors acted to limit the 
possible choice of partner, thus sometimes leading to little alternative for a firm than to 
enter a partnership with some level of recognized incompatibility existent. The most 
lationship. The relative size of the partner was a further recognized limiter of partner 
It is difficult for small companies to make alliances. Cultural differences can get in the 
 
The level at which the agreement for partnerships was made, alongside 
geographical/market requirements and language restrictions, are also influencing factors 
on partner choice, thus affecting the selection process further: 
  The partner is strong in Germany, we can use this. Also politics precluded an 
y for you in 
that country. 
te these limitations, evidence from the interview confirmed that where partners had 
achieved good cultural matches, this had a strong positive impact on intent realization. Of 
respondents pursuing positive, long term cooperative and competitive learning 
approaches, fifteen companies noted a high level of corporate and national compatibility. 
Of those firms that reported low levels of corporate and national compatibility, they were 
significant of these was the need to gain agreement from, and availability of, a chosen 
partner. Thus, there was a need for both partners to recognize potential benefits from the 
re
choice. Where a culturally compatible partner was relatively small, it was often rejected 
due to its inability to offer the size advantages being sought. Conversely, a much larger 
partner could impose too much control or dominates a smaller organization: 
  Governments and large organizations like to deal with other large organizations. 
way. 
alternative of working with a non German company. You need them to lobb
 
Despi
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pursuing short-term competitive intents focusing on skill or competence acquisition. For 
some, cultural incompatibility had developed over time as both partners had grown apart. 
As a result fewer benefits were being gained by the partners and increasingly competitive 
approaches could be seen to be developing with some of these: 
  There is also a difference in culture now. We used to have a common interest. 
 
dence summarized above, 
fluence the extent to which a cooperative/competitive intent can be pursued within a 
partnership.  
 
5.7.5  The Level of Experience 
It has been argued that a higher level of experience of partnering will lead to increasing 
levels of confidence and understanding of how to manage and use the relationship to the 
best advantage. It is therefore worth considering the influence of experience upon the 
realization of an entrant partner’s intent. The data was analysed to compare different 
levels of experience within the population. Of the respondents, eleven companies said 
they had high or significant levels of experience in partnering (classified as 10 years and 
over). At the lower end, only four companies felt they were inexperienced in this respect 
Everyone was working for the same thing. Now we all have a different philosophy. 
 
Exposure to, and training in, cross cultural management skills enhances the alliance 
management process. This allows partners to appreciate differences and to work on 
common interests, rather than to focus on faultfinding. The ability to focus on the big 
picture, while simultaneously tracking operational or process issues, is an alliance art that 
managers need to master. It is, therefore, suggested from the evi
that although sometimes difficult in reality to achieve, cultural compatibility does 
in
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(classified as less than 5 years). In relation to the approaches to the partnership pursued, 
learning experience we can use. We do have a meeting which is supposed to look at 
mistakes or where things go wrong with alliances is very badly shared. Although we are 
 
It is clear from the above analysis that the motivation to enter into an alliance is also 
significantly related to the particular characteristics and experience both of the 
corporation and its top decision maker and suggests that breath of experience of the 
company operating internationally is important. The characteristics of the CEO parallel 
the corporate characteristics to some extent. Successful experience in a variety of 
s years of experience with strategic alliances. This is consistent with Harrigan’s (1985) 
six of the firms with high or significant levels of experience were pursuing a complex, 
stable cooperative and competitive learning approach to the relationship. These firms 
were planning to gaining from long term synergies of the partnership and also benefiting 
from skill or technology exchange. Only one of the inexperienced firms was in the same 
position. There was however, evidence that the level of experience should also be 
considered in connection with the level of learning in an organization. In this respect, size 
was a relevant factor. Larger organizations appeared to find it more difficult to learn from 
previous partnership experiences, and to disseminate this throughout the organization. 
Additionally, poor communication and an unsupportive organizational culture could 
throw up additional barriers to learning: 
  Where people who work for you have experience of bad alliances this is a good 
problems with past ventures as part of its meaning, however I think information on 
trying to learn, we are just not very good at it yet. 
environments generates confidence that the CEO is able to cope with a different culture. 
It would also appear that years of industrial experience for managers is not the same thing 
a
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findings that successful management of strategic alliances often requires a different 
management style from that of the parent company. 
 
It can therefore be considered from the evaluation above that the level of experience of 
partnering relationships can enable/disable the ability of an entrant firm to exercise to 
exercise a cooperative or competitive intent. However, the extent to which it does so will 
also be influenced by the learning ability within the organization.  
 
5.8  Strategic Alliance Motives and Objectives in Malaysia 
The investigation reported here strongly supports the point first adumbrated by Tomlison 
970) that the motivating factors for establishing a strategic alliance should be clearly 
ifferent cultures may 
rovide completely different ways of satisfying a particular desire…Apparently ends in 
e those ends”. This thesis 
(1
differentiated from the motivating factors involved in partner selection; they are two 
separate decision processes. This distinction between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ is consistent 
with psychological theory, (Maslow, 1970; Dichter, 1971), and this distinction, is also 
related to cultural issues. As Maslow (1970, p.22) says, “two d
p
themselves are far more universal than the roads taken to achiev
distinction between ‘task related’ factors and ‘partner related’ factors appears to be of 
importance, and is related to the ends means dichotomy. 
 
An explanation for the use of strategic alliances stems from theories on how strategic 
behavior influences the competitive positioning of the firm (Kogut, 1988). Porter and 
Fuller (1986), Contractor and Lorange (1988) and Glaister and Buckley (1996) all 
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provide catalogues of reasons for joint venture formation from a strategic perspective. 
Ohmae (1989), Hamel (1991) and Hegedoorn (1995) also provide rich literature in why 
firms might seek collaboration in their competitive efforts. Several of the same motives 
are identified by these authors, while some of the motives overlap. The main elements of 
e motives identified in the literature are outlined below: 
2.  risk sharing 
4.  complementary resources 
6.  economies of scale 
 
otives would vary with the 
r. To better understand collaboration patterns, Malaysian 
queried as to why they ally with a foreign partner (motivations). From 
 and discussion based on semi structured interviews with Malaysian 
ed consisting of sixteen motives 
r Malaysian companies. These included the main motives identified in the literature, 
th
1.  technological knowledge 
3.  competition 
5.  market access 
7.  conform to host government policies  
 
However, the prior literature gives little indication of what to expect in terms of the 
relative importance of a set of motivating factors for strategic alliance activity. It may be 
argued however, that the relative importance of the m
nationality of foreign partne
companies were 
the prior literature
companies, a separate set of strategic motives was deriv
fo
while making some adjustments for some of the motives of the Malaysian firms due to 
their idiosyncratic situation. These adjustments encompassed adding and/or dropping 
some of the motives in order to form a suitable list of Malaysian firms. The strategic 
motives of Malaysian firms for strategic alliance formation are set in rank order in Figure 
5.6. 
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Figure  5.6  Strategic Motivation of Malaysian firms for Strategic Alliance 
Motivation Rank 
Formation 
To enable high quality production  1 
To facilitate transfer of technology  2 
To cope with industry competition  3 
Enabling faster market entry  4 
To enhance the company’s image  5 
To introduce modern managerial techniques  6 
Resource and capacity usage  7 
Economies of scale  8 
To trai rkforce  n local staff/wo 9 
To benefit from foreign partner’s financial resources  10 
Risk sharing  11 
Exclusive access to inputs  12 
To estab   1   lish local R&D capabilities 3
Non transferability of technology by licensing and  14 
patents 
Po 1   tential problems with licensing and patents  5
To benefit from government incentives  16 
 
To enable high quality production, facilitate transfer of technology, cope with industry 
d enhance the comp ’s image constitute 
the first five with the highest degree of importance. It is clear fr
highest ra erned with transfer of technology and enabling high 
quality prod increasing competition and to achieve market 
expansion. The second group of strategic motives (those ranked 6 to 9), which are still 
considered important are concerned with the acquisition of skills, managerial learning 
competition, enabling faster market entry an any
om Figure 5.6 that the 
nked motives are conc
uction in order to cope with 
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and the efficiency of production. The third and lowest ranked group (10 to 16) consists of 
a number of distinct motives. The leading otive in the third group is ‘benefit from 
articularly in the last decade and now more firms in 
alaysia are open to joint venture deals and are searching for suitable partners. For 
 m
foreign partner’s financial resources’. The strategic motives of ‘risk sharing’ and 
‘exclusive access to inputs’, are not seen as particularly important driving forces. 
Similarly, the motive of ‘establish local R&D capabilities’ does not feature as being 
important. Transaction cost specific motives of both ‘non-transferability of technology by 
licensing and patents’, ‘potential problems with licensing and patents’ and the motive of 
‘benefit from government incentives’ are the lowest ranked motivating factors for this 
sample of Malaysian firms. The finding that economies of scale, resource and capacity 
usage, exclusive access to inputs and non transferability of technology by licensing and 
patents are important for Malaysian firms is not particularly suprising. Most Malaysian 
companies are operating with low production capacity and remain largely focused on 
their narrow domestic market.  
 
Malaysia has few companies that are able to hold their own against giant global 
competitors and the majority of domestic firms are characterized as medium sized 
businesses that are more vulnerable to weak management and are experiencing low 
capacity production and low productivity. Therefore, Malaysian companies have turned 
to strategic alliances as a vehicle to overcome the high manufacturing costs of developing 
new products and to attain economies of scale in order to cope with increasing 
competition in the domestic market. In fact strategic alliance formation has been 
accelerating at a rapid pace p
M
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Malaysian companies, strategic alliances are likely to be more effective means of 
transferring technology than arm’s length contracts such as licensing and patents. 
Strategic alliance can enable the Malaysian firms to purchase materials and equipment 
from the foreign partner and also provides access to technical and managerial skills and 
the international experience of the foreign multinational.  
 
5.9 Conclusion 
The findings arising from the cross case analysis are briefly evaluated against the 
theoretical summary derived from the extant literature from Chapter three. The discussion 
reviews the theoretical contributions of the strategic alliance partner selection and 
alliance management to the extant literature both in the West and Malaysia. This is then 
followed by insights from the cross case analysis. This exercise is important because a 
thesis such as this, which uses the case study method, is aimed at deriving theoretical 
generalisations rather than statistical generalisations (Yin 1994). This process also fulfils 
eory triangulation to complement the process of data triangulation (Yin 1994; 91-92; 
 in the actual research. The cross case analysis and theoretical 
th
Patton 1990) undertaken
summary provide the empirical and theoretical base for the conclusions to this thesis in 
Chapter six.  
 
This study sheds some light on alliance management at the initial stages in partnerships 
between Malaysian and foreign companies. The researcher explored the task and partner 
related criteria Malaysian companies use when selecting a foreign partner. Important as 
they are, task related criteria may be expected to have a lesser weight in the process of 
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partner selection than partner related criteria do, with the exception of capabilities related 
to local knowledge. Thus, normally task related criteria do not impose tough constraints 
on selecting the partner. At the same time, the management difficulties that partnerships 
usually present due to the fact that two companies are brought together are accentuated 
y the fact that Malaysian and foreign companies come from very different backgrounds. 
ips are poised between being ends and 
eans to ends. Consequently, it can be inferred that this whole phenomenon of strategic 
b
Since paying attention to partner related criteria may diminish these differences, such 
criteria gain weight when selecting the partner.  
 
This finding is consistent with Geringer’s finding that the relative importance of selection 
criteria is contingent upon the strategic context of a partnership (Geringer 1991). In this 
connection, this study has found that Malaysian firms do not consider every option thus 
supporting the view of Cyert and March (1963) with regard to managerial decision 
making. It is also clear from the study that the range of possibilities, in this case the range 
of possible alliance partners, is restricted in all sorts of ways, some of these 
unconsciously employed. It also seems to be the case that relationships have pre-eminent 
place in strategic alliances, and these relationsh
m
alliances is affected by circumstance and opportunity, by chance and sometimes 
miscalculation. 
 
Managing the relationship encounters difficulties that stem from two main sources 
namely operational and cultural differences, the latter influencing the former. Attention 
paid to partner related criteria at the selection stage will affect the initial process of 
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managing the relationship. While more attention to assessing the ability of both 
companies to work together will enhance the prospects of the partnership, an adaptation 
of classical business practices prevailing in the developed countries is also a key for 
success in Malaysian alliances, with a necessary adaptation in managerial processes such 
as goal setting, performance monitoring, conflict resolution and information sharing. 
inally, one area that deserves special attention is the process of trust building. Legal 
and the partner’s willingness to share its expertise with them. Also, due to the 
F
contracts play no significant role in this process. On the contrary, organizational aspects 
such as openness in decision making and conflict resolution as well as good interpersonal 
relationships have an important impact on this process. Results from this study showed 
that there were some significant differences in the characteristics sought for alliance 
partners between Malaysian companies and developed countries companies. However, 
there were also some interesting similarities. Following are important conclusions from 
this study. 
1.  Firms in developed countries place heavy emphasis on the financial assets of a 
partner as well as its intangible resources (to include managerial capabilities, 
reputation, human resources and unique core competencies). They are also 
interested in a partner that complements their particular skills and knowledge 
set. These core skills and knowledge set are often embedded in a firm’s 
systems and produce the firm’s competitive advantage. 
2.  Malaysian executives place heavy emphasis on the technical capabilities of a 
partner, along with other special skills that they can learn from their partner 
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likely influence of the Malaysian national government, Malaysian firms place 
strong emphasis on the attractiveness of the partner’s industry. 
3.  Likely due to the global emphasis on quality, both developed countries and 
Malaysian managers place importance on a partner’s capabilities to provide 
quality products and services. 
4.  Malaysian firms are searching for partners from which they can learn and to 
ough they may 
 
Dif n be complementary and lead to successful 
exem to successfully compete in global 
suc characteristics 
com
str an, 1985). 
which they can provide a mutual benefit. 
5.  Developed countries’ executives seem to be centred more on achieving their 
firm’s own goals, with less emphasis on their partner’s benefit. 
6.  Considering the complete range of important criteria utilized by both sets of 
managers, there are several similarities in the criteria used (alth
vary somewhat in their importance in partner selection). 
ferent skill sets between partners ca
strategic alliances. On the other hand, many Malaysian firms have shown that they have 
plary managerial capabilities by their ability 
markets. Furthermore, this achievement has produced some large and financially 
cessful firms. Thus, it is likely that a number of Malaysian firms have 
desired by potential partners and as such, provide desirable resource profiles. Because 
plementary goals and resource profiles have been found important to the success of 
ategic alliances, these findings are of profound importance (Harrig
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Alternatively, while the top three criteria from both sets of managers may be met by 
potential partners from the other country, the fourth criterion on the list may be more 
difficult to satisfy. For example, it may be a challenge to find a Malaysian partner that 
has capabilities complementary to those of a OECD (Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development) from a developed country firm. Likewise, while 
developed country firms may have the technical capabilities and special skills desired by 
a Malaysian firm, they may not be willing to allow the Malaysian firm to learn them. 
Developed country firms may fear that allowing such activity could create a future 
ompetitor. Thus, they may attempt to buffer their core capabilities from their partner in  c
an alliance, leading to partner dissatisfaction. As a result, alliances between developed 
country and Malaysian firms still are likely to be complex and fraught with potential 
problems. While the results suggest that a number of developed country firms and 
Malaysian firms may have desirable resource profiles for alliance partners, finding the 
optimum partner, nonetheless, will be no easy task. The information needed to identify 
feasible potential partners may be time consuming to obtain. Furthermore, once partners 
with desired resource profiles are identified, negotiations must be initiated to develop a 
suitable alliance agreement.    
 
The results of this case study support and extend the Hitt et al (2000) findings by showing 
that emerging market firms differ in their partner selection criteria based on the 
institutional environments in which they must operate. In particular, this study found 
similarities as well as some important differences in alliance partner selection used by 
Malaysian and developed country managers. This study predicted several differences 
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based on the institutional frameworks in the two countries and this study predictions’ was 
largely supported by the results. The results also provide empirical evidence for the 
influence of the institutional environment on strategic decisions of firms based in another 
portant emerging economy such as Malaysia. The results of this study show that there 
t were of lower priority (as shown in Figure 5.7). Clearly, the results of this 
search show the importance of both tangible and intangible resources in the selection of 
im
are differences between Malaysian and developed country preferences for alliance 
partners. Most of these differences were predicted based on differences in the 
institutional environments in Malaysia. The two differences seemingly unrelated to the 
institutional environments were on industry attractiveness and cost of alternatives. Still, 
majority predictions based specifically on institutional theory for criteria used in alliance 
partner selection by managers in Malaysia were supported by the results. Therefore, the 
empirical results of this study suggest that strategic decisions of firms in emerging 
economy are significantly influenced by the institutional environments in these 
economies. 
 
Figure 5.7 summarizes the results of this study. The Malaysian firms, as expected, more 
strongly emphasized partners’ technical capabilities, industry attractiveness, special skills 
they can learn from partner, willingness to share expertise and capabilities to provide 
quality in their search for international alliance partner. Partners’ complementary 
capabilities and managerial capabilities were important and of similar priority to both 
Malaysia and developed market firms but the cost of alternatives were unimportant to 
Malaysian firms. The other partner characteristics not mentioned above were important in 
Malaysia bu
re
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international alliance partners. The financial assets desired in partners by developed 
market firms are largely tangible. The technical and managerial capabilities desired by 
Malaysian firms and the unique competencies, market knowledge, and access desired by 
developed market firms are largely intangible. In fact, several of these intangible 
resources are based on tacit knowledge. Most are valuable, and because of their tacit and 
intangible nature, they are difficult to imitate, thereby providing a basis for a competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Figure 5.7  Priorities in Selecting Alliance Partners by Market Type   
Importance/Priority Malaysian  Firms  Developed Country Firms 
Important and differential priority  1)Technical Capabilities 
3)Special Skills You can Learn     
from Partner 
4)Willingness to share expertise 
5)Capabilities to provide quality 
1)Financial assets 




2)Industry Attractiveness  2)Managerial capabilities 
Important and similar priority  1)Complementarity capabilities  1)Complementarity capabilities 
2)Managerial capabilities  2)Managerial capabilities 
Important but lower priority  1)Unique competencies 
4)Intangible assets 
1)Intangible assets 
4)Cost of alternatives 
2)Market knowledge/access 
3)Previous alliance experience 
5)Financial assets 
2)Market knowledge/access  
3)Previous alliance experience 
5)Industry attractiveness 
Unimportant 1)Cost  of  alternatives 
2)Partner’s ability to acquire 
skills 




Th ze the im izatio
eans of transferring tacit managerial 
and technological capabilities
firms search for partners from er . 
to  ners to understand even  
components of their capabiliti 98). D lso 
seek to gain local market knowledge and perhaps the uniqu  partners. 
e results also emphasi portance of organ nal learning as a basis for 
partner selection. Alliances are perhaps the best m
 (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996). Thus, Malaysian 
 which they can learn manag ial and technical capabilities
Alliances allow a firm  get close enough to part  tacit
es (Lane & Lubatkin, 19 eveloped country firms a
e competencies of
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The focus on organizational le ce decisions is at both 
Malaysian and developed cou artners 
 share their expertise and on special skills they could learn from partners. Thus, firms 
to transfer knowledge across organizational boundaries. Strategic similarity 
as also been shown to promote better performance in horizontal mergers (Ramaswamy, 
arning in allian  shown by the fact th
ntry firms placed importance on the willingness of p
to
involved in alliances seek to learn from the experience of others, one of the most 
productive means of organizational learning, according to March and Levitt (1999). Lane 
and Lubatkin (1998) suggested that this form of organizational learning often has a 
higher probability of producing a competitive advantage because it allows the transfer of 
tacit knowledge. Furthermore, other forms of learning such as written materials require 
the information to be fully articulable and thus available to all others including 
competitors.  
 
Therefore, these other forms of learning are not rare, and are less likely to produce a 
competitive advantage.  Learning from the experiences of others can provide significant 
benefits for an organization, but it can be difficult to know who has the most useful or 
applicable knowledge. Knowledge is acquired from many sources; from within the firm; 
from other firms; or from competitors and channel partners. This thesis also argues that 
partner similarity aids the search through a universe of potential knowledge sources. 
Indeed research on strategic alliances (Simonin, 1999) and strategic groups (Dranove, 
Peteraf and Shanley, 1998) suggests that firms with common business strategies may be 
better aligned 
h
1997). Results from the interviews indicate that this transfer happened most often 
between firms sharing similar strategies and problems. Two distinct strategies existed in 
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the sample of Malaysian companies and that of foreign partner and both were aware of 
these two strategies. In answering a free response question, participants described one 
group of foreign partners as “concerned with running a tight ship” and “interested in 
making a quality product with little waste.”  These descriptors seem to fit well with a cost 
conscious strategy. Respondents similarly described a second group of foreign partners as 
“concerned with customer response,” “driven to improve company awareness,” 
“concerned about training,” and “more concerned with quality and image”. This second 
set of descriptors seems to fit well with an expansion oriented strategy.  
 
Results from the interviews demonstrate that Malaysian companies focused on a similar 
set of strategies with their foreign partners. These results suggest that it is easier to share 
knowledge within, as opposed to across, strategy type. The pattern of responses also 
suggests that business strategy focuses manager attention on specific sets of problems. 
Selecting a transfer partner based on business strategy similarity seems to be the most 
accurate way for Malaysian companies to identify others with potentially useful 
knowledge. Although these results cannot directly demonstrate that managers consciously 
choose knowledge transfer partners based on strategic similarity, it does show that 
anagers are cognizant of different strategies and, given a choice, tend to align  m
themselves with potential knowledge transfer partners displaying a similar strategy to 
their own.  
 
The finding that partner company size and its quality of management are relatively more 
important for Malaysian firms appears to be relatively unsurprising, since the majority of 
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Malaysian firms are characterized as medium sized by international standard and suffer 
from lack of effective organization and weak management practices. Managerial 
expertise is particularly important in Malaysian firms to help acquire up-to-date 
technological capabilities to be efficient and produce goods of sufficient quality to 
compete with international firms in their domestic and global markets. The importance of 
quality for competitiveness in global markets (Sherman and Hitt, 1996) may be the 
rimary reason.  
 been particularly interested in gaining access to capital that has been 
ifficult and costly to obtain from Malaysia’s capital markets. Some Malaysian firms 
p
 
The proliferation of International Standards Organization (ISO) standards worldwide has 
placed pressure on firms from all countries to improve and maintain their quality. Thus, 
they search for partners with the technological capabilities they need to enrich their 
resource endowments. Although some Malaysian firms have adequate infrastructures, 
they still need access to more financial capital at a reasonable cost. The devaluation of the 
ringgit (Malaysian currency) post 1997 and economic conditions in Malaysia made it 
critical for Malaysian firms to seek partners with strong financial assets (Mat Nor, 2003). 
These firms have
d
interviewed expressed substantial concerns about the formation of strategic alliances and 
use of financial capital. Also, some evidence indicates that capital markets respond 
favourably to strategic alliance announcements (Koh and Venkatratman, 1991; 
McConnell and Nantell, 1985). 
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The finding that international experience of partner and relatedness of partner’s business 
are relatively more important for Malaysian firms tends to partially confirm Demirbag et 
al.’s (1995) findings that local firms are not only motivated by technology transfer or 
enabling high quality production but also motivated by other expectations such as 
enabling international market access and internationalization of their domestic business 
operations. These findings also provide support for the view that the transfer of 
technology and access to product constitutes the main task related criteria for developing 
ountry local firms when seeking partners from technologically advanced countries for  c
international strategic alliance formation (Datta, 1988; Yan and Gray, 1994; Gillespie and 
Teegen, 1995; Li and Shenkar, 1997). It is also apparent that Malaysian firms focuses 
more on partner related selection criteria, a finding which tends to support Arino et al. 
(1997) study. This indicates that there is a greater consensus among the firms in the 
sample on the relative importance of partner related selection criteria than on the 
importance of task related criteria. The relative importance of particular task related 
criteria will be somewhat specific to the underlying purpose of the strategic alliance. In 
contrast, particular partner related selection criteria will tend to be more general in nature, 
implying that the characteristics of a suitable partner will be more universal and will be 
related much less with the specific activities of the strategic alliance than will task related 
selection criteria (Glaister, 1997). 
 
The dynamic and complex nature of the strategic alliance can engender both cooperative 
and competitive responses from the partners involved. These responses can prove to be a 
decisive factor in establishing the basis of the partnership and, in its potential direction, 
  332 
orientation and success. This research confirmed that levels of uniqueness and value all 
contribute towards the overall cooperative/competitive intent with which an entrant 
partner will view, and attempt to operate within, an alliance relationship. Where a key 
skill or competence of a partner was considered to be relatively unique, was transferable 
 some form, and was not mirrored by the other partner’s contribution to the alliance, 
ore positive, learning 
pproach.  
the complexity, level and type of inter linkages between the two partners, national and 
in
this could engender a competitive approach by the other partner. In contrast, where 
transfer proved to be problematic or where both partners brought relatively unique 
contributions to the relationship, a more mutual longer term, synergistic approach was 
adopted by both partners. In the more productive of these relationships the competitive 
aspect of intent was then used as a more positive learning vehicle. 
 
In terms of value, intent was strongly influenced by the extent to which mutual or 
individual value was considered to provide the greatest benefit, skills and technology 
transfer tending to be viewed as providing more individual than mutual benefits once the 
relationship was established. The overall intent adopted was, however, also influenced by 
the relative size, scope or market or industry influence of the partner. Where this was 
extensive or the partner had strong network links, the pursued intent tended to be on a 
more cooperative basis, with the competitive factor used in a m
a
 
However, it was found that the ability to realize any of these particular strategies needed 
to be related to the second set of drivers identified from the study. These included the 
extent to which the partner firm allowed access to its skills and resources (transparency), 
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corporate cultural compatibility (within the limitations of choice available), and the prior 
experience of partnering. In these respects, the level of openness of the partner firm was 
identified as being relative to the initial expectations of the entrant partner. It could also 
be reduced where the industry was experiencing highly dynamic and uncertain 
haracteristics. Equally, the level of experience had to have been translated into a 
 closely with a 
rategic concern for firms in many liberalizing countries. Decades of protected markets 
high quality 
roducts and timely delivery. In post liberalization Malaysia, firms eagerly seek supply 
tion  and performance standards. 
c
learning element within the organization to be relevant in this context.   
 
As shown in Figure 5.6, the alliance managers in this study report a wide range of 
motivations for allying with foreign firms and from the analysis six major categories of 
motivations for Malaysian firms to ally with foreign partners can be drawn: 
 
1.  Access to a Foreign Partner’s Technical Expertise 
The most important motivation relates to access to a foreign partner’s expertise, as 
discussed above, with resources including supplier connections and materials as well as 
technology and product market knowledge. This motivation is tied
st
constrained Malaysian companies’ access to technological expertise and efficient 
suppliers. Local suppliers in that era were not subject to the competitive pressures that 
prioritize responsiveness to customer needs in areas such as consistently 
p
rela ships with foreign partner firms that have high quality
Linkages of this sort are required for these Malaysian firms that themselves now face 
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competitive pressures that can be addressed through effective supply chain management 
and assurances of high quality inputs domestically as well as from abroad. 
 
2.  Access to a Foreign Partner’s Marketing Expertise 
Access to a foreign partner’s marketing expertise is the second most important motivation 
for these Malaysian firms. This factor includes marketing infrastructure and relationships 
with important customers. Economic liberalization, coupled with advances in 
communications, has created strong pressures for Malaysian firms to better respond to 
consumer needs both domestically and internationally. Foreign partners, with greater 
xperience in competitive market places can provide their allies with knowledge that can 
tran markets in Malaysia are of 
at many 
alaysian firms are not willing to cede. By joining forces with capital rich partners, 
gal independence. 
e
be  sferred to the domestic markets in Malaysia. Domestic 
insufficient scale in many industries for production and marketing efficiencies. By 
accessing a foreign partner’s marketing infrastructure and client bases abroad, these firms 
can more readily tap into scale advantages as well as new areas for sales growth. 
 
3.  Access to a Foreign Partner’s Financial Resources 
Accessing a foreign partner’s financial resources (capital and credit line) further 
motivates many of these Malaysian firms to collaborate. This result is not surprising 
given the prevalence of capital constraints on many Malaysian firms. Domestic credit is 
scarce, and that which is available tends to be prohibitively costly for these firms. Direct 
investment in firms tends to be more stable, but implies a loss of control th
M
Malaysian allies can access funds whereas maintaining their le
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4.  Direct Access to Foreign Markets  
Direct access to foreign markets is sought by many Malaysian companies via their 
alliances with foreign companies by receiving regulatory permission to enter through the 
alliance and by utilizing the geographic market knowledge of the partner. The concern 
about regulatory permission is most notable for alliances with firms from countries that 
are not economically integrated with the home country of the Malaysian firm ally. To 
access those markets, Malaysian companies must identify a foreign firm that incorporates 
to its finished products or jointly develops 
investments in the business reduces the downside risk of their loss in the event of 
their components and process their goods in
products to gain access to the foreign partner’s market. In many cases, this takes the form 
of a joint venture formation. Even where a Malaysian firm can freely enter the foreign 
partner’s market in regulatory terms, lack of knowledge about the market itself poses a 
significant barrier to successful entry. Many of these Malaysian companies are new to the 
global business milieu, and thus lack the experience to know where, when, how and if to 
adapt their product offerings, promotion, pricing and distribution when entering a given 
market, such as the Europe. This need to access geographic market knowledge is likely to 
be most pressing in those markets representing large cultural distances from the 
Malaysian alliance partner home markets. 
 
5.  Risk and Cost Reduction 
Risk and cost reduction also motivates Malaysian firms to ally. By partnering with 
another firm, costs are often shared, reducing the financial investments necessary for any 
individual firm to undertake a given business venture. Clearly reducing financial 
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business failure. Another important way in which alliances allow firms to reduce risk is 
through diversification. By partnering with a firm in a different geographic market and/or 
ifferent product market, losses in one market may be offset by gains in others, reducing 
ll portfolio of investments. Where firms in an alliance 
ead of a firm against which to 
ompete. This finding is consistent with Harrigan (1988) that companies involved in the 
in, concentrate on what strategic alliances require to be 
d
the risk of the partner firm’s overa
specialize, they reduce costs and risk for the overall venture; each partner has already 
invested in progress along a given learning curve and the alliance then captures the 
benefits of this learning from both partners. Finally, by allowing for greater market 
access, and by avoiding duplication of efforts through rationalization, allying firms can 
further reduce costs of participating in their joint business. 
 
6. Competitive  Move 
Lastly, competitive moves also motivated Malaysian companies to collaborate with firms 
outside their borders. This motivation relates to partnering with the intention of bettering 
the firm’s potential in competitive field by blocking or co-opting potential competitors. 
By partnering with other firms, strong entry barriers are created that serve to limit the 
effective competition in a given product or geographic market. By partnering with a 
potential competitor, that firm is converted into an ally inst
c
venture process should, in the ma
able to compete effectively. 
 
In the last part of this chapter, the process of theoretical synthesizing was undertaken. 
This process was then extended to a process of juxtaposing the theoretical insights gained 
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from the literature review against the findings from the cross case analysis. In so doing, 
this chapter has fulfilled an important requirement of the case study method, namely the 
processes of data and theory triangulation. The study’s conclusions, together with 
answers to the seven research questions and main research problems, can now be 
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CHAPTER 6   CONCLUSIONS 
.1  Introduction 
hapter one introduced the purpose of the thesis and defined the main research problem. 
hapter two outlined the basic Malaysian economic framework and specifically looks at 
e structural transformations that have taken place in the Malaysian economy over the 
st three decades. The extant literature on strategic alliances and partner selection was 
viewed in Chapter three, resulting in the identification of six research questions. 
hapter four then identified phenomenology as the appropriate paradigm for this research 
nd subsequently the case study method as the most appropriate strategy for finding 












answers to the researc
for the selection of paradigm and method stemmed from the need for specific research 
that produces rich data to explain the high alliance failure rate world wide; research on 
the role that alliance managers play in determining alliance outcome; the fact that no 
empirical research has been hitherto undertaken on alliance partner selection in Malaysia; 
and that present research has focused only on preferred managerial aspects of strategic 
alliances to the neglect of a holistic approach to alliance managerial problems. The cross 
case analysis of the research data was presented in Chapter five. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the study’s conclusions to the six research 
questions and main research problem. The implications for policy and practice are also 
presented and a holistic conceptual model for strategic alliance partner selection deriving 
from the study is presented in section 6.3 which goes towards the thesis’ contribution to 
theory. This study’s limitations are discussed and potential areas for future research 
  339 
identified.  This chapter brings the results emerging from the cross case analysis and the 
theoretical evaluation in Chapters three and five, to bear on the six research questions and 
search problem. The presentation of a holistic conceptual model in Figure 6.1 
partnership candidate? 
This study sheds some light on management at the initial stages in partnerships between 
Malaysian and foreign companies. The author explored the task and partner related 
criteria Malaysian companies use when selecting a foreign partner. Important as they are, 
task related criteria were found to have a lesser weight in the process of partner selection 
than partner related criteria do. Thus, task related criteria do not impose tough constraints 
on selecting the partner, although there are exceptions such as capabilities to local 
knowledge. At the same time, the management difficulties that partnerships usually 
present companies are brought together are accentuated by the 
re
completes the thesis process cycle. In so doing, the thesis fills a major research gap on the 
subject matter, specifically about developing countries such as Malaysia and generally on 
the international alliance partner selection process and ultimately international strategic 
alliance success. 
 
6.2  Conclusions to research questions 
6.2.1  Research Question 1 
Which key characteristics did Malaysian companies search for in a 
 
 due to the fact that two 
fact that Malaysian and foreign companies come from very different backgrounds. Since 
paying attention to partner related criteria may diminish these differences, such criteria 
gain weight when selecting the partner. This finding is consistent with Geringer’s (1991) 
finding that the relative importance of selection criteria is contingent upon the strategic 
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context of a partnership. The results of this research also support and extend the Hitt et al 
(2000) findings by showing that emerging firms differ in their partner selection criteria 
based on the institutional environments in which they must operate. In particular, the 
author found similarities as well as some important differences in alliance partner 
selection criteria used by Malaysian and foreign managers. The results of this study show 
that there are differences between Malaysian and foreign companies’ preferences for 
alliance partners. The author found significant differences in eight of the fourteen criteria 
used in alliance partner selection. Most of these differences (five) were predicted based 
on differences in the institutional environments in Malaysia. The two differences 
seemingly unrelated to the institutional environments were on industry attractiveness and 
cost of alternatives. Still, six of seven predictions based specifically on institutional 
theory for criteria used in alliance partner selection by managers in Malaysia were 
supported by the results. The different foci in firms from Malaysia are evident in the use 
of previous alliance experience.  
 
Social connections and relationships are important in Malaysian culture. The importance 
of these connections is shown in the Malaysian firms’ emphasis on alliance partners’ 
previous alliance experience. They select partners with whom they can form a long term 
and trusting relationship, thereby developing social capital. Prior alliance experience 
provides information on the firm’s performance and reputation for reliability in its 
alliances. Firms with greater alliance experience are more likely to be trustworthy. Thus, 
the apparent link between alliance experience and performance (Harbison and Pekar, 
993; Simonin 1997) may be attributable to a firm’s tendency to develop new alliances  1
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with those it already knows (Gulati, 1995). Therefore, the empirical results of this study 
suggest that strategic decisions of firms in an emerging economy are significantly 
influenced by the institutional environments. The findings also revealed that in their 
search for potential alliance partners, none of the Malaysian companies interviewed in 
this study relied on market research or information procured from official trade 
promoting agencies. In all cases of partner identification studied, potential partners were 
identified primarily on the basis of existing social networks which were defined in terms 
of business and friendship ties. Moreover, this pattern of behavior was observed across a 
range of firm types and industries, supporting the idea that social networks provide a 
valuable resource for reducing search costs.  
 
In the initial search and identification process, weak ties between actors were most 
valuable in terms of generating the largest number of leads. However, where they existed, 
strong ties expedited the search process and provided a more robust basis for final 
selection and subsequent inter partner cooperation. Finally, whether identified via strong 
or weak ties selection outcomes were broadly similar across the sample, indicating that 
other partner and task related factors are also critical in the strategic alliance partner 
selection process. The determinants of strategic alliance partners are much more likely to 
e described by the match of partners’ core competencies (Harrigan, 1988) than in the  b
manner in which they first met. Further research is clearly needed before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 
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6.2.2  Research Question 2 
What initial conditions were critical for the future success of the partnership 
 
and what were the main differences between the two organizational cultures? 
Managing a partnership between Malaysian and foreign companies is not a trivial 
undertaking. Operational and cultural difficulties between the two types of companies 
introduce difficulties specific to this kind of partnership. Nonetheless, the operational 
difficulties may diminish if attention is paid to partner related criteria at the partner 
selection stage (Segil, 1996; 1997). The initial conditions deemed critical by Malaysian 
firms are most clearly understood as comprising a definition of the task to be performed, 
a set of action routines borrowed from the organizational contexts of each partner, a 
design 
ts first, expecting the partner to reciprocate, but 
sing the opportunity to build and test trust. One may argue that the evolution of 
for the interface between the partners, and a series of expectations about the 
performance of the alliance and the behavior of one’s partner towards and within it. 
These initial conditions were observed to facilitate the partner’s learning about the 
environment of the alliance, how to work together to accomplish the alliance task, their 
respective skills and each other’s goals.  
 
As the partners engaged into the alliances, and the initial conditions allowed them to start 
to learn from the joint or coordinated activities and from the interactions with each other, 
they also started to monitor the alliance for efficiency and each other for equity and 
adaptability. The cycles of alliances cumulated over time as alliance participants went 
through a sequence of progressively improving on the initial conditions of the alliance 
and of making increasingly irreversible commitments to the alliance. They were also 
willing to make irreversible commitmen
u
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collaborative agreements is driven primarily by their initial conditions (Doz, 1996). If 
these are wrongly configured, no amount of relationship building will compensate for 
their misspecification. 
   
All cases studied had alliance agreements in place. However, the main differences in 
organizational cultures between alliances arise when such agreements are juxtaposed with 
the presence of alliance management skills in particular process issues. In managing 
process issues, Malaysian firms depend heavily on the use of qualitative information 
rather than quantitative information to inform important decisions and the development 
of coping strategies to survive the negative effects of government influence, societal 
culture and resource deficiencies both at the organizational and environmental levels. The 
option of coping strategies by alliance managers in Malaysia is consistent with  ad
previous research findings from studies on Asian business networks (Haley 1997, Haley 
and Haley 1998). Such strategies tend to evolve over time from within organizations 
rather than following a formal rational plan, confirming the view of Mitzberg and Quinn 
(1996) on emerging strategy. Developing country environments tend to encourage 
improvisation because of resource deficiencies and high environmental turbulence (Dror 
1983). This research has demonstrated that governmental and socio cultural factors 
predominate in the national and local environments. Previous studies concur that 
governmental intervention often hampers international strategic alliance development 
from the point of view of foreign businesses (Beamish, 1993; Shenkar, 1990). Even from 
the perspective of Malaysian firms, such intervention hurts international strategic alliance 
performance. An important lesson for the Malaysian government and perhaps 
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governments in other economies as well is the understanding on how to use market or 
fiscal levers in lieu of administrative interference to boost investment and monitor 
subsequent activities. It seems that the development of strategic alliance management 
skills in Malaysia is still at an embryonic stage. The fact that the government of Malaysia 
is just gearing up to restructure all government linked companies attests to the state of 
management training in the country.  
 
6.2.3  Research Question 3 
What did each partner bring to the partnership to add value? 
The contributions from both Malaysian and foreign partners to the partnership are closely 
connected with the task related criteria for selecting a partner. Thus, we may expect the 
contributions from Malaysian companies are related to their knowledge of the local 
conditions and those from foreign companies are related to their knowledge of the 
business skills and technology access. The main contributions from the foreign 
ompanies were their industrial facilities and production capacity as well as their market 
e a basis to start with even if they require renovations. 
Some a rch for a good 
c
access. Local facilities provid
dditional contributions from foreign companies include the sea
location and ability to manage the process of securing regulatory approvals. When the 
latter is done by the local partner or by a specialized local institute, the process speeds up 
because of the locals’ knowledge of regulation and procedures and personal contacts. The 
main contributions from Malaysian companies are financial resources. Other 
contributions from Malaysian companies include experience and credibility and the 
initiative to undertake the project. Partners’ contributions to alliances are strongly 
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associated with business negotiations of collaborative arrangements. A list of potential 
contributions would not only speed up the process of negotiation but would also establish 
a clear path for discussion and understanding of each other’s views. Both short term and 
long term expectations over partners’ potential contributions would be expected to 
directly affect the negotiation process (Ghauri and Usunier, 1996). 
 
6.2.4  Research Question 4  
What initial obstacles in the partnership were most difficult to overcome? 
Two main sources of obstacles, and thus hindrances to success, are the operational and 
cultural differences between Malaysian and foreign companies, with the cultural having a 
key impact on the operational. This happens at all levels in the organization. Operational 
differences in the way of running a business stem from different concepts of company 
and the functions it is expected to perform. These radically different assumptions 
anslate into important differences in management practices that, when brought together, 




t difficulties in managing the partnerships include price setting, investm
policies, cost analysis and control, quality control and understanding the organizational 
structure. The research confirms the views expressed in the extant literature that 
developing countries are high in culture context with a strong relationship orientation. 
Therefore, it is recognized that culture is a strategic issue with a direct bearing on alliance 
management performance. Increasingly, there is a need to establish cultural fit between 
the partners’ organizational cultures and with societal culture. The cross case analysis 
found, however, that alliance managers found it difficult to establish cultural fit between 
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the partners’ culture and societal culture. As such, the research confirms the views 
expressed in the extant literature that highly volatile and information void environments 
buffet alliance process management in developing countries. The cross case analysis 
reveals that Malaysian firms which adopted formal governance structures were able to 
effectively manage the process issues of relationship building and process reengineering 
in order to make alliance management more effective. The research also confirms the 
theory of networking by Buttery (1992, cited in Buttery et al. 1994:23-24), that posits that 
there are five imperatives for networking success, and each needs to be operational in 
tandem with the networking situation. These are: (a) domain overlap, (b) something to 
offer (c) motivation to join the network, (d) appropriate business climate, and (e) 
bonding. Importantly, the research shows that in developing country contexts the fourth 
requirement for an appropriate business environment cannot always be guaranteed and 
may actually prove intractable for alliance managers.  
 
6.2.5  Research Question 5  
Did you feel that the legal contracts were effective to protect your interests? 
Malaysian companies unanimously agreed that legal contracts play no significant role in 
the process of trust building. The contract is the basis on which the partnership is 
developed. The challenge is to make it alive, but nobody will enforce it. Contracts 
between private institutions may work out, but they may also fail and prove useless. The 
fault lies not in the contract itself, but rather in the environmental conditions namely that 
ere is no market to sell either the share or the specific assets in case one partner wants 
at alliance agreements are insufficient 
th
to abandon the venture. This research revealed th
  347 
mechan  
 
what kind of actions or initiatives did you take to accelerate the process of 
 
e idea of trust seems akin to that of reliability. It takes time 
nd interactions to build confidence in the partner’s good faith. Malaysian companies 
heir counterparts’ trustworthiness. In particular, there are 
misund
contrac e less reluctant to 
isms for effective alliance management and that governance structures ensures the
management of interaction. 
 
6.2.6  Research Question 6  
What kind of things did you identify in your partner that made you trust it, 
trust building and what factors influenced this process?     
Building inter-partner trust as an aspect of managing the relationship deserves particular 
attention. For a partnership to be formed there must be some initial trust between the 
companies involved. As time passes, trust may be enhanced or destroyed (Gill and Butler, 
1996). In the early stages, th
a
face difficulties in assessing t
erstandings regarding commitment to the given word or unwritten aspects of the 
t. For example, foreign firms were occasionally found to b
perform in terms of providing access to technology to their Malaysian partners. As such, 
a good interface becomes very important. Often, it is difficult for Malaysian companies to 
assess the validity of the figures provided by their foreign counterparts; it then becomes 
critical to have a “feeling” for the company. Over time, the interactions between the 
partners help shape a deeper trust or else they destroy it. This process of trust building is 
influenced by how decision making is carried out, and by the companies’ attitude toward 
conflict resolution. Decision making by consensus involves lengthy discussion, but it 
brings the partners’ attitudes closer to each other. Interpersonal relationships become the 
cornerstone of trust building and develop over time. Malaysian firms’ discussion of trust 
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centred on three themes: communication, competition and integrity. For Malaysian firms, 
integrity of alliance partner (honesty, opportunistic behavior, underlying motives) 
represented a dominant concern and assumed the largest role in destroying trust. Fear of 
hidden agendas and ulterior motives preoccupied managers of Malaysian firms. They 
identified communication frequency and openness as important drivers of trust. As well 
as being mechanisms for minimizing transaction costs and pooling complementary assets, 
strategic alliances are also vehicles for transferring knowledge between firms (Lyles and 
Salk, 1996). Before the strategic aspects of any proposed alliance can be assessed, 
knowledge germane to the evaluation of potential partners must first be exchanged. This 
study has also highlighted the role social ties play in the early stages of that knowledge 
transfer process.  
 
Research on international business research has begun to uncover a connection between 
social structures and the pursuit of opportunities for international exchange and 
investment (e.g., Ellis, 2000; Rangan, 2000). Consistent with that work this study 
supports the view that economic exchange across borders follows information exchange 
which in turn, reflects antecedent network connections. Despite pressures for 
globalization, knowledge barriers persist creating “information insufficiencies” as 
indicated in the visible stickiness of trade flows (Rangan 2000). In such settings boundary 
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6.2.7  Research Question 7 
How important were the interpersonal relationships and how did the 
 
relationships change as time went on?  
Managing the relationship encounters difficulties that stem from two main sources 
namely operational and cultural differences, the latter influencing the former. Attention 
paid to partner related criteria at the selection stage will affect the initial process of 
managing the relationship. While more attention to assessing the ability of both 
companies to work together will enhance the prospects of the partnership, an adaptation 
of classical business practices prevailing in the West is also a key for success in 
Malaysian alliances, with a necessary adaptation in managerial processes such as goal 
setting, n, and information sharing.  
anagerial 
ulture. Appointing senior foreign executives to the board recognized the importance of 
 performance monitoring, conflict resolutio
 
One particular area that deserves special attention in improving interpersonal relationship 
is the process of trust building. Legal contracts play no significant role in the process. On 
the contrary, organizational aspects such as openness in decision making and conflict 
resolution as well as good interpersonal relationships have an important impact on this 
process. Answers to this question are two pronged, entailing strategies that were adopted 
by alliances to manage the process issues, and the adoption of coping strategies to make 
up for deficiencies in the business environment, organization component and m
c
relationship building in alliances. Malaysia’s relationship culture is characterized by 
personal contact and exchange obligations. All cases in this study demonstrate that solid 
personal relationships at both the strategic and operational levels enable alliances to be 
managed beyond the legal agreements and alliance structure. It is also clear that all cases 
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had designed governance structures to facilitate these close interactions. The importance 
of governance design and information technology for interfacing is confirmed in the work 
of Doz et al. (1998:127-140). At the same time Doz et al. (1998) make the point that few 
alliance managers understand how to actually move beyond the deal and the structural 
aspects of alliance design to the active management of alliances in order to create value. 
This point is showing up in the cases studied for this thesis. The research confirms the 
views of Doz et al. (1998:127-140) that formal governance structures and design greatly 
enhance the process management involving joint tasks, productive relationship building, 
reporting, planning and control, communication, boundary spanning, implementation and 
the propagation of alliance management skills at both strategic and operational levels.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes a holistic approach to the study of strategic alliances 
management in a developing country. The thesis has provided answers to the research 
problem from a developing country perspective by laying out the alliance management 
strategies adopted by cases in Malaysia relating to the alliance partner selection, alliance 
environment, organization component, alliance management skills, alliance management 
culture, and alliance management process. The thesis underscores the utility of strategic 
alliance (parent discipline) and specifically contributes to the immediate discipline of 
rategic alliance partner selection by noting that alliance managers in developing  st
countries in particular Malaysia have had to adopt various strategies that include an 
emphasis on qualitative information rather than quantitative data analysis due to the 
highly unpredictable and information void environments. In this environment, 
conventional methods of strategic management have not yet been well developed, but at 
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the same time questions must be asked about their utility, given that the validity of 
information has a short life span. 
 
 
6.3  Implications for theory 
A new holistic conceptual model for strategic alliance partner selection is presented in 
this section, modifying the preliminary conceptualisations presented in Chapter three. 
This model is based on the systems approach of this thesis and synthesizes the theoretical 
findings of the strategic alliance approach, strategic alliances theory, network theory and 
relationship approach on strategic alliances presented in Chapter three. Important 
additions to this model presented in Figure 6.1, emerge from the primary data presented 
in the case reports and evaluated in Chapter five. The alliance manager’s role is central to 
onfirms the point made in Chapter one that a major cause  this model, since the research c
of business network failure is related to management, particularly where partners are 
involved (Niederkofler 1991). The model also underscores systems components and 
strategy. It contributes a new dimension to alliance management by adding the 
importance of institutional context in the developing country for the purpose of 
enhancing the alliance performance as exemplified in the cases. The model shows that the 
management of the alliance depends on how the alliance manager makes sense of the 
organization environment, organization context, management culture, and management 
process. For each of these components a strategy emerges, developed either rationally 
(Glueck 1976) or incrementally (Mintzberg 1979; Mintzberg and Quinn 1996). The cases 
reveal that in developing country contexts, barriers to alliance management abound which 
elicits coping strategies from alliance managers. Such strategies are either used for 
coping with environmental and organizational deficiencies with the intention of 
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continuing the alliance, or as means for cutting losses where institutional barriers prevent 
early termination, eventually acting as exit strategies.  A description and rationale of the 
major components of the model is undertaken in the remaining part of this section. The 
model does not, however, provide a prescription for selecting partners, but offers a 
framework for what and when certain aspects should be considered. By their nature, 
projects are unique and a degree of discretion should be used in applying any general 
model to a particular project. In some cases, some factors will be more important than in 
other cases and these may need to be considered at different times from those suggested 
by the model. Nevertheless, the model does present a general strategy to be followed. 
Many alliances have been cancelled even after years of negotiations and costly feasibility 
studies, because of economic factors, changes in goals and so on. The process is highly 
demanding in terms of energy, time, persistence and diplomatic ability. At any rate, it is 
better for the money spent on planning to be wasted, rather than greater losses being 
risked by an unsuccessful alliance. 
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Figure 6.1   Partner Attributes and Strategic Alliances Success. 
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Alliance Manager 
The central role of alliance managers in alliance management is confirmed by insights 
from the strategic management approach (Limerick et al. 1998:91-96; Lorange et al. 
1983; Yoshino et al. 1995; Cauley De La Sierra 1995; Child et al. 1998; Doz et al. 1998). 
Niederkofler (1991:245) notes that the presence of inappropriate liaison managers 
exacerbates organizational differences between larger and small firms and public and 
private organizations such as cultural, structural and procedural incompatibilities. 
Further, Niederkofler (1991:246) specifically notes that alliances which faced difficulties 
in maintaining strategic and operating fit, had liaison managers who did not posses the 
appropriate position and skills or, even worse, no liaison manager was appointed. 
Spekman et al. (1996:347) identified the different roles that alliance managers have to 
perform in the various stages of the alliance cycle. In developing countries such as 
Malaysia, where society is highly relationship oriented and with a high culture context, 
selecting an alliance manager of suitable rank must recognize these factors. The cases 
also illustrate the importance of involving would be alliance managers early in the 
negotiation process, the importance of cross cultural management skills and the full 
backing of parent organizations. Alliance managers in Malaysia also face steep 
challenges because of cultural and institutional differences. 
 
Partner Attributes 
The intercultural and inter-organizational nature of international strategic alliances results 
in enormous complexity, dynamics and challenges in managing this cross border, hybrid 
form of organization. One popular argument is that inter partner comparative or 
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configurational features, variously termed as strategic symmetries (Harrigan, 1985), inter-
firm diversity (Parkhe, 1991) or complementary resources and skills (Geringer 1991) 
create inter partner fit which is expected to generate a synergistic effect on international 
strategic alliance performance (Luo, 1997). One of the key notions in the international 
strategic alliance literature is that these additional benefits will accrue only through the 
retention of a partner who can provide compatible goals, complementary skills, 
cooperative culture and commensurate risk (Brouthers, Brouthers & Wikinson, 1995). 
Partner selection determines an international strategic alliances mix of skills, knowledge 
and resources, its operating policies and procedures and its vulnerability to indigenous 
conditions, structures and institutional changes (Geringer 1991).  
 
In a dynamic, complex or hostile environment, the importance of local partner selection 
to international strategic alliances is magnified because the right partner can spur the 
international strategic alliances adaptability, strategy environment configuration, and 
uncertainty reduction (Luo, 1997). Moreover, local partners can assist foreign partners in 
obtaining insightful information and country specific knowledge concerning 
governmental policies, local business practices, operational conditions and the like. It 
also helps companies gain access to, secure at a low cost, locally scarce production 
factors such as labor force, capital or land. During the process of international strategic 
alliance formation, firms must identify appropriate criteria for local partner selection as 
well as the relative importance of each criterion. They are divergent depending on firm, 
setting and time. Broadly, the criteria can be classified into three categories related to: (1) 
tasks or operations; (2) partnership or cooperation; and (3) cash flow or capital structure. 
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Operation related criteria are associated with the strategic attributes of partners including 
marketing competence, relationship building, market position, industrial experience, 
strategic orientation and corporate image. Cooperation related criteria often mirror 
organizational attributes such as organizational leadership, organizational rank, 
ownership type, learning ability, foreign experience and human resource skills. Cash flow 
related criteria are generally represented by financial attributes exemplified by 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, and asset management. A partner’s strategic traits 
influence the operational skills and resources needed for the joint venture’s competitive 
success; organizational traits affect the efficiency and effectiveness of inter firm 
cooperation; and financial traits impact the optimization of capital structure and cash 
flow. Conceptually, strategic, organizational, and financial attributes are all crucial to 
international alliance success.  
 
A partner with superior strategic traits, but lacking strong organizational and financial 
characteristics, can results in an unstable strategic alliance. The possession of desirable 
organizational attributes without corresponding strategic and financial competence leaves 
the strategic alliance unprofitable. A partner with superior financial strengths without 
strategic and organizational competencies can lead to an unsustainable venture. From a 
process perspective, the linkage between partner selection and international strategic 
alliance success lies in inter partner fit (Hamel, 1991; Yan & Gray, 1994). While strategic 
attributes may affect strategic fit between partners, organizational traits are likely to 
influence organizational fit and financial attributes will impact financial fit. Figure 6.1 
(page 331) schematically summarises these relationships.  
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The above three-fold classification scheme (strategic, organizational and financial) may 
be of interest to both theory and practice. Although this study uses Malaysia as its 
analytical setting, such scheme and key components may be applicable to other contexts.  
Such classification is imperative because each group affects a different kind of fit 
(strategic, organizational and financial), thus influencing different dimensions of 
international strategic alliance performance. Financial attributes are also important 
because cash flow positions, financial strategies and capital structures of partner firms 
impact the degree of both financial and operational synergies derived from venturing 
activities. The author addressed these variables using an integrative approach with an aim 
to include all relevant attributes that may influence international strategic alliance success 
in the scheme. In the selection process, international managers may use this scheme to 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of the potential partners and to determine whether 
partner attributes fit their own in strategic, organizational, and financial arenas. 
 
Strategic Attributes 
It is important to note that different strategic, organizational and financial traits may have 
a heterogeneous effect on different aspects of international strategic alliances 
performance. Companies need to discern not only partner selection criteria in general but 
also which ones are crucial to their specific strategic goals. The specific performance 
effects include profitability, market growth, cost minimization, stability, risk reduction, 
export growth and the like. The success of international strategic alliances is generally 
measured by the extent to which the participating firm’s strategic goals are achieved.  
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Marketing Competence 
Malaysia has already become a mixed market economy. Government instituted 
distribution, wholesale and retail systems under the present system designed to protect   
indigenous products have been slowly abolished. Instead, competitive pressure from both 
local rivals and other foreign competitors has become increasingly strong in all 
deregulated industries. In this new environment, a Malaysian partner’s marketing 
competencies in distribution channels, promotional skills, knowledge about local 
business practices and relationships with major buyers and relevant governmental 
authorities are fundamentally important for foreign companies seeking market position in 
Malaysia. Perhaps Malaysian firms, entrenched in low cost, low price strategy, would 
want to rethink their strategy for long term survival (Zabid et al. 1999). Shenkar (1990) 
suggests that a foreign company’s technological strengths and a local partner’s marketing 
competence create operational synergies which are mutually beneficial to both parties. 
Luo (1995) observed an importance of such marketing competence, particularly skills in 
personnel direct marketing to the market performance in international strategic alliances.  
Relationship Building  
Foreign companies can gain an edge over their competitors in the Malaysian market if 
they have a network with the business community (e.g., suppliers, buyers, distributors 
and banks) and government authorities (e.g., political governments, industrial 
administration departments, foreign trade and economics commissions). As shown in 
Chapter two, rather than depending on an abstract notion of impartial injustice, Malaysian 
and businesses traditionally prefer to rely on their contacts with those in power to get 
things done. Personal connections and loyalties are often more important than 
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organizational affiliations or legal standards. A local partner’s network constitutes 
strategic assets for all international strategic alliances regardless of their strategic goals, 
orientations or objectives. 
Market Position 
A major objective of foreign investors in the Malaysian market is to exploit market 
opportunities and business potential (Beamish, 1993), so a local partner’s market power 
is a key asset. In Malaysia, market power is often represented by a local partner’s 
industrial and business background, market position and established marketing and 
distribution networks. Market power also enables the firm to influence some industry 
wide restrictions on output, increase bargaining power, and offer the advantages of 
economies of scale (Luo, 1995). Over the last few years, the Malaysian government has 
relinquished control over a growing number of industries. The rapidly expanding 
Malaysian economy, together with high market demand has made market positioning 
extremely important for the success of any business in the country. In such 
circumstances, a Malaysian partner’s market strength is central to the international 
strategic alliance financial return and indigenous market growth. Moreover, strong local 
market power can strengthen the international strategic alliance commitment to local 
market expansion (Park & Ungson, 1997). Furthermore, strong market power can lead to 
greater bargaining power with the local government. This can help reduce political risks 
and business uncertainties (Kobrin, 1982). 
Industrial Experience 
When operating in an emerging economy characterized by relatively weak market 
structure, poorly specified property rights and institutional uncertainty, an international 
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strategic alliance seeking efficiency and growth needs an adaptive orientation, a solid 
supply relationship, comprehensive buyer networks and a good organizational image 
(Luo, 1997). The local partner’s market experience and accumulated industrial 
knowledge are of great value to the realization of these goals. In Malaysia, a local 
partner’s established history and strong background in the industry often result in a good 
reputation or high credibility in the market. Lengthy industrial and market experience 
signifies that the local firm has built an extensive marketing and distribution network, a 
badly needed competence for international market growth. In addition, since Malaysia 
has a stronger relationship oriented culture compared to most industrialized market 
economies, the business activities of international strategic alliance in Malaysia can be 
greatly facilitated by local partners’ connections in the domestic business scene and good 
relations with influential persons. Goodwill and superior contacts constitute country 
specific knowledge or, what the resource based view calls the ‘resource position barrier’ 
(Wernerfelt, 1984) which enhances an international strategic alliances competitive 
advantage, economic efficiency and risk reduction capability. According to Luo (1997), a 
local partner’s industrial experience has a favorable influence on the international market 
growth and operational stability. 
Strategic Orientation 
The strategic orientation (Miles and Snow, 1978) of local firms is important to alliance 
success because how well it matches that of its foreign partner influences inter partner 
consistency in terms of strategic goals and behaviors, cooperative culture and investment 
commitment (Parkhe, 1991). These in turn affect the formulation and implementation of 
technological, operational, financial and managerial policies at various levels including 
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corporate, business, functional and international. As strategic orientation determines 
organizational adaptability and innovativeness, it may affect not only the local firm’s 
strategic but also organizational behaviors such as managerial philosophy and style and 
long term orientation, which may in turn influence mutual trust and collaboration 
between parties. Under this orientation, the partner candidate should be innovative and 
adaptive but not extremely aggressive and risk taking when the market changes. This is 
especially important for organizations facing a rapidly changing environment. Malaysia 
has seen rapid changes in economic and social environments in the last two decades, 
requiring firms to be adaptive and flexible (Sulaiman et al, 1999). 
Corporate Image 
A superior corporate image usually implies a superior product brand, customer loyalty or 
organizational reputation. Corporate image may be unusually critical in Malaysia because 
Malaysian consumers are particularly loyal to the products made by the companies 
maintaining a superior image in the market. For instance, when purchasing household, 
appliances, Malaysian people, similar to consumers elsewhere, tend to attach more 
importance to corporate image, than to the physical attributes of the products (Rokiah; 
1999; Roslin et al. 2000). Therefore, it is imperative for foreign investors to collaborate 
with those Malaysian businesses that have maintained a good organizational reputation 
and product image. This selection will significantly benefit the market power and 
competitive position of the venture in the relevant industry. A superior company image in 
Malaysia also implies better relationships with the local government, as well as with 
suppliers and distributors. These relationships are crucial for firms pursuing a market 
share and competitive position in the industry. In 2004, the Malaysian government     
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decided to reform all government linked companies as part of the reform focus for the 
next five years. It is deemed that a firm with a superior corporate image will be more 
likely to be the leading or core unit in the group. Such business groups which will soon 
become new market driven oligopolists in related industry will become the ideal partner 
for multinational companies in the future. 
Environmental strategy 
The challenges posed by the alliance environmental context to alliance management were 
discussed in Chapter three. These discussions confirm that environmental turbulence 
directly affects alliance management (Glueck 1976; Buttery et al. 1998; Johnson et al. 
1999; Porter 1980; Ohmae 1989; Hamel et al. 1994; Cauley De la Sierra 1995; Doz et al. 
1998; Nohria 1992; DiMaggio et al. 1983). Further, Austin (1990), Kohn et al. (1996) 
and Manning (1999) note that volatility in developing countries makes alliance 
management more difficult. The research reveals that such a volatile environment is 
characterized in Malaysia by the dominance of governmental and socio cultural factors. 
The cases show that only those alliances that develop strategies to cushion the negative 
effects of the alliance environment are able to survive. All cases developed strategies to 
curtail the influence of political interference, a key feature of the socio cultural factor. 
According to Wildeman (1998:97), business strategies that are developed to take into 
account environmental influences are themselves highly influenced by environmental 
factors. As Malaysia progresses toward a developed nation status, Malaysian firms might 
need to focus greater attention on developing strategies consistent with their industry 
environments and in designing appropriate and more sophisticated control systems that 
can be aligned to strategy and environment (Sim et al. 1997). In the design control 
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systems, management needs to emphasize attributes of control system changeability, 





In Chapter three we saw that adequate organizational components and the ability of 
alliance managers to leverage resources and structures are critical to an alliance’s 
success.  Adequate organizational components depend on the partners’ contributions; the 
latter depend in turn on the degree of sufficiency of resources within the alliance 
environment. In developing country contexts, organization components are typically 
poorly resourced, increasing the susceptibility to strategic drift in alliance goals and 
strategic intent (World Bank 1999:202; Kavanumar 2001; Kohn et al. 1996; Turner et al. 
1997; Kotabe et al. 2000; Quang et al.1998). The case studies show that, those that 
achieved a relative degree of success developed organizational strategies that took 
alliance management beyond the formal agreements and focused on the actual 
management of interaction. The cases show that due to Malaysia’s relationship oriented 
culture, personal contact through governance structures enhanced the alliance 
management process. The cases also show that those that inculcated alliance management 
skills at both strategic and operational levels were able to interface effectively. 
Developing communication infrastructures was also vital to alliance management.  
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Leadership is another important aspect of organizational attributes. Leadership in 
Malaysian state owned enterprises is a fairly complicated issue because top level 
management positions are assigned by upper level government authorities. On the other 
hand, leadership is fundamental to alliance success in Malaysia. The relationship with 
leaders often outweighs the contractual terms and clauses agreed upon by both parties to 
an alliance. The leadership of the Malaysian partner also critically influences the 
cooperative culture between the two partners, which in turn affects their mutual trust. In 
addition, the partner’s relationships with the government are largely determined by the 
interpersonal relationship between its management and government officials. These 
personal connections can be the most important factor for an alliance competitive edge, 
especially if the venture has to rely upon the government in acquiring approvals or in 
securing various kinds of support and assistance. As a result of continuous industrial 
decentralization and economic reforms, which further increase the autonomy and 
authority of corporate level managers, the effect of a Malaysian partner’s leadership 
appears to be even more fundamental to the international strategic alliance today.   
Ownership Type 
Economic development in Malaysia has given birth to a new diversity of organizational 
forms. The spectrum spans the continuum from state owned to non state owned 
businesses. A Malaysian partner’s organizational form influences not only its motivations 
for forming an international strategic alliance but also its commitment and contribution to 
operations, which in turn affects the international strategic alliance’s performance. 
During structural reforms in the Malaysian economy characterized by a weak market 
structure, poorly specified property rights, and strong governmental interference, state 
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owned firms have the advantage in gaining access to scarce resources, materials, capital, 
information and investment infrastructure. In addition, state owned organizations due to 
their close ties with the government sometimes have an advantage over privately owned 
firms in terms of industry experience, market power and production and innovation 
facilities. State owned businesses are also treated preferentially by the government when 
selecting market segments. This organizational form may hence facilitate the market 
growth in new domains. For all these reasons, state owned organizations may contribute 
more to an international strategic alliance market expansion than non state owned 
organizations. This is empirically confirmed by Luo (1997) and Edwards (1993). 
Nevertheless, state firms lack self motivation and operational autonomy, while being 
highly vulnerable to bureaucratic red tape. It is reported that over sixty percent of state 
owned enterprises in Malaysia have shown a loss whereas private businesses cannot 
survive if they continuously make losses. International strategic alliances with efficiency 
oriented private partners are thus more likely to enjoy superior returns on investment. 
Learning Ability 
It has been noted in the international strategic alliance literature that complementary 
needs create inter partner fit which is expected to generate a synergistic effect on 
international strategic alliance performance (Buckley & Casson, 1988). However, 
complementarity is not likely to materialize unless certain thresholds of skills are already 
in place. Malaysian businesses generally seek technological, innovational and managerial 
skills from foreign partners. The success of an international strategic alliances operations 
and expansion will largely depend upon its local partner’s learning capability, or its 
ability to acquire, assimilate, integrate and exploit knowledge and skills (Beamish, 1987, 
  366 
Hamel 1991). The firm’s ability to process, integrate and deploy an inflow of new 
knowledge and skills closely depends on how these relate to the skills already established 
(Luo, 1997). This skill based is expected to influence strategic fit and organizational fit 
between alliance partners, which in turn influence the alliance accomplishment in terms 
of both financial and operational synergies.  
Foreign Experience 
A local partner’s previous foreign experience is critical to the success of intercultural and 
cross border ventures. Foreign experience affects the organizational fit between partners 
in the early stages of the alliance and how well they remain matched as the venture 
evolves over time. Because the business atmosphere and commercial practices in a 
developing country are different from those in developed countries, mistrust and 
opportunism have often taken place in the international strategic alliances operations 
(Shenkar, 1990). A Malaysian firm’s foreign experience through import and export 
business or cooperative projects with other foreign investors, proves to be a very 
desirable attribute since this represents superior knowledge, skills and values regarding 
modern management methods. Contact with foreign companies can sharpen sensitivity 
toward competitiveness in the international market. As foreign experience is 
accompanied by exposure to foreign values, it also increases a Malaysian business’s 
ability to effectively communicate with its foreign partner. This acquired knowledge 
stimulates the trust, collaboration and forbearance between partners. As a consequence, a 
Malaysian partner having international experience will contribute more to the alliance 
financial return, risk reduction and sales growth in the domestic as well as export 
markets. This effect is empirically supported by Beamish (1987) and Shenkar (1990).   
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Human Resource Skills 
In international strategic alliances, people with different cultural backgrounds, 
compensation systems and other human resource ‘baggage’ often have to begin working 
together with little advance preparation. Unless the ground has been smoothed, this 
‘people factor’ can halt the alliance progress, sometimes permanently (Cascio & Serapio, 
1991). These skills are reflected not only in blending of cultures and management styles 
with their foreign counterparts, but also in job design, recruitment and staffing, 
orientation and training, performance appraisal, compensation and benefits, career 
development and labour management relations. Among these attributes, the abilities to 
overcome cultural barriers, recruit qualified employees and establish incentive structures 
are particularly imperative. In recent years, foreign companies have encountered 
increasing pressure from local government agencies to hire locally qualified people and 
from labour departments to obey bureaucratic stipulations over human resource 
management. Under these circumstances, a foreign company needs a local partner which 
is skillful in managing the workforce and dealing with unions while externally handling 
labour departments and other governmental authorities. It is important to create a 
corporate culture that contains some aspects of Western management style and is at the 
same time, acceptable to the Malaysian staff.  
Cultural fit (Acculturation) 
Culture significantly affects alliance implementation and performance. The challenges 
faced by alliance managers in developing cultural fit between partners’ organizational 
cultures and with the dominant societal cultures were discussed in Chapter three. The 
analysis of culture at the organizational level and differentiation between Western and 
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developing country cultures have been mainly captured in Hofstede’s Value Survey 
Model undertaken in 1980 and later updated in 1984 (Hofstede 1980, 1997; Hofstede and 
Bond 1984). The works of Trompenaars (1993), Gannon (1984) and Hall (1976) have 
also exemplified the importance of culture in management. In the context of cross 
cultural alliances the work of Elashmawi et al. (1993), Segil (1996) and Lorange et al. 
(1993) highlight the challenges posed by culture. How can the process of acculturation be 
managed? One instrument is to staff key positions with managers who have a high 
intercultural competence. Such “cultural cross border commuters” (Ringlstetter, 1994) 
may support mutual understanding and reduce emotional and cultural conflicts. 
Generally, empirical studies show that decision makers, while concluding strategic 
partnerships, rarely pay enough attention to cultural differences and concentrate more on 
strategic issues. The result may be organizational problems created by unrealistic change 
programs or disappointments in terms of synergies achieved (Vaara, 2000). Thus, alliance 
managers who purposely devised strategies to filter these challenges or blend the positive 
aspects of societal culture with organizational culture were less affected. 
Institutional fit 
Much market activity is arranged through the existence of institutions embedded in 
economics, political and cultural arrangements (Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; North, 
1990). Firms do not have an unlimited array of strategic actions from which to make 
choices. Rather, in order to enhance their likelihood of success, they choose from a 
defined set of legitimate options as determined by economic opportunity, resources and 
institutional forces within an industry and a country or region (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; 
Hoffman, 1999). That is firms are embedded in social frameworks of norms, values and 
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rules of exchange that define appropriate economic behaviour and influence strategic 
choices (Fligstein, 1996). Institutional arrangements can produce entry barriers or create 
opportunities for action. Therefore, institutional arrangements, as reflected in government 
legislation, the nature of property rights and the presence or absence of professional and 
commercial norms of behaviour, determine the boundaries and paths for acceptable 
action. Park and Ungson (1997) argued that the values and norms embedded in the 
institutions could also affect the development and management of strategic alliances. 
Bianchi (2002) showed that a firm’s success with an international strategy was a function 
of its conformity to institutional norms most salient in the local country contexts. Thus, 
institutional arrangements influence the evolution of national economies, organizational 
forms and managerial actions. 
Trust 
Trust is perhaps the foundation of a strategic alliance (Parkhe 1998; Currall and Inkpen 
2002). Without trust during the collaborative process, information exchanged between the 
partners may be low in accuracy (Currall and Judge 1995). A defining characteristic of 
trusting relationships is open and prompt communication among partnering firms. 
Likewise, frequent interactions, the timely exchange of information and accurate 
feedback on each partner’s actions will minimize misperceptions and strengthen 
cooperation in the alliance. At the extreme, when a firm can fully trust its partner, there 
may be no need to control the behaviour of the strategic alliance entity. The presence of 
trust may negate the need for certain controls (Inkpen and Currall 2004). In the 
collectivist Malaysian culture, trust and respect are imperative to ensure success. In 
addition, trust has efficiency implications; trust reduces the probability of loss and 
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enables partners to move forward even though uncertainty in the relationship may remain 
(Nooteboom et al. 1997). Selecting a partner with trust as an expectation, being willing to 
gradually, yet continuously reveal the firm’s strategic goals for the alliance as partners do 
the same and demonstrating patience when expecting partners to become trustworthy are 
important actions (Cullen et al., 2000). Thus, if trust increases and mutual partner 
understanding develops, knowledge about partner systems and ways of doing business 




A local partner’s profitability will directly influence its ability to make a capital 
contribution, fulfill financial commitments and disperse financial resources to the alliance 
(Barrett, 1992). These in turn affect the alliance’s profit margin and wealth accumulation. 
The profitability attribute will also indirectly influence the joint venture’s capital 
structure, financing costs and leverage. In recent years, a sustained tight monetary policy 
reflected in increased interest rates and reduced bank lending and money supply (credit 
crunch) has resulted in liquidity problems for many Malaysian firms, particularly those 
heavily relying on bank loans. As a large proportion of capital contribution by Malaysian 
partners to alliances comes from bank loans, this new measure substantially constrains 
the capacity of Malaysian partners to meet their financial commitments (Ragayah, 1999). 
In sum, lack of profitability of local partner can be symbolic of internal weaknesses in 
financial, technological, operational and managerial areas. 
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Liquidity 
A local partner’s liquidity is critical to alliance operations because it directly affects the 
venture’s ability to pay off short term financial obligations (Susskind, 2005). In the 
international business literature, it is commonly understood that foreign investors attain 
financial synergies from the optimization of operational cash flows. A foreign venture 
can reduce the default risk and uncertainty of operational cash flow, but this depends on 
the correlation of the pre-cooperation cash flow of the two firms. Ideally, in an attempt to 
achieve the maximum financial and operational synergies, two partners should be 
complementary not only in capital structure but also between their financial and 
competitive strengths. Because these issues significantly influence growth and survival in 
international market, investors should attach utmost importance to the liquidity level of 
local firms during the selection process.  
Asset Efficiency 
The asset efficiency of a local partner is critical to the effectiveness of the strategic 
alliance for maximizing return on investment. A partnership with a local firm which 
manages its total assets skillfully and efficiently is surely beneficial to the foreign 
investor either short term profitability or a long term competitive position in the market 
(Kaplan and Hurd, 2002). Asset efficiency has become particularly important for the 
evaluation of Malaysian business performance in recent years because the level of asset 
management mirrors the degree of advancement of managerial skills and the extent of 
effectiveness of corporate administration (Mat Nor, 2003). Although a large local firm 
helps increase the economy of scale and gain better access to capital markets or 
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commercial loans, the net size effect on the firm’s financial and market performance 
virtually relies on asset turnover.  
 
Coping Strategy and Conflict resolution 
The literature on alliance management processes in developing countries indicates that 
organization processes are generally managed as closed systems and that they are often 
not responsive to environmental changes as there is little perspective taking. Process 
management is constrained by ambiguous criteria for performance management and 
organizational goals (Kiggundu, 1990). Process management also has to be undertaken in 
an environment where positive organization culture is still very much fragmented, 
volatile and information void. In response to such environments, Haley et al. (1998:302) 
point out that the predominance of strong relationship cultures acts as a major tool for 
coping strategies. Typical coping strategies in Asian business networks include top 
managers placing emphasis on hands on experience to make fast decisions within minutes 
without the benefit of detailed analysis of hard data; use of qualitative information; 
holistic information processing as analytical models often prove unworkable; action 
driven decision making and emergent planning where strategies bubble up. Such 
strategies are often based on experience based intuitive models rather than analytical 
models where formal data collection and analyses is emphasized. Instead, external 
sources of qualitative information, which is subjective and obtained from business 
associates, government officials whose judgement and character they trust are preferred.  
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Conflict often exists in inter organizational relationships due to the inherent 
interdependencies between parties. Given that a certain amount of conflict is expected, an 
understanding of how such conflict is resolved is important (Borys and Jemison, 1989). 
The impact of conflict resolution on the relationship can be productive or destructive 
(Assael, 1969; Deutsch, 1969). Thus the manner in which partners resolve conflict has 
implications for partnership success. When parties engage in joint problem solving, a 
mutually satisfactory solution may be reached, thereby enhancing partnership success. 
Partners often attempt to persuade each other to adopt particular solutions to the conflict 
situation. These persuasive attempts will generally be more constructive than the use of 
coercion or domination (Deutsch, 1969).  
 
The use of destructive conflict resolution techniques such as domination and 
confrontation is seen as counter productive and is very likely to strain the fabric of the 
partnership. In some partnerships, the method of conflict resolution is institutionalized 
and third party arbitration is sought. While such mediation can be helpful in producing 
beneficial outcomes (Anderson and Narus, 1990), “internal resolution” shows a greater 
promise of long term success (Assael, 1969:580). As a result, smoothing or avoiding fails 
to go to the root cause of the conflict and tends to undermine the partnership’s goal of 
mutual gain. Although this research stressed the importance of reduction of selection 
uncertainty and pointed out organizational mechanisms for reducing it, it is noteworthy 
that complete resolution of selection uncertainty is almost impossible due to bounded 
rationality which refers to cognitive limits of individuals to predict and identify all 
contingencies in decision making (March & Simon, 1958).  
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Strategic alliance success 
The outcome of any strategic alliances cannot be considered in isolation from the 
processes within. The research indicates that all the Malaysian companies studied 
developed strategies either formally or through emergent planning to manage the alliance 
environment, organizational components, alliance culture and alliance processes. 
However, developing a model of partnership success begs the question of what 
partnership success means. Although success in strategic partnerships might be viewed as 
a function of continuation (Harrigan, 1988) relationship longevity may not accurately 
capture partnership success. Some partnerships are purposively dissolved after a period of 
time (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989). In this model, an affective measure (satisfaction 
of one party with the other) is used. The affective indicator (satisfaction) is based on the 
notion that success is determined in part by how well the partnership achieves the 
performance expectations set by the partners (Anderson and Narus, 1990). A partnership 
which generates satisfaction exists when performance expectations have been achieved.  
 
6.4  Implications for policy and practice 
Implications for policy and practice abound. The research findings could be used to 
formulate alliance management strategies for new strategic alliances in both developed 
and developing countries. At the same time alliance managers could directly use the 
findings derived therein for realigning strategic intent to managing relationship, control, 
culture and environment in order to avoid strategic drift. Findings are also specifically 
useful for deriving strategic and operational fit. Overall, the thesis has provided a new 
model of alliance practice based on the theoretical underpinnings of the strategic 
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alliances, organizational and financial fit approaches as well as on the practical 
experiences of alliance management in Malaysia. The model also offers insights into how 
alliance managers develop coping and conflict resolution strategies to survive the 
idiosyncratic environment in Malaysia and in other developing countries. A pertinent 
policy lesson has to be the need to elevate management education in Malaysia, where 
there should be a clear shift away from old management principles shrouded with various 
idiosyncratic and bureaucratic policies to management principles based on current and 
flexible specialisation. Addressing this concern could result in an increased availability of 
potential alliance managers in the country. The findings from this thesis offer a good start 
to the design of alliance management education in Malaysia in view of the liberalization 
of the Malaysian economy. An appreciation of the relationship oriented and high culture 
context of the Malaysia environment goes a long way towards educating alliance 
managers about the challenges and about the appropriate strategies that they should 
adopt. 
 
The other managerial implication to be drawn from this research relate to the manner in 
which partners attempt to manage the future scope and tone of their relationship. Trust, 
commitment, communication quality, joint planning and joint problem resolution all 
serve to better align partners’ expectations, goals and objectives. These factors all 
contribute to partnership success. The challenge, however, lies in developing a 
management philosophy or corporate culture in which independent and autonomous 
trading parties can relinquish some sovereignty and control while also engaging in 
planning and organizing which takes into account the needs of the other party. Such an   
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abdication of control and autonomy does not come easily but appears to be a necessary 
managerial requirement for the future. While it would seem that similarities across 
organizational cultures would improve the probability of partnership success (Harrigan, 
1988) such compatibility cannot be ensured. In many cases, differences in culture, 
operating procedures and practices become apparent only during the course of the 
partnership. Effort must be devoted to the formation and implementation of management 
strategies that promote and encourage the continued growth and maintenance of the 
partnership.  
 
The other important implication derived from this research is the importance of 
institutional effects on strategic alliance partner selection. Importantly, it suggests that 
multinational firms need to adapt their approaches for establishing alliances in separate 
countries. In particular, they should understand that local firms in various emerging 
market countries are likely to have different needs and seek different types of partners for 
strategic alliances. All emerging economies are not equal. The partner selection process 
may be particularly sensitive to differences in institutional environments (Newman, 
2000). Given the results of this research and previous work on partner selection (Hill et 
al. 2000) multinational firms entering alliances with local emerging markets firms must 
consider the partner’s needs as well as their own, while understanding the institutional 
environment if the alliance is to be successful.  
 
The research also suggests that the Malaysian economy reform process has been quite 
successful. Malaysian firms emphasize long term acquisition and development of a range 
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of technology capabilities to improve their competitiveness. Of particular importance to 
Malaysia is the establishment of a viable financial system and capital market, requiring 
extensive development of a range of financial service providers. Malaysian firms must 
also continue to build their resources and capabilities and remain focused on the long 
term. They must be careful to develop trusting and stable relationships with foreign 
multinationals so that they feel comfortable in transferring knowledge necessary for the 
Malaysian firms to build internal capabilities.  The incumbent stability in the Malaysian 
institutional environment thus may override cultural influences in this instance.  
 
The saliency of institutional environment stability has important implications for policy 
makers who can raise or weaken their countries’ economic appeal to foreign investors. 
One dimension of raising such appeal would be to create a climate within which foreign 
and local firms can prosper (North, 1991). Needless to say, policy makers ought to 
exercise prudent discretion in shaping their national stance towards foreign investment 
climate, trading openness and intellectual property protection. Other factors such as 
availability of skilled labour and market size are relatively quasi-discretionary, albeit still 
within policy makers’ spheres of influence (Porter, 1990). A careful execution of such 
policies could economize on the costs of ‘location tournaments’ (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992) which governments often host to attract foreign investment.  Foreign investors 
have been attracted to Malaysia by its economic and political stability as well as packages 
of investment incentives. However, there is evidence that many investors have not found 
the environment to be as conducive to doing business as they had anticipated (Edwards, 
1993). It is clear that the role of the host government in creating and maintaining a 
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favourable business environment is very much an ongoing one if societal objectives are 
to be realized.   
 
Data analysis also revealed the growing importance of selection and training for partner 
interface and alliance management. Some of the firms invest quite heavily in training 
including the need to appreciate the differences of managing to compete and managing to 
cooperate. Selection procedures are important because some types of individuals are 
considered inappropriate for such roles even though they may be intrinsically good 
managers. In that context, this study found that staff rotation through different parts of the 
business, including overseas postings and cultural exposure, was important. This was to 
ensure that they see every aspect of the company, including using the opportunity of an 
overseas post to perceive the company more from the perspective of a partner and learn 
something as a result. The more the company is able to do this, the more it is able to build 
a group of people who will be adept at managing the elements of the strategic alliances.  
This builds on Zajac and Olsen’s (1993) notion of transaction value, and is related to 
other work that has noted the advantage of thinking through some issues related to 
alliances in ways other than minimizing transaction costs (Dyer, 1997; Madhok and 
Tallman, 1998). 
 
Finally, consideration should be given to succession planning in alliance management. It 
should be acknowledged that personnel changes can have a significant impact on the 
alliance and parent firms and incumbent alliance managers should carefully plan for 
management succession in order to minimize disruption to alliance performance. This 
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research also presents one important implication for the current literature on alliance 
formation; while previous research taking the embeddedness approach has emphasized 
that concrete personal relations provided a condusive frame for economic exchange 
(Larson, 1992, p.84), this research has found that there indeed exist variations in the 
strength of ties out of which firms form alliances. Not all inter organizational relations 
and alliances were built upon a long history of interactions and strong personal rapport, 
some emerged out of cold calls or circumstantial ties that involved no or limited prior 
interaction. This finding is consistent with an emerging argument in the embedded 
approach claiming that researchers should treat embeddedness not only as an academic 
program but also as a variable to be explored (Block, 1990, DiMaggio & Louch, 1998; 
Granovettar, 1995; Uzzi, 1996). While Malaysia and foreign companies share many 
features, clear differences stem from their different socio cultural grounding.  
 
This study identified a clear mismatch between what the Malaysian companies would 
have liked to do and what they were able to do in managing their relationships with 
foreign partners. Also, and contrary to a priori expectations, the profiles and individual 
characteristics of the executives involved seemed to play a greater role than the profile of 
the companies. Alliances among culturally different partners are another complex 
phenomenon that requires a multidisciplinary approach. At the same time, the research 
also found that cross cultural training and exposure enhances alliance management. The 
importance of culture in management has been emphasized in the work of Hofstede 
(1997), Trompenaars (1993), Hall (1976), Gannon (1984) and Peters et al. (1982). 
Managerially, such research offers insight into how to proactively manage partnerships in 
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order to reap the benefits of success, and to avoid the damaging costs inherent in their 
failure. These contributions are important to management scholars and executives of 
multinationals as well as to firms domiciled in developing countries. 
 
6.5     Limitations 
The findings from this research, as in all research, must be tempered by the limitations of 
the study. Clearly, the findings are contingent upon the context and the type of 
partnerships studied, in this case, partnership between Malaysian companies and their 
partners. The general applicability of these results across a broad range of strategic 
partnerships is possibly limited. In addition, data were collected from only one side of the 
partnership. The Malaysian partners’ perception remains unknown. Data were collected 
from only a single informant from the Malaysian companies’ organization. While use of a 
single informant met Campbell’s (1955) criteria, it is clear that these respondents were 
providing their individual perceptions of organizational level phenomena. The findings 
are limited to those alliances studied and it is therefore left to readers to familiarize 
themselves with other cases and to draw their own inferences about other strategic 
alliances in different contexts and industries. Furthermore, since the qualitative data was 
gathered from firms in a single country and only in a number of industries and 
organizations, the findings cannot be generalized without restriction. 
 
Despite this, the research did not incorporate the clientele into the study so as to complete 
a holistic evaluation of alliances as propounded by Feng et al. (2004) and Brief et al. 
(2003).  Budgetary and time limitations confined the author to only Malaysian firms and 
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it was necessary to rely on documentary evidence to gauge the views of customers. 
Another limitation is that the research relies solely on Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) 
dimensions to measure cultural differences. These dimensions have often been used (see 
Chandy and Williams (1994); Hickson (1996) but Hofstede’s work has also been 
criticized (Roberts and Boyacigiller, 1984) and Triandis 1982). For instance, using 
countries as a unit of analysis to address cultural differences is an obvious simplification 
because cultural differences do not strictly follow country borders. Future studies using 
other measures of cultural differences will add to the present study. Finally, due to the 
agreements with the interviewees, organizational and alliance information cannot be 
disclosed. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that firms have different alliance 
strategies and that, the contents of knowledge or resources to be exchanged shape the 
formation of alliances. Granovetter (1995) for instance, argued that both business 
strategies and management orientations determine ways by which firms form alliances 
through personal networks, then it is reasonable to suppose close connections between 
business strategies and activation of the relational mechanism. In addition, the reduction 
in selection uncertainty would be contingent upon what allying firms exchange and how 
they exchange it. 
 
6.6          Implications for further research.   
This research has contributed to a general effort worldwide aimed at deciphering the 
causes of the high failure rates of strategic alliances, which is currently sixty to seventy 
per cent within the first year of business (Rackham et al. 1996; Wildeman 1998; Cauley 
De La Sierra 1995) and forty to fifty per cent within five years (Bleeke et al. 1993). By 
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focusing on the role of partner selection in alliance management, the thesis has satisfied 
(Doz and Hamel, 1998; Geringer 1991; Gulati 1998; Hitt et al. 2000; 2004; Parkhe 2003) 
concerns that although it was clear a major cause of alliance failure was partner selection, 
little has been known about how firms form alliances and more importantly about the 
influence of institutional environment on the strategic actions of firms (i.e., selection of 
strategic alliance partners). This study suggests several future research questions. For 
example, how do firms identify prospective alliance partners that have the needed 
resources and capabilities? Future research should address how strategic alliances can be 
managed successfully to ensure that both partners’ needs are satisfied through the alliance 
(Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2002). Do differences in the way local firms navigate the 
institutional environment affect their success in strategic alliances and their 
competitiveness in their markets? Do the preferred intangible assets vary with the 
institutional environment and how do they acquire them from alliance partners?  
 
The research has also plugged a major gap in alliance partner selection research in 
Malaysia in that it is the first empirical study of its kind. In terms of its contribution to the 
discipline of strategic alliance, the research has incrementally added to the corpus of 
knowledge by offering a holistic conceptual model for strategic alliance management 
and, in particular, this conceptualization has been undertaken in the context of a 
developing country. In such contexts where environments are complex, resource deficient 
and highly information void, alliance managers commonly adopt coping strategies to 
prevent strategic drift and drive strategic choice, a practice not common in developed 
countries where conditions are relatively conducive. However, having made the above 
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contribution, future research along the positivistic paradigm is required to further extend 
the frontiers of knowledge in strategic alliances and to generalize statistically the 
findings. Such research should not only focus on several industries in Malaysia but also 
draw from a cross section of industries. 
 
The findings from this exploratory research offer avenues for follow up studies enhancing 
our knowledge of Malaysian and foreign partnerships. Strategic alliances during 
Malaysia’s transition toward becoming a fully developed and industrialized nation by the 
year 2020 present their own peculiarities that make them a new phenomenon within 
management research. Taking cognizance of the complexity and dynamism of strategic 
alliances process associated with Malaysia’s rapid industrialization, the author believes 
that future research should be guided towards dissecting the extent of technology imports 
into the country; the relative significance of local firms in the utilization of imported 
technology; the development of inter-firm technology flows from foreign firms in 
Malaysia to local firms; the impact of institutions governing technology appropriation on 
the extent and form of transfer activities; and the extent of success achieved by local 
firms in acquiring best practiced technology.  
 
International alliances and cooperative arrangements form the economic framework of 
technology transfer (Contractor and Sadafi, 1981; Marton, 1986; Robinson, 1988). 
Economic liberalization in Malaysia exacerbates this concern with technological 
advancement. The need to develop existing capabilities and to accumulate new 
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knowledge is becoming critical for Asian companies in an increasingly global market 
(Pananond and Zeithami, 1998; Tsang, 1999).  
 
While firms are the critical agent for the creation and implementation of innovations, the 
long term sustainability of innovative efforts depends very much on the institutional 
network in which they are embedded. The institutions that shape innovation include not 
only specialized technology policies and organizations, however, but also the broader 
rules and structures that affect firms’ investment incentives (Jomo and Rasiah, 1999). 
Industrial competitiveness in Malaysia has been achieved through domestic capability 
building rather than mere exposure to external competition. Government intervention has 
particularly been significant in averting potential market failures where information 
asymmetry, scale economies, learning effects and public goods characteristics had been 
involved. One good example is Singapore. Singapore’s successful industrialization 
involved a high degree of strategic intervention through a range of policy instruments, 
combined with specific changes in strategies and networks (Jomo and Rasiah, 1999; Sim 
and Pandian, 2003).  
 
In general, however, effective state-business coordination helped minimize both 
government and market failures. It should be noted that, whereas technical progress is 
central to economic growth, its contribution to Malaysia’s rapid industrialization success 
is complex and difficult to measure with certainty. The debate about the contribution of 
productivity growth to East Asian economic success underscores this point (Krugman 
1994). It is thus vital to study the prospects for and extent of absorption of technology by 
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firms operating in Malaysia. Also, since we lack a clear understanding of the 
phenomenon, it makes more sense to map key concepts and relationships than to 
undertake detailed quantitative analysis (Hamel, 1991; Parkhe 1993; Prahalad, 2004; 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Government shareholdings in top 19 listed companies, 2003 
 
 
Name    Industry    Market    Government 
       C a p i t a l i z a t i o n    s h a r e h o l d i n g  
       (RM  million)   (per  cent) 
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Malayan  Banking   Banking     30  783    70 
 
Tenaga  Nasional   Generation,  transportation   27  695    89 
   and  distribution  of  electricity 
 
Telekom  Malaysia  Telecommunications   24  582    88 
 
Malaysia  International  Shipping   14  228    85 
Shipping Corporation 
 
Maxis  Communications  Telecommunications   14  093    5 
 
Petronas  Gas   Natural  Gas    13  851    95 
 
Plus Expressways    Operation of tolled     12 150      88 
   Expressways 
 
Sime Darby    Plantations, tyre manufacturing  11 864      58 
   heavy  equipment  and  motor   
   vehicle  distribution,  property, 
   energy,  general  trading  and   
   s e r v i c e s  
 
Public  Bank   Financial  Banking  11  537    8 
 
British America    Manufacture, import and sale  11 208      23 
Tobacco Malaysia  of cigarettes and other tobacco   
   products 
  
Resorts  World   Tourist  resort  operations  at 9608    n.a   
   Genting  Highlands,  covering 
   Leisure  and  hospitality 
 
Genting    Leisure  and  hospitality,  gaming  9438    n.a 
   and  entertainment,  plantations, 
   property  development/management 
   tours  and  travel,  investments, 
   manufacturing  and  trading  in  paper   
   oil  and  gas 
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YTL  Power   Power  generation,  sales  of   6752    13 
International    water, water treatment, disposal  
of waste water 
 
Hong  Leong  Bank Financial  banking    6485    5 
 
IOI  Corporation   Cultivation/processing  of   5495    3 
   Oil  palm  and  rubber,  property 
   Development 
 
YTL  Corporation   Power  generation,  construction  5309    25 
   Manufacturing  and  trading  of   
   Industrial  products,  property 
   Development,  hotel  operation 
   Sales  of  water,  water  treatment, 
   Disposal  of  waste  water 
 
Nestle  Malaysia   Manufacture,  marketing  and  4807    21   
   Sale  of  food  products 
 
Malaysian  Airline National  Airline    4587    79   
System 
 
Total  Bursa  Malaysia      491  198    25 
Market capitalization 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Selected Malaysian business regulations and conditions 
 
Corporate income tax  28 per cent. Businesses operating in the petroleum industry 
pay 38 per cent 
 
Capital gains tax  None on the portfolio investment. 5 to 30 per cent on property 
 
Withholding tax  10 per cent on special classes of income; 15 per cent on 
interest; 10 per cent on royalties; 10 per cent for a contract 
payment on an account of contractor; 3 per cent for a contract 
payment on an account of employee 
 
Personal income tax  1 to 28 per cent for resident individuals on taxable income of 
RM 30 000 and above per annum; 28 per cent for non resident 
individuals 
 
General sales tax  5 per cent on fruits, certain foods, building materials and 
selected services; 20 per cent on alcohol; 25 per cent on 
cigarettes; 10 per cent on all other types of goods. A goods 
and services tax will be introduced on 1 January 2007. 
 
Import duties  Tariff exemptions are available on raw materials, components, 
machinery and equipment not produced locally. For 
exemption on spares and consumables, businesses must also 
export 80 per cent of production and the tariff must exceed 5 
per cent. Duty drawback is available for exported goods. 
 
Excise duties  10 to 100 per cent levied on selected manufactured goods. 
Piece rates on alcohol and cigarettes. 
 
Social security/payroll tax  No unemployment benefits. Employee Provident Fund, 
currently 20 per cent of employee salaries, provides retirement 
benefits. 11 per cent paid by the employer, 9 per cent paid by 
the employee. Compulsory. 
 
Foreign exchange controls  Limits on ringgit payments and currency held by travelers; 
payments for imports must be made in foreign currency; 
investment abroad typically limited to 10 per cent of funds 
invested by resident clients; ringgit lending to non residents 
limited to RM 10 million. 
 
Labour supply  Foreign workers are an important source of cheap, low skilled 
labour. 
 
Staff overtime/bonuses  8 hour day, 48 hour week; Overtime pay is one and a half 
times the hourly rate of pay on normal working days; twice the 
hourly rate of pay on rest days and three times the hourly rate 
of pay on public holidays. 
 
Staff leave  60 days maternity leave, up to 16 days annual leave per year 
and up to 22 days sick leave per year, depending on length of 
service. Up to 60 days paid sick leave where hospitalization is 
necessary. 
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Staff dismissal  Malaysian workers typically cushioned from dismissal 
because foreign workers are easier to dismiss. 
 
Employee health cover  Available for workers earning wages not exceeding RM 2000 
per month. Employers contribute 1.25 per cent of employees’ 
wages to the Employment Injury Insurance Scheme. 
Employers and employees each contribute 0.5 per cent of 
employees’ wages to the Invalidity Pension Scheme. 
Maximum contribution is based on wages of RM 2000. 
 
Labour issues  Shortage of scientists and teachers. 
 
Skills development  A key priority of the Malaysian Government; Manufacturers 
contribute to the Human Resources Development Fund which 
qualifies them for a training grant. Levies vary according to 
firm size. 
 
Accounting principles  International accounting standards 
 
Foreign land ownership  Ownership of agricultural land allowed under certain 
conditions 
 
Banking services  Well-developed banking sector with some commentators 
suggesting Malaysia is “over-banked”. Strong Islamic banking 
sector 
 
Stock/financial markets  20
th largest stock exchange in the world 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
The Multimedia Super Corridor 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), designed to be a global ICT and multimedia hub, 
encompasses the area from Kuala Lumpur City Centre through Cyberjaya, Putrajaya and 
out to Kuala Lumpur International Airport. 
 
To receive the benefits of working in the Multimedia Super Corridor, businesses must 
first qualify for MSC status. To qualify, applicants must be a provider or heavy user of 
multimedia products and services; employ a substantial number of knowledge workers; 
provide technology transfer and /or contribute towards the development of the MSC or 
support Malaysia’s knowledge economy initiatives; establish a separate legal entity for 
the MSC-qualifying multimedia business and activities; locate in a MSC-designated 
cybercity (Cyberjaya, Technology Park Malaysia, UPM-MTDC, KLCC and Menara KL); 
and comply with environmental guidelines. Manufacturing, trading and consultancy 
services are not eligible for MSC status. 
 
Active MSC status companies include Sun Microsystems, Intel, Oracle, Siemens, HSBC, 
NTT and Fujitsu. Australian businesses operating in the MSC include Flaming Pear, 
Technology One Corporation, MYOB Asia, Learned Solutions, World Net Services, 
Lembaran Pegun, Cissa Communications, Optimiser Digital Management and Runge 
Malaysia. Australian Firms also are involved with 21 other businesses in the MSC, 
covering everything from game development to risk analysis software. 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
THE MALAYSIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MIDA) 
 
The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, more commonly known as MIDA, is 
the government’s principal agency for the promotion and coordination of industrial 
development. It is the first point of contact for investors who intend to set up projects in 
manufacturing or related manufacturing support services sectors in Malaysia. Although 
MIDA is not authorized to approve investment outside manufacturing, senior government 
representatives from Finance, Human Resources, Immigration, Customs, Environment, 
Occupational Safety and Health, Tenaga Nasional and Telekom Malaysia are stationed at 
MIDA’s headquarters in Kuala Lumpur to advise investors on government policies and 
procedures. 
 
The major functions of MIDA are to promote foreign and local investment in 
manufacturing and related services, undertake planning for industrial development in 
Malaysia and recommend to the Minister of International Trade and Industry policies and 
strategies on industrial promotion and development. MIDA also evaluates applications 
for establishing a business, tax incentives and expatriate posts for operational 
headquarters, regional distribution centres, international procurement centres, 
representatives offices and regional offices, incentives for promoted manufacturing 
activities, tourism, R&D, training institutions and software development, manufacturing 
licenses, expatriate posts required by manufacturing projects and tariffs protection/duty 
exemptions for raw materials, components and machinery. 
 
To help business, MIDA facilitates new and existing companies in the implementation 
and operation of their projects, offers assistance through direct consultation and 
cooperation with the relevant authorities at both the Federal and State levels and 
facilitates the exchange of information and coordination among institutions engaged in or 
connected with, industrial development. 
 
The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority is headquartered in Kuala Lumpur and 
has offices in Johor Bahru, Kuala Terengganu, Alor Star, Kuantan, Kota Bharu, Ipoh, 
Bandar Melaka, Kota Kinabalu, Pulau Pinang and Kuching. They also have international 
offices in Sydney, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Jose, Cologne, 
London, Milan, Paris, Stockholm, Osaka, Seoul, Shanghai, Taipei and Tokyo. 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
SELECTED FACTOR COSTS, MALAYSIA 
 
Electricity 
  Commercial tariffs, per kWh      RM0.10 – RM0.40 
 Industrial  tariffs,  per  kWh     RM0.10  –  RM0.40 
 Minimum  charge  per  month    RM10.00  –  RM1000.00 
 
Water 
  Per  cubic  metre      RM0.52  –  RM2.96 
 Minimum  charge      RM0.00  –  RM30.00 
 
Sewerage, per month 
  Domestic      RM2.00  –  RM8.00 
 Industrial,  per  head     RM2.00  –  RM2.50 
 Commercial      RM8.00  –  RM9975.00 
 
Telecommunications 
  Rental charges, per month       RM13.00 – RM45.00 
 Domestic  call  charges  per  minute    RM0.04  –  RM0.90 
  International call charges per minute    RM0.90 – RM2.40 
 
Internet service fees 
  Dial-up call charge per minute      RM0.03  
 Broadband  per  month     RM44.00  –  RM1188.00 
  Digital leased line – normal, annual charge    RM10800 – RM636 000 
  Digital leased line – Multimedia      RM9600 – RM548 400 
 
Rent, per month 
  Prime office space, per m square      RM12.95 – RM67.20 
  Factory space, per foot square    RM0.35  –  RM2.00 
  Industrial land, selling price foot square    RM0.46 – RM22.00 
 
Freight 
  Road, 20 foot container, per metric ton 
 Per  km  laden      RM0.06  –  RM0.20 
 Air,  per  kg      RM4.45  –  RM23.87 
 Sea,  per  20  foot  container     RM380  –  RM24  966 
 
Allowances on qualifying capital expenditure  Initial allowances (allowances given only 
once) range from 10 per cent for industrial 
buildings to 40 per cent for environmental 
control equipment. Annual allowances 
(allowances given every year) range from 3 
per cent for industrial buildings to 40 per 
cent for computer and information 
technology equipment. 
 









The Malaysian Economy: Comparing the Recessions of 1985-86 and 1997-98 
 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND RISKS 
1985 1998 
Economy small (nominal GDP of US$31.2 billion) and 
vulnerable to external shocks 
Economy much larger (nominal GDP of US$71.1 billion) 
and fundamentally stronger 
Economy open with exports at 49.1% of GDP, but 
concentrated in commodities (66.7% of total exports) 
Economy more open, with exports at 102.9% of GDP, but 
risks shifted to manufacturing (82.9% of gross exports) 
especially electronics (39.8% of gross exports) 
Inflation low at 0.4%  Inflation much higher at 5.3% 
Unemployment of 6.9%, no pressure on inflation  Full employment, with foreign labour at about 10% of 
total employment, exerting inflationary pressures 
Weak fiscal position-large fiscal deficit (peak of 16.9% of 
GDP in 1982, public sector deficit was 18% in 1982). 
Revenue base was dependent on export taxes, and 
expenditure was focused on heavy industries. Deficit was 
reduced to 0.6% of GDP in 1985. 
Strong fiscal position-fifth year of fiscal surplus in 1997 
(2.4% of GDP). Revenue was broad based, and 
expenditure had been directed mainly to education, health 
and infrastructure. Still in surplus in 1997 (2.4% of GDP) 
but moved to deficit of 1.8% of GDP in 1998 to stimulate 
recovery.  
Public sector engine of growth, accounted for 46.9% of 
investment (nominal) and 22.7% of consumption 
(nominal) 
Public sector important in recovery process. Share of 
public investment amounted to 44.1% (nominal) and 
consumption to 20.9% (nominal). 
External sector weak with current account deficit high at 
2.1% of GDP, attributable to high consumption and high 
government expenditure. 
Current account surplus at 12.9% of GDP due mainly to 
export growth and declining imports 
High external debt in 1986 (75.6% of GNP), mainly by 
public sector (64.9% of GNP) and high debt service ration 
(DSR) of 18.9% 
Low external debt of 60.9% of GNP and DSR of 6.7% 
due to improved debt management and prepayments. 
Public sector debt low at 26% GNP. 
Exchange rate stable, fluctuating between 
US$1=RM2.41-2.60. No change in exchange rate policy, 
but the rate depreciated following realignment of yen/US$ 
rate under Plaza Accord. 
Extreme volatility of exchange rates breaching intra day 
trading levels of RM3.35 to 4.88 between January and 
August. Fixed exchange rate regime adopted on 
September 2.  
Basic thrust of monetary policy generally expansionary to 
revive economic growth in the face of serious budgetary 
restraints and declining commodity prices. 
Tight monetary policy stance in late 1997 to address 
emerging inflation in early 1998, and to restore stability in 
the foreign exchange markets. Monetary policy gradually 
relaxed as inflation eased, to support economic recovery. 
Loans to private sector equivalent to 85.2% of GDP. 
Growth was fuelled through expansionary fiscal policy. 
Domestic loans to private sector much higher at 148.4% 
of GDP. 
Authorised deposit taking cooperatives that were 
relatively less regulated, and illegal deposit takers 
proliferated. Regulated banking sector in early stage of 
observing new prudential regulations. Several banking 
institutions experienced large losses, arising from 
imprudent lending, poor management and fraud in certain 
cases. 
Comprehensive regulatory and supervisory framework for 
licensed banking institutions, with provisions to extend 
purview of BNM to other financial institutions when 
required to preserve financial stability. Stronger banking 
system and prudential standards largely in line with 
international standards. 
Capital adequacy ratio of 7.5% at the end of 1985, NPL of 
30.1% at the end of 1988 based on the 12 month 
classification. 
At end 1998, RWCR of 11.8%; NPLs of 7.6% (net) and 
12.6% (gross) under the six month classification. 
By the end of 1989, four commercial banks and eight 
finance companies rehabilitated through capital injection 
or assumption of control by BNM and placed under 
receivership prior to absorption by a larger banking 
institution. 
Comprehensive bank restructuring plan implemented. For 
further details, please refer to “Restructuring the Banking 
Sector”. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report, 1998 and 1999 
 
 
 
 